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Ted Quinn and Chad Kiger invited me to teach a course on Control Room Design and Modernization at the Digital I&C Workshop that is co-occurring with the 2019 ANS NPIC-HMIT Conference. What I am submitting here are the slides I intend to present as part of the training I have been asked to deliver.
Defining and achieving reasonable confidence in the validation of nuclear power plant control room designs is a complex challenge for many reasons; not the least of which is that validation is a test of strength rather than a test of truth. In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Agency, Committee for Safety of Nuclear Installations' Working Group on Human and Organizational Factors (WGHOF) hosted an experts' workshop to identify and critically examine potential means to address the challenge of achieving reasonable confidence in control room design validations. The experts' principal task was to answer four challenge questions. (1) What are the critical considerations in defining validation objectives and how do these impact achieving reasonable confidence? (2) What methods, approaches, resources, or rationales might be used for deriving performance requirements, selecting measures, and establishing acceptance criteria so as to support reasonable confidence? (3) What methods might be used to develop scenarios that maximize the amount and relevance of information in support of the validation conclusions and achieving reasonable confidence? (4) How should the validation results be aggregated and analyzed to determine the final validation conclusions? This paper provides an overview of the experts' responses to these challenges and briefly touches upon their implications for future directions. (authors)
The first AP1000 nuclear power plant is constructed in Sanmen county in Zhejiang Province in China, which has creative and distinctive design characteristics. Human factors engineering disciplines are applied to the design of the AP1000. In addition to the elements of the program review model(including human factors engineering program management, operating experience review, functional requirements analysis and allocation, task analysis, staffing, integration of human reliability analysis with human factors engineering, human system interface design, procedure development, training program development, human system interface verification and validation, design implementation, human performance monitoring),the minimum inventory of controls, displays, and alarms present in the main control room and at the remote shutdown workstation. These contents mentioned above are reviewed according to standards, rules and regulations. This article introduces review process, and several important issues during the reviewing are described in detail. These issues include many elements, such as operating experience review, task analysis, human system interface design, verification and validation,and so on. This paper emphasizes on the main control room design(including environment and layout). Background noise in the actual main control room may exceed too much to design value. Another important issue is about main control room habitability systems(VES) changes to satisfy post-actuation performance requirements in AP1000 design change proposal. All the wall panel displays will be closed in this design change proposal. Review process and proposal are described in the paper. Since the AP1000 unit in China is the first constructed all over the world, verification and validation are especially important and necessary. The plan of verification and validation, the results summary report of verification and validation, the report of human engineering discrepancies are focus attention. Verification and validation in human factors engineering include HSI task support verification, HFE design verification and integrated system validation. This paper introduces the review process of verification and validation, the issues found in verification and validation. (authors)
What should we ask the control room crew about when evaluating situation awareness? Currently available freeze probe techniques concentrate on trends of process parameters. Analysis of control room work shows that there are far more involved in control room crews' Situation Awareness (SA). The Process Awareness and Situation Understanding (PASU) measure has been developed from an analysis of control room work and includes probing the crew about the status of safety functions and main plant systems such as coolant supply, ordinary and emergency power supply, main reactor parameters, and main plant parameters. Results from a nuclear control room evaluation showed that the crew's overview of safety functions developed differently across scenario phases compared to the crew's overview of main process parameters. SA in the nuclear control room seems to be a multifaceted phenomenon and valid measurement needs to cover its aspects. Initial empirical testing showed that PASU was sensitive to scenario phases and related to other performance indicators. PASU, or measures based on similar principles, can be a valid and useful probe based technique for use in the evaluation of control room design and control room work. The measure will fill a gap in the research literature and will serve as an example of SA measurement with utility for control room evaluation. (authors)
Control room modernization in the commercial nuclear power industry often takes the form of phased system-by-system upgrades that result in hybrid control rooms with digital and analog equipment. Ensuring that these upgrades results in enhanced human performance and more intuitive interfaces, researchers at INL have been supporting the design of upgraded systems in coordination with a large scale modernization effort at a partner utility. This report describes the experimental evaluation of a liquid radiological waste control room concept which investigated the use of color in system overview screens. The results indicated that maintaining existing color conventions to indicate component status yielded no benefit and in some cases caused a detriment to performance. The researchers recommended using a minimal muted color in overview screens, but advocated using color to enhance understanding of different flow paths and using saturated color to highlight abnormal operating states.
The primary objective of the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is to sustain operation of the existing commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) through a multi-pathway approach in conducting research and development (R and D). The Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II and C) System Technologies pathway conducts targeted R and D to address aging and reliability concerns with legacy instrumentation and control (I and C) and other information systems in existing U.S. NPPs. Control room modernization is an important part following this pathway, and human factors experts at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have been involved in conducting R and D to support migration of new digital main control room (MCR) technologies from legacy analog and legacy digital I and C. This paper describes a human factors engineering (HFE) process that supports human-system interface (HSI) design in MCR modernization activities, particularly with migration of old digital to new digital I and C. The process described in this work is an expansion from the LWRS Report INL/EXT-16-38576, and is a requirements-driven approach that aligns with NUREG-0711 requirements. The work described builds upon the existing literature by adding more detail around key tasks and decisions to make when transitioning from HSI Design into Verification and Validation (V and V). The overall objective of this process is to inform HSI design and elicit specific, measurable, and achievable human factors criteria for new digital technologies. Upon following this process, utilities should have greater confidence with transitioning from HSI design into V and V. (authors)
This paper reports on the generic prediction capability of full electromagnetic plasma initiation modelling with DYON, which was carried out for the first time in fusion research by the joint modelling of the International Tokamak Physics Activity—Integrating Operation Scenario group. The following devices were included in the experiment database: VEST (spherical torus, copper coils, Stainless steel wall, R/a = 0.3 m/0.2 m, V v = 3.7 m 3 ), MAST-U (spherical torus, copper coils, C wall, R/a = 0.7 m/0.5 m, V v = 55 m 3 ), EAST (conventional tokamak, superconducting coils, metallic wall, R/a = 1.85 m/0.5 m, V v = 38 m 3 ), DIII-D (conventional tokamak, copper coils, C wall, R/a = 1.67 m/0.65 m, V v = 35 m 3 ), and KSTAR (conventional tokamak, superconducting coils, C wall, R/a = 1.8 m/0.5 m, V v = 55 m 3 ). Despite the different hardware features of the devices, the required operating spaces of the loop voltage induction and prefill gas pressure for inductive plasma initiation in each device were successfully reproduced by the predictive simulations with DYON using only the individual hardware design and the control room input data for each discharge. This successful validation across multiple machines demonstrates that the full electromagnetic DYON modelling can capture the essential physics of inductive plasma initiation. The simulation settings commonly employed for all modelling and the modifications necessary to account for the discrepancies between individual devices are reported. Predictions for ITER based on the multi-machine validation indicate that a wide range of prefill gas pressures exists for the Townsend breakdown and the plasma burn-through (0.01–1.5 mPa).
The primary objective of the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is to sustain operation of the existing commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) through a multi-pathway approach in conducting research and development (R&D). The Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) System Technologies pathway conducts targeted R&D to address aging and reliability concerns with legacy instrumentation and control (I&C) and other information systems in existing U.S. NPPs. Control room modernization is an important part following this pathway, and human factors experts at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have been involved in conducting R&D to support migration of new digital main control room (MCR) technologies from legacy analog and legacy digital I&C. This paper describes a human factors engineering (HFE) process that supports human-system interface (HSI) design in MCR modernization activities, particularly with migration of old digital to new digital I&C. The process described in this work is an expansion from the LWRS Report INL/EXT-16-38576, and is a requirements-driven approach that aligns with NUREG-0711 requirements. The work described builds upon the existing literature by adding more detail around key tasks and decisions to make when transitioning from HSI Design into Verification and Validation (V&V). The overall objective of this process is to inform HSI design and elicit specific, measurable, and achievable human factors criteria for new digital technologies. Upon following this process, utilities should have greater confidence with transitioning from HSI design into V&V.
The primary objective of the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program is to sustain operation of the existing commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) through a multi-pathway approach in conducting research and development (R&D). The Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) System Technologies pathway conducts targeted R&D to address aging and reliability concerns with legacy instrumentation and control (I&C) and other information systems in existing U.S. NPPs. Control room modernization is an important part following this pathway, and human factors experts at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have been involved in conducting R&D to support migration of new digital main control room (MCR) technologies from legacy analog and legacy digital I&C. This paper describes a human factors engineering (HFE) process that supports human-system interface (HSI) design in MCR modernization activities, particularly with migration of old digital to new digital I&C. The process described in this work is an expansion from the LWRS Report INL/EXT-16-38576, and is a requirements-driven approach that aligns with NUREG-0711 requirements. The work described builds upon the existing literature by adding more detail around key tasks and decisions to make when transitioning from HSI Design into Verification and Validation (V&V). The overall objective of this process is to inform HSI design and elicit specific, measurable, and achievable human factors criteria for new digital technologies. Upon following this process, utilities should have greater confidence with transitioning from HSI design into V&V.
The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the AP1000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis of the location of the core (i.e., whether reactor vessel failure has occurred). This is a fundamental consequence of the AP1000 In-Vessel Retention approach, which allows severe accident management to be based on fundamental principles (e.g. provide coolant as close as possible to the core) that do not change during a specific event. This eliminates the need for one of the more difficult diagnostic requirements, since reactor vessel failure does not directly relate to any measurable plant parameter, and differs from other designs in that an engineered failure of the pressure vessel' (e.g. core catcher) is never required. (authors)
The Control Room Modernization (CRM) research effort is a part of the Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, which is a research and development program sponsored by Department of Energy (DOE) and performed in close collaboration with industry research and development programs that provides the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. One of the primary missions of the LWRS program is to help the U.S. nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. This report describes the background and technical basis for an end-state vision design philosophy for and advanced hybrid control room.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that it remains a state-of-the-art design evaluation tool. To this end, the NRC is updating its guidance to stay current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology being employed in plant and control room design. This paper describes the role of HFE guidelines in the safety review process and the content of the key HFE guidelines used. Then we will present the methodology used to develop HFE guidance and update these documents, and describe the current status of the update program.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that it remains a state-of-the-art design evaluation tool. To this end, the NRC is updating its guidance to stay current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology being employed in plant and control room design. NUREG-0711 is the first document to be addressed. We present the methodology used to update NUREG-0711 and summarize the main changes made. Finally, we discuss the current status of the update program and the future plans.
Many nuclear power plants in the United States have recently been granted a 20 year extension to their operation license and are considering modernization. The Idaho National Laboratory is committed to successful modernizations and has been identifying and developing candidate technologies for power plants using methods that match the requirements of an integrated system validation. To do so this paper discusses current and potential workload, situation awareness and other performance methods used in evaluating control room design against the criteria defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The analysis provided is narrowed to the scope of methods surrounding the Light Water Reactor Sustainability research at the Idaho National Laboratory and therefore evaluates only a handful of the numerous methods used in control room modernizing efforts. As such, it was determined the most popular methods for measuring situation awareness, workload, and performance are measurements that rarely measure their intended construct directly and must be inferred. Physiological measures of workload have matured and become more accessible, sensitive, unobtrusive, valid, and objective but are reliant on variable technology. Situation Awareness measures possess little construct validity but eye-tracking technology is a measure progressing in sensitivity, objectivity, and continues to improve in unobtrusiveness. All things considered, this paper has identified a significant need for a more extensive review of the various performance measures used in modernizing control rooms and integrated system validation. (authors)
Most operational Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) in the United States are primarily outfitted with physical (analog) Instruments and Controls (I and C). However, as parts wear out in legacy plants, these I and Cs are being replaced by digital interfaces. Furthermore, new plants are being proposed and built domestically and throughout the world that are composed primarily of soft controls in the main control room. To that end, it is important to understand if and how various types of interfaces affect performance. The present effort sought to compare a desktop and touchscreen interface. The Instantaneous Self-Assessment, the NASA-Task Load Index, and electrocardiography were used to assess workload response while performing three main control room task types on each interface. Results have implications for interface selection and assessment of new NPP main control room designs. (authors)
Small, advanced reactors may require few, if any, safety-related human actions (HAs) and fewer HAs to monitor and control the plant. In comparison to large light water reactors, these are significant changes that have implications for many aspects of an applicant's human factors engineering (HFE), including control room design, plant staffing, and the management of safety functions. To support the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) ability to evaluate these changes, information needs to be developed addressing the characteristics and potential issues. The objectives of our research were to (1) identify when a traditional main control room (MCR) may not be necessary, (2) identify workplace design alternatives to traditional MCRs, and (3) develop guidance for reviewing an applicant's workplace designs with and without a MCR. We determined that the safety question isn't so much justifying why a design has no MCR, but rather verifying that important human actions can be accurately and reliably performed under a range of challenging conditions using the HSIs provided regardless of their location. We developed guidance to review alternatives to MCRs based on HFE analyses for determining workplace location and design.
This report describes the foundational human factors principles needed to design user interfaces for accelerator control rooms. These principles are presented as recommendations for accelerator control system interface design and are illustrated with examples drawn from accelerator operations at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). These high-level principles are intended to serve as design objectives that apply generally across all control system interfaces developed for the accelerator complex. This design philosophy document is a high-level roadmap to approach the general interface design for the accelerator complex. This philosophy applies state-of-the-art human factors principles and evidence-based design standards to an accelerator environment, which will transform the next era of accelerator interfaces as outlined by the Accelerator Controls Operations Research Network (ACORN) Project. Further work will include mapping the general design principles included in this report to more specific guidance in the form of a user interface style guide.
Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems of the latest nuclear power plants are based on the use of digital technology, distributed control systems and the integration of information in data networks (Distributed Control and Instrumentation Systems). This has a repercussion on Control Rooms (CRs), where the operations and monitoring interfaces correspond to these systems. These technologies are also used in modernizing I and C systems in currently operative nuclear power plants. The new interfaces provide additional capabilities for operation and supervision, as well as a high degree of flexibility, versatility and reliability. An example of this is the implementation of solutions such as compact stations, high level supervision screens, overview displays, computerized procedures, new operational support systems or intelligent alarms processing systems in the modernized Man-Machine Interface (MMI). These changes in the MMI are accompanied by newly added Software (SW) controls and new solutions in automation. Tecnatom has been leading various projects in this area for several years, both in Asian countries and in the United States, using in all cases international standards from which Tecnatom own methodologies have been developed and optimized. The experience acquired in applying this methodology to the design of new control rooms is to a large extent applicable also to the modernization of current control rooms. An adequate design of the interface between the operator and the systems will facilitate safe operation, contribute to the prompt identification of problems and help in the distribution of tasks and communications between the different members of the operating shift. Based on Tecnatom experience in the field, this article presents the methodological approach used as well as the most relevant aspects of this kind of project. (authors)