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Mars Perseverance Rover: Presentation to the National Contract Management Association World Congress
No abstract provided
The management of Department of Defense laser research contracts
DOD laser research and development contracts management
Expanded Guidance for NASA Systems Engineering. Volume 2: Crosscutting Topics, Special Topics, and Appendices
Historically, most successful NASA projects have depended on effectively blending project management, systems engineering, and technical expertise among NASA, contractors, and third parties. Underlying these successes are a variety of agreements (e.g., contract, memorandum of understanding, grant, cooperative agreement) between NASA organizations or between NASA and other Government agencies, Government organizations, companies, universities, research laboratories, and so on. To simplify the discussions, the term "contract" is used to encompass these agreements. This section focuses on the NASA systems engineering activities pertinent to awarding a contract, managing contract performance, and completing a contract. In particular, NASA systems engineering interfaces to the procurement process are covered, since the NASA engineering technical team plays a key role in the development and evaluation of contract documentation. Contractors and third parties perform activities that supplement (or substitute for) the NASA project technical team accomplishment of the NASA common systems engineering technical process activities and requirements outlined in this guide. Since contractors might be involved in any part of the systems engineering life cycle, the NASA project technical team needs to know how to prepare for, allocate or perform, and implement surveillance of technical activities that are allocated to contractors.
Applicability of NASA contract quality management and failure mode effect analysis procedures to the USGS Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas lease management program
An approach that might be used for determining the applicability of NASA management techniques to benefit almost any type of down-to-earth enterprise is presented. A study was made to determine the following: (1) the practicality of adopting NASA contractual quality management techniques to the U.S. Geological Survey Outer Continental Shelf lease management function; (2) the applicability of failure mode effects analysis to the drilling, production, and delivery systems in use offshore; (3) the impact on industrial offshore operations and onshore management operations required to apply recommended NASA techniques; and (4) the probable changes required in laws or regulations in order to implement recommendations. Several management activities that have been applied to space programs are identified, and their institution for improved management of offshore and onshore oil and gas operations is recommended.
Government conceptual estimating for contracting and management
The use of the Aerospace Price Book, a cost index, and conceptual cost estimating for cost-effective design and construction of space facilities is discussed. The price book consists of over 200 commonly used conceptual elements and 100 systems summaries of projects such as launch pads, processing facilities, and air locks. The cost index is composed of three divisions: (1) bid summaries of major Shuttle projects, (2) budget cost data sheets, and (3) cost management summaries; each of these divisions is described. Conceptual estimates of facilities and ground support equipment are required to provide the most probable project cost for budget, funding, and project approval purposes. Similar buildings, systems, and elements already designed are located in the cost index in order to make the best rough order of magnitude conceptual estimates for development of Space Shuttle facilities. An example displaying the applicability of the conceptual cost estimating procedure for the development of the KSC facilities is presented.
Life-Cycle Baseline Customization for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program - 20304
One of the responsibilities of the federal government is to estimate sound and defensible life-cycle baseline costs for use in federal budget estimates and to meet federal financial reporting requirements. To accomplish this, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have partnered together to ensure that the liabilities documented in each Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site's life-cycle baseline are specifically tailored. FUSRAP was created in the mid-1970's to clean up radiological contamination resulting from the early development of nuclear weapons. DOE was responsible for FUSRAP until October 1997, when Congress transferred the administration and execution of FUSRAP site cleanups to USACE. By 1997, DOE had completed the cleanup of 25 of the 46 sites that were active within the program and had begun cleanup at 13 additional sites. USACE was assigned responsibility for the cleanup of the 21 remaining FUSRAP sites, and at 8 additional sites that had since been referred for cleanup. The LM mission for the FUSRAP sites is to perform long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Currently, LM provides long-term stewardship for 34 completed FUSRAP sites. Another 20 sites are under active remediation by USACE. Within the last 5 years, USACE has completed the cleanup at five FUSRAP sites and the LTS and M responsibility has been transferred to LM. By 2029, USACE will compete remediation at eight additional sites and LTS and M for those sites will transfer to LM. Because responsibilities for the FUSRAP sites transfer between USACE and LM upon completion of remedial actions, both agencies maintain life-cycle baselines for different stages of the project and both must have a strong understanding of the needs and requirements for each site. This understanding ensures that the life-cycle baselines form a complete and accurate picture of what is required for the site and for the FUSRAP program. LM focuses on several things when customizing the life-cycle baseline estimates for the FUSRAP sites, including (1) Understanding the unique requirements for each site. By reviewing site-specific documents prepared by USACE, such as Feasibility Studies and Records of Decision, and partnering with USACE to gain additional insight about site conditions and requirements for stewardship, as well as potential risks, LM can better develop the life-cycle baselines. (2) Developing site-specific labor breakdowns. This ensures the required labor mix is baselined for specific activities by comparing the labor mix required to perform activities at (a) other LM-managed FUSRAP sites and (b) non-FUSRAP LM sites and (c) by USACE at active FUSRAP sites. (3) Taking a tiered approach to life-cycle baseline planning. Estimates for sites transferring to LM in the near term (5 years) are more definitive than for sites transferring in the out-year period. Remedial actions at the near-term sites are at or near completion, providing LM a strong understanding of the LTS and M requirements and remaining liabilities. This in turn allows for site-specific customization of the baseline. (4) Using a robust risk management approach to ensure that liabilities specific to each site are identified, evaluated by probability and severity, and documented in relation to the impact to cost or schedule. To ensure the most accuracy within all the baselines, the FUSRAP life-cycle baselines are updated as needed to support program, project, and contract management needs. (authors)
Teamwork for Oversight of Processes and Systems (TOPS). Implementation guide for TOPS version 2.0, 10 August 1992
As the nation redefines priorities to deal with a rapidly changing world order, both government and industry require new approaches for oversight of management systems, particularly for high technology products. Declining defense budgets will lead to significant reductions in government contract management personnel. Concurrently, defense contractors are reducing administrative and overhead staffing to control costs. These combined pressures require bold approaches for the oversight of management systems. In the Spring of 1991, the DPRO and TRW created a Process Action Team (PAT) to jointly prepare a Performance Based Management (PBM) system titled Teamwork for Oversight of Processes and Systems (TOPS). The primary goal is implementation of a performance based management system based on objective data to review critical TRW processes with an emphasis on continuous improvement. The processes are: Finance and Business Systems, Engineering and Manufacturing Systems, Quality Assurance, and Software Systems. The team established a number of goals: delivery of quality products to contractual terms and conditions; ensure that TRW management systems meet government guidance and good business practices; use of objective data to measure critical processes; elimination of wasteful/duplicative reviews and audits; emphasis on teamwork--all efforts must be perceived to add value by both sides and decisions are made by consensus; and synergy and the creation of a strong working trust between TRW and the DPRO. TOPS permits the adjustment of oversight resources when conditions change or when TRW systems performance indicate either an increase or decrease in surveillance is appropriate. Monthly Contractor Performance Assessments (CPA) are derived from a summary of supporting system level and process-level ratings obtained from objective process-level data. Tiered, objective, data-driven metrics are highly successful in achieving a cooperative and effective method of measuring performance. The teamwork-based culture developed by TOPS proved an unequaled success in removing adversarial relationships and creating an atmosphere of continuous improvement in quality processes at TRW. The new working relationship does not decrease the responsibility or authority of the DPRO to ensure contract compliance and it permits both parties to work more effectively to improve total quality and reduce cost. By emphasizing teamwork in developing a stronger approach to efficient management of the defense industrial base TOPS is a singular success.
Proposal Improvements That Work
Rocketdyne Propulsion and Power, an operating location of Boeing in Canoga Park, California is under contract with NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama for design, development, production, and mission support of Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). The contract was restructured in 1996 to emphasize a mission contracting environment under which Rocketdyne supports the Space Transportation System launch manifest of seven flights a year without the need for a detailed list of contract deliverables such as nozzles, turbopumps, and combustion devices. This contract structure is in line with the overall Space Shuttle program goals established by the NASA to fly safely, meet the flight manifest, and reduce cost. Rocketdyne's Contracts, Pricing, and Estimating team has worked for the past several years with representatives from MSFC, the local Defense Contract Management Command, and the DCAA to improve the quality of cost proposals to MSFC for contract changes on the SSME. The contract changes on the program result primarily from engineering change proposals for product enhancements to improve safety, maintainability, or operability in the space environment. This continuous improvement team effort has been successful in improving proposal quality, reducing cycle time, and reducing cost. Some of the principal lessons learned are highlighted here to show how proposal improvements can be implemented to enhance customer satisfaction and ensure cost proposals can be evaluated easily by external customers.
Government - contractor interaction
The development of the Administrative Contracting Officer represents an advance in the Government system of contract management because it provides an individual with knowledge, time, and a specialized function to insure performance of Government contracts. However, the development has created a dichotomy between the award and the post-award function which increases the adversary relationship with Government contractors. This paper advocates that this adversary relationship can be decreased if PCOs and ACOs are provided with opportunities to serve in the assignments of the other.
GSFC Supplier Surveillance
Topics covered include: Develop Program/Project Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans The work activities performed by the developer and/or his suppliers are subject to evaluation and audit by government-designated representatives. CSO supports project by selecting on-site supplier representative s by one of several methods: (1) a Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) person via a Letter Of Delegation (LOD), (2) an independent assurance contractor (IAC) via a contract Audits, Assessments, and Assurance (A3) Contract Code 300 Mission Assurance Support Contract (MASC)
Jet Propulsion Laboratory: Annual Report 2002
The year 2002 brought advances on many fronts in our space exploration ventures. A new orbiter settled in at Mars and delivered tantalizing science results suggesting a vast store of water ice under the planet's surface, a discovery that may have profound consequences for exploring Mars. A long-lived spacecraft made its final fly-bys of Jupiter's moons, while another started its final approach toward Saturn and yet another flew by an asteroid on its way to a comet. A new ocean satellite began science observations, joined in Earth orbit by a pair of spacecraft measuring our home planets gravity field, as well as JPL instruments on NASA and Japanese satellites. A major new infrared observatory and a pair of Mars rovers were readied for launch. All told, JPL is now communicating with 14 spacecraft cast like gems across the velvet expanses of the solar system. It is a far cry from the early 1960's, when JPL engineers made prodigious efforts to get the first planetary explorers off the ground and into space - an achievement of which we were especially mindful this year, as 2002 marked the 40th anniversary of the first successful planetary mission, Mariner 2, which barely reached our closest planetary neighbor, Venus. Added to this anniversary were celebrations surrounding the 25th anniversaries of the launches of Voyagers 1 and 2, two remarkable spacecraft that are still flying and are actively probing the outer realms of the solar system. These events of the past and present provide an occasion for reflection on the remarkable era of exploration that we at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory are privileged to be a part of. As 2002 neared its end, the Laboratory had yet another reason for celebration, as a new five-year management contract between NASA and the California Institute of Technology was signed that calls for a closer working relationship with NASA and other NASA centers as a member of the 'One NASA' team. There is a strong emphasis on cost control and management, areas in which we can improve, enabling us to become more competitive. This new agreement again confirms NASA's trust and faith in Caltech and JPL, in which we should all take great pride. If the history of JPL were a book, we are on the verge of turning the page to one that promises to be one of the most exciting and busiest chapters in JPL's history. In 2003 and 2004, we will launch 11 spacecraft or major payloads. We will land two rovers on Mars; put a spacecraft in orbit around Saturn, deliver a probe to the surface of its largest moon, Titan, and map Titan's surface withimaging radar; send a spacecraft past a comet collecting samples from its tail, while another one is launched toward a comet impact; bring a capsule back to Earth with the first samples ever collected beyond the orbit of the Moon; map the skies in the ultraviolet as well as the infrared spectrum to unprecedented accuracy; and continue the mapping of ocean topography and winds on our home planet, Earth.
The Costs and Feasibility of Floating Offshore Wind Energy in the O'ahu Region
The State of Hawai'i has set a target to achieve a 100% Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) by 2045, and is well suited to become the first state to achieve this goal due to its relatively small load, high electricity prices, heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels, and favorable conditions for wind and solar. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management contracted NREL to conduct a cost and feasibility study to provide information to decision makers on Hawai'i about the viability of floating offshore wind to be a part of the 100% RPS. We used NREL's Offshore Regional Cost Analyzer (ORCA) spatial cost model to evaluate the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) in the region surrounding O'ahu as this is the island with the highest energy demand. The ORCA results showed that LCOE could range from around $\$$83 MWh to $\$$194 MWh for commercial operation dates in 2019 but has the potential to decrease to $\$$48 MWh - $\$$109 MWh by 2032 due to maturing global supply chains, increasing turbine rating, and new technological innovations. These costs are expected to be competitive with global floating wind costs in the early 2030s. The strong wind resource, proximity to infrastructure on land, and benign metocean conditions can potentially compensate for the logistical complexities of installing projects in Hawai'i far from mainland supply chains if sufficient investments are made to develop ports, grid infrastructure, and workforce on O'ahu to support the construction and operation of offshore wind projects. In addition to the cost results, this report also discusses the likely technologies that would comprise floating wind projects near O'ahu, the existing infrastructure available to projects, unique conditions facing offshore wind in the region such as exposure to hurricanes and limits on allowable export cable capacity, newly developed wind resource data sets for the region, and local stakeholder perspectives on offshore wind.
Space Station Program Plans
Project and contract management in NASA orbital space station program
Evaluation of human engineering design standard (MSFC-STD-267A) in the design of manned space vehicles
The major conclusion of the detailed examination of the human factors engineering design standard is that it is unsuitable for future spacecraft design. The standard, published in 1966, was not intended to be a zero or reduced gravity standard and was directed primarily toward ground support equipment and technology. Futhermore, ambiguities, conflicts, and unenforceable requirements contribute to the difficulty. The role of man in future space missions and its impact on human engineering standards are also discussed, and it is concluded that greater standardization is vital to the success of future missions. A survey of NASA/MSFC contractors was made, and it was found that MSFC-STD-267A is largely ignored and the most significant problems are inaccessibility and nonspecificity of the data. The resistance of contract management and designer and of program managers is a primary reason for poor human engineering design. Specific recommendations for improvement of format and organization, including an interim solution, are given.
An evaluation of contractor projected and actual costs
GSFC contractors with cost-plus contracts provide cost estimates for each of the next four quarters on a quarterly basis. Actual expenditures over a two-year period were compared to the estimates, and the data were sorted in different ways to answer several questions and give quantification to observations, such as how much does the accuracy of estimates degrade as they are made further into the future? Are estimates made for small dollar amounts more accurate than for large dollar estimates? Other government agencies and private companies with cost-plus contracts may be interested in this analysis as potential methods of contract management for their organizations. It provides them with the different methods one organization is beginning to use to control costs.
Standardization and program effect analysis (Study 2.4). Volume 3: Design-to-cost analysis
The program procedures that were incorporated into an on-going "design-to-cost" spacecraft program are examined. Program procedures are the activities that support the development and operations of the flight unit: contract management, documents, integration meetings, engineering, and testing. This report is limited to the program procedures that were implemented, with emphasis on areas that may depart from normal satellite development practices.
Bibliography of Lewis Research Center technical contributions announced in 1976
Abstracts of Lewis authored publications and publications resulting from Lewis managed contracts which were announced in the 1976 issues of STAR (Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports) and IAA (International Aerospace Abstracts) are presented. Research reports, journal articles, conference presentations, patents and patent applications, and these are included. The arrangement is by NASA subject category. Citations indicate report literature (identified by their N-numbers) and the journal and conference presentations (identified by their A-numbers). A grouping of indexes helps locate specific publications by author (including contractor authors), contractor organization, contract number, and report number.