SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Containment of Biohazards”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2018

Next Steps in Planetary Protection for Human Spaceflight

Planetary protection is defined as: a) the prevention of contamination of extraterrestrial bodies by terrestrial microorganisms, and b) biohazard containment of returned samples from bodies in the Solar System that could harbor life.1 While the majority of interplanetary missions to date have involved robotic exploration, future missions will include human explorers. Current planetary protection requirements do not address the unique challenges associated with human exploration. The purpose of this abstract is to review planetary protection efforts for crewed missions and provide a forward plan for implementing them at the systems level. Article IX of the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides the definition of planetary protection, outlined above.1 COSPAR holds the international standard in line with this treaty2, while NASA's Planetary Protection Policy (NPD 8020.7G) outlines the U.S. implementation of the COSPAR standard. 3;4 NPI 8020.7 groups future human spaceflight planetary protection studies as follows: 1) microbial monitoring, 2) contamination mitigation and control, and 3) environmental effects. Additionally, a NPI 8020.7 outlines a five-step plan for forward work: 1) a literature review, 2) community inputs, 3) completion of recommended studies, 4) developing a draft NPR, and 5) implementation with NASA teams. The literature review was published in 2016.5 Inputs from the community were gathered at the Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, held in 2015.6 Johnson and Race (2016) outlined notional requirements and prioritized studies needed before final requirements can be produced. This prior work sets the stage for completing the necessary studies and finalizing planetary protection requirements for human spaceflight. We propose a continuation of the systems engineering approach adopted thus far. The challenges associated with the implementation of notional requirements will be quantified in detailed discussions with internal stakeholders. The status and results of high-priority studies that have been completed since 2016 or are ongoing will be incorporated into discussions with stakeholders. In this way, we plan to bridge the gap between the science behind planetary protection and the engineering development that will implement it, allowing finalized planetary protection requirements to be developed for future human space missions.

Mitchell, Julie↗

NASA NTRS2017

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Facilities for Meeting Restricted Earth Return Containment Requirements

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample containment and biohazard testing in a receiving laboratory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8020.12D - ensuring the preservation and protection of Earth and the sample. Currently, NPR 8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Enceladus with the caveat that future proposed mission locations could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of biohazards progresses. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 standards and protocols are used to study the most dangerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological agents on Earth. Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United States; of theses, 8 are operational. In the last two decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the facility requirements and size. Previous mission concept studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facility with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As an alternative option, we have recently conducted an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a faction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in approximately 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional construction methods without compromising the preservation of the sample or Earth.

Calaway, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return: Risk Management & Sample Safety Assessment

Returning samples from Mars has long been a major planetary science objective due to the high scientific value and transformative potential of the resulting data. An exciting dimension of this objective is the potential for the detection of ancient microbiological life, and the possibility of improving our understanding of the evolution of habitable environments on Mars and the development of life on Earth. To ensure that returned samples meet stringent planetary protection requirements and do not expose Earth to potential biohazards, the joint NASA/ESA Sample Receiving Project (SRP) assembled the Sample Safety Assessment Protocol Tiger Team (SSAP-TT). Members were recruited with the specific goal of creating a multi-disciplinary and internationally distributed team of experts in their respective fields across the federal government, academia, and private industry. This team was chartered with reassessing previous sample safety assessment strategies, defining what constitutes a biological hazard, developing a protocol to test for potential biohazards, and establishing a statistical framework to determine if samples are “safe” for release. The team developed a three-step protocol, supported by a Bayesian statistical framework, to assess whether returned samples contain potential biohazards that could present a risk to Earth’s biosphere. Initial conclusions indicated that an effective and comprehensive safety assessment protocol is feasible using modern techniques and does not require an excessive amount of sample consumption or traditional microbiological detection methodology. Herein, we will present an overview of the MSR SRP, the proposed safety assessment protocol, and how aspects of this novel approach can be applied to biological assessment in healthcare product manufacturing practices.

Alvin L Smith↗

DOE OSTI2020

Intubation Containment System for Improved Protection From Aerosolized Particles During Airway Management

Worldwide efforts to protect front line providers performing endotracheal intubation during the COVID-19 pandemic have led to innovative devices. Authors evaluated the aerosol containment effectiveness of a novel intubation aerosol containment system (IACS) compared with a recently promoted intubation box and no protective barrier. In a simulation center at the authors’ university, the IACS was compared to no protective barrier and an intubation box. Aerosolization was simulated using a commercial fog machine and leakage of aerosolize mist was visually assessed. The IACS appeared to contain the aerosolized mist, while the intubation box allowed for mist to contact the laryngoscopist and contaminate the clinical space through arm port holes and the open caudal end. Both devices protected the laryngoscopist better than no protective barrier. The IACS with integrated sleeves and plastic drape appears to offer superior protection for the laryngoscopist and assistant providers from aerosolized particles.

aerosols↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Medical System Requirements Development for Lunar Operations

The major health hazards of spaceflight include higher levels of damaging radiation, altered gravity, extended periods of isolation and confinement, a closed and potentially hostile living environment, and the stress associated with being a long distance from Earth. As we increase the duration of lunar stays with foreseeable communication latencies and disruptions, there will be a progressive need for crew to maintain their own health and independently respond to critical medical events. The Exploration Medical Capability element of the NASA Human Research Program is developing a set of Medical System requirements for lunar transit and surface operations. These requirements specify the capabilities, processes and procedures of a habitat Medical System needed for a range of conditions known to occur during spaceflight. Requirement text is written so as not to constrain innovative design solutions necessary for a resilient system. The requirement set includes attributes and functions the Medical System imposes on eight additional habitat systems. A key property of the Medical System is the provision of medical knowledge that will be stored, updated, analyzed, and secured within a Habitat Data System. A Task Performance Support System will aid in medical data acquisition and interpretation, crew training, medical condition prevention, diagnosis and treatment, provide interactive procedures, and track medical inventory. A Wellness System will focus on the provision of countermeasures to prevent, mitigate or treat adverse physical and behavioral health effects while the Medical System recommends adjustments to these countermeasures to maintain crew health. An Environmental Monitoring System will share out-of-bounds readings of air and water quality, acoustics, and radiation exposure levels with the Medical System to help identify issues before they affect crew health and performance. A Communications System will provide secured and private consultations between crew and the ground medical team and their loved ones on Earth. The Medical System also imposes requirements on a Research & Testbed System, fostering advanced medical science such as human research. A Waste Management System provides biohazard waste containment and waste disposal options (recycle and reuse). An Extravehicular Activity System supports crew health during lunar surface activities. And finally, a Maintenance Support System ensures that medical equipment is performing as expected. These requirements are being specifically developed for lunar surface operations but could help to identify Medical System requirements for any space habitat (e.g., I-Hab, commercial endeavors, etc.).

technology↗

NASA NTRS2016

Overview of the Life Science Glovebox (LSG) Facility and the Research Performed in the LSG

The Life Science Glovebox (LSG) is a rack facility currently under development with a projected availability for International Space Station (ISS) utilization in the FY2018 timeframe. Development of the LSG is being managed by the Marshal Space Flight Center (MSFC) with support from Ames Research Center (ARC) and Johnson Space Center (JSC). The MSFC will continue management of LSG operations, payload integration, and sustaining following delivery to the ISS. The LSG will accommodate life science and technology investigations in a "workbench" type environment. The facility has a.Ii enclosed working volume that is held at a negative pressure with respect to the crew living area. This allows the facility to provide two levels of containment for handling Biohazard Level II and lower biological materials. This containment approach protects the crew from possible hazardous operations that take place inside the LSG work volume. Research investigations operating inside the LSG are provided approximately 15 cubic feet of enclosed work space, 350 watts of28Vdc and l IOVac power (combined), video and data recording, and real time downlink. These capabilities will make the LSG a highly utilized facility on ISS. The LSG will be used for biological studies including rodent research and cell biology. The LSG facility is operated by the Payloads Operations Integration Center at MSFC. Payloads may also operate remotely from different telescience centers located in the United States and different countries. The Investigative Payload Integration Manager (IPIM) is the focal to assist organizations that have payloads operating in the LSG facility. NASA provides an LSG qualification unit for payload developers to verify that their hardware is operating properly before actual operation on the ISS. This poster will provide an overview of the LSG facility and a synopsis of the research that will be accomplished in the LSG. The authors would like to acknowledge Ames Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Teledyne Brown Engineering, MOOG-Bradford Engineering and the entire LSG Team for their inputs into this abstract.

Cole, J. Michael↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Life Sciences Glovebox (LSG)

The Life Sciences Glovebox (LSG) accommodates life science and technology investigations in a “workbench” type environment. It is used for biological studies, including rodent research and cell biology. The facility has an enclosed Work Volume (WV) that is held at a negative pressure with respect to the crew living area. This allows the facility to provide two levels of containment for handling Biohazard Level II and lower biological materials. The LSG facility is operated by the Payloads Operations Integration Center at MSFC. Payloads may also operate remotely from different telescience centers located in the United States and different countries. The Glovebox Integration Engineer (GIE) is the focal to assist organizations that have payloads operating in the LSG facility. NASA provides an LSG engineering unit for payload developers, fit checks, and to verify that the hardware is operating properly before beginning actual operations on the ISS.

biology↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth

NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.

mars sample return↗

NASA NTRS2003

Survival of endospores of Bacillus subtilis on spacecraft surfaces under simulated martian environments: implications for the forward contamination of Mars

Experiments were conducted in a Mars simulation chamber (MSC) to characterize the survival of endospores of Bacillus subtilis under high UV irradiation and simulated martian conditions. The MSC was used to create Mars surface environments in which pressure (8.5 mb), temperature (-80, -40, -10, or +23 degrees C), gas composition (Earth-normal N2/O2 mix, pure N2, pure CO2, or a Mars gas mix), and UV-VIS-NIR fluence rates (200-1200 nm) were maintained within tight limits. The Mars gas mix was composed of CO2 (95.3%), N2 (2.7%), Ar (1.7%), O2 (0.2%), and water vapor (0.03%). Experiments were conducted to measure the effects of pressure, gas composition, and temperature alone or in combination with Mars-normal UV-VIS-NIR light environments. Endospores of B. subtilis, were deposited on aluminum coupons as monolayers in which the average density applied to coupons was 2.47 x 10(6) bacteria per sample. Populations of B. subtilis placed on aluminum coupons and subjected to an Earth-normal temperature (23 degrees C), pressure (1013 mb), and gas mix (normal N2/O2 ratio) but illuminated with a Mars-normal UV-VIS-NIR spectrum were reduced by over 99.9% after 30 sec exposure to Mars-normal UV fluence rates. However, it required at least 15 min of Mars-normal UV exposure to reduce bacterial populations on aluminum coupons to non-recoverable levels. These results were duplicated when bacteria were exposed to Mars-normal environments of temperature (-10 degrees C), pressure (8.5 mb), gas composition (pure CO2), and UV fluence rates. In other experiments, results indicated that the gas composition of the atmosphere and the temperature of the bacterial monolayers at the time of Mars UV exposure had no effects on the survival of bacterial endospores. But Mars-normal pressures (8.5 mb) were found to reduce survival by approximately 20-35% compared to Earth-normal pressures (1013 mb). The primary implications of these results are (a) that greater than 99.9% of bacterial populations on sun-exposed surfaces of spacecraft are likely to be inactivated within a few tens of seconds to a few minutes on the surface of Mars, and (b) that within a single Mars day under clear-sky conditions bacterial populations on sun-exposed surfaces of spacecraft will be sterilized. Furthermore, these results suggest that the high UV fluence rates on the martian surface can be an important resource in minimizing the forward contamination of Mars. c2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Bacillus subtilis/growth & development/physiology/↗

NASA NTRS2000

The ultraviolet environment of Mars: biological implications past, present, and future

A radiative transfer model is used to quantitatively investigate aspects of the martian ultraviolet radiation environment, past and present. Biological action spectra for DNA inactivation and chloroplast (photosystem) inhibition are used to estimate biologically effective irradiances for the martian surface under cloudless skies. Over time Mars has probably experienced an increasingly inhospitable photobiological environment, with present instantaneous DNA weighted irradiances 3.5-fold higher than they may have been on early Mars. This is in contrast to the surface of Earth, which experienced an ozone amelioration of the photobiological environment during the Proterozoic and now has DNA weighted irradiances almost three orders of magnitude lower than early Earth. Although the present-day martian UV flux is similar to that of early Earth and thus may not be a critical limitation to life in the evolutionary context, it is a constraint to an unadapted biota and will rapidly kill spacecraft-borne microbes not covered by a martian dust layer. Microbial strategies for protection against UV radiation are considered in the light of martian photobiological calculations, past and present. Data are also presented for the effects of hypothetical planetary atmospheric manipulations on the martian UV radiation environment with estimates of the biological consequences of such manipulations.

NASA Center ARC↗

NASA NTRS1994

Anticipating the reaction: public concern about sample return missions

Shifts in public attitude that may affect extraterrestrial sample return include increased public participation in the legal and regulatory environment, institutionalized public vigilance, politicization of technological debates and shifts in the nature of public decision-making, and a risk-averse public accustomed to mass media coverage that focuses on hazards and disasters. The ice-minus recombinant DNA experiment is used as an example of the effects of public opinion on scientific experimentation.

NASA Center ARC↗

NASA NTRS2003

Critical issues in connection with human missions to Mars: protection of and from the Martian environment

Human missions to Mars are planned to happen within this century. Activities associated therewith will interact with the environment of Mars in two reciprocal ways: (i) the mission needs to be protected from the natural environmental elements that can be harmful to human health, the equipment or to their operations; (ii) the specific natural environment of Mars should be protected so that it retains its value for scientific and other purposes. The following environmental elements need to be considered in order to protect humans and the equipment on the planetary surface: (i) cosmic ionizing radiation, (ii) solar particle events; (iii) solar ultraviolet radiation; (iv) reduced gravity; (v) thin atmosphere; (vi) extremes in temperatures and their fluctuations; and (vii) surface dust. In order to protect the planetary environment, the requirements for planetary protection as adopted by COSPAR for lander missions need to be revised in view of human presence on the planet. Landers carrying equipment for exobiological investigations require special consideration to reduce contamination by terrestrial microorganisms and organic matter to the greatest feasible extent. Records of human activities on the planet's surface should be maintained in sufficient detail that future scientific experimenters can determine whether environmental modifications have resulted from explorations. c2002 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Extraterrestrial Environment↗

NASA NTRS2001

Introduction to Mars Sampling Handling Workshop Series. Workshop on Life Detection: Issues and Topics

Before martian soil and rock samples can be distributed to the research community, the returned materials will initially be quarantined and examined in a proposed BSL-4 containment facility to assure that no putative martian microorganisms or attendant potential biohazards exist. During the initial quarantine, state-of-the-art life detection and biohazard testing of the returned martian samples will be conducted. Life detection, as defined here in regard to Mars sample return missions, is the detection of living organisms and/or materials that have been derived from living organisms that may be present in the sample.

Rummel, John D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

rHealth One Demonstration Aboard ISS: A Microfluidic Bioanalyzer Based on Sheath/Hydrodynamic Focusing Flow Cytometry

The Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element aims to provide astronauts with the means for their own health monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment during exploration missions. As space flight ventures further from earth, the need for autonomous medical care increases under greater constraints on size, mass, and resources. One pillar for diagnosis that crew would be separated from is laboratory analysis. Even now on ISS, blood samples must be collected and returned to earth for testing. In response, ExMC is assessing how assays for hematology, bone health, radiation exposure etc. could be addressed through commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) funded bioanalyzers that are miniaturizing lab technology. Since missions will reach distances where there are no timely replacements, validation on the International Space Station (ISS) is a necessary part of that assessment. In partnership with NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Immunology Lab and the Research Operations and Integration (ROI) element, ExMC conducted a technology demonstration on ISS of the rHEALTH ONE, a flow cytometry based bioanalyzer, to assess future devices based on this design. In flow cytometry, there are predominantly three ways to focus the cells (or particles) into a single file stream: hydrodynamic focusing, microcapillary, and acoustic focusing. The rHEALTH ONE utilizes the commercial standard, sheath-based hydrodynamic focusing. rHEALTH itself represents both a company and a suite of medical tools NASA has funded through SBIR grants towards the development of a promising diagnosis instrument for exploration missions. rHEALTH ONE is the interim version of the technology, functional as a benchtop analyzer and test bed for the next generation of rHEALTH in development. Several modifications were made to the rHEALTH ONE analyzer for operation in microgravity. For function, fluid management was key. A sheath-based analyzer uses sheath fluid to flow the sample, cleaning fluid to prevent biological contamination, and a reservoir to collect the liquid waste. The rHEALTH ONE analyzer uses bottles dependent on gravity to separate the air and liquid pathways and keep the liquids contained. It uses only 1 psig of air pressure to directly push the liquid through the device, requiring little-to-no resistance at inlet and outlet. A microtubing assembly with self-sealing luer connectors was designed – featuring 0.014 mm thick durable medical balloons to hold water inside the supply bottles – to create safe containment and easy access for the crew while maintaining the analyzer’s function. For safety, copper tape was added to the interior of the plastic housing to reduce electromagnetic interference, fluid and electrical connections were secured against vibration and leaks, and gaps were further sealed to ensure containment of the optical block and lasers. Water as the sheath and cleaning fluid and TOX 0 samples were used to reduce the biohazard risk to the crew. In May 2022, European Space Agency astronaut Samantha Cristoforetti demonstrated the rHEALTH ONE aboard ISS for its sample loading, flow cytometry, and data collection capability in microgravity. The JSC Immunology Lab provided flow cytometry expertise, designed the sample test protocol, and manufactured and benchmarked the flight samples on a ‘gold-standard’ flow cytometer. The analyzer was primed with water, purged of air, and four calibration solutions of polystyrene microparticles were tested to characterize its performance. Tightly controlled procedures and excellent execution prevented air bubble interference during air/water separation, fluid transfer, sample mixing and loading. Data showed a slight increase in signal noise on 3 of 5 channels and an anomaly of fluorophores migrating in one sample (confirmed by JSC post-flight). Flight results correctly detected the change in sample, matched the analyzer’s ground performance, and were consistent with the gold-standard’s ground results. Although areas were noted for improvement, these outcomes signified complete mission success.

R. S. Miller↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

NASA, in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), is seeking to return Martian geological and atmospheric samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Due to the possibility that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, Mars Sample Return (MSR) is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence) to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized. The nominal utilization period for a SRF is anticipated to be 2-5 years and is intended to enable curation activities, biohazard assessment, select early science activities, and the rapid release of samples to the scientific community. However, to account for possible delays in schedule or the identification of extant life, this anticipated period of time must be flexible to accommodate schedule extensions and contingency plans. Due to requirements for high-level biological containment and cleanliness, a traditional receiving/curation facility cannot be utilized for MSR. Therefore, beginning in 2022, NASA Johnson Space Center is performing a MSR SRF Assessment Study (MSAS) to investigate the most optimal facility modality for a MSR SRF, as well as start to define programmatic early estimate of costs and schedules before the initial design phase begins. NASA is partnering with industry contractors (architectural and engineering firms with BSL-4 and cleanroom technology experience, as well as other contracted infrastructure and construction specialists) along with selected experts from NASA, ESA, existing U.S. BSL-4 facilities, and other U.S. government agencies, to carry out the assessment study. The MSAS should also aid in the future refinement of the science requirements (e.g., contamination control, equipment accommodations) before site-specific design would commence. As part of the MSAS, NASA is planning to assess an array of possibilities for a MSR SRF. One of the main considerations is the facility modality and whether an existing BSL-4 facility can be utilized (for some or all functions); or, if new constructure would be required, would a traditional fixed facility or a modular facility the best choice. MSAS will also investigate the ability of the modalities to accommodate two different facility capability endmembers: 1) a minimal facility focusing on biohazard assessment and curation tasks with a small footprint, and 2) an enhanced facility with additional capabilities to enable expedited processing and the completion of time-sensitive and (some) sterilization-sensitive science. The assessment is intended to generate information that will inform the selection of facility modalities for high-level conceptual design development. While the assessment study will focus on SRF requirements for accommodating curation, science, and sample safety assessment infrastructure, it will also consider an array of other factors, such as ease of access for international users, decommissioning, repurposing, future sale or lease following MSR’s use of the facility, and uncontained preparatory laboratory spaces. Upon completion of the study, the preferred modality and refined requirements would be utilized for site-specific design but will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

A.D. Harrington↗

NASA NTRS2002

A Draft Protocol for Detecting Possible Biohazards in Martian Samples Returned to Earth

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples, it is necessary to prepare for the safe receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but a specific protocol for handling and testing of returned -=1 samples from Mars remained to be developed. To refine the requirements for Mars sample hazard testing and to develop criteria for the subsequent release of sample materials from precautionary containment, NASA Planetary Protection Officer, working in collaboration with CNES, convened a series of workshops to produce a Protocol by which returned martian sample materials could be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct), while safeguarding the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. The Draft Protocol was then reviewed by an Oversight and Review Committee formed specifically for that purpose and composed of senior scientists. In order to preserve the scientific value of returned martian samples under safe conditions, while avoiding false indications of life within the samples, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is required to allow handling and processing of the Mars samples to prevent their terrestrial contamination while maintaining strict biological containment. It is anticipated that samples will be able to be shipped among appropriate containment facilities wherever necessary, under procedures developed in cooperation with international appropriate institutions. The SRF will need to provide different types of laboratory environments for carrying out, beyond sample description and curation, the various aspects of the protocol: Physical/Chemical analysis, Life Detection testing, and Biohazard testing. The main principle of these tests will be described and the criteria for release will be discussed, as well as the requirements for the SRF and its personnel.

Viso, M.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Lunar Samples: Apollo Collection Tools, Curation Handling, Surveyor III and Soviet Luna Samples

The 6 Apollo missions that landed on the lunar surface returned 2196 samples comprised of 382 kg. The 58 samples weighing 21.5 kg collected on Apollo 11 expanded to 741 samples weighing 110.5 kg by the time of Apollo 17. The main goal on Apollo 11 was to obtain some material and return it safely to Earth. As we gained experience, the sampling tools and a more specific sampling strategy evolved. A summary of the sample types returned is shown in Table 1. By year 1989, some statistics on allocation by sample type were compiled [2]. The "scientific interest index" is based on the assumption that the more allocations per gram of sample, the higher the scientific interest. It is basically a reflection of the amount of diversity within a given sample type. Samples were also set aside for biohazard testing. The samples set aside and used for biohazard testing were represen-tative, as opposed to diverse. They tended to be larger and be comprised of less scientifically valuable mate-rial, such as dust and debris in the bottom of sample containers.

Allton, J.H.↗