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Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria contains descriptions of technical, safety, and crew health medical processes and specifications, and the criteria which will be used to evaluate the acceptability of the Commercial Providers' proposed processes and specifications.
Under the guidance of processes provided by Crew Transportation Plan (CCT-PLN-1100), this document, with its sister documents, International Space Station (ISS) Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document (CCT-REQ-1130), Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria (CCT-STD-1140), Crew Transportation Operations Standards (CCT STD-1150), and ISS to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document (SSP 50808), provides the basis for a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) certification for services to the ISS for the Commercial Provider. When NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification is achieved for ISS transportation, the Commercial Provider will be eligible to provide services to and from the ISS during the services phase.
Under the guidance of processes provided by Crew Transportation Plan (CCT-PLN-1100), this document with its sister documents, Crew Transportation Technical Management Processes (CCT-PLN-1120), Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design Evaluation Criteria (CCT-STD-1140), and Crew Transportation Operations Standards (CCT-STD-1150), and International Space Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements Document (SSP 50808), provides the basis for a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) certification for services to the ISS for the Commercial Provider. When NASA Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification is achieved for ISS transportation, the Commercial Provider will be eligible to provide services to and from the ISS during the services phase of the NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has been chartered to facilitate the development of a United States (U.S.) commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS) as soon as possible. Once the capability is matured and is available to the Government and other customers, NASA expects to purchase commercial services to meet its ISS crew rotation and emergency return objectives. The primary role of the CCP is to enable and ensure safe human spaceflight and processes for the next generation of earth orbital space systems. The architecture of the Program delineates the process for investment performance in safe orbital systems, Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification, and CTS Flight Readiness. A series of six technical documents build up the architecture to address the top-level CTS requirements and standards. They include Design Reference Missions, with the near term focus on ISS crew services, Certification and Service Requirements, Technical Management Processes, and Technical and Operations Standards Evaluation Processes.
A systems study is presented for a transportation system which will follow the interim upper stage and spinning solid upper stage. Included are concepts, concept comparisons, trends, parametric data, etc. associated with the future system. Relevant technical and programmatic information is developed. This information is intended to focus future activity to identify attractive options and to summarize the major issues associated with the future development of the system. To establish a common basis for identifying current transportation concepts, an orbit transfer vehicle (OTV) is defined as a propulsive (velocity producing) rocket or stage. When used with a crew transfer module, a manned sortie module or other payloads, the combination becomes an orbit transfer system (OTS). Standardization of OTV's and OTS's is required.
This is a report of work in progress. In it, I summarize the status of the research and development of the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) for managing, processing, and analyzing digital flight-recorded data. The objectives of the NASA-FAA APMS research project are to establish a sound scientific and technological basis for flight-data analysis, to define an open and flexible architecture for flight-data-analysis systems, and to articulate guidelines for a standardized database structure on which to continue to build future flight-data-analysis extensions. APMS will offer to the air transport community an open, voluntary standard for flight-data-analysis software, a standard that will help to ensure suitable functionality, and data interchangeability, among competing software programs. APMS will develop and document the methodologies, algorithms, and procedures for data management and analyses to enable users to easily interpret the implications regarding safety and efficiency of operations. APMS does not entail the implementation of a nationwide flight-data-collection system. It is intended to provide technical tools to ease the large-scale implementation of flight-data analyses at both the air-carrier and the national-airspace levels in support of their Flight Operations and Quality Assurance (FOQA) Programs and Advanced Qualifications Programs (AQP). APMS cannot meet its objectives unless it develops tools that go substantially beyond the capabilities of the current commercially available software and supporting analytic methods that are mainly designed to count special events. These existing capabilities, while of proven value, were created primarily with the needs of air crews in mind. APMS tools must serve the needs of the government and air carriers, as well as air crews, to fully support the FOQA and AQP programs. They must be able to derive knowledge not only through the analysis of single flights (special-event detection), but through statistical evaluation of the performance of large groups of flights. This paper describes the integrated suite of tools that will assist analysts in evaluating the operational performance and safety of the national air transport system, the air carrier, and the air crew.
This is a report of work in progress. In it, I summarize the status of the research and development of the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) for managing, processing, and analyzing digital flight-recorded data. The objectives of the NASA-FAA APMS research project are to establish a sound scientific and technological basis for flight-data analysis, to define an open and flexible architecture for flight-data-analysis systems, and to articulate guidelines for a standardized database structure on which to continue to build future flight-data-analysis extensions . APMS will offer to the air transport community an open, voluntary standard for flight-data-analysis software, a standard that will help to ensure suitable functionality, and data interchangeability, among competing software programs. APMS will develop and document the methodologies, algorithms, and procedures for data management and analyses to enable users to easily interpret the implications regarding safety and efficiency of operations. APMS does not entail the implementation of a nationwide flight-data-collection system. It is intended to provide technical tools to ease the large-scale implementation of flight-data analyses at both the air-carrier and the national-airspace levels in support of their Flight Operations and Quality Assurance (FOQA) Programs and Advanced Qualifications Programs (AQP). APMS cannot meet its objectives unless it develops tools that go substantially beyond the capabilities of the current commercially available software and supporting analytic methods that are mainly designed to count special events. These existing capabilities, while of proven value, were created primarily with the needs of air crews in mind. APMS tools must serve the needs of the government and air carriers, as well as air crews, to fully support the FOQA and AQP programs. They must be able to derive knowledge not only through the analysis of single flights (special-event detection), but through statistical evaluation of the performance of large groups of flights. This paper describes the integrated suite of tools that will assist analysts in evaluating the operational performance and safety of the national air transport system, the air carrier, and the air crew.
This is a report of work in progress. In it, I summarize the status of the research and development of the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) for managing, processing, and analyzing digital flight-recorded data. The objectives of the NASA-FAA APMS research project are to establish a sound scientific and technological basis for flight-data analysis, to define an open and flexible architecture for flight-data-analysis systems, and to articulate guidelines for a standardized database structure on which to continue to build future flight-data-analysis extensions. APMS will offer to the air transport community an open, voluntary standard for flight-data-analysis software, a standard that will help to ensure suitable functionality, and data interchangeability, among competing software programs. APMS will develop and document the methodologies, algorithms, and procedures for data management and analyses to enable users to easily interpret the implications regarding safety and efficiency of operations. APMS does not entail the implementation of a nationwide flight-data-collection system. It is intended to provide technical tools to ease the large-scale implementation of flight-data analyses at both the air-carrier and the national-airspace levels in support of their Flight Operations and Quality Assurance (FOQA) Programs and Advanced Qualifications Programs (AQP). APMS cannot meet its objectives unless it develops tools that go substantially beyond the capabilities of the current commercially available software and supporting analytic methods that are mainly designed to count special events. These existing capabilities, while of proven value, were created primarily with the needs of air crews in mind. APMS tools must serve the needs of the government and air carriers, as well as air crews, to fully support the FOQA and AQP programs. They must be able to derive knowledge not only through the analysis of single flights (special-event detection), but through statistical evaluation of the performance of large groups of flights. This paper describes the integrated suite of tools that will assist analysts in evaluating the operational performance and safety of the national air transport system, the air carrier, and the air crew.
In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.
NASA is currently developing the next generation crewed spacecraft and launch vehicle for exploration beyond earth orbit including returning to the Moon and making the transit to Mars. Managing the design integration of major hardware elements of a space transportation system is critical for overcoming both the technical and programmatic challenges in taking a complex system from concept to space operations. An established method of accomplishing this is formal interface management. In this paper we set forth an argument that the interface management process implemented by NASA between the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and the Space Launch System (SLS) achieves the Level 3 tier of the EIA 731.1 System Engineering Capability Model (SECM) for Generic Practices. We describe the relevant NASA systems and associated organizations, and define the EIA SECM Level 3 Generic Practices. We then provide evidence for our compliance with those practices. This evidence includes discussions of: NASA Systems Engineering Interface (SE) Management standard process and best practices; the tailoring of that process for implementation on the Orion to SLS interface; changes made over time to improve the tailored process, and; the opportunities to take the resulting lessons learned and propose improvements to our institutional processes and best practices. We compare this evidence against the practices to form the rationale for the declared SECM maturity level.
INTRODUCTION The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is preparing for future Artemis missions that will return humans to the lunar surface. A critical piece of these future missions is the Lunar Transport Vehicle (LTV), a transportation device to be used on the lunar surface. A vehicular method of transportation will allow for longer duration missions with increased capabilities to conduct research and transport soil, geological samples, or other materials of interest. The objective of this project is to provide occupant protection guidance for the design of the LTV. METHODS At the time of writing of occupant protection requirements, much of the LTV design is unknown. However, several general assumptions have been established. It is assumed that the LTV will be an unpressurized crewed rover with the occupant(s) wearing an EVA suit. Additionally, the occupant must be protected using established health limits as governing criteria to protect the occupant from hazardous levels of acceleration, jerk, and vibration. In addition to the health limits, it is expected that the LTV shall provide a comfortable transportation solution to Lunar operations. Several restraint configurations have been considered to allow for seated and standing operation of the vehicle. RESULTS Preliminary recommendations and metrics were put forward by a cross functional working group with members from Johnson Space Center and Ames Research Center. Exposure to acceleration, vibration, and jerk metrics above the proposed limits could create a risk of occupant injury. In addition to satisfying crew health needs, these limits permit the occupant to meet performance objectives including operating the vehicle and reading displays while traversing the Lunar surface. Initial guidance was refined during a Technical Interchange Meeting with external subject matter experts in industry, academia, and United States Air Force. CONCLUSION Operating a crewed vehicle in a lunar environment is a novel problem with few analogs to provide data. Based on terrestrial data from ISO & MIL Standards, occupant protection recommendations have been identified with several assumptions made about reduced gravity and deconditioned occupants. If the design of the vehicle attenuates energetics to levels below those put forward, there is high confidence the occupant will be able to repetitively operate the vehicle without physical harm or operational issues.
For over 10 years, NASA has been working with U.S.-based commercial companies to support the design, development, and operations of new commercial space vehicles. The purpose of these vehicles is to provide cargo and crew transportation services to the International Space Station (ISS) and to stimulate the commercial space transportation industry to Low-Earth Orbit (LEO). Along with the ability to provide a couple tons of cargo to the ISS each mission, the commercial visiting vehicles also provide the ability to transfer NASA payloads to and from the ISS in an active, powered state. To take advantage of this capability, NASA requirements for the data services that payloads need while they are integrated into the visiting vehicles have grown with each set of commercial contracts. Today, NASA desires for payload data services encompass a variety of capabilities including payload health and status (H&S) telemetry monitoring, visiting vehicle environment data monitoring, and payload commanding. The intent of these capabilities is to provide payload developers with situational awareness and the ability to quickly diagnose any problems with payload operations prior to vehicle docking or post-landing to support immediate troubleshooting response. As new requirements for payload data services have emerged over the years, the ISS Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has established ground segment interfaces to the visiting vehicle control centers to enable payload developers to use these services. Many technical and programmatic challenges have been faced while establishing these interfaces. The most significant challenge faced has been in finding the right balance amongst providing interfaces to payloads that are compatible with the ISS so that payload hardware or software changes are not necessary to ensure compatibility with the visiting vehicles; keeping POIC ground system development costs low by standardizing implementation approaches across commercial vehicle partners; and fostering commercialization through supporting vendor-unique implementations that are commercially economical. This paper will first detail the data services that will be available to payload users under each commercial visiting vehicle contract. Secondly, this paper will offer discussion of the most significant technical and programmatic challenges faced to-date in offering these new data services to payload developers.