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At least 19 records

Visualization Techniques for Computer Network Defense

Effective visual analysis of computer network defense (CND) information is challenging due to the volume and complexity of both the raw and analyzed network data. A typical CND is comprised of multiple niche intrusion detection tools, each of which performs network data analysis and produces a unique alerting output. The state-of-the-practice in the situational awareness of CND data is the prevalent use of custom-developed scripts by Information Technology (IT) professionals to retrieve, organize, and understand potential threat events. We propose a new visual analytics framework, called the Oak Ridge Cyber Analytics (ORCA) system, for CND data that allows an operator to interact with all detection tool outputs simultaneously. Aggregated alert events are presented in multiple coordinated views with timeline, cluster, and swarm model analysis displays. These displays are complemented with both supervised and semi-supervised machine learning classifiers. The intent of the visual analytics framework is to improve CND situational awareness, to enable an analyst to quickly navigate and analyze thousands of detected events, and to combine sophisticated data analysis techniques with interactive visualization such that patterns of anomalous activities may be more easily identified and investigated.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Computer network defense system

A method and apparatus for protecting virtual machines. A computer system creates a copy of a group of the virtual machines in an operating network in a deception network to form a group of cloned virtual machines in the deception network when the group of the virtual machines is accessed by an adversary. The computer system creates an emulation of components from the operating network in the deception network. The components are accessible by the group of the cloned virtual machines as if the group of the cloned virtual machines was in the operating network. The computer system moves network connections for the group of the virtual machines in the operating network used by the adversary from the group of the virtual machines in the operating network to the group of the cloned virtual machines, enabling protecting the group of the virtual machines from actions performed by the adversary.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Learning System for Discriminating Variants of Malicious Network Traffic

Modern computer network defense systems rely primarily on signature-based intrusion detection tools, which generate alerts when patterns that are pre-determined to be malicious are encountered in network data streams. Signatures are created reactively, and only after in-depth manual analysis of a network intrusion. There is little ability for signature-based detectors to identify intrusions that are new or even variants of an existing attack, and little ability to adapt the detectors to the patterns unique to a network environment. Due to these limitations, the need exists for network intrusion detection techniques that can more comprehensively address both known unknown networkbased attacks and can be optimized for the target environment. This work describes a system that leverages machine learning to provide a network intrusion detection capability that analyzes behaviors in channels of communication between individual computers. Using examples of malicious and non-malicious traffic in the target environment, the system can be trained to discriminate between traffic types. The machine learning provides insight that would be difficult for a human to explicitly code as a signature because it evaluates many interdependent metrics simultaneously. With this approach, zero day detection is possible by focusing on similarity to known traffic types rather than mining for specific bit patterns or conditions. This also reduces the burden on organizations to account for all possible attack variant combinations through signatures. The approach is presented along with results from a third-party evaluation of its performance.

Computer Network Defense↗

Addressing Software Security

Historically security within organizations was thought of as an IT function (web sites/servers, email, workstation patching, etc.) Threat landscape has evolved (Script Kiddies, Hackers, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Nation States, etc.) Attack surface has expanded -Networks interconnected!! Some security posture factors Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.) Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, Continuous Monitoring, etc.) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)

software↗

Dynamic defense and network randomization for computer systems

The various technologies presented herein relate to determining a network attack is taking place, and further to adjust one or more network parameters such that the network becomes dynamically configured. A plurality of machine learning algorithms are configured to recognize an active attack pattern. Notification of the attack can be generated, and knowledge gained from the detected attack pattern can be utilized to improve the knowledge of the algorithms to detect a subsequent attack vector(s). Further, network settings and application communications can be dynamically randomized, wherein artificial diversity converts control systems into moving targets that help mitigate the early reconnaissance stages of an attack. An attack(s) based upon a known static address(es) of a critical infrastructure network device(s) can be mitigated by the dynamic randomization. Network parameters that can be randomized include IP addresses, application port numbers, paths data packets navigate through the network, application randomization, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A likelihood ratio anomaly detector for identifying within-perimeter computer network attacks

The rapid detection of attackers within firewalls of enterprise computer networks is of paramount importance. Anomaly detectors address this problem by quantifying deviations from baseline statistical models of normal network behavior and signaling an intrusion when the observed data deviates significantly from the baseline model. But, many anomaly detectors do not take into account plausible attacker behavior. As a result, anomaly detectors are prone to a large number of false positives due to unusual but benign activity. Our paper first introduces a stochastic model of attacker behavior which is motivated by real world attacker traversal. Then, we develop a likelihood ratio detector that compares the probability of observed network behavior under normal conditions against the case when an attacker has possibly compromised a subset of hosts within the network. Since the likelihood ratio detector requires integrating over the time each host becomes compromised, we illustrate how to use Monte Carlo methods to compute the requisite integral. We then present Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for various network parameterizations that show for any rate of true positives, the rate of false positives for the likelihood ratio detector is no higher than that of a simple anomaly detector and is often lower. Finally, we demonstrate the superiority of the proposed likelihood ratio detector when the network topologies and parameterizations are extracted from real-world networks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber and physical infrastructure interdependencies.

The goal of the work discussed in this document is to understand the risk to the nation of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures. The large body of research results on cyber attacks against physical infrastructure vulnerabilities has not resulted in clear understanding of the cascading effects a cyber-caused disruption can have on critical national infrastructures and the ability of these affected infrastructures to deliver services. This document discusses current research and methodologies aimed at assessing the translation of a cyber-based effect into a physical disruption of infrastructure and thence into quantification of the economic consequences of the resultant disruption and damage. The document discusses the deficiencies of the existing methods in correlating cyber attacks with physical consequences. The document then outlines a research plan to correct those deficiencies. When completed, the research plan will result in a fully supported methodology to quantify the economic consequences of events that begin with cyber effects, cascade into other physical infrastructure impacts, and result in degradation of the critical infrastructure's ability to deliver services and products. This methodology enables quantification of the risks to national critical infrastructure of cyber threats. The work addresses the electric power sector as an example of how the methodology can be applied.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A unified lunar control network - The near side

A unified lunar control network for the moon's near side, which combines all the data collected by the Lunokhod 2 and Apollo 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17 missions, is presented. Transformations involving translation, rotation, and scale were determined that adjusted the coordinates of the points of three Apollo control networks, computed previously, to the center of mass origin and the mean earth/polar axis coordinate system defined by the lunar ranging retroreflector experiment. The transformed control network computed by the Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center was found to be the best fit to the Apollo ALSEP antenna coordinates and was selected as a base to transform all points in Meyer's (1979) telescopic network to the new origin and coordinate system. New coordinates of 1156 of these points are given as are 10 points from a Mariner 10 solution in the north polar region.

Davies, Merton E.↗

A game theoretic investigation of deception in network security

We perform a game theoretic investigation of the effects of deception on the interactions between an attacker and a defender of a computer network. The defender can employ camouflage by either disguising a normal system as a honeypot or by disguising a honeypot as a normal system. We model the interactions between defender and attacker using a signaling game, a non-cooperative two player dynamic game of incomplete information. For this model, we determine which strategies admit perfect Bayesian equilibria. These equilibria are refined Nash equilibria in which neither the defender nor the attacker will unilaterally choose to deviate from their strategies. Finally, we discuss the benefits of employing deceptive equilibrium strategies in the defense of a computer network.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

AdaNET phase 0 support for the AdaNET Dynamic Software Inventory (DSI) management system prototype. Catalog of available reusable software components

The Ada Software Repository is a public-domain collection of Ada software and information. The Ada Software Repository is one of several repositories located on the SIMTEL20 Defense Data Network host computer at White Sands Missile Range, and available to any host computer on the network since 26 November 1984. This repository provides a free source for Ada programs and information. The Ada Software Repository is divided into several subdirectories. These directories are organized by topic, and their names and a brief overview of their topics are contained. The Ada Software Repository on SIMTEL20 serves two basic roles: to promote the exchange and use (reusability) of Ada programs and tools (including components) and to promote Ada education.

Hanley, Lionel↗

Data Diode

The Data Diode is a data security technology that can be deployed within an organization's defense-in-depth computer network strategy for information assurance. For internal security, the software creates an environment within the network where an organization's approved users can work freely inside an enclave of protected data, but file transfers out of the enclave is restricted. For external security, once a network intruder has penetrated the network, the intruder is able to "see" the protected data, but is unable to download the actual data. During the time it takes for the intruder to search for a way around the obstacle created by the Data Diode, the network's intrusion detection technologies can locate and thwart the malicious intent of the intruder. Development of the Data Diode technology was made possible by funding from the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).

Source record↗

Integration of sensing and computing in an intelligent decision support system for homeland security defense

We propose an intelligent decision support system based on sensor and computer networks that incorporates various component techniques for sensor deployment, data routing, distributed computing, and information fusion. The integrated system is deployed in a distributed environment composed of both wireless sensor networks for data collection and wired computer networks for data processing in support of homeland security defense. We present the system framework and formulate the analytical problems and develop approximate or exact solutions for the subtasks: (i) sensor deployment strategy based on a two-dimensional genetic algorithm to achieve maximum coverage with cost constraints; (ii) data routing scheme to achieve maximum signal strength with minimum path loss, high energy efficiency, and effective fault tolerance; (iii) network mapping method to assign computing modules to network nodes for high-performance distributed data processing; and (iv) binary decision fusion rule that derive threshold bounds to improve system hit rate and false alarm rate. These component solutions are implemented and evaluated through either experiments or simulations in various application scenarios. The extensive results demonstrate that these component solutions imbue the integrated system with the desirable and useful quality of intelligence in decision making.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Best Paper Award: Gathering Threat Intelligence Through Computer Network Deception

Presented at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), this LDRD-funded research received a Best Paper award, the highest award presented at the conference. The research focused on developing, implementing, and testing a novel computer network operations architecture that enables proactive defense by managing and monitoring enterprise resource allocations and network flows. The architecture leverages three emerging concepts: software-defined networks, cloud computing, and deception, to enable the detection and identification of anomalous access and intrusions to adjust to the dynamic nature of the adversary and to provide a mechanism to discover and react to the adversary’s attacks in a methodical and proactive manner. Additionally, the work allows network defenders to gather information on an adversary’s tools, tactics and procedures, providing insight into the “what, why, and how” of the adversary’s operations. A summary of the work presented at IEEE can be found at http://tiny.sandia.gov/8d8lu.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Trust Management Considerations For the Cooperative Infrastructure Defense Framework: Trust Relationships, Evidence, and Decisions

Cooperative Infrastructure Defense (CID) is a hierarchical, agent-based, adaptive, cyber-security framework designed to collaboratively protect multiple enclaves or organizations participating in a complex infrastructure. CID employs a swarm of lightweight, mobile agents called Sensors designed to roam hosts throughout a security enclave to find indications of anomalies and report them to host-based Sentinels. The Sensors’ findings become pieces of a larger puzzle, which the Sentinel puts together to determine the problem and respond per policy as given by the enclave-level Sergeant agent. Horizontally across multiple enclaves and vertically within each enclave, authentication and access control technologies are necessary but insufficient authorization mechanisms to ensure that CID agents continue to fulfill their roles in a trustworthy manner. Trust management fills the gap, providing mechanisms to detect malicious agents and offering more robust mechanisms for authorization. This paper identifies the trust relationships throughout the CID hierarchy, the types of trust evidence that could be gathered, and the actions that the CID system could take if an entity is determined to be untrustworthy.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DualTrust: A Trust Management Model for Swarm-Based Autonomic Computing Systems

Trust management techniques must be adapted to the unique needs of the application architectures and problem domains to which they are applied. For autonomic computing systems that utilize mobile agents and ant colony algorithms for their sensor layer, certain characteristics of the mobile agent ant swarm -- their lightweight, ephemeral nature and indirect communication -- make this adaptation especially challenging. This thesis looks at the trust issues and opportunities in swarm-based autonomic computing systems and finds that by monitoring the trustworthiness of the autonomic managers rather than the swarming sensors, the trust management problem becomes much more scalable and still serves to protect the swarm. After analyzing the applicability of trust management research as it has been applied to architectures with similar characteristics, this thesis specifies the required characteristics for trust management mechanisms used to monitor the trustworthiness of entities in a swarm-based autonomic computing system and describes a trust model that meets these requirements.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗