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At least 19 records

Managing Complex IT Security Processes with Value Based Measures

Current trends indicate that IT security measures will need to greatly expand to counter the ever increasingly sophisticated, well-funded and/or economically motivated threat space. Traditional risk management approaches provide an effective method for guiding courses of action for assessment, and mitigation investments. However, such approaches no matter how popular demand very detailed knowledge about the IT security domain and the enterprise/cyber architectural context. Typically, the critical nature and/or high stakes require careful consideration and adaptation of a balanced approach that provides reliable and consistent methods for rating vulnerabilities. As reported in earlier works, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System provides a comprehensive measure of reliability, security and safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. This paper advocates a dependability measure that acknowledges the aggregate structure of complex system specifications, and accounts for variations by stakeholder, by specification components, and by verification and validation impact.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge Tennessee. Specifically, the processes housed in building 9212 are being replaced as this facility dates to the World War II Manhattan Project days of Y-12. When the UPF Project is completed it will consist of three main facilities along with several support facilities. The Main Processing Building (MPB) will house oxide production and metal casting operations. The Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB) will house wet chemistry operations (examples include recovery evaporation and calcination of solutions). The Personnel Support Building will be connected to both the SAB and the MPB and will serve as a transition facility for materials and personnel between the two. The MPB will also be connected to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Storage Facility (HEUMF) via a connector (HCON) to permit transfers from storage into UPF directly. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space – everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed – nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions – to include any assumptions – is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Document Management: A Focused Analysis on the Configuration Management Process at Y-12 National Security Complex

The configuration management process at Y-12 is a crucial process to ensure safe operations and compliance with Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and requirements. This process is evaluated utilizing systems-thinking methodology in order to understand the current operational flow, with the ultimate goal of building an easily understandable, representative model. This model offers insights on key areas of waste and provides a potential solution by modernizing rate limiting steps: a software implementation to update the traditional document management system and make it paperless. Stakeholders of the software implementation are identified in order to define characteristic requirements of an effective product and the anticipated benefit is evaluated. Ultimately, this project is an effort to increase the quality of life for all stakeholders, while improving the capacity, throughput, and effectiveness of a necessary process at Y-12.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear Materials Process Modeling at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) has implemented process modeling for various accountable nuclear materials operations that are performed throughout the plant. Using a discrete, event-based dynamic simulation program, key nuclear material streams are modeled, allowing Y-12 to effectively manage numerous points of interest within the plant’s production operations. Integration of the various material processes into a single, interdependent supply and demand model is one of the ongoing focuses within Y-12’s process modeling effort. The primary purpose of using dynamic simulation modeling is to allow for analysis of the nuclear materials inventories and forecasted supplies based on future demands. Analysis of these inventories includes capacity evaluation, bottleneck mitigation, and assessments of individual pieces of equipment to inform future facility investment decisions and associated project schedules. Modeling of the nuclear materials processes throughout the complex also allows for incorporation of changes relevant to production capabilities such as the upcoming transition of specific operations to the new Uranium Processing Facility. Prior to implementation of process modeling, Y-12 forecasted supply and demand of accountable nuclear materials streams using Microsoft Excel. With deterministic models such as Microsoft Excel, the annual forecasts, generated within data input condition parameters, can only provide a fixed point of data. Fixed data cannot simulate integrated material streams and account for the possibility of occurrences and other changes that dynamic simulations take into consideration. Y-12’s dynamic process modeling allows integrated simulations of multiple accountable nuclear materials processes, including supply and demand forecasting and analysis, and is a coordinated effort involving many steps of verification and validation (V&V), site briefings, testing, reporting, data mining, planning, and documentation that spans various programs throughout the Y-12 complex.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Systematic Approach to Applying Lean Techniques to Optimize an Office Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex

This capstone offers the introduction of Lean concepts to an office activity to demonstrate the versatility of Lean. Traditionally Lean has been associated with process improvements as applied to an industrial atmosphere. However, this paper will demonstrate that implementing Lean concepts within an office activity can result in significant process improvements. Lean first emerged with the conception of the Toyota Production System. This innovative concept was designed to improve productivity in the automotive industry by eliminating waste and variation. Lean has also been applied to office environments, however the limited literature reveals most Lean techniques within an office are restricted to one or two techniques. Our capstone confronts these restrictions by introducing a systematic approach that utilizes multiple Lean concepts. The approach incorporates: system analysis, system reliability, system requirements, and system feasibility. The methodical Lean outline provides tools for a successful outcome, which ensures the process is thoroughly dissected and can be achieved for any process in any work environment.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Using Project Complexity Determinations to Establish Required Levels of Project Rigor

This presentation discusses the project complexity determination process that was developed by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for implementation at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The complexity determination process was developed to address the diversity of NNSS project types, size, and complexity; to fill the need for one procedure but with provision for tailoring the level of rigor to the project type, size, and complexity; and to provide consistent, repeatable, effective application of project management processes across the enterprise; and to achieve higher levels of efficiency in project delivery. These needs are illustrated by the wide diversity of NNSS projects: Defense Experimentation, Global Security, weapons tests, military training areas, sensor development and testing, training in realistic environments, intelligence community support, sensor development, environmental restoration/waste management, and disposal of radioactive waste, among others.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Signal Decomposition for Intrusion Detection in Reliability Assessment in Cyber Resilience (Summary Report)

The complexity of assuring cyber resilience for physical process interactions in connected systems such as energy grids increases dramatically as the coupling between processes becomes more direct and responsive. An example of this growing complexity is provided by Integrated Energy Systems (IES), in which various processes such as nuclear heat generation and commodity production are being directly coupled for increased responsiveness to highly variable signals such as market pricing or electricity demand. As such, the potential attack surface of the coupled processes is larger than the two processes independently. Securing these complex systems requires two-fold monitoring: cybersecure monitoring for potential malicious incursion, and physics monitoring for system tampering. Physics monitoring includes analyzing the behavior of the signals within the system for anomalous behavior. This analysis has been shown to be insufficient if approached by only data-driven machine learning and artificial intelligence (MLAI) techniques or only low-level model comparison. Previous efforts at Purdue University suggested combining high-fidelity models with MLAI algorithms as a basis for a software tool for detecting anomalies in physical processes. This work built on that suggestion, developing an advanced library for signal decomposition and analysis using both MLAI and high-fidelity physics algorithms for greatly improved anomaly detection, especially false data injection. This software can be used as part of a secure imbedded intelligence (SEI) system designed under Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) for complex coupled systems. This library established a foundation for online and posteriori analysis of digital signals for the purpose of detecting potential malicious tampering in digital signals representing physical processes. Demonstrations carried out throughout the development highlight the effective use of characterization algorithms to detect signal perturbations, particularly triangle attack-style perturbations, in three wide-ranging applications: seismic monitoring, nuclear thermal hydraulics system simulation, and custom manufacturing.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear Material Process Modeling at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Dynamic simulation modeling is used at Y-12 to evaluate and forecast nuclear material inventories and production capacities to ensure that future supply can meet mission demand. Model outputs are analyzed by numerous Y-12 organizations and programs and coordinated with NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization. Data-driven decisions for both short-term and long-term strategic planning for Y-12 mission execution are informed by the model. Dynamic simulation modeling capabilities for Y-12 nuclear material production continue to be expanded and refined.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Basis for the Uranium Processing Facility Criticality Accident Alarm System

The technical basis for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) 90% design has been completed. The CAAS design was evaluated for two primary processing facilities, the Main Processing Building (MPB) and the Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB), and for connected facilities known as the Personnel Support Building (PSB) and the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials facility (HEUMF) Connector (HCON), which connects UPF to existing Y-12 facilities. The evaluation focused on three primary areas to address requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.3: (1) detectability of the minimum accident of concern; (2) determination of areas where total dose could exceed 12 rad for the maximum anticipated accident yield; and (3) evaluation of the radiation tolerance of the detectors and associated control cabinets. The design was based on extensive analyses performed in MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION FOR WATERBORNE MERCURY REMOVAL AT THE Y12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

The Hg-contaminated processing water produced at Y-12 facility is discharged through the storm drain system, merged at Outfall 200, and then discharged to EFPC. Most of the baseflow mercury at Outfall 200 arises from a small number of short sections of storm drain. This report discusses the waterborne mercury treatment technologies to decrease mercury loading to the surface water of EFPC at Y-12 NSC. We reviewed current available waterborne Hg treatment technologies based on the specific conditions of Y-12 and identified two possible options: SnCl2 reduction coupled with air stripping (SnCl2/air stripping) and sorption. The ORNL 2008 and 2009 field studies suggested that SnCl2/air stripping has the capability to remove waterborne mercury with efficiency higher than 90% at Outfall 200. To achieve this goal, dechlorination (i.e., removing residual chlorine from water) using dechlorinating agents such as thiosulfate has to be performed before the reduction. It is unclear whether or not SnCl2/air stripping can reduce the mercury concentration from ~1000 ng/L to 51 ng/L at a full-scale operation. Therefore, a pilot test is a logical step before a full-scale design to answer questions such as Hg removal efficiency, selection of dechlorinating agents, and so on. The major advantages of the SnCl2/air stripping system are: (1) expected low cost at high flow (e.g., the flow at Outfall 200); and (2) production of minimum secondary waste. However, there are many environmental uncertainties associated with this technology by introducing tin to EFPC ecosystem, for example tin methylation causing abiotic Hg methylation, which should be addressed before a full-scale implementation. Mercury adsorption by granular activated carbon (GAC) is a proven technology for treating Hg at Y-12. The ONRL 2010 lab sorption studies suggest that thiol-based resins hold the promise to combine with GAC to form a more cost-effective treatment system. To achieve a treatment goal of 51 ng/L at Outfall 200 (flow rate: 1300 gpm), using a single GAC system will request very large reaction vessels and cost much more than a SnCl2/air stripping system (assuming it can achieve the 51 ng/L goal). However, the treatment cost depends on the treatment goal. If the treatment goal is 200 ng/L, the cost of GAC system will be significantly reduced while the cost of SnCl2/air stripping will remain the same. In addition, a GAC coupled with thiol-based resin system may further reduce the cost. Treating the Hg-contaminated water at source area with low flow rate (e.g., 40 gpm) may be another option to reduce the treatment cost. The advantages of the sorption technology are that it has proven treatment efficiency, reliability, and no environmental uncertainties. The disadvantages include that it produces large amount of secondary wastes. Based on the information evaluated in this report, we recommend that a pilot-scale test for SnCl2/air stripping process at Outfall 200 should be carried out before a full-scale implementation to address all the engineering and environmental risk questions. We also recommend continuing the sorbent lab studies at ORNL to optimize a sorption system that may be efficient and cost-effective enough for a full-scale implementation.

He, Feng↗

Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CAAS-3S Radiation Testing for Y-12 and UPF with Godiva-IV

The Y-12 National Security Complex and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) selected the Mirion CAAS-3S as the Criticality Accident Alarm System for UPF and for Y-12 facilities replacing their legacy CAAS as part of efforts to extend the facility lifespans. As part of this process, the CAAS-3S system was exposed to a high radiation dose and dose rate during reactor testing with the Godiva-IV fast burst reactor. The reactor testing was designed around preliminary analyses that determined Y-12 and UPF requirements, and simulations of the radiation field within the reactor facility were used to determine reactor operating parameters, CAAS equipment locations, and the design of a neutron shield wall. This paper presents the design and results of the testing, and discusses how the test results were interpreted by criticality safety engineers at Y-12 and UPF.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

UPF and Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Radiation Testing Report

This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Successful Characterization Strategies for the Active High Risk Y-12 National Security Complex 9201-5 (Alpha-5) Facility, Oak Ridge, TN - 12164

Building 9201-5 (Alpha 5) was completed in May 1944 and served as a production facility for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Weapons Plant. During the Manhattan Project, it functioned as a uranium enrichment facility. The facility was renovated and altered over the years, converting the calutrons to support other missions. Alpha 5 consists of 4 floors and a basement measuring approximately 600,000 square feet. The facility contains various pieces of equipment remaining from legacy operations. A significant amount (approximately 200,000 kgs) of mercury (Hg) has been spilled in the facility over the operational history of the building. To further complicate matters, beryllium (Be) contamination in 9201-5 is found throughout approximately sixty percent of the facility. Concentrations varying from very low (< 0.2 micrograms (μg)/100 cm{sup 2}) to areas where concentrations are relatively high, approximately 600 μg/100 cm{sup 2}, in regulated beryllium areas. The primary site related contaminants (SRCs) for the waste in this facility are enriched uranium, depleted uranium, beryllium and mercury. This facility represents the highest environmental risk for DOE-ORO EM and NNSA at Y-12 and must be quickly addressed to minimize impacts to future Y-12 missions, as well as human health and the environment. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), approximately 700,000 cubic feet of legacy material was removed in 2010 and 2011. In addition, characterization of the 9201-5 facility was scheduled in the winter and spring of 2011. This activity was initiated in January 2011 and was completed in July 2011. Heavy schedule pressure was further complicated by the fact that this building has active utility, security and process systems. Given these complex variables, a unique, out of the box characterization strategy was forged in an effort to bound radiological and chemical contaminants, as well as providing the appropriate level of quality to ensure that this data could be used to develop waste profiles when deactivation, decontamination and demolition (D and D) activities are authorized at a future date. The characterization strategy involved a hybrid model of statistically-based and biased sampling events. To achieve the desired results, traditional intrusive sampling and laboratory analysis, as well as a number of field-based characterization methodologies (e.g., X-ray Fluorescence [XRF], Lumex and Non-Destructive Assay [NDA]) were utilized. Results were captured and synthesized into meaningful, usable conclusions in a facility characterization report that will more accurately aid D and D cost estimates for future remedial actions. This massive characterization campaign involved over 1,200 separate sample locations using 4 separate characterization methods and was successfully completed to meet a performance-based milestone within 8 months of initiation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Basic Energy Sciences Roundtable: Foundational Science for Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies (Brochure)

Basic research to identify and understand the fundamental principles governing carbon dioxide removal processes of capture, conversion, and storage is essential for achieving zero carbon emissions by 2050. In March 2022, the Office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES)—in coordination with the US Department of Energy (DOE) technology Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, and Nuclear Energy—held a roundtable titled, “Foundational Science for Carbon Dioxide Removal Technologies,” to discuss the scientific and technical barriers for CO 2 capture, conversion, and storage. Five priority research opportunities were identified to address these scientific and technical challenges and accelerate progress toward the realization of zero carbon emissions. The PROs are as follows: 1) Master Interfacial Processes of CO2 Transport and Reactivity Across Multiple Length and Time Scales; 2) Create Materials that Simultaneously Exhibit Multiple Properties for CO 2 Capture and Release or Conversion; 3) Discover Unconventional Pathways for Energy-Efficient CO 2 Capture, Release, and Conversion; 4) Control Multiphase Interactions Required for CO 2 Conversion into Minerals and Materials; and 5) Achieve Predictive Understanding of Coupled Processes in Complex Subsurface Geologic Systems for Secure Carbon Storage.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

An evaluation of in-line component process modules

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the analysis of abnormal configurations of in-line components, tanks and pumps in support of the integration of Criticality Safety into the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). In-line components are components that are used in solution piping systems, including instrumentation, valves, pumps, and other general-use equipment. Mounted on self-contained skids/modules, in-line components (instruments, seal pots, level switches, etc.), tanks, and pumps are associated with a wide variety of the UPF processes. Using computer generated models expected to bound abnormal conditions for process module configurations, this report evaluates the impact of loss of spacing between in-line components in in-line component arrays and the effects of abnormal events. All fissile materials are considered to have a {sup 235}U enrichment of 100% and full theoretical density of 18.81 g/cm{sup 3} to conservatively represent the maximum credible enrichment available. Water and concrete were utilized to account for the construction materials associated with the skids and other reflective surfaces. Uranyl nitrate, was evaluated over the range of 0 to 550 g U/L for various normal and abnormal configurations of components mounted on skids. Abnormal events included fissile spills, sprinkler activation, and loss of spacing due to a seismic event. The results from this analysis provide a basis that supports development of nuclear safety design criteria, which generates standardized volume limits expected to bound the actual internal volume of the planned components. The results also provide a basis for consistent Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control of in-line components, pumps, and tanks, for the ultimate development of Criticality Safety Process Studies in the UPF. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗