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NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Four

This is Volume Four of a set of six reports produced by NASA and other organizations which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The Technical Documents included in this volume are: Appendix F.1 Water Absorption by Foam; Appendix F.2 Follow the TPS; Appendix F.3 MADS Sensor Data; Appendix F.4 ET Cryoinsulation; Appendix F.5 Space Shuttle STS-107 Columbia Accident Investigation, and External Tank Working Group Final Report - Volume 1.

CRYOINSULATION↗
NASA NTRS2004

Test and Analysis Correlation of Form Impact onto Space Shuttle Wing Leading Edge RCC Panel 8

Soon after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) began their study of the space shuttle Columbia accident, "physics-based" analyses using LS-DYNA were applied to characterize the expected damage to the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) leading edge from high-speed foam impacts. Forensic evidence quickly led CAIB investigators to concentrate on the left wing leading edge RCC panels. This paper will concentrate on the test of the left-wing RCC panel 8 conducted at Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) and the correlation with an LS-DYNA analysis. The successful correlation of the LS-DYNA model has resulted in the use of LS-DYNA as a predictive tool for characterizing the threshold of damage for impacts of various debris such as foam, ice, and ablators onto the RCC leading edge for shuttle return-to-flight.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-Wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

The Space Shuttle fleet has been grounded since the Columbia accident. As a result, 'Return to Flight' has become not just a phrase but a program and the global of virtually everyone associated with NASA. Even those who are not affiliated with the Shuttle Program are looking forward to the safe and successful completion of the next Shuttle mission. In this recovery process, NASA will be guided by the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The CAIB was an investigating body, convened by NASA Administrator O'Keefe the day of the Columbia accident, according to procedures established after the loss of Space Challenger.

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗
NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle

This viewgraph presentation summarizes changes to the Space Shuttle Propulsions Systems made for the Return to Flight in response to the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The presentation also includes an overivew of the Columbia debris recovery effort.

Roberts, Lisa↗
NASA NTRS2004

Improving Performance of the System Safety Function at Marshall Space Flight Center

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that organizational and management issues were significant contributors to the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the CAIB observed similarities between the organizational and management climate that preceded the Challenger accident and the climate that preceded the Columbia accident. To prevent recurrence of adverse organizational and management climates, effective implementation of the system safety function is suggested. Attributes of an effective system safety program are presented. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) system safety program is analyzed using the attributes. Conclusions and recommendations for improving the MSFC system safety program are offered in this case study.

Kiessling, Ed↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Three

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAIB) independent investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia produced a six volume report. This is Volume III of the report. Volume III contains other technical documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the CAIB in support of its inquiry into the tragedy. Technical documents included in the report are: Appendix E.1 CoFR Endorsements; Appendix E.2 STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report; Appendix E.3 An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the 'Flight Day 2', Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107; Appendix E.4 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report.

STS-107↗
NASA NTRS2006

An Overview of Spray-On Foam Insulation Applications on the Space Shuttle's External Tank: Foam Applications and Foam Shedding Mechanisms

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the cause of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel No. 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. The CAIB conclusion has spawned numerous studies to identify the cause of and factors influencing foam shedding and foam debris liberation from the External Tank during ascent. The symposium on the Thermo-mechanics and Fracture of Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On Foam Insulation is a collection of presentations that discuss the physics and mechanics of the ET SOFI with the objective of improving analytical and numerical methods for predicting foam thermo-mechanical and fracture behavior. This keynote presentation sets the stage for the presentations contained in this symposium by introducing the audience to the various types of SOFI applications on the Shuttle s External Tank and by discussing the various mechanisms that are believed to be the cause of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space

Sullivan, Roy M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗
NASA NTRS2009

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations (M and S): Development Process and Rationale

After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report. the NASA Administrator at that time chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify the CAIB report elements with Agency-wide applicability, and to develop corrective measures to address each element. This report documents the chronological development and release of an Agency-wide Standard for Models and Simulations (M&S) (NASA Standard 7009) in response to Action #4 from the report, "A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, January 30, 2004".

Zang, Thomas A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.

Chandler, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Summary of the Space Shuttle Columbia Tragedy and the Use of LS Dyna in the Accident Investigation and Return to Flight Efforts

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry resulting in loss of 7 crewmembers and craft. For the next several months an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA concluded in August, 2003 that the cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the missions launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. In order to gain a better understanding the foam impact on the orbiters RCC wing leading edge, a multi-center team of NASA and Boeing impact experts was formed to characterize the foam and RCC materials for impact analysis using LS Dyna. Dyna predictions were validated with sub-component and full scale tests. LS Dyna proved to be a valuable asset in supporting both the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA s return to flight efforts. This paper summarizes Columbia Accident and the nearly seven month long investigation that followed. The use of LS-DYNA in this effort is highlighted. Contributions to the investigation and return to flight efforts of the multicenter team consisting of members from NASA Glenn, NASA Langley, and Boeing Philadelphia are introduced and covered in detail in papers to follow in these proceedings.

Melis, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Columbia Accident Investigation and The NASA Glenn Ballistic Impact Laboratory Contributions Supporting NASA's Return to Flight

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry, resulting in loss of the vehicle and its seven crewmembers. For the next several months, an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA, concluded in August, 2003 that the most likely cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the mission's launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing, which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. The findings of the CAIB were supported by ballistic impact tests, which simulated the physics of External Tank Foam impact on the RCC wing leading edge material. These tests ranged from fundamental material characterization tests to full-scale Orbiter Wing Leading Edge tests. Following the accident investigation, NASA spent the next 18 months focused on returning the shuttle safely to flight. In order to fully evaluate all potential impact threats from the many debris sources on the Space Shuttle during ascent, NASA instituted a significant impact testing program. The results from these tests led to the validation of high-fidelity computer models, capable of predicting actual or potential Shuttle impact events, were used in the certification of STS-114, NASA s Return to Flight Mission, as safe to fly. This presentation will provide a look into the inner workings of the Space Shuttle and a behind the scenes perspective on the impact analysis and testing done for the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA's Return to Flight programs. In addition, highlights from recent Shuttle missions are presented.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Investigations of Shuttle Main Landing Gear Door Environmental Seals

The Columbia Accident investigation Board (CAIB) requested an investigation into the MLG door seals. Initially, the MLG door seals were thought to have been a potential contributor to the loss of Columbia. These suspicions were later found to be untrue, but the seals remained as a cause for concern in future flights. MLG door seals comprised of thermal barrier and environmental seal. This study focuses on the environmental seal for the MLG door.

Finkbeiner, Joshua↗
NASA NTRS2011

Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as it returned to Earth from a 16-day science mission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at [http://www.caib.us]) on August 26, 2003, concluding that the tragedy was caused by technical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Board specified must be completed before the shuttle returns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, and observations. Further information on Columbia and issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated.

Smith, Marcia S.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Characterization of Space Shuttle External Tank Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials in Support of the Columbia Accident Investigation

NASA suffered the loss of the seven-member crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003 when the vehicle broke apart upon re-entry to the Earth's atmosphere. The final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that the accident was caused by a launch ascent incident-a suitcase-sized chunk of insulating foam on the Shuttle's External Tank (ET) broke off, and moving at almost 500 mph, struck an area of the leading edge of the Shuttle s left wing. As a result, one or more of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the wing leading edge were damaged. Upon re-entry, superheated air approaching 3,000 F breached the wing damage and caused the vehicle breakup and loss of crew. The large chunk of insulating foam that broke off during the Columbia launch was determined to come from the so-called bipod ramp area where the Shuttle s orbiter (containing crew) is attached to the ET. Underneath the foam in the bipod ramp area is a layer of TPS that is a cork-filled silicone rubber composite. In March 2003, the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama received cured samples of the foam and composite for testing from the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans, Louisiana. The MAF is where the Shuttle's ET is manufactured. The foam and composite TPS materials for the ET have been well characterized for mechanical property data at the super-cold temperatures of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen fuels used in the ET. However, modulus data on these materials is not as well characterized. The TA Instruments 2980 Dynamic Mechanical Analyzer (DMA) was used to determine the modulus of the two TPS materials over a range of -145 to 95 C in the dual cantilever bending mode. Multi-strain, fixed frequency DMA tests were followed by multi-frequency, fixed strain tests to determine the approximate bounds of linear viscoelastic behavior for the two materials. Additional information is included in the original extended abstract.

Wingard, Charles D.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Application of Non-Deterministic Methods to Assess Modeling Uncertainties for Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Debris Impacts

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) made several recommendations for improving the NASA Space Shuttle Program. An extensive experimental and analytical program has been developed to address two recommendations related to structural impact analysis. The objective of the present work is to demonstrate the application of probabilistic analysis to assess the effect of uncertainties on debris impacts on Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels. The probabilistic analysis is used to identify the material modeling parameters controlling the uncertainty. A comparison of the finite element results with limited experimental data provided confidence that the simulations were adequately representing the global response of the material. Five input parameters were identified as significantly controlling the response.

Lyle, Karen H.↗