Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “CISA”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) Assessment Prioritization Project

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division (CISA ISD) manages a diverse portfolio of assessments across the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. These assessments—ranging in type, scope, and complexity—are essential for identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening national security. However, the wide variation in assessment offerings and the increasing demand for limited resources have highlighted the need for a transparent, structured approach to prioritizing assessment activities. To address this challenge, CISA ISD partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to review current assessment methodologies, analyze existing prioritization practices, and develop a comprehensive, national-security-focused prioritization framework. This report summarizes the project’s approach, key findings, and actionable recommendations for enhancing ISD’s assessment program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

I Can't Patch My OT Systems! A Look at CISA's KEVC Workarounds & Mitigations for OT

We examine the state of publicly available information about known exploitable vulnerabilities applicable to operational technology (OT) environments. Specifically, we analyze the Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities Catalog (KEVC) maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to assess whether currently available data is sufficient for effective and reliable remediation in OT settings. Our team analyzed all KEVC entries through July 2025 to determine the extent to which OT environments can rely on existing remediation recommendations. We found that although most entries in the KEVC could affect OT environments, only 13% include vendor workarounds or mitigations as alternatives to patching. This paper also examines the feasibility of developing such alternatives based on vulnerability and exploit characteristics, and we present early evidence of success with this approach.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Bridge Seismic Screening Tool (BSST), Version 2.0

The Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) is a cooperative assessment of specific critical infrastructure within a designated geographic area and a regional analysis of the surrounding infrastructure that addresses a range of infrastructure resilience issues that could have regionally and nationally significant consequences. In 2018, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) sponsored the Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP project in coordination with the Office of the Governor (under the oversight of the state resilience officer), the Oregon Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), and other regional stakeholders (CISA 2021). This project focuses on assessing the impacts of a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake on state transportation systems and, in particular, how those impacts may affect the ability of emergency response efforts to move supplies into the region. The intended outcome of this analysis is the prioritization of transportation routes and modes for additional planning, investment, hardening, or other activities to enhance their resilience—and therefore, to enhance their ability to support response and recovery efforts following a CSZ earthquake. An important part of this transportation system-level assessment has been to assess the seismic vulnerability of the state highway system. In doing so, the RRAP project team used the Bridge Seismic Screening Tool (BSST) to assess, at a system-level, the potential impacts that a CSZ earthquake could have on state highway bridges (Bergerson et al. 2019).1 Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), in collaboration with the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), originally developed the BSST as part of the 2017 Washington State Transportation Systems RRAP project, a sister project to the 2018 Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP project. Argonne updated the BSST during this more recent project in Oregon based on feedback from stakeholders and subject matter experts (SMEs) on the original version of the tool. The first step in the BSST is to assess the seismic vulnerability of roadway bridges following a CSZ earthquake to determine a projected or potential damage state. Damage states then help determine approximate reopening times for bridge crossings.2 This document provides details on the BSST methodology, the implementation of that tool to analyze the projected damage incurred in a CSZ earthquake scenario, and the determination of corresponding reopening times of interstate, state highway, and local bridges following such an event.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Oregon Rivers Characterization Tool

DHS’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) undertook the Oregon State Transportation Systems RRAP project between 2018-2021 to assess the seismic vulnerabilities of the state’s transportation system to a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake (CISA 2021). The project primarily focused on the effects of a CSZ earthquake on the mobility of emergency response efforts into the region. In the event that bridges located at crucial river crossings fail during a CSZ earthquake, rivers will become natural barriers affecting the ability to support response and recovery efforts. The characteristics of rivers (e.g., width, depth, and flow) are critical data to inform planning for the recovery of transportation systems across river barriers and determine reopening times following a CSZ earthquake. As part of the transportation system assessment, an Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) project team developed a River Characterization Tool (RCT) to quantify the physical characteristics of the river system in Oregon, which can be used to inform a system-level analysis of transportation recovery and reopening times. This report mainly discusses approaches, methods, development, and applications of the RCT. The use of the river data generated from this tool for a system-level analysis of transportation recovery is discussed in the Oregon Transportation Systems RRAP Resiliency Assessment report (CISA 2021). The primary goal of the RCT is to generate statewide dataset of widths, depths, and flows for all rivers across Oregon to assess the effects of river barriers on emergency response and recovery efforts following a CSZ earthquake. The RCT leverages remote sensing data that multispectral sensors collect from satellites, employs a deep learning model to characterize river predictions, and computes river channel geometric dimensions with hydraulic relationships and river predictions. The entire process of river characterization is automated and implemented through the RCT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Oregon Roadway CSZ Liquefaction and Landslide Impact Screening Analysis

The roadway transportation routes and the surrounding environments in Oregon will be subject to ground acceleration and potential associated deformation due to the propagation of waves of energy during a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake. Linear features such as highways may be subject to partial or complete disruption of their function resulting from ground deformations at and along the roadway. A potential source of these disruptions associated with a CSZ event are landslides and liquefaction in the soils along and beneath the highways and local roadways. The construction of the Oregon roadway system and urban development have occurred largely along the banks of the rivers—those along the Pacific coast, and along the valleys throughout the Oregon Coast Range and Cascade Mountains. These locations also represent areas where landslides and liquefaction have occurred historically, or may potentially occur in the future, presenting a significant vulnerability for the roadway system and dependent post-CSZ earthquake emergency response and recovery effort. Many of the Oregon areas with landslide- and liquefaction-prone soils have the potential to impact roadway transportation routes after a major earthquake causing delays in establishing routes to transport emergency response personnel and resources to impacted areas and communities. This report presents methods used to project the impacts that CSZ earthquake-induced landslides and liquefaction may have on roadways across Oregon. First, this report presents an approach for estimating the risk of landslides to Oregon roadways, and determining approximate reopening times. Second, this report presents a similar approach for estimating the risk of liquefaction-induced ground displacements to roadway pavements, also resulting in approximate reopening times for roadway segments. The outcomes of these two ground failure analyses serve as inputs to a broader analysis of CSZ earthquake impacts to Oregon’s surface transportation system and its ability to support post-disaster response and recovery activities, as part of the Oregon Transportation Systems Regional Resiliency Assessment Program project (CISA 2021).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Requirements and Recommendations for a Physical Attack Characterization Framework

This study seeks to identify existing frameworks or develop requirements and recommendations for a new framework that can consistently characterize physical attacks, analogous to MITRE ATT&CK®. MITRE ATT&CK is widely used across government, research organizations, and the cyber security community to characterize cyber attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a consistent and commonly understood manner. While physical attack taxonomies, methodologies, and other tools for evaluating physical security do exist, many are sector and/or facility-type specific—and therefore not able to provide comparable scenarios across sectors—or are more focused on security assessment instead of the characterization of attacks themselves. A MITRE ATT&CK analog for physical attacks on critical infrastructure would provide a common language and structure for analysis of physical attacks. Existing attack characterization methodologies do not robustly address cyber-physical security risks. To fully understand a facility’s security needs, it is important to understand the entire vulnerability landscape from both a physical and a cyber perspective. To underscore this need, organizations such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are calling for a coordinated approach to cyber and physical security, which they refer to as cyber and physical security convergence. A physical attack characterization framework that could be used jointly with MITRE ATT&CK would help support a more robust analysis in support of convergence, enabling the consistent characterization of attacks that utilize both cyber and physical tactics and techniques. This could provide analysts and stakeholders with a clearer understanding of how security mitigations deployed in the physical realm impact security risks in the cyber realm, and vice versa. In this study, the project team evaluates existing physical security taxonomies and methodologies to assess whether an existing method can be used to create a “physical half” of MITRE ATT&CK. This study then provides requirements and recommendations for a framework that can leverage aspects of existing methodologies. The goal of the final framework is for it to be widely adopted and referenced, regardless of critical infrastructure sector, facility type, or facility components. This study also identifies applicable use cases for when and how a framework could be applied across the various critical infrastructure sectors for a variety of attack types or motivations. Through a literature review of existing security-focused methodologies and taxonomies, engagement with relative stakeholders, evaluation of potential physical attack framework use cases, and subsequent identification of requirements, this study identified the following key findings and recommendations: There is a need for a new physical attack characterization framework; A physical attack framework should be interoperable with the MITRE ATT&CK framework; A physical attack framework should be broadly applicable, but with detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures that encompass the entire attack path; A physical attack framework should be based on observed or feasible events; A physical attack framework should adapt features from existing methodologies, frameworks, and taxonomies; A physical attack framework should be owned, overseen, and maintained by one organization.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Evaluation of the Self Retrieval Augmented Generation Technique on Common Security Advisory Framework Data

This small experimental report evaluates a variation of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), called Self-RAG. This method uses a generative language model that incorporates retrieved facts into its generation and is explicitly trained to be able to determine whether retrieved information is enough to answer the input query, with a user-defined threshold for confidence. We performed an experiment using data from the publicly available CISA Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) repository (https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF) as the database of facts to be used in retrieval. Qualitative results from the experiment demonstrate that the Self-RAG method has some ability to provide reasonable answers to queries that are in the dataset and will often ignore irrelevant information when asked outside of domain questions (e.g., general facts). In settings with deliberately confusing questions (the question is within domain, but asks about a fabricated advisory), it was able to refuse 40% of the time without further adjustments to the original framework. While this performance is not sufficient for current practical use, further improvements to data formatting, disambiguating results, and leveraging threshold values could improve performance significantly. However, evaluating this will require more extensive evaluations on larger datasets and potentially better models.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure and Resilient Operations Using Open-Source Distributed Systems Platform (OpenDSP)

The goal of this project is to identify and address cybersecurity gaps by developing a multi-layer multi-channel cyber-physical defense and survival mechanism for operating distribution networks with high penetration of solar / inverter-based resource (IBR) / distributed energy resource (DER). The proposed security enhancements are built upon the distributed framework and solution architecture for both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The technical solutions consist of two composite functionalities and six layers: proactive defense (vulnerability assessment, communication protection, and attack detection, as layers 1-3), and adaptive self-healing (attack-resilient control, adaptive recovery, and resilient survival, as layers 4-6). These layers, built on and extended from DHS CISA Cyber Framework, establish an integrated and robust cybersecurity framework for operating large-scale distribution networks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Vulcan-Forge: Architecture and Design of a Multi-Modal Forensic Analysis Plugin for CALDERA

Forge and VULCAN together describe an open-architecture cybersecurity analysis ecosystem that unifies forensic artifact processing, detection engineering, and vulnerability intelligence within integrated platforms. Forge operates as a plugin for MITRE CALDERA, ingesting diverse evidence formats—including EVTX, PCAP/PCAPNG, CSV, JSON, YAML, XML, binaries, and archives—to construct a unified artifact graph enriched with severity scoring, TLP classification, and audit trails. It provides subsystems for artifact parsing, streaming structured-data visualization, NetworkMiner-based packet inspection, PE/.NET binary analysis, and LLM-assisted triage and rule generation, with outputs validated against CCCS-YARA and pySigma schemas. VULCAN complements this by serving as a cybersecurity analyst platform that integrates a Neo4j knowledge graph, Qdrant vector retrieval, SSVC-based triage, and a local LLM to deliver CVE intelligence and forensic analysis through a multi-source ingest pipeline drawing from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, MITRE ATT&CK, and CAPEC. Together, they bridge structured threat intelligence with automated forensic analysis and detection workflows.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Water Security: Trends, Capabilities, and Research Directions to Secure Water Infrastructure

Water and wastewater sector is target rich and resource poor ~153k water utilities, serve 80% of US population ~16k publicly-owned wastewater systems in the US serve 75% of the population Need scalable solutions to fit small and medium to large systems Federal attention to critical infrastructure continues to grow – particularly in the water sector Increase in water sector incidents and threats for large scale disruption – particularly by nation-state actors and their proxies EPA is the SRMA DHS CISA focuses on critical infrastructure protection across sectors They must work together to secure WWW systems Research capabilities to enable secure water systems Current and future threats Resilience – natural disasters, accidents, cyber-physical attacks

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) Sharing Lifecycle Report

As Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) adoption efforts mature, SBOM sharing continues to occur, but no single solution or set of solutions have become ubiquitous. The purpose of this report is to enumerate and describe the different parties and phases of the SBOM sharing lifecycle and assist readers in choosing suitable SBOM sharing solutions based on the amount of time, resources, subject-matter expertise, effort, and access to tooling that is available to the reader to implement a phase of the SBOM sharing lifecycle. The SBOM sharing lifecycle consists of the Discovery, Access, and Transport of an SBOM and this report details these individual phases and how an SBOM goes from author to the consumer. This report also details how potential enrichment activities may be performed on an SBOM to create a new product before or after it has been shared. The concept of a sophistication classification for SBOM sharing solutions is concurrently introduced with a focus on the inclusion or lack of certain features and effort associated with their implementation. Examples of low, medium, and high-sophistication solutions are provided; however, these examples and associated categorizations should not be seen as a qualitative judgment meant to push the reader towards a particular adoption strategy since sharing solutions are chosen based on the unique needs of the user. This report does recommend the SBOM community consider how to make current and future sharing solutions interoperable with each other as well as more automated methods to facilitate sharing and broader SBOM adoption. This report also highlights an SBOM sharing survey results obtained from interviews with stakeholders to understand the current SBOM sharing landscape. The categorized results of the survey suggest that SBOMs are currently transported directly to the receiver through email or similar informal communication mechanisms or alternatively the SBOM resides on a repository available to consumers. In addition to these transport methods, this report captures industry efforts to create private sharing solutions and services that can store and transport enrichment data and may use higher sophistication features that are cloud-based or using distributed ledger technologies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗