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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed—particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection—have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. Here this study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Third international challenge to model the medium- to long-range transport of radioxenon to four Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

In 2015 and 2016, atmospheric transport modeling challenges were conducted in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, however, with a more limited scope with respect to emission inventories, simulation period and number of relevant samples (i.e., those above the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)) involved. Therefore, a more comprehensive atmospheric transport modeling challenge was organized in 2019. Stack release data of Xe-133 were provided by the Institut National des Radioéléments/IRE (Belgium) and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories/CNL (Canada) and accounted for in the simulations over a three (mandatory) or six (optional) months period. Best estimate emissions of additional facilities (radiopharmaceutical production and nuclear research facilities, commercial reactors or relevant research reactors) of the Northern Hemisphere were included as well. Model results were compared with observed atmospheric activity concentrations at four International Monitoring System (IMS) stations located in Europe and North America with overall considerable influence of IRE and/or CNL emissions for evaluation of the participants’ runs. Participants were prompted to work with controlled and harmonized model set-ups to make runs more comparable, but also to increase diversity. It was found that using the stack emissions of IRE and CNL with daily resolution does not lead to better results than disaggregating annual emissions of these two facilities taken from the literature if an overall score for all stations covering all valid observed samples is considered. A moderate benefit of roughly 10% is visible in statistical scores for samples influenced by IRE and/or CNL to at least 50% and there can be considerable benefit for individual samples. Effects of transport errors, not properly characterized remaining emitters and long IMS sampling times (12–24 h) undoubtedly are in contrast to and reduce the benefit of high-quality IRE and CNL stack data. Complementary best estimates for remaining emitters push the scores up by 18% compared to just considering IRE and CNL emissions alone. Despite the efforts undertaken the full multi-model ensemble built is highly redundant. An ensemble based on a few arbitrary runs is sufficient to model the Xe-133 background at the stations investigated. The effective ensemble size is below five. An optimized ensemble at each station has on average slightly higher skill compared to the full ensemble. However, the improvement (maximum of 20% and minimum of 3% in RMSE) in skill is likely being too small for being exploited for an independent period.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

International challenge to model the long-range transport of radioxenon released from medical isotope production to six Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

After performing a first multi-model exercise in 2015 a comprehensive and technically more demanding atmospheric transport modelling challenge was organized in 2016. Release data were provided by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization radiopharmaceutical facility in Sydney (Australia) for a one month period. Measured samples for the same time frame were gathered from six International Monitoring System stations in the Southern Hemisphere with distances to the source ranging between 680 (Melbourne) and about 17,000 km (Tristan da Cunha). Participants were prompted to work with unit emissions in pre-defined emission intervals (daily, half-daily, 3-hourly and hourly emission segment lengths) and in order to perform a blind test actual emission values were not provided to them. Despite the quite different settings of the two atmospheric transport modelling challenges there is common evidence that for long-range atmospheric transport using temporally highly resolved emissions and highly space-resolved meteorological input fields has no significant advantage compared to using lower resolved ones. As well an uncertainty of up to 20% in the daily stack emission data turns out to be acceptable for the purpose of a study like this. Model performance at individual stations is quite diverse depending largely on successfully capturing boundary layer processes. No single model-meteorology combination performs best for all stations. Moreover, the stations statistics do not depend on the distance between the source and the individual stations. Finally, it became more evident how future exercises need to be designed. Set-up parameters like the meteorological driver or the output grid resolution should be pre-scribed in order to enhance diversity as well as comparability among model runs.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2019

Book Review: Monitoring compliance with the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Contributions by the German national data centre edited by Christoph Pilger, Lars Ceranna and Christian Bönnemann

For decades, the nuclear weapons capability of different countries was tracked in part via the interpretation of signals from more than 2000 nuclear test explosions that were conducted in programs of weapons development. The first such explosion took place in July 1945 (in New Mexico, USA, prior to the use of nuclear weapons in World War 2 against Japan). The last nuclear test, prior to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) becoming open for signature in September 1996, was in July 1996 (in China). This treaty, which took nearly forty years to negotiate, has been signed by 184 states as of December 2018, but a few key additional signatures and ratifications are still needed before nuclear tests are banned under international law. The evidence that a nuclear test explosion has occurred can come from electromagnetic, seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic waves; and from unusual radionuclides— which can be present in particulate matter and/or as noble gases. Of course there is a vast infrastructure associated with military programs of nuclear weapons development in a limited number of countries. Less well-known, is the existence of a large infrastructure involving national and international efforts to monitor for the possible occurrence of nuclear test explosions, and thus to support CTBT verification. This book does a very good job of explaining much of that work, as it is conducted in practice by a western nation with sophisticated facilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Improving prediction of radioactive gas seepage for nuclear testing treaty verification

The length of time it takes for radioactive gases to seep from an underground nuclear test to the ground surface is crucial for verification of nuclear testing treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The identification of short-lived radioactive gases emanating from the ground surface at a suspected nuclear test location could provide “smoking gun” type evidence of a nuclear test. Accurate predictions of radioactive gas arrival time and detection window (duration of time gas concentration is above its detection threshold) are critical for procuring this type of evidence. LANL researchers are working toward improving such predictions in support of the Global Security mission and Information Science & Technology science pillar.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Impact of environmental backgrounds on atmospheric monitoring of nuclear explosions

Radionuclide monitoring for nuclear explosions includes measuring radioactive aerosol and noble gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has made such measurements for decades, revealing much about how atmospheric radioactivity impacts the sensitivity of the network. For example, civilian emissions of radioiodine make a substantial regional impact, but a minor global impact, while civilian radioxenon emissions create major regional and complex global impacts. This example statement is strongly influenced by the minimum signal level anticipated to be interesting. The original design of the IMS anticipated relatively large signal levels, and the accomplished IMS network substantially meets or exceeds the sensitivity needed to detect those signal levels. Much lower signal levels can be motivated, which could require reconsideration of station sensitivity. Using measured and simulated background concentrations, various possible desired signal levels, and an innovative anomaly threshold, maps of sensitivity and a station ranking are developed for current and future stations. These provide a strong motivation for additional experimentation to learn about sources and the potential plusses of new technology.

Eslinger, Paul W.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full‐Waveform Simulation of Infrasound Propagation in the Atmosphere: A Case Study of the 2023 April 20 SpaceX Starship Explosion

Infrasound, low‐frequency sound below 20 Hz, has been a key technology to monitor explosion events in the atmosphere. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty Organization provides the means for continuous monitoring of infrasonic events worldwide. Infrasonic techniques for event location and size estimation can also complement other observational techniques for the detection and characterization of the entry of asteroids or large meteoroids. In this study, we describe the detection capability of IMS infrasound stations for an explosive event in the middle of the atmosphere. Full‐waveform simulations are performed with the specification of atmospheric conditions and incorporated into the event location and explosion yield estimation. We applied it to the 2023 April 20 SpaceX Starship explosion at 29 km altitude. Starship is a super heavy‐lift space vehicle constructed by SpaceX and known as the largest and most powerful rocket ever built. The Starship explosion created huge pressure disturbances in the atmosphere, and its infrasound was detected by the IMS arrays in North America between 2000 and 4000 km. Independent observational data and available ground‐truth information provide a rare opportunity to evaluate the monitoring capability of the IMS network for elevated sources in the atmosphere. We also demonstrate the capability of full‐waveform simulation for infrasound wavefield characterization and prediction to improve event location and yield estimation.

Geosciences↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation and Uncertainty of Radioxenon Transport with a Mesoscale Model after the February 2013 Underground Test in North Korea

Abstract The transport of radioxenon released from the February 2013 underground nuclear weapons test in North Korea was analyzed at two receptors—one at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty site Rn58 in Russia (400 km downwind) and a second at Rn38 in Japan (1000 km downwind). Transport was modeled with two ensembles of mesoscale simulations, one generated with varying initial and lateral boundary conditions taken from the Global Forecasting System uncertainty ensemble, and a second created from different parameterizations and surface conditions. The wind variability was similar for the two ensembles and consistent with observations at 925 mb (1 mb = 1 hPa) but not at the surface. Biases in calculated surface winds and the radioxenon concentration in the ensembles were attributed mainly to poor simulation of the sea breeze at both locations and mountain lee affects at Rn38 in Japan. These wind regimes affected the timing of the surface radioxenon plume at Rn58 and its duration at Rn38. Surface wind variability induced by terrain and land–sea contrast (the sea breeze) also had a significant effect on the surface winds and plume dynamics, including blocking of flow approaching elevated terrain near Vladivostok and the west side of Japan. Increased plume uncertainty was seen at night because of surface wind variability. Measured surface chemical variability was larger than found in the first European Tracer Experiment in central Europe. The study found that horizontal model resolution contributes to uncertainty but not as much as vertical resolution, boundary layer parameterizations, and assimilation of surface meteorological data near the receptor.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Applying Waveform Correlation to Reduce Seismic Analyst Workload Due to Repeating Mining Blasts

Agencies that monitor for underground nuclear tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize mining blasts to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high–quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events, including mining blasts. We report the results of an experiment to detect and identify mining blasts for two regions, Wyoming (U.S.A.) and Scandinavia, using waveform templates recorded by multiple International Monitoring System stations of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) for up to 10 yr prior to the time of interest. We discuss approaches for template selection, threshold setting, and event detection that are specialized for characterizing mining blasts using a sparse, global network. We apply the approaches to one week of data for each of the two regions to evaluate the potential for establishing a set of standards for waveform correlation processing of mining blasts that can be generally applied to operational monitoring systems with a sparse network. Here, we compare candidate events detected with our processing methods to the Reviewed Event Bulletin of the International Data Centre to assess potential reduction in analyst workload.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1998

Ionospheric Signature of Surface Mine Blasts from Global Positioning System Measurements

Sources such as atmospheric or buried explosions and shallow earthquakes are known to produce infrasonic pressure waves in the atmosphere. Because of the coupling between neutral particles and electrons at ionospheric altitudes, these acoustic and gravity waves induce variations of the ionospheric electron density. The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a way of directly measuring the total electron content in the ionosphere and, therefore, of detecting such perturbations in the upper atmosphere. In July and August 1996, three large surface mine blasts (1.5 Kt each) were detonated at the Black Thunder coal mine in eastern Wyoming. As part of a seismic and acoustic monitoring- experiment, we deployed five dual-frequency GPS receivers at distances ranging from 50 to 200 km from the mine and were able to detect the ionospheric perturbation caused by the blasts. The perturbation starts 10 to 15 min after the blast, lasts for about 30 min, and propagates with an apparent horizontal velocity of 1200 meters per second. Its amplitude reaches 3 x 10 (exp 14) el per square meters in the 7-3 min period band, a value close to the ionospheric perturbation caused by the M = 6.7 Northridge earthquake. The small signal-to-noise ratio of the perturbation can be improved by slant-stacking the electron content time-series recorded by the different GPS receivers taking into account the horizontal propagation of the perturbation. The energy of the perturbation is concentrated in the 200 to 300 second period band, a result consistent with previous observations and numerical model predictions. The 300 second band probably corresponds to gravity modes and shorter periods to acoustic modes, respectively. Using a 1-D stratified velocity model of the atmosphere we show that linear acoustic ray tracing fits arrival times at all GPS receivers. We interpret the perturbation as a direct acoustic wave caused by the explosion itself. This study shows that even relatively small subsurface events can produce ionospheric perturbations that are above the detection threshold of the GPS technique. By sensing derivative signals, which can be detected over a relatively broad region, it appears that GPS might be particularly useful for source characterization within the first acoustic quiet zone where infrasound would probably be ineffective. This suggests that dual-frequency GPS monitoring could contribute to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty verification.

Calais, Eric↗
DOE OSTI2022

Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Novel Photonuclear Methods to Produce an Argon-37 Standard

The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Validation of MCNPX-PoliMi code for simulations of radioxenon beta-gamma coincidence detection

Radioxenon detection is an important component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We developed and validated a new model in MCNPX-PoliMi to simulate the decay of various radioxenon isotopes and the detector response of a variety of detector types. The model was validated using calibration data from a plastic and NaI(Tl) beta-gamma coincidence detector and the results are presented. The results of this validation show that this model can also be used as a tool to produce training spectra and as a method to calibrate radioxenon detection systems.

Radioxenon analysis, MCNP, beta-gamma coincidence↗
DOE OSTI2021

Guidelines for Broadband Seismometer Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mandates the four verification technologies to be used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor compliance to the Treaty. These technologies are seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Operational manuals for each of these technologies specify the requirements that equipment installed at IMS stations must meet for data from said stations to be accepted by the International Data Center. Following a model in which a revised set of infrasound sensor specifications and accompanying test procedures were developed in an international collaboration overseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the same process was recently followed for seismometers potentially of use by the IMS. This document, a product of that collaboration, defines key concepts and recommends test procedures to be followed to characterize broadband seismometers in a consistent and standardized way. Results from these test procedures can be used to verify that a seismometer meets the manufacturers stated specifications and IMS requirements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writers of this document would like to acknowledge Charles R. Hutt, John R. Evans, Fred Followill, Robert L. Nigbor, and Erhard Wielandt, the authors of the 2009 Guidelines for Standardized Testing of Broadband Seismometers and Accelerometers funded by the U.S. Department of Interior, on which this document is based. Although this document is limited in scope to seismometers and much of the document has been updated, the structure remains essentially the same.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

OSIRIS User's Manual, v. 1.0

The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (OSIRIS) system is a gamma-ray spectroscopy instrument for on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). [1] OSIRIS identifies fission-product isotopes with a high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer. The spectrometer is controlled by a ruggedized notebook computer running data acquisition and data analysis software customized for CTBT on-site inspections. This manual explains OSIRIS preparation and setup for operation; startup procedures, including energy-calibration of the spectrometer; spectral measurements and spectral analyses; and shutdown procedures.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2019

OSIRIS Validation and Verification Report

The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (OSIRIS) system is a gamma-ray spectroscopy instrument for on-site inspections conducted under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The OSIRIS software filters spectral analysis data, revealing information to users on only 17 CTBT-relevant fission-product isotopes. In this report, we review the CTBT requirements for on-site inspection radionuclide identifiers, plus additional requirements imposed by the design team. Then a series of validation tests conducted during OSIRIS development are described. The validation tests were designed to gauge if the nascent OSIRIS system met those requirements. We conclude with a set of recommended verification tests to ensure that newly-manufactured OSIRIS systems also will meet the requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗