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CTBT on-site inspections

On-site inspection (OSI) is a critical part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The OSI verification regime provides for international inspectors to make a suite of measurements and observations on site at the location of an event of interest. The other critical component of the verification regime is the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is a globally distributed network of monitoring stations. The IMS along with technical monitoring data from CTBT member countries, as appropriate, will be used to trigger an OSI. After the decision is made to carry out an OSI, it is important for the inspectors to deploy to the field site rapidly to be able to detect short-lived phenomena such as the aftershocks that may be observable after an underground nuclear explosion. The inspectors will be on site from weeks to months and will be working with many tens of tons of equipment. Parts of the OSI regime will be tested in a field exercise in the country of Jordan late in 2014. The build-up of the OSI regime has been proceeding steadily since the CTBT was signed in 1996 and is on track to becoming a deterrent to someone considering conducting a nuclear explosion in violation of the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr 3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232 Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137 Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137 Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

CTBT↗

Book Review: Monitoring compliance with the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Contributions by the German national data centre edited by Christoph Pilger, Lars Ceranna and Christian Bönnemann

For decades, the nuclear weapons capability of different countries was tracked in part via the interpretation of signals from more than 2000 nuclear test explosions that were conducted in programs of weapons development. The first such explosion took place in July 1945 (in New Mexico, USA, prior to the use of nuclear weapons in World War 2 against Japan). The last nuclear test, prior to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) becoming open for signature in September 1996, was in July 1996 (in China). This treaty, which took nearly forty years to negotiate, has been signed by 184 states as of December 2018, but a few key additional signatures and ratifications are still needed before nuclear tests are banned under international law. The evidence that a nuclear test explosion has occurred can come from electromagnetic, seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic waves; and from unusual radionuclides— which can be present in particulate matter and/or as noble gases. Of course there is a vast infrastructure associated with military programs of nuclear weapons development in a limited number of countries. Less well-known, is the existence of a large infrastructure involving national and international efforts to monitor for the possible occurrence of nuclear test explosions, and thus to support CTBT verification. This book does a very good job of explaining much of that work, as it is conducted in practice by a western nation with sophisticated facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CTBT infrasound network performance to detect the 2013 Russian fireball event

The explosive fragmentation of the 2013 Chelyabinsk meteorite generated a large airburst with an equivalent yield of 500 kT TNT. It is the most energetic event recorded by the infrasound component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-International Monitoring System (CTBT-IMS), globally detected by 20 out of 42 operational stations. This study performs a station-by-station estimation of the IMS detection capability to explain infrasound detections and nondetections from short to long distances, using the Chelyabinsk meteorite as global reference event. Investigated parameters influencing the detection capability are the directivity of the line source signal, the ducting of acoustic energy, and the individual noise conditions at each station. Findings include a clear detection preference for stations perpendicular to the meteorite trajectory, even over large distances. Only a weak influence of stratospheric ducting is observed for this low-frequency case. As a result, a strong dependence on the diurnal variability of background noise levels at each station is observed, favoring nocturnal detections.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Engineering Upgrades to the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer for the CTBT International Monitoring System

The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) is an automated aerosol collection and analysis system designed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the 1990’s and is deployed in several locations around the world as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) required under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The utility of such an automated system is the reduction of human intervention and the production of perfectly uniform results. However, maintainability and down time issues threaten this utility, even for systems with over 90% data availability. Engineering upgrades to the RASA are currently being pursued to address these issues, as well as Fukushima lessons learned. Current work includes a new automation control unit, and other potential improvements such as alternative detector cooling and sampling options are under review. This paper presents the current state of upgrades and improvements under investigation

Forrester, Joel B.↗

Construction of a Shallow Underground Low-background Detector for a CTBT Radionuclide Laboratory

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a verification component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and in addition to a series of radionuclide monitoring stations, contains sixteen radionuclide laboratories capable of verification of radionuclide station measurements. This paper presents an overview of a new commercially obtained low-background detector system for radionuclide aerosol measurements recently installed in a shallow (>30 meters water equivalent) underground clean-room facility at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Specifics such as low-background shielding materials, active shielding methods, and improvements in sensitivity to IMS isotopes will be covered.

Forrester, Joel B.↗

Aircraft Field Exercise to Develop Multi-Spectral and Infrared Imaging for CTBT On-Site Inspections

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) permits Multi-Spectral and InfraRed Imaging (MSIR) to be performed as part of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) for the purpose of reducing the search area for the location of a possible underground nuclear explosion (UNE). Dedicated airborne MSIR measurements have not been made in conjunction with historical or recent UNE’s. Satellite data has been used to show that MSIR observables can be used to reduce the search area, but the satellite data do not have the spatial resolution or spectral and thermal capabilities desired to fully characterize the MSIR observables. Consequently, there is insufficient information currently available to confidently specify an MSIR instrument to be used on an Additional Overflight as part of an OSI. The potential MSIR observables are known, but not well characterized. The possibility of using airborne MSIR measurements to characterize some of those observables has been assessed here for a variety of field exercise scenarios. The main challenge in making aircraft measurements is to have confidence that the field conditions will accurately reproduce the MSIR observable compared to a UNE. The four types of events expected to generate relevant MSIR observables are (1) underground coal fires, (2) road traffic measurements, (3) underground mining operations, and (4) certain carefully staged explosions, such as the Source Physics Experiment.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

A consideration of radionuclide particulate resuspension as a verification tool in the CTBT on-site inspection verification component

Here, a considerable amount of radioactivity could leak from an underground nuclear test at levels easily detectable by one or more of the radiological methods available for on-site inspection, even if the event does not immediately result in gas or particulate debris reaching stations of the International Monitoring System, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This work presents a feasibility study showing that winds or human activity can resuspend surface debris in quantities that could be detected using high-volume aerosol samplers outside an established restricted area and subsequent measurement in a Base of Operations laboratory.

CTBT↗

Radioxenon detections in the CTBT International Monitoring System likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea conducted on February 12, 2013

Abstract: Observations of the radioxenon isotopes 133Xe and 131mXe collected at the IMS stations RN38 and RN58 on April 7-8, and April 12-13 2013, respectively, are unique with respect to the measurement history of these stations. Comparison of measured data with calculated isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric transport modeling indicate that it is likely that the xenon measured was created in the underground nuclear test conducted by North Korea on February 12, 2013, and released 7 weeks later. More than one release is required to explain all observations. The 131mXe source terms for each release were calculated to 7x1011 Bq, corresponding to about 1-10% of the total xenon inventory for a 10-kt explosion, depending on fractionation and release scenario. The observed ratios could not be used to obtain any information regarding the fissile material that was used in the test.

International Monitoring System↗

Scenarios and Spectra Set for CTBT OSI Information Barrier Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty limits radiation measurements during an on-site inspection to those isotopes the States Parties have agreed are appropriate for the purpose of determining if a nuclear explosion has occurred without revealing irrelevant confidential information. To accomplish this, the radiation detectors used will need to have information barriers that are proven to function reliably over the wide range of possible inspection uses and scenarios. In order to provide a basis set of spectra for testing proposed information barrier systems, PNNL and LLNL defined a set of treaty-compliant and non-compliant scenarios and then independently developed a set of spectra relevant to those scenarios. Real spectra were utilized to the extent possible, but often computer simulations were necessary. These spectra will next be used to assess the performance of an INL information barrier system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Primer on Use of Multi-Spectral and Infra Red Imaging for On-Site Inspections

The purpose of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) is to determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to gather information which might assist in identifying the violator (CTBT, Article IV, Paragraph 35) Multi-Spectral and Infra Red Imaging (MSIR) is allowed by the treaty to detect observables which might help reduce the search area and thus expedite an OSI and make it more effective. MSIR is permitted from airborne measurements, and at and below the surface to search for anomalies and artifacts (CTBT, Protocol, Part II, Paragraph 69b). The three broad types of anomalies and artifacts MSIR is expected to be capable of observing are surface disturbances (disturbed earth, plant stress or anomalous surface materials), human artifacts (man-made roads, buildings and features), and thermal anomalies. The purpose of this Primer is to provide technical information on MSIR relevant to its use for OSI. It is expected that this information may be used for general background information, to inform decisions about the selection and testing of MSIR equipment, to develop operational guidance for MSIR use during an OSI, and to support the development of a training program for OSI Inspectors. References are provided so readers can pursue a topic in more detail than the summary information provided here. The following chapters will provide more information on how MSIR can support an OSI (Section 2), a short summary what Multi-Spectral Imaging and Infra Red Imaging is (Section 3), guidance from the CTBT regarding the use of MSIR (Section 4), and a description of several nuclear explosion scenarios (Section 5) and consequent observables (Section 6). The remaining sections focus on practical aspects of using MSIR for an OSI, such as specification and selection of MSIR equipment, operational considerations for deployment of MISR equipment from an aircraft, and the conduct of field exercises to mature MSIR for an OSI. Finally, an appendix provides detail describing the magnitude and spatial extent of the surface shock expected from an underground nuclear explosion. If there is a seismic event or other data to suggest there has been a nuclear explosion in violation of the CTBT, an OSI may be conducted to determine whether a nuclear explosion has occurred and to gather information which may be useful in identifying the party responsible for conducting the explosion. The OSI must be conducted in the area where the event that triggered the inspection request occurred, and the inspected area must not exceed 1,000 square kilometers, or be more than 50 km on aside (CTBT Protocol, Part II, Paragraphs 2 and 3). One of the guiding principles for an inspection is that it be effective, minimally intrusive, timely, and cost-effective [Hawkins, Feb 1998]. In that context, MSIR is one of several technologies that can be used during an aircraft overflight to identify ground regions of high interest in a timely and cost-effective manner. This allows for an optimized inspection on the ground. The primary purpose for MSIR is to identify artifacts and anomalies that might be associated with a nuclear explosion, and to use the location of those artifacts and anomalies to reduce the search area that must be inspected from the ground. The MSIR measurements can have additional utility. The multi-spectral measurements of the ground can be used for terrain classification, which can aid in geological characterization of the Inspected Area. In conditions of where light smoke or haze is present, long-wave infrared imaging can provide better imaging of the ground than is possible with standard visible imagery.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (Osiris) System Development

We have designed and tested hardware and software for the acquisition and analysis of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra during on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy—Osiris—software filters the spectral data to display only radioisotopic information relevant to CTBT on-site inspections, e.g.,132I. A set of over 100 fission-product spectra was employed for Osiris testing. These spectra were measured, where possible, or generated by modeling. The synthetic test spectral compositions include non-nuclear-explosion scenarios, e.g., a severe nuclear reactor accident, and nuclear-explosion scenarios such as a vented underground nuclear test. Comparing its computer-based analyses to expert visual analyses of the test spectra, Osiris correctly identifies CTBT-relevant fission product isotopes at the 95% level or better.The Osiris gamma-ray spectrometer is a mechanically-cooled, battery-powered ORTEC Transpec-100, chosen to avoid the need for liquid nitrogen during on-site inspections. The spectrometer was used successfully during the recent 2014 CTBT Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan. The spectrometer is controlled and the spectral data analyzed by a Panasonic Toughbook notebook computer. To date, software development has been the main focus of the Osiris project. In FY2016-17, we plan to modify the Osiris hardware, integrate the Osiris software and hardware, and conduct rigorous field tests to ensure that the Osiris system will function correctly during CTBT on-site inspections. The planned development will raise Osiris to technology readiness level TRL-8; transfer the Osiris technology to a commercial manufacturer, and demonstrate Osiris to potential CTBT on-site inspectors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗