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Class B Materials Code Case to include: FY25 - High temperature design methodology, overview of ASME Section III (Division 5), Design for elevated temperature service, Goal to address current gaps, evaluation of proposed rules, allowable stress development, Class A materials (existing ASME approach), variable confidence index, data extrapolation, bounding value for SEE, and next steps.
This report provides the time-dependent allowable stress calculation strategy leveraging the limited creep rupture tests data generated to support the allowable stress for 100,000 hours in American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section II, Part D. A variable confidence index procedure to extrapolate material properties to support 500,000 hours design life is discussed. Time-dependent allowable stresses for Class B component design and analysis are presented for Grade 1 and Grade 2 of Alloy 625. The presented data extrapolation and allowable stress calculation method will support new material addition using limited creep rupture data in the new ASME Boiler and BPVC, Section III, Division 5, Class B rules.
Overview of high temperature metals, including component construction rules for advanced reactor designs, assessment of filler metal for Alloy 800H weldments, high-temperature crack growth rate testing, work packages and contributors for FY24, creep-fatigue damage summation evaluation, GCR metal needs, and high temperature metals from other programs.
This report summarizes updates on the ongoing development of the new American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section III, Division 5, Class B rules to address the potential failure modes of Class B components. An initial design-by-analysis approach and supporting design rules are presented. The elastic-perfectly plastic (EPP) analysis approach has been adopted for primary stress limit and ratcheting check to prevent the component failure against the structural failure mode against primary load and strain accumulation due to cyclic loads. The creep-fatigue damage assessment uses explicitly defined elastic follow-up calculated from the stress concentration region of given component. Damage fraction calculation uses a novel coupled approach to capture the influence of the elastic follow-up and provide adequate conservatism for Class B components. The proposed Class B rules does not use the stress classification approach and uses the combined loads to assess component.
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code currently only allows five materials for use in construction of nuclear components for high temperature service. These are: 2.25Cr-1Mo and V-modified 9Cr-1Mo steels, Types 304 and 316 stainless steels and the high nickel Alloy 800H. Since 2005, the US high temperature gas-cooled reactor program has been characterizing elevated temperature mechanical properties of Alloy 617 as the leading candidate construction material for the intermediate heat exchanger. After analysis of these experimental results, along with historical data and additional results available through the Generation IV International Forum, Very High Temperature Reactor, Materials Program Management Board Materials Handbook, a draft ASME Code Case to allow nuclear construction with Alloy 617 for temperatures up to 1750°F (954°C) has been developed. This report contains the Code Case for Low Temperature Service Construction of Section III, Division 5, Subsection HB, Subpart A, Class A and Subsection HC, Subpart A, Class B components, which has been approved in Section II, Materials, and Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components. Supporting technical justification for the low temperature Code Case is also included. This Code Case allows use of Alloy 617 up to 800°F (425°C). This report also contains an updated draft of a Section III, Division 5, Subsection HB, Subpart B, Class A Code Case for Alloy 617 to qualify it for use in construction of nuclear components up to 1750°F (954°C) for service life up to 100,000 hours. The draft contained in Appendix 4, subject to editorial revision and approval by the ASME Special Task Group on Alloy 617 Code Qualification, will be submitted for approval by letter ballot by the appropriate ASME Committees. The technical justification supporting the Code Case is presented in Appendix 5 of this report. This background document is part of the information package that will be submitted with the Code Case for ballot.
This PowerPoint presentation is for Joint ART Materials/AMMT Program Review, Germantown, MD, on June-5-8, 2023. It will discuss development to revamp the ASME Section III Division 5 Class B design rules. There will be a plan in the FY24 to assess extrapolation methods for other Class A materials, alternative strain range evaluations for fatigue damage, evaluation of Class B intersection point in D-diagram relative to material-specific Class A intersection points, and evaluation of new Class B rules against Class A rules based on Elastic-Perfectly Plastic (EPP) methodology and full inelastic analysis method, using sample problems.
CFRP composites have not been used for nuclear safety-related applications until recently. In 2019, the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Committee approved a new Code Case N-871 for internal repairs of Class 2 and 3 safety-related piping using CFRP for Service Levels A, B, C, and D for a service life of 50 years. The NRC did not review N-871 for inclusion in the Code Case Regulatory Guides. This project focuses on evaluating the capabilities and limitations of Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) methods for examining the Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) repairs in commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). This Report summarizes the work done on this project until the end of FY24.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.87 (Rev 1, June 1975) to provide interim licensing guidelines to aid applicants in implementing the 10 CFR Part 50 requirements with respect to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code (BPVC) Class 1 components operating at elevated temperatures for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid-metal fast-breeder reactors, and gas-cooled fast-breeder reactors. RG 1.87 referenced ASME Code Case 1592 for materials and design and Code Cases 1593, 1594, 1595, and 1596 for fabrication and installation, examination, testing, and overpressure protection, respectively.
This report provides a final status update on work to develop and implement two new constitutive models for 316H stainless steel and the Ni-based Alloy 617 in Nonmandatory Appendix Z to the Section III, Division 5, Subsection HB, Subpart B ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code rules covering the design and construction of Class A high temperature nuclear reactor components. This report summarizes the objections of the overall project and provides the final versions of the constitutive models proposed for incorporation into the ASME Code. The report also provides an update on the balloting status at ASME of the two proposed constitutive models. As of the time of writing (July 2022) the models are on-track to be approved by ASME after the August 2022 Code Week. If so, this will mean the 316H model will be published in the 2023 edition of the Code and the A617 model available as part of a revised Code Case immediately
Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste is low-level waste (LLW) that exceeds the Class C concentrations tabulated in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61. Disposal of GTCC waste in the near surface (i.e. upper 30 m of the earth's surface) is prohibited in the United States. Though GTCC waste disposal is generally prohibited, the Commission can approve disposal according to 10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)(iv) on a case-by-case basis. The waste classification tables, developed in the early 1980's, were based on model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural, construction, and discovery exposure scenarios. The assumptions and parameters used were documented in a series of public reports. Though different disposal facility designs and site conditions were considered, the waste classification tables were based on a disposal facility design located in a specific environment. The tables were based on shallow (i.e., top few meters) trench facility designs and did not consider deeper facilities. To determine the suitability of GTCC waste disposal in the near-surface, site-specific analyses must account for differences between GTCC waste and Class A, B, and C LLW (hereafter, traditional LLW). GTCC waste can have concentrations of radionuclides that are much higher than traditional LLW. Because of these higher concentrations, processes that are typically not significant for traditional LLW may be significant with respect to disposal of GTCC waste. These processes include, but are not limited to, heat generation, criticality, and radiolysis. The form of the waste as well as the barriers to release of the waste (e.g. waste package) could be substantially different than they are for traditional LLW. These barriers need to be considered when assessing the impacts of accidents during receipt and placement and in evaluating long-term performance. Some GTCC radioactivity is either embedded in stainless steel or contained in stainless steel barriers. Stainless steel can have very low corrosion rates under a variety of environmental conditions. Finally, and possibly most importantly, GTCC waste would likely need to be disposed deeper than traditional LLW to reduce the probability of disturbance. The waste classification table values of traditional LLW are based on an inadvertent intruder excavating into the waste and bringing some of the material to the land surface. If waste is deeper than approximately 5 m, the excavation scenario becomes very unlikely. Therefore, other intruder scenarios, such as drilling exposure scenarios, need to be evaluated. This paper summarizes key technical issues for the disposal of GTCC waste. Our previous study shows that certain GTCC waste may be suitable for near surface disposal whereas others may not. This study may support ongoing technical analyses assessing potential disposal of GTCC in a near surface disposal facility. (authors)