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NASA NTRS2003

Airport Pricing Strategies

Conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports. Several characteristics of aviation markets, however, may make naive congestion prices equal to the value of marginal travel delays a non-optimal response. This paper has developed a model of airport pricing that captures a number of these features. The model in particular reflects that airlines typically have market power and are engaged in oligopolistic competition at different sub-markets; that part of external travel delays that aircraft impose are internal to an operator and hence should not be accounted for in congestion tolls. We presented an analytical treatment for a simple bi-nodal symmetric network, which through the use of 'hyper-networks' would be readily applicable to dynamic problems (in discrete time) such as peak - off-peak differences, and some numerical exercises for the same symmetric network, which was only designed to illustrate the possible comparative static impacts of tolling, in addition to marginal equilibrium conditions as could be derived for the general model specification. Some main conclusions are that second-best optimal tolls are typically lower than what would be suggested by congestion costs alone and may even be negative, and that the toll as derived by Brueckner (2002) may not lead to an increase in total welfare. While Brueckner (2002) has made clear that congestion tolls on airports may be smaller than expected when congestion costs among aircraft are internal for a firm, our analysis adds to this that a further downward adjustment may be in order due to market power. The presence of market power (which causes prices to exceed marginal costs) may cause the pure congestion toll to be suboptimal, because the resulting decrease in demand is too high (the pure congestion tall does not take into account the decrease in consumer surplus). The various downward adjustments in welfare maximizing tolls may well cause the optimal values of these to be negative. Insofar as subsidization is considered unacceptable for whichever reason, our results warn that the most efficient among the non-negative tolls may actually be a zero toll; the pure congestion toll may actually decrease welfare compared to the base case. The model in this paper contains a few simplifying assumptions that may be relaxed in future work. Load factors and aircraft capacity are fixed in this model for simplicity. In a more advanced version of this model, load factors and aircraft capacity can be endogenized. This makes the derivation of the optimality conditions far more complicated, but it should be feasible in a numerical experiment. One can also add a fourth layer to the model, describing the airport's optimization problem. For example, the airport can maximize profits under a cost recovery constraint. The model then deals with interactions between four types of agents. No distinction is made between peak and off-peak traffic in this paper. Finally, the results of the numerical exercise in this paper need to be checked against an asymmetric equilibrium.

Pels, Eric↗

NASA NTRS2010

Optimizing Air Transportation Service to Metroplex Airports: Analysis Using the Airline Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) - Par 2

The air transportation system is a significant driver of the U.S. economy, providing safe, affordable, and rapid transportation. During the past three decades airspace and airport capacity has not grown in step with demand for air transportation; the failure to increase capacity at the same rate as the growth in demand results in unreliable service and systemic delay. This report describes the results of an analysis of airline strategic decision-making that affects geographic access, economic access, and airline finances, extending the analysis of these factors using historic data (from Part 1 of the report). The Airline Schedule Optimization Model (ASOM) was used to evaluate how exogenous factors (passenger demand, airline operating costs, and airport capacity limits) affect geographic access (markets-served, scheduled flights, aircraft size), economic access (airfares), airline finances (profit), and air transportation efficiency (aircraft size). This analysis captures the impact of the implementation of airport capacity limits, as well as the effect of increased hedged fuel prices, which serve as a proxy for increased costs per flight that might occur if auctions or congestion pricing are imposed; also incorporated are demand elasticity curves based on historical data that provide information about how passenger demand is affected by airfare changes.

Donoue, George↗

NASA NTRS2010

Optimizing Air Transportation Service to Metroplex Airports: Analysis of Historical Data - Part 1

The air transportation system is a significant driver of the U.S. economy, providing safe, affordable, and rapid transportation. During the past three decades airspace and airport capacity has not grown in step with demand for air transportation (+4% annual growth), resulting in unreliable service and systemic delays. Estimates of the impact of delays and unreliable air transportation service on the economy range from $32B to $41B per year. This report describes the results of an analysis of airline strategic decision-making with regards to: (1) geographic access, (2) economic access, and (3) airline finances. This analysis evaluated markets-served, scheduled flights, aircraft size, airfares, and profit from 2005-2009. During this period, airlines experienced changes in costs of operation (due to fluctuations in hedged fuel prices), changes in travel demand (due to changes in the economy), and changes in infrastructure capacity (due to the capacity limits at EWR, JFK, and LGA). This analysis captures the impact of the implementation of capacity limits at airports, as well as the effect of increased costs of operation (i.e. hedged fuel prices). The increases in costs of operation serve as a proxy for increased costs per flight that might occur if auctions or congestion pricing are imposed.

Donohue, George↗

NASA NTRS2015

An Integrated Framework for Modeling Air Carrier Behavior, Policy, and Impacts in the U.S. Air Transportation System

The implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the United States is an ongoing challenge for policymakers due to the complexity of the air transportation system (ATS) with its broad array of stakeholders and dynamic interdependencies between them. The successful implementation of NextGen has a hard dependency on the active participation of U.S. commercial airlines. To assist policymakers in identifying potential policy designs that facilitate the implementation of NextGen, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and LMI developed a research framework called the Air Transportation System Evolutionary Simulation (ATS-EVOS). This framework integrates large empirical data sets with multiple specialized models to simulate the evolution of the airline response to potential future policies and explore consequential impacts on ATS performance and market dynamics. In the ATS-EVOS configuration presented here, we leverage the Transportation Systems Analysis Model (TSAM), the Airline Evolutionary Simulation (AIRLINE-EVOS), the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES), and the Aviation Environmental Design Tool (AEDT), all of which enable this research to comprehensively represent the complex facets of the ATS and its participants. We validated this baseline configuration of ATS-EVOS against Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data and subject matter expert opinion, and we verified the ATS-EVOS framework and agent behavior logic through scenario-based experiments that explored potential implementations of a carbon tax, congestion pricing policy, and the dynamics for equipage of new technology by airlines. These experiments demonstrated ATS-EVOS's capabilities in responding to a wide range of potential NextGen-related policies and utility for decision makers to gain insights for effective policy design.

Horio, Brant M.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Route Monopolie and Optimal Nonlinear Pricing

To cope with air traffic growth and congested airports, two solutions are apparent on the supply side: 1) use larger aircraft in the hub and spoke system; or 2) develop new routes through secondary airports. An enlarged route system through secondary airports may increase the proportion of route monopolies in the air transport market.The monopoly optimal non linear pricing policy is well known in the case of one dimension (one instrument, one characteristic) but not in the case of several dimensions. This paper explores the robustness of the one dimensional screening model with respect to increasing the number of instruments and the number of characteristics. The objective of this paper is then to link and fill the gap in both literatures. One of the merits of the screening model has been to show that a great varieD" of economic questions (non linear pricing, product line choice, auction design, income taxation, regulation...) could be handled within the same framework.VCe study a case of non linear pricing (2 instruments (2 routes on which the airline pro_ddes customers with services), 2 characteristics (demand of services on these routes) and two values per characteristic (low and high demand of services on these routes)) and we show that none of the conclusions of the one dimensional analysis remain valid. In particular, upward incentive compatibility constraint may be binding at the optimum. As a consequence, they may be distortion at the top of the distribution. In addition to this, we show that the optimal solution often requires a kind of form of bundling, we explain explicitly distortions and show that it is sometimes optimal for the monopolist to only produce one good (instead of two) or to exclude some buyers from the market. Actually, this means that the monopolist cannot fully apply his monopoly power and is better off selling both goods independently.We then define all the possible solutions in the case of a quadratic cost function for a uniform distribution of agent types and explain the implications for airlines in terms of service differentiation.

Tournut, Jacques↗

NASA NTRS2006

Autonomous Congestion Control in Delay-Tolerant Networks

Congestion control is an important feature that directly affects network performance. Network congestion may cause loss of data or long delays. Although this problem has been studied extensively in the Internet, the solutions for Internet congestion control do not apply readily to challenged network environments such as Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) where end-to-end connectivity may not exist continuously and latency can be high. In DTN, end-to-end rate control is not feasible. This calls for congestion control mechanisms where the decisions can be made autonomously with local information only. We use an economic pricing model and propose a rule-based congestion control mechanism where each router can autonomously decide on whether to accept a bundle (data) based on local information such as available storage and the value and risk of accepting the bundle (derived from historical statistics). Preliminary experimental results show that this congestion control mechanism can protect routers from resource depletion without loss of data.

delay-tolerant networking↗

NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Congestion Control in Delay-Tolerant Networks

delay tolerant networking↗

NASA NTRS2003

Auction Mechanism to Allocate Air Traffic Control Slots

This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A disequilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and ATC services demand are at the origin of almost one fourth of delays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation of ATC services, by setting up an auction mechanism. Objects of the auction will be the right for airlines to cross a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the necessary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auctioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To that end, we apply the principle of Clarke-Groves mechanism auction: each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.

Raffarin, Marianne↗

NASA NTRS2004

Journal of Air Transportation, Volume 9, No. 2

The following articles from the "Journal of Air Transportation" were processed: Future Requirements and Concepts for Cabins of Blended Wing Body Configurations:A Scenario Approach; Future Scenarios for the European Airline Industry: A Marketing-Based Perspective; An Application of the Methodology for Assessment of the Sustainability of the Air Transport System; Modeling the Effect of Enlarged Seating Room on Passenger Preferences of Domestic Airlines in Taiwan; Developing a Fleet Standardization Index for Airline Pricing; and Future Airport Capacity Utilization in Germany: Peaked Congestion and/or Idle Capacity).

Bowen, Brent↗

NASA NTRS1971

Economic utilization of general aviation airport runways

The urban general aviation airport economics is studied in detail. The demand for airport services is discussed, and the different types of users are identified. The direct cost characteristics of the airport are summarized; costs to the airport owner are largely fixed, and, except at certain large airports, weight is not a significant factor in airport costs. The efficient use of an existing airport facility is explored, with the focus on the social cost of runway congestion as traffic density at the airport build up and queues form. The tradeoff between aircraft operating costs and airport costs is analyzed in terms of runway length. The transition from theory to practice is treated, and the policy of charging prices only on aircraft storage and fuel is felt likely to continue. Implications of the study from the standpoint of public policy include pricing that spreads traffic peaks to improve runway utilization, and pricing that discriminates against aircraft requiring long runways and causes owners to adopt V/STOL equipment.

Piper, R. R.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Civil Tiltrotor Feasibility Study for the New York and Washington Terminal Areas

NASA tasked LMI to assess the potential contributions of a yet-undeveloped Civil Tiltrotor aircraft (CTR) in improving capacity in the National Airspace System in all weather conditions. The CTRs studied have assumed operating parameters beyond current CTR capabilities. LMI analyzed CTRs three ways: in fast-time terminal area modeling simulations of New York and Washington to determine delay and throughput impacts; in the Integrated Noise Model, to determine local environmental impact; and with an economic model, to determine the price viability of a CTR. The fast-time models encompassed a 250 nmi range and included traffic interactions from local airports. Both the fast-time simulation and the noise model assessed impacts from traffic levels projected for 1999, 2007, and 2017. Results: CTRs can reduce terminal area delays due to concrete congestion in all time frames. The maximum effect, the ratio of CTRs to jets and turboprop aircraft at a subject airport should be optimized. The economic model considered US traffic only and forecasted CTR sales beginning in 2010.

Stouffer, Virginia↗

NASA NTRS1997

Multiple Hub Network Choice in the Liberalized European Market

A key question that so far has received relatively little attention in the germane literature is that of the changes at various airports as a result of the EU liberalization policies. That is, presently, most major European airports still benefit from the so-called home-carrier phenomenon where the country's publicly or semi-publicly owned carrier uses the country's main airport as its gateway hub and, consequently, the home-carrier is also the principal user of this airport (in terms of proportion of total aircraft movements, number of passengers transported, connections, slots ownership, etc.). The country's main airport has substantially benefited from these monopoly conditions of airline captivity, strongly determined by the bilateral system of international air transport regulation. Therefore, European major airports were used to operate in essentially different markets, compared to the increasingly competitive markets of their home based carriers. This partly explains relative stability of transport volumes and financial results of European major airports compared to the relatively volatile financial results of most European national airlines. However, the liberalization of European aviation is likely to change this situation. Market access is open now to all community carriers, i.e. carriers with majority ownership and effective control in the hands of EU citizens. Ticket prices are free, governments can only intervene in case of dumping or excessive pricing. A community airline can choose its seat in any of the 15 member states. Licensing procedures are harmonized between member states. In the last few months community carriers have had unrestricted route access within the EU. Most probably this development will be extended to countries inside and outside Europe. Last year the European Commission got the mandate to start negotiations with 10 other European countries. In the meantime the EC has also started negotiations with the USA on so-called soft rights. In the meantime, open skies agreements have been concluded between the USA and most of the EU member states to facilitate strategic alliances between airlines of the states involved. As a result of this on-going liberalization the model of the single 'national' carrier using the national home base as its single hub for the designated third, fourth and sixth freedom operations will stepwise disappear. Within the EU the concept of the national carrier has already been replaced by that of the community carrier. State ownership in more and more European carriers is reduced. On the longer run mergers or even bankruptcy will further undermine the "single national carrier - single national hub" model in Europe. In the meantime, strategic alliances between national carriers in Europe will already reduce the airlines' loyalty to a single airport. Profit maximization and accountability to share holders will supersede the loyalty of these newly emerging alliances, probably looking for the opportunities of a multiple hub network to adequately cover the whole European market. As a consequence, some European airports might see a substantial decline in arriving, departing and transfer traffic, thus in revenues and financial solvency, as well as in their connection to other inter-continental and intra-European destinations. At the same time, other airports might realize a significant increase in traffic as they will be sought after by the profit maximizing airlines as their major gateway hubs. Which will be the losing airports and which will be the winning ones? Can airports anticipate the actions of airlines in deregulated markets and utilize policies which will improve their relative position? If so, what should be these anticipatory policies? These questions become the more urgent, since an increasing number of major European airports will be privatized in the near future. Although increasing airport congestion in Europe will also be reflected in a growing demand pressure for airport slots, this is not a guarantee for a stable transport volume growth of individual airports. The more volatile the market is, the more vulnerable privatized airports become. Therefore, the main issue of this study is the analysis of the opportunities of major European airports to become a central hub as a result of the network choices made by the new European airlines in a completely liberalized market. In a previous study (Berechman and de Wit, 1996), we already explored the potential of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol of becoming the major West-European hub, once European aviation markets are deregulated. A major hindrance of that study was the use of a single hub-and-spoke network. For example that model could not analyze the viability of different combinations of European hubs within a multiple hub network of alternative airline alliances. In this study, we have formulated the model of a multi-hub network where two West-European airports are used for inter-continental and intra-European travel to enable a more realistic analysis of hub choice. Like the previous one also this multi-hub model is primarily used to assess the potential ability of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for becoming a major West-European hub. Thus, in particular, the policy tests focus on this airport in a double hub network.

Berechman, Joseph↗