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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes and Key Takeaways

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson presented this talk. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video with a run time of 32 min. 31 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Launch and Recovery

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring this talk to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talk. Retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented this talk. Mr. Thurston brings a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video presentation with a run time of 36 min. 20 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as it returned to Earth from a 16-day science mission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at [http://www.caib.us]) on August 26, 2003, concluding that the tragedy was caused by technical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Board specified must be completed before the shuttle returns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, and observations. Further information on Columbia and issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated.

Smith, Marcia S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating the WFIP2 updates to the HRRR model using scanning Doppler lidar measurements in the complex terrain of the Columbia River Basin

The wind-energy (WE) industry relies on numerical weather prediction (NWP) forecast models as foundational or base models for many purposes, including wind-resource assessment and wind-power forecasting. During the Second Wind Forecast Improvement Project (WFIP2) in the Columbia River Basin of Oregon and Washington, a significant effort was made to improve NWP forecasts through focused model development, to include experimental refinements to the High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model physics and horizontal grid spacing. In this study, the performance of an experimental version of HRRR that includes these refinements is tested against a control version, which corresponds to that of the operational HRRR run by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Centers for Environmental Protection at the outset of WFIP2. Furthermore, the effects of horizontal grid resolution were also tested by comparing wind forecasts from the HRRR (with 3-km grid spacing) with those from a finer-resolution HRRR nest with 750-m grid spacing. Model forecasts are validated against accurate wind-profile measurements by three scanning, pulsed Doppler lidars at sites separated by a total distance of 71 km. Model skill and improvements in model skill, attributable to physics refinements and improved horizontal grid resolution, varied by season, by site, and during periods of atmospheric phenomena relevant to WE. In general, model errors were the largest below 150 m above ground level (AGL). Experimental HRRR refinements tended to reduce the mean absolute error (MAE) and other error metrics for many conditions, but degradation in skill (increased MAE) was noted below 150 m AGL at the two lowest-elevation sites at night. Finer resolution was found to produce the most significant reductions in the error metrics.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Characterizing NWP Model Errors Using Doppler-Lidar Measurements of Recurrent Regional Diurnal Flows: Marine-Air Intrusions into the Columbia-River Basin

Ground-based Doppler-lidar instrumentation provides atmospheric wind data at dramatically improved accuracies and spatial/temporal resolutions. These capabilities have provided new insights into atmospheric flow phenomena, but they also should have a strong role in NWP model improvement. Insight into the nature of model errors can be gained by studying recurrent atmospheric flows, here a regional summertime diurnal sea breeze and subsequent marine-air intrusion into the arid interior of Oregon-Washington, where these winds are an important windenergy resource. These marine intrusions were sampled by three scanning Doppler lidars in the Columbia-River Basin as part of the Second Wind Forecast Improvement Project (WFIP2), using data from summer 2016. Lidar time-height cross sections of wind speed identified eight days when the diurnal-flow cycle, (peak wind speeds at midnight, afternoon minima) was obvious and strong. Eight-day composite time-height cross sections of lidar wind speeds are used to validate those generated by the operational NCEP-HRRR model. HRRR simulated the diurnal wind cycle, but produced errors in the timing of onset and significant errors due to a premature nighttime demise of the intrusion flow, producing low-bias errors of 6 m s-1 . Day-to-day and in the composite, whenever a marine intrusion occurred, HRRR made these same errors. The errors occurred under a range of gradient wind conditions indicating that they resulted from the misrepresentation of physical processes within a limited region around the measurement locations. Because of their generation within a limited geographical area, field-measurement programs can be designed to find and address the sources of these NWP errors.

Banta, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials for Return-to-Flight following the Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

During the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, it was determined that a large chunk of polyurethane insulating foam (= 1.67 lbs) on the External Tank (ET) came loose during Columbia's ascent on 2-1-03. The foam piece struck some of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of Columbia's left wing in the mid-wing area. This impact damaged Columbia to the extent that upon re-entry to Earth, superheGed air approaching 3,000 F caused the vehicle to break up, killing all seven astronauts on board. A paper after the Columbia Accident Investigation highlighted thermal analysis testing performed on External Tank TPS materials (1). These materials included BX-250 (now BX-265) rigid polyurethane foam and SLA-561 Super Lightweight Ablator (highly-filled silicone rubber). The large chunk of foam from Columbia originated fiom the left bipod ramp of the ET. The foam in this ramp area was hand-sprayed over the SLA material and various fittings, allowed to dry, and manually shaved into a ramp shape. In Return-to-Flight (RTF) efforts following Columbia, the decision was made to remove the foam in the bipod ramp areas. During RTF efforts, further thermal analysis testing was performed on BX-265 foam by DSC and DMA. Flat panels of foam about 2-in. thick were sprayed on ET tank material (aluminum alloys). The DSC testing showed that foam material very close to the metal substrate cured more slowly than bulk foam material. All of the foam used on the ET is considered fully cured about 21 days after it is sprayed. The RTF culminated in the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery on 7-26-05. Although the flight was a success, there was another serious incident of foam loss fiom the ET during Shuttle ascent. This time, a rather large chunk of BX-265 foam (= 0.9 lbs) came loose from the liquid hydrogen (LH2) PAL ramp, although the foam did not strike the Shuttle Orbiter containing the crew. DMA testing was performed on foam samples taken fiom a simulated PAL ramp panel. It was found that the smooth rind on the foam facing the cable tray did significantly affect the properties of foam at the PAL ramp surface. The smooth rind increased the storage modulus E' of the foam as much as 20- 40% over a temperature range of -145 to 95 C. Because of foam loss fiom the PAL ramp, future Shuttle flights were grounded indefinitely to allow further testing to better understand foam properties. The decision was also made to remove foam from the LH2 PAL, ramp. Other RTF efforts prior to the launch of Discovery included

Wingard, Doug↗
NASA NTRS2010

Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.

Chandler, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned

On February 25, 2026, two NASA Talks were held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson and retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented these talks. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. Mr. Thurston brought a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. These talks were timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team.

Space Shuttle Columbia↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evaluating the Impacts of Coordination for Cascaded Hydropower Plants on the Mid-Columbia

The Mid-Columbia region in the U.S. Pacific Northwest includes seven large, cascaded hydropower plants with a combined nameplate capacity of nearly 14 GW. These plants have several different operators, and there is currently limited coordination among the operators. We develop a detailed model of the Mid-Columbia system that captures both river flow constraints and power system operations. We then place this detailed model within a production cost model of a 2030 system of the Western Interconnection to evaluate how coordination of the Mid-Columbia hydropower plants might impact operations throughout the interconnection. We find that coordination of the Mid-Columbia plants leads to more generation from the Mid-Columbia plants and increased revenues for the Mid-Columbia operators. This benefit is achieved primarily through better utilization of the storage reservoirs and decreased spill through the cascade. We also evaluate the impacts of look-ahead on production costs and find that longer look-ahead values result in lower system-wide production costs.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Population Structure of White Sturgeon (Acipenser transmontanus) in the Columbia River Inferred from Single-Nucleotide Polymorphisms

White sturgeon (Acipenser transmontanus) are the largest freshwater fish in North America, with reproducing populations in the Sacramento-San Joaquin, Fraser, and Columbia River Basins. Of these, the Columbia River is the largest, but it is also highly fragmented by hydroelectric dams, and many segments are characterized by declining abundance and persistent recruitment failure. Efforts to conserve and supplement these fish requires an understanding of their spatial genetic structure. Here, we assembled a large set of samples from throughout the Columbia River Basin, along with representative collections from adjacent basins, and genotyped them using a panel of 325 single-nucleotide markers. Results from individual- and group-based analyses of these data indicate that white sturgeon in the uppermost Columbia River Basin, in the Kootenai and upper Snake Rivers, are the most distinct, while the remaining populations downstream in the basin can be described as a genetic gradient consistent with an isolation-by-distance effect. Notably, the population in the lowest reaches of the Columbia River is more distinct from the middle or upper reaches than from outside basins, and suggests historically a higher or more recent gene exchange through coastal routes than with populations in the interior Columbia Basin. Nonetheless, proximal reaches were generally only marginally or non-significantly divergent, suggesting that transplanting larvae or juveniles from nearby sources poses relatively little risk of outbreeding depression. Indeed, we inferred examples of dispersal between reaches via close-kin mark-recapture and genetic mark-recapture that indicate movement between nearby reaches is not unusual. Samples from the Kootenai and upper Snake Rivers exhibited notably lower genetic diversity than the remaining samples as a result of population bottlenecks, genetic drift, and/or historical divergence. Conservation actions, such as supplementation, are underway to maintain population viability and will require balanced efforts to increase demographic abundance while maintaining genetic diversity.

Willis, Stuart C.↗
NASA NTRS2006

The Columbia Debris Loan Program; Examples of Microscopic Analysis

Following the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia NASA formed The Columbia Recovery Office (CRO). The CRO was initially formed at the Johnson Space Center after the conclusion of recovery operations on May 1,2003 and then transferred .to the Kennedy Space Center on October 6,2003 and renamed The Columbia Recovery Office and Preservation. An integral part of the preservation project was the development of a process to loan Columbia debris to qualified researchers and technical educators. The purposes of this program include aiding in the advancement of advanced spacecraft design and flight safety development, the advancement of the study of hypersonic re-entry to enhance ground safety, to train and instruct accident investigators and to establish an enduring legacy for Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew. Along with a summary of the debris loan process examples of microscopic analysis of Columbia debris items will be presented. The first example will be from the reconstruction following the STS- 107 accident and how the Materials and Pro~es~steesa m used microscopic analysis to confirm the accident scenario. Additionally, three examples of microstructural results from the debris loan process from NASA internal, academia and private industry will be presented.

Russell, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Summary of the Space Shuttle Columbia Tragedy and the Use of LS Dyna in the Accident Investigation and Return to Flight Efforts

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during reentry resulting in loss of 7 crewmembers and craft. For the next several months an extensive investigation of the accident ensued involving a nationwide team of experts from NASA, industry, and academia, spanning dozens of technical disciplines. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), a group of experts assembled to conduct an investigation independent of NASA concluded in August, 2003 that the cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the left wing leading edge Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) thermal protection system initiated by the impact of thermal insulating foam that had separated from the orbiters external fuel tank 81 seconds into the missions launch. During reentry, this breach allowed superheated air to penetrate behind the leading edge and erode the aluminum structure of left wing which ultimately led to the breakup of the orbiter. In order to gain a better understanding the foam impact on the orbiters RCC wing leading edge, a multi-center team of NASA and Boeing impact experts was formed to characterize the foam and RCC materials for impact analysis using LS Dyna. Dyna predictions were validated with sub-component and full scale tests. LS Dyna proved to be a valuable asset in supporting both the Columbia Accident Investigation and NASA s return to flight efforts. This paper summarizes Columbia Accident and the nearly seven month long investigation that followed. The use of LS-DYNA in this effort is highlighted. Contributions to the investigation and return to flight efforts of the multicenter team consisting of members from NASA Glenn, NASA Langley, and Boeing Philadelphia are introduced and covered in detail in papers to follow in these proceedings.

Melis, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2005

Building Columbia from the SysAdmin View

Project Columbia was built at NASA Ames Research Center in partnership with SGI and Intel. Columbia consists of 20 512 processor Altix machines with 440TB of storage and achieved 51.87 TeraPlops to be ranked the second fastest on the top 500 at SuperComputing 2004. Columbia was delivered, installed and put into production in 3 months. On average, a new Columbia node was brought into production in less than a week. Columbia's configuration, installation, and future plans will be discussed.

Chan, David↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Alternative Operations and Renewable Energy Deployment on Columbia River Hydropower

The Columbia River Treaty Tribes in the Pacific Northwest - the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama - hold treaty-reserved fishing rights for the Columbia River, one of the world's most productive salmon rivers and a critical resource for these tribes. However, the tribes have expressed that current operating regimes of hydropower dams throughout the Columbia River Basin (CRB) do not fully account for tribal fishing rights and have negatively impacted fish populations. Four tribes acting together through the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC)'s 2022 Energy Vision stated that current power system models often do not fully account for the many constraints faced by hydropower facilities in the CRB. As the deployment of variable renewable energy (VRE) like solar and wind continues to increase, power system flexibility will become increasingly important. As a result, there is a growing need to better understand the true capabilities of the hydropower generation fleet while accurately accounting for ecological constraints (Northwest Power and Conservation Council 2022). Understanding hydropower's role in a future grid with a higher share of VRE can inform water resources planning to address ecological needs. The goal of this study is to examine the impacts of alternative hydropower operation rules and weather variability on hydropower generation and grid operations in VRE and transmission infrastructure deployment scenarios. The study evaluates how hydropower scheduling practices can reduce ecological impacts to the region's salmon populations. More specifically, the study examines the impact of today's dam water release rules (called "adjusted base water rules" in this study) and new, ecologically informed water release rules (called "ecosystem water rules" in this study) on two VRE scenarios (current renewable energy levels and higher renewable energy levels) using six weather years for each scenario (2008-2013). CRITFC developed the ecosystem water rules, which capture a portion of the changes they recommend for CRB hydropower operations. These analyses use a water resource planning model (OASIS) and a production cost model (PLEXOS) to simulate CRB reservoir cascade and Western Interconnection power grid operation.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Passage and survival of juvenile salmonid smolts through dams in the Columbia and Snake Rivers, 2010-2018

Minimizing the mortality and migration time of juvenile salmon (smolts) passing dams is a longstanding objective in the pursuit of salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin. We compiled and analyzed 40 juvenile salmonid acoustic-tag studies that were performed at seven of the eight hydroelectric projects in the Federal Columbia River Power System between 2010–2018. We found the utilization of non-turbine routes decreased monotonically moving downstream from the Snake River to the mainstem Columbia River and that route usage and associated mortality differed substantially between the dams in the two rivers. Spillways were the predominant passage route at mainstem Columbia River dams, whereas passage through surface weirs and juvenile bypass systems was more common and generally provided higher survival at Snake River dams. Stocks exhibited variable passage behaviors and mortalities, with the estimated probability of an individual passing through all eight dams in the system and never using a turbine route at 0.31, 0.47, and 0.60 for subyearling Chinook Salmon, yearling Chinook Salmon, and steelhead, respectively. Although subyearling Chinook Salmon were generally more likely to pass through a turbine route, they also experienced less turbine-associated mortality than other stocks, especially steelhead. Notably, the proportion of smolts passing through the spillway relative to the amount of water released was lowest at Bonneville Dam, the largest and lowermost dam in the system. Bonneville Dam also stood out as having the highest proportion of smolts passing through turbines, but the lowest rate of turbine-associated mortality.

Skalski, J R.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the tragic February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months and involved 13 Board members, approximately 120 Board investigators, and thousands of NASA and support personnel. Because the events that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the investigation's depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA history. Further, the Board determined early in the investigation that it intended to put this accident into context. We considered it unlikely that the accident was a random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree to NASA's budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of the democratic process. We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing. The Board was also influenced by discussions with members of Congress, who suggested that this nation needed a broad examination of NASA's Human Space Flight Program, rather than just an investigation into what physical fault caused Columbia to break up during re-entry. Findings and recommendations are in the relevant chapters and all recommendations are compiled in Chapter 11. Volume I is organized into four parts: The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and various appendices. To put this accident in context, Parts One and Two begin with histories, after which the accident is described and then analyzed, leading to findings and recommendations. Part Three contains the Board's views on what is needed to improve the safety of our voyage into space. Part Four is reference material. In addition to this first volume, there will be subsequent volumes that contain technical reports generated by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, as well as volumes containing reference documentation and other related material.

Gehman, Harold W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Probe Widens

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board has identified about a dozen shuttle program safety concerns it will address in its final report, in addition to foam shedding from the Lockheed Martin external tank-believed by many board members to be the direct cause for the loss of Columbia and her crew. As new evidence narrows the location of Columbia's left-wing breach to a lower corner of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) Panel 8 and its adjoining T-seal, the board is broadening its penetration of other shuttle safety issues. As the board works in Houston, United Space Alliance technicians here at Kennedy last week sent the first six of 22 RCC panels from the orbiter Atlantis left wing to Vought Aircraft Industries Inc. in Dallas for extensive testing to assess their integrity. The move is a key step toward both returning the shuttle to flight with Atlantis and obtaining more data on RCC panels subjected to fewer flights, and less exposure to the weather, than the older panels used on Columbia.

Covault, Craig↗
NASA NTRS2005

Next Generation Security for the 10,240 Processor Columbia System

This presentation includes a discussion of the Columbia 10,240-processor system located at the NASA Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) division at the NASA Ames Research Center which supports each of NASA's four missions: science, exploration systems, aeronautics, and space operations. It is comprised of 20 Silicon Graphics nodes, each consisting of 512 Itanium II processors. A 64 processor Columbia front-end system supports users as they prepare their jobs and then submits them to the PBS system. Columbia nodes and front-end systems use the Linux OS. Prior to SC04, the Columbia system was used to attain a processing speed of 51.87 TeraFlops, which made it number two on the Top 500 list of the world's supercomputers and the world's fastest "operational" supercomputer since it was fully engaged in supporting NASA users.

Hinke, Thomas↗