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NASA NTRS2016

Commercial Crew Program and the Safety Technical Review Board

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is unique to any other program office at NASA. After the agency suffered devastating budget cuts and the Shuttle Program retired, the U.S. gave up its human spaceflight capabilities. Since 2011 the U.S. has been dependent on Russia to transport American astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station (ISS) and back. NASA adapted and formed CCP, which gives private, domestic, aerospace companies unprecedented reign over America's next ride to space. The program began back in 2010 with 5 companies and is now in the final phase of certification with 2 commercial partners. The Commercial Crew Program is made up of 7 divisions, each working rigorously with the commercial providers to complete the certification phase. One of these 7 divisions is Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) which is partly comprised of the Safety Technical Review Board (STRB). The STRB is primarily concerned with mitigating improbable, but catastrophic hazards. It does this by identifying, managing, and tracking these hazards in reports. With the STRB being in SE&I, it significantly contributes to the overall certification of the partners' vehicles. After the partners receive agency certification approval, they will have the capability to provide the U.S. with a reliable, safe, and cost-effective means of human spaceflight and cargo transport to the ISS and back.

crew transportation system↗

NASA NTRS2012

Use of Commercial Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in NASA's Commercial Crew Program (CCP)

NASA's Commercial Crew and Cargo Program (CCP) is stimulating efforts within the private sector to develop and demonstrate safe, reliable, and cost-effective space transportation capabilities. One initiative involves investigating the use of commercial electronic parts. NASA's CCP asked the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to collect data to help frame the technical, cost, and schedule risk trades associated with electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts selection and specifically expressed desire of some of the CCP partners to employ EEE parts of a lower grade than traditionally used in most NASA safety-critical applications. This document contains the outcome from the NESC's review and analyses.

Gonzalex, Oscar↗

NASA NTRS2016

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine the commercial providers transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted Hazard Reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100 percent of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) model does not support the nature of the Commercial Crew Program. To that end, NASA SMA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance (RBA) process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications. This paper will describe the evolution of the CCP Mission Assurance process from the beginning of the Program to its current incarnation. Topics to be covered include a short history of the CCP; the development of the Programmatic mission assurance requirements; the current safety review process; a description of the RBA process and its products and ending with a description of the Shared Assurance Model.

Commercial Crew Program↗

NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Commercial Crew Program, the Next Step in U.S. Space Transportation

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is leading NASA's efforts to develop the next U.S. capability for crew transportation and rescue services to and from the International Space Station (ISS) by the middecade timeframe. The outcome of this capability is expected to stimulate and expand the U.S. space transportation industry. NASA is relying on its decades of human space flight experience to certify U.S. crewed vehicles to the ISS and is doing so in a two phase certification approach. NASA certification will cover all aspects of a crew transportation system, including: Development, test, evaluation, and verification. Program management and control. Flight readiness certification. Launch, landing, recovery, and mission operations. Sustaining engineering and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure NASA crew safety, NASA certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify compliance with NASA requirements, validate that the crew transportation system operates in the appropriate environments, and quantify residual risks. The Commercial Crew Program will present progress to date and how it manages safety and reduces risk.

Mango, Edward J., Jr.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Commercial Crew Program and Medical Operational Challenges

BACKGROUND: NASA embarked on the Commercial Crew Program to launch astronauts into low-earth orbit from US soil and dock with the International Space Station (ISS). The eventual industry providers selected were SpaceX (SpX) and Boeing. These commercial transportation systems are vital to ensure crew availability on ISS for research and discovery. OVERVIEW: NASA/SpaceX Demo-2 (DM2) mission launched from the Kennedy Space Center in 2020 as the historic first crewed test-flight of the Crew Dragon spacecraft with two NASA Astronauts onboard. DM2 represented the first flight in 9-years from US soil since STS-135 in 2011. The 63-day mission ended with splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, the first US water recovery in 45-years since Apollo-Soyuz. Validation of system hardware and operations allowed four-person crews to launch on subsequently missions (Crew-1, Crew-2, Crew-3, Crew-4, Crew-5 to date), which included International Partner crewmembers. DISCUSSION: A multitude of operational, training, medical, and technical issues needed to be addressed between NASA Medical Operations, the commercial provider SpaceX, and the Department of Defense. These included Flight rule development, occupant protection, pressurized suit testing, communication plans during mission phases, and emergency simulations for supporting Flight Surgeons and Biomedical Engineers. In providing crew experience with expected launch and entry G-force profile, Centrifuge training was established. Preventive health measures via the Health Stabilization Program were especially vital during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Unique aspects arise for SpX Dragon parachute splashdown and shipboard recovery operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The new Commercial Crew Program is indeed a wonderfully challenging and exciting era for human spaceflight.

Joseph P Dervay↗

NASA NTRS2014

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Shared Assurance Model for Safety

NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (nongovernmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the commercial provider's transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate compliance. This will be accomplished through the use of Shared Assurance and Risk Based Assessment by NASA thus shifting more responsibility to the Provider. This model will be the focus of this presentation.

Programmatic safety requirements↗

NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Commercial Crew Program, The Next Step in U.S. Space Transportation

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is leading NASA's efforts to develop the next U.S. capability for crew transportation and rescue services to and from the International Space Station (ISS) by the mid-decade timeframe. The outcome of this capability is expected to stimulate and expand the U.S. space transportation industry. NASA is relying on its decades of human space flight experience to certify U.S. crewed vehicles to the ISS and is doing so in a two phase certification approach. NASA Certification will cover all aspects of a crew transportation system, including development, test, evaluation, and verification; program management and control; flight readiness certification; launch, landing, recovery, and mission operations; sustaining engineering and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure NASA crew safety, NASA Certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify compliance with NASA requirements, validate the crew transportation system operates in appropriate environments, and quantify residual risks.

Mango, Edward J.↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA Commercial Crew Program Crew Transportation System Certificate of Flight Readiness Plan

NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) is the authorization granted by the Agency that certifies the flight readiness of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to conduct a flight test or mission to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the flight readiness of its CTS. The CCP with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s CoFR assertion to ensure compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety. NASA CCP CTS CoFR is the approval of the Commercial Provider’s evidence that: • The physical as-built CTS was produced, assembled, integrated, and tested within the approved production and operational constraints. • The mission specific requirements are enveloped within the certified CTS capabilities. • The CTS personnel are trained and certified to support the mission. • All aspects of the CTS are ready for the mission.

Certification of Flight Readiness↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Commercial Crew Program and Medical Operational Challenges

This abstract is submitted as part of the USSPACECOM Command Surgeon’s panel demonstrating the medical capabilities and challenges involved in human space flight support operations. BACKGROUND: NASA embarked on the Commercial Crew Program to launch astronauts into low-earth orbit from US soil and dock with the International Space Station (ISS). The eventual industry providers selected were SpaceX (SpX) and Boeing. These commercial transportation systems are vital to ensure crew availability on ISS for research and discovery. OVERVIEW: NASA/SpaceX Demo-2 (DM2) mission launched from the Kennedy Space Center in 2020 as the historic first crewed test-flight of the Crew Dragon spacecraft with two NASA Astronauts onboard. DM2 represented the first flight in 9-years from US soil since STS-135 in 2011. The 63-day mission ended with splashdown in the Gulf of Mexico, the first US water recovery in 45-years since Apollo-Soyuz. Validation of system hardware and operations allowed four-person crews to launch on subsequently missions (Crew-1, Crew-2, Crew-3, Crew-4, Crew-5 to date), which included International Partner crewmembers. DISCUSSION: A multitude of operational, training, medical, and technical issues needed to be addressed between NASA Medical Operations, the commercial provider SpaceX, and the Department of Defense. These included Flight rule development, occupant protection, pressurized suit testing, communication plans during mission phases, and emergency simulations for supporting Flight Surgeons and Biomedical Engineers. In providing crew experience with expected launch and entry G-force profile, Centrifuge training was established. Preventive health measures via the Health Stabilization Program were especially vital during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Unique aspects arise for SpX Dragon parachute splashdown and shipboard recovery operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. The new Commercial Crew Program is indeed a wonderfully challenging and exciting era for human spaceflight.

Joseph Dervay↗

NASA NTRS2015

Software Assurance Challenges for the Commercial Crew Program

This paper will provide a description of some of the challenges NASA is facing in providing software assurance within the new commercial space services paradigm, namely with the Commercial Crew Program (CCP). The CCP will establish safe, reliable, and affordable access to the International Space Station (ISS) by purchasing a ride from commercial companies. The CCP providers have varying experience with software development in safety-critical space systems. NASA's role in providing effective software assurance support to the CCP providers is critical to the success of CCP. These challenges include funding multiple vehicles that execute in parallel and have different rules of engagement, multiple providers with unique proprietary concerns, providing equivalent guidance to all providers, permitting alternates to NASA standards, and a large number of diverse stakeholders. It is expected that these challenges will exist in future programs, especially if the CCP paradigm proves successful. The proposed CCP approach to address these challenges includes a risk-based assessment with varying degrees of engagement and a distributed assurance model. This presentation will describe NASA IV&V Program's software assurance support and responses to these challenges.

Commercial Crew↗

NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Crew Program Crew Safety Strategy

The purpose of this presentation is to explain to our international partners (ESA and JAXA) how NASA is implementing crew safety onto our commercial partners under the Commercial Crew Program. It will show them the overall strategy of 1) how crew safety boundaries have been established; 2) how Human Rating requirements have been flown down into programmatic requirements and over into contracts and partner requirements; 3) how CCP SMA has assessed CCP Certification and CoFR strategies against Shuttle baselines; 4) Discuss how Risk Based Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance is used to accomplish these strategies.

Crew Safety↗

NASA NTRS2012

Commercial Crew Program Overview

No abstract available

Russell, Richard W.↗

NASA NTRS2011

One Methodology for Proving Compliance to the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Abort Capability Requirement

As of Draft 4.0 of the CCT-REQ-1130 requirements document for CCP, ISS Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document, specific language for the verification of the abort capability requirement, 3.3.1.4, was added. The abort capability requirement ensures that the CTS under dispersed conditions is always capable of aborting from a failed LV. The Integrated Aborts IPT was asked to author a memo for how this verification might be completed. The following memo dictates one way that this requirement and its verification could be met, but this is the not the only method.

Proud, Ryan↗

NASA NTRS2015