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A test using NASA's DSN to mimic the probe's signal was performed in 2000 and uncovered an anomaly that, unchecked, would result in nearly complete loss of the Huygens mission. This led to a suggested modification to the Cassini trajectory that will result in nearly complete data return for Huygens with minimal impact on Cassini.
The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn and Titan, a joint venture between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the European Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency, is conducting a four-year, prime mission exploring the Saturnian system, including its atmosphere, rings, magnetosphere, moons and icy satellites. Launched in 1997, Cassini began its prime mission in 2004. Cassini is now preparing for a new era, a two-year extended mission to revisit many of the highlights and new discoveries made during the prime mission. Because of the light time delay from Earth to Saturn, and the time needed to coordinate the complicated science and engineering activities that take place on the spacecraft, commanding on Cassini is done in approximately 40-day intervals known as sequences. The Cassini Uplink Operations team is responsible for the final development and validation of the pointing profile and instrument and spacecraft commands that are contained in a sequence. During this final analysis prior to uplink to the spacecraft, thorough and exact evaluation is necessary to ensure there are no mistakes during commanding. In order to perform this evaluation, complete and refined processes and procedures are fundamental. The Uplink Operations team is also responsible for anomaly response during sequence execution, a process in which critical decisions often are made in real-time. Recent anomalies on other spacecraft missions have highlighted two major risks in the operations process: (1) personnel turnover and the retirement of critical knowledge and (2) aging, outdated operations procedures. If other missions are a good barometer, the Cassini extended mission will be presented with a high personnel turnover of the Cassini flight team, which could lead to a loss of expertise that has been essential to the success of the prime mission. In order to prepare the Cassini Uplink Operations Team for this possibility and to continue to develop and operate safe science and engineering sequences, a review and major update of the current documentation and operations procedures was needed. This paper will address the changes made to extended mission sequence generation processes primarily due to new restrictions in spacecraft operating capability and lessons learned from prime mission. In addition, it will address the state of the prime mission operations procedures, the philosophy changes and updates that were made to those procedures in response to process improvement, and the validation of those new procedures through the training of current and new personnel. And lastly, it will address the lessons learned throughout prime mission and how the Uplink Operations team chose to incorporate those lessons into the working documentation and team knowledge. This incorporation was necessary to facilitate the success of the extended mission with potentially all new personnel at some point prior to the end of the mission.
The Cassini-Huygens mission ended on September 15, 2017, after nearly two decades in ight. The well-designed Cassini spacecraft had robust hardware that permitted two extended missions, lasting nine years longer than the expected prime mission. At the end of the mission, the Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) was using two pieces of redundant back-up of hardware, one reaction wheel and the hydrazine thruster branch, due to hardware anomalies earlier in the mission. The back-up hardware performed nominally through the rest of mission. The prime reaction wheels at the end of the mission had reached more than 130% of the consumable limit for number of revolutions. No thruster on either thruster branch accumulated more than 45% of the consumable limits. The inertial reference unit slightly exceeded the pre-launch requirements on bias error, but as the software continuously estimated this value in ight, the attitude estimation was not adversely a ected. The star trackers performed nominally, and though there was a spacecraft anomaly in 1998 related to the star trackers, the origin was not in hardware itself. The Sun sensors and accelerometer both performed as expected and met all requirements throughout the mission. Ultimately, the lifetime of the Cassini spacecraft was not limited by hardware performance. Planetary protection requirements necessitated the end of the mission as the spacecraft's propellant reserves depleted, and Cassini plunged into Saturn's atmosphere with a healthy attitude control system.