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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Understanding the International Space Station Crew Perspective following Long-Duration Missions through Data Analytics & Visualization of Crew Feedback

The International Space Station (ISS) first became a home and research laboratory for NASA and International Partner crewmembers over 16 years ago. Each ISS mission lasts approximately 6 months and consists of three to six crewmembers. After returning to Earth, most crewmembers participate in an extensive series of 30+ debriefs intended to further understand life onboard ISS and allow crews to reflect on their experiences. Examples of debrief data collected include ISS crew feedback about sleep, dining, payload science, scheduling and time planning, health & safety, and maintenance. The Flight Crew Integration (FCI) Operational Habitability (OpsHab) team, based at Johnson Space Center (JSC), is a small group of Human Factors engineers and one stenographer that has worked collaboratively with the NASA Astronaut office and ISS Program to collect, maintain, disseminate and analyze this data. The database provides an exceptional and unique resource for understanding the "crew perspective" on long duration space missions. Data is formatted and categorized to allow for ease of search, reporting, and ultimately trending, in order to understand lessons learned, recurring issues and efficiencies gained over time. Recently, the FCI OpsHab team began collaborating with the NASA JSC Knowledge Management team to provide analytical analysis and visualization of these over 75,000 crew comments in order to better ascertain the crew's perspective on long duration spaceflight and gain insight on changes over time. In this initial phase of study, a text mining framework was used to cluster similar comments and develop measures of similarity useful for identifying relevant topics affecting crew health or performance, locating similar comments when a particular issue or item of operational interest is identified, and providing search capabilities to identify information pertinent to future spaceflight systems and processes for things like procedure development and training. In addition, the comments were scored for sentiment using a polarity scoring algorithm to identify both positive and negative comments for particular groups and clusters, allowing the team to make analytically informed decisions regarding future hardware and operating procedures. The use of polarity scoring with time series analysis was used to provide insight into how crew health and habitability is changing throughout various spaceflight increments or the station lifecycle as a whole. Finally, a visualization framework was developed to address the needs of the end users to search for and analyze comments by user, category or mission. This paper will discuss how the use of an analytical framework in conjunction with the current human interface, improved the understanding of crew perspective and shortened the time for analysis allowing for more informed decisions and rapid development of improvements. These methods are significantly optimizing the way that this valuable data can be assessed and applied to current and future spaceflight design and development. This collaboration allows the FCI OpsHab team to effectively analyze and share data in a more automated and timely fashion. Trends are no longer derived manually and can be illustrated effectively and accurately with these evolving techniques to an ever growing group of human spaceflight end users.

Bryant, Cody↗
NASA NTRS2019

Supporting Crew Autonomy in Deep Space Exploration: Preliminary Onboard Capability Requirements and Proposed Research Questions. Technical Report of the Autonomous Crew Operations Technical Interchange Meeting

Communication delays are a critical challenge posed by long duration deep space exploration. Space missions historically have relied on an ever-present Mission Control Center (MCC) to direct operations in near real-time. As unanticipated anomalies that defeat fault detection and resolution systems do arise, the lack of real-time communication will significantly weaken what the MCC support represents: a reliable safety net for the flight crew through its deep and diverse areas of expertise and investigative resources. As a consequence, future space vehicles and habitats need to be equipped with capabilities to support the flight crew to operate with little or no ground support. Considerations must be given to vehicle and mission designs that will fortify the traditionally ground-centered safety net and forge new support systems, when communication delays exist. In August 2018, NASA’s Human Research Program, through its Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element, convened a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on Autonomous Crew Operations at NASA Ames Research Center. The goal of the meeting was to gather input from NASA centers, industry, academia, and branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) to address how intelligent technologies can be applied to augment onboard capabilities to support crew anomaly response. The TIM featured 24 presentations by 29 speakers and hosted a total of 59 attendees, including 43 from 5 NASA centers (Ames, Johnson, Langley, Marshall, and Jet Propulsion Lab) and 4 from the DoD (3 from Army Research Lab and 1 from Naval Postgraduate School), with remaining attendees from academia (e.g., UC Davis, CMU) and industry (e.g., IBM, Siemens). Discussions were centered around three themes: standards and guidelines, lessons learned in analog environments, and technologies. To help provide a framework for discussion, a concept matrix describing anomaly response processes was created prior to the TIM (Figure 1, page 6). The matrix captures the steps involved (monitoring and detection, diagnosis, solution development and evaluation, solution implementation and verification, resolution documentation) as well as the resources and capabilities required to support these steps (data, knowledge, analysis, synthesis, resource management). A wallpaper size printout of the matrix was utilized at the TIM to solicit attendee inputs along the three themes; the activity garnered 108 submissions of ideas. Overall, what emerged from TIM discussions was a picture of mismatch between crew anomaly response needs and support that can be provided by existing intelligent technologies. The needs are broad, spanning multiple steps and processes/resources, with many of which lacking support from existing technologies, such as knowledge management throughout the steps of problem solving (especially in resolution documentation) and manpower management. The solutions provided by existing intelligent technologies are specific to the steps/processes that they are designed to support and constrained to solving only problems similar to those that have occurred before. What is lacking from technologies is typically made up by humans, specifically their complex critical thinking, creative problem solving, and domain expertise. In the end, the TIM highlighted the pressing need to support responses to onboard anomalies during autonomous crew operations, particularly those that have eluded the system tests, inspection, and other assurance processes. Such anomalies can potentially threaten crew and vehicle safety, as well as significantly impact overall operations with additional workload. These fairly rare events are difficult to anticipate and prepare for, given the state-of-the-art in intelligent technologies. This is true even for anomalies that stem from “unknown knowns”—cases in which there is sufficient external information to characterize the problem but the overall pattern fails to be recognized by the problem solver, or in which the internal knowledge needed to solve a problem is held tacitly and potentially accessible by the problem solver but not articulated. It follows that the ability to tackle anomalies lies not only with the availability of relevant information and knowledge but also their accessibility in times of need. To that end, we propose research questions along the following three broad themes: • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information available? • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information accessible? • How intelligent technologies can help support the crew operating as a team in anomaly response processes?

autonomous crew operations↗
NASA NTRS2015

Effectiveness of Advanced Collaboration Tools on Crew Communication in Reduced Crew Operations

The present research examines operational performance and verbal communication in airline flight crews under reduced crew operations (RCO). Eighteen two-pilot crews flew six scenarios under three conditions; one condition involved current-day operations while two involved RCO. In RCO flights, the Captain initially operated the simulated aircraft alone but could request remote crewmember support as off-nominal events occurred and workload was expected to increase. In one of the two RCO conditions, crewmembers were provided with advanced prototype collaboration tools designed to alleviate difficulties in crew coordination. Crews successfully solved all challenging events without accident and analyses of operational performance did not reveal any differences among the three conditions. In RCO flights, crew communication increased when tools were available relative to flights in which they were not; specifically, there were more acknowledgements and decision-making communications. These results suggest the collaboration tools enable higher degrees of crewmember awareness andor coordination during distributed operations.

crew resource management↗
NASA NTRS2005

Effective Crew Operations: An Analysis of Technologies for Improving Crew Activities and Medical Procedures

NASA's vision for space exploration (February 2004) calls for development of a new crew exploration vehicle, sustained lunar operations, and human exploration of Mars. To meet the challenges of planned sustained operations as well as the limited communications between Earth and the crew (e.g., Mars exploration), many systems will require crews to operate in an autonomous environment. It has been estimated that once every 2.4 years a major medical issue will occur while in space. NASA's future travels, especially to Mars, will begin to push this timeframe. Therefore, now is the time for investigating technologies and systems that will support crews in these environments. Therefore, this summer two studies were conducted to evaluate the technology and systems that may be used by crews in future missions. The first study evaluated three commercial Indoor Positioning Systems (IPS) (Versus, Ekahau, and Radianse) that can track equipment and people within a facility. While similar to Global Positioning Systems (GPS), the specific technology used is different. Several conclusions can be drawn from the evaluation conducted, but in summary it is clear that none of the systems provides a complete solution in meeting the tracking and technology integration requirements of NASA. From a functional performance (e.g., system meets user needs) evaluation perspective, Versus performed fairly well on all performance measures as compared to Ekahau and Radianse. However, the system only provides tracking at the room level. Thus, Versus does not provide the level of fidelity required for tracking assets or people for NASA requirements. From an engineering implementation perspective, Ekahau is far simpler to implement that the other two systems because of its wi-fi design (e.g., no required runs of cable). By looking at these two perspectives, one finds there was no clear system that met NASA requirements. Thus it would be premature to suggest that any of these systems are ready for implementation and further study is required.

Harvey, Craig↗
NASA NTRS2019

Capability Considerations for Enhancing Safety on Long Duration Crewed Missions: Insights from a Technical Interchange Meeting on Autonomous Crew Operations

As future flight crews on long duration deep space missions are expected to operate more autonomously, considerations must be given to onboard capabilities and human-computer teaming that will fortify the safety net traditionally provided by the Mission Control Center. In August 2018, the Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element of NASA's Human Research Program convened a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on Autonomous Crew Operations at NASA Ames Research Center to address how intelligent technologies can be utilized to augment crew capabilities to support real-time anomaly response. In this paper, we highlight three topic areas discussed at the TIM that have direct implications for future crew anomaly response capabilities: smart structures, cognitive assistants, and manpower.

autonomous crew operations↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA Commercial Crew Program Crew Transportation System Certificate of Flight Readiness Plan

NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) is the authorization granted by the Agency that certifies the flight readiness of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to conduct a flight test or mission to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the flight readiness of its CTS. The CCP with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s CoFR assertion to ensure compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety. NASA CCP CTS CoFR is the approval of the Commercial Provider’s evidence that: • The physical as-built CTS was produced, assembled, integrated, and tested within the approved production and operational constraints. • The mission specific requirements are enveloped within the certified CTS capabilities. • The CTS personnel are trained and certified to support the mission. • All aspects of the CTS are ready for the mission.

Certification of Flight Readiness↗
NASA NTRS1976

Apollo experience report: Crew station integration. Volume 1: Crew station design and development

An overview of the evolution of the design and development of the Apollo command module and lunar module crew stations is given, with emphasis placed on the period from 1964 to 1969. The organizational planning, engineering techniques, and documentation involved are described, and a detailed chronology of the meetings, reviews, and exercises is presented. Crew station anomalies for the Apollo 7 to 11 missions are discussed, and recommendations for the solution of recurring problems of crew station acoustics, instrument glass failure, and caution and warning system performance are presented. Photographs of the various crew station configurations are also provided.

Allen, L. D.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Assured crew return capability Crew Emergency Return Vehicle (CERV) avionics

The Crew Emergency Return Vehicle (CERV) is being defined to provide Assured Crew Return Capability (ACRC) for Space Station Freedom. The CERV, in providing the standby lifeboat capability, would remain in a dormat mode over long periods of time as would a lifeboat on a ship at sea. The vehicle must be simple, reliable, and constantly available to assure the crew's safety. The CERV must also provide this capability in a cost effective and affordable manner. The CERV Project philosophy of a simple vehicle is to maximize its useability by a physically deconditioned crew. The vehicle reliability goes unquestioned since, when needed, it is the vehicle of last resort. Therefore, its systems and subsystems must be simple, proven, state-of-the-art technology with sufficient redundancy to make it available for use as required for the life of the program. The CERV Project Phase 1'/2 Request for Proposal (RFP) is currently scheduled for release on October 2, 1989. The Phase 1'/2 effort will affirm the existing project requirements or amend and modify them based on a thorough evaluation of the contractor(s) recommendations. The system definition phase, Phase 2, will serve to define CERV systems and subsystems. The current CERV Project schedule has Phase 2 scheduled to begin October 1990. Since a firm CERV avionics design is not in place at this time, the treatment of the CERV avionics complement for the reference configuration is not intended to express a preference with regard to a system or subsystem.

Myers, Harvey Dean↗
NASA NTRS2016

Designing and Building a Crew-Centric Mobile Scheduling and Planning Tool for Exploring Crew Autonomy Concepts Onboard the International Space Station

During 2015, as part of our ongoing research on crew autonomy, our team adapted and extended the plan viewing tool, Playbook, into a mobile tool for exploring crew autonomy onboard the International Space Station (ISS). This work enables crewmembers to intuitively re-plan and schedule on their own with limited input from mission control. Designed for ease of use, re-planning is composed of simple drag and drop interactions and learning the tool requires little to no training. Playbook was successfully uplinked onto ISS as a technology demonstration and completed its onboard ground and crew checkouts in August and September 2015, respectively. We will discuss and describe how Playbook was able to integrate with actual ISS operational plans and operational procedures without disrupting real mission operations. This work will also outline the design and technical constraints required to build a collaborative tool that allows multiple users to simultaneously self-schedule and synchronize during communication dropouts in the restricted networking and computing environment onboard ISS. Finally, we will explore the aspects of crew autonomy that this technology enables as well as discuss our next steps and possible extensions.

ISS↗
NASA NTRS2019

Dynamic Characterization of the Crew Module Uprighting System for NASA’s Orion Crew Module

The Orion Crew Module Uprighting System is a set of five airbag that are responsible for the uprighting of the crew module in the case of an inverted splashdown. A series of tests during the Underway Recovery Test 7 (URT-7) were run in preparation for the Artemis I mission, where the dynamic characterization of the CMUS in an ocean wave environment was performed. A Datawell Waverider DWR-G4 wave buoy was deployed to the characterize the wave environment during these tests. The heave measurements from this buoy were projected to the Orion Crew Module Buoyancy Test Article location by two different methods: (1) directly time-shifting the data, and (2) performing a frequency-domain, phase-shifting operation. Results demonstrate that the phase-shifting operation led to better correlation with the true crew module response to wave excitation as compared with the purely time-shifted method. Additionally, a novel approach to localize an object in a bidirectional wave field based on its heave response is presented and validated with URT- 7 data. Given a wave measurement device at a known location, one can estimate the relative distance to another object based solely off its heave response. Results show that if signals have sufficiently good correlation, this method can be used to estimate the relative separation between two objects in the same wave field.

Vertaska, Ivan Bertaska↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Recommended Crew Systems Capabilities for a 30 to 90 Day Four-Crew Lunar Surface Mission

For any given surface mission duration, there exists a set of surface capabilities necessary to sustain a four-person crew for the length of time the crew is on the surface. Identifying these capabilities is important to mission planners and spacecraft design engineers responsible for lunar surface habitation elements, who need to know which systems and capabilities must be prioritized for the vehicles they are designing. However, simply identifying the surface capabilities does not necessarily equal a viable surface configuration. These capabilities may or may not satisfy stakeholder expectations or even permit completion of mission objectives. Lunar lander cargo mass constraints are a powerful forcing function that requires significant efforts to reduce the mass of all surface elements, including those supporting crew habitation. The required capabilities do increase as a function of mission duration, but it is a nonlinear growth. There are key points in mission duration, beyond which certain additional capabilities are needed. This forms bands of capability between each point. Within a given band, the same functional capabilities are needed, and the only scaling is that associated with daily consumables. The next higher band requires additional capabilities. This paper will focus on those capabilities needed for missions of 30-90 days. It should be noted that there are some uncertainties interpreting NASA requirements that require capabilities after a certain number of days, as typically this refers to number of days in space, not number of days on the lunar surface. Depending on transportation architecture, the number of days between Earth launch and lunar surface landing may vary, therefore impacting when certain required capabilities are implemented. However, activities to prepare humans for missions to Mars and commercial interest in lunar development may drive progressive increases in surface duration. Missions up to 30 days are expected to follow the initial 6.5-day surface missions and there may be commercial interest in extending to even greater durations. This paper will examine the potential case of a 30-90-day surface mission duration with respect to the systems necessary to support crew living and working on the lunar surface.

Habitat↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Autonomy through Self-Scheduling: Guidelines for Crew Scheduling Performance Envelope and Mitigation Strategies

Future long duration exploration missions (LDEMs) bring new challenges to astronaut crews in deep space, one of which is increased communication latencies with ground stations. As a result, crews will have to behave more autonomously by self-scheduling their own operational timelines in an efficient and effective manner. To support crew autonomy, our team has spent the last few years developing Playbook, a mission planning and scheduling tool. Our research focuses on investigating scheduling performance using Playbook to inform the deployment of novel aids that streamline the timeline creation process and proposing relevant standards and guidelines for autonomous crews in LDEMs. Summarizing yearly progress of research analysis and experiment in HERA.

user experience↗
NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Crew Program Crew Safety Strategy

The purpose of this presentation is to explain to our international partners (ESA and JAXA) how NASA is implementing crew safety onto our commercial partners under the Commercial Crew Program. It will show them the overall strategy of 1) how crew safety boundaries have been established; 2) how Human Rating requirements have been flown down into programmatic requirements and over into contracts and partner requirements; 3) how CCP SMA has assessed CCP Certification and CoFR strategies against Shuttle baselines; 4) Discuss how Risk Based Assessment (RBA) and Shared Assurance is used to accomplish these strategies.

Crew Safety↗
NASA NTRS2011

Estimating the Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission for Crew Spacecraft

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2011, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project will have to meet the Agency Threshold requirements set forth by NASA. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques used to generate these numbers.

Lutomski, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Autonomy through Self-Scheduling: Guidelines for Crew Scheduling Performance Envelope and Mitigation Strategies

As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions, it is envisioned that crews will behave more autonomously as compared to low-Earth orbit missions. When considering long duration exploration missions, Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) identified the following benefits and challenges presented on this slide. As missions operate further from Earth, the communication latency between the spacecraft and Mission Control Center will increase requiring the crew to take a more active role in reacting to daily planning. However, one of the key challenges for crew self-scheduling is that we do not want to overwhelm astronauts who are not expert mission planners. This leads to our primary research objective: to first, characterize the human performance envelope for the task of planning and scheduling in the context of human spaceflight operations, then, develop countermeasure aids to mitigate adverse performance effects due to plan complexity, and finally, inform performance standards and guidelines based on research results. Our next steps are to finish summarizing our findings from the experiment in conference papers and our upcoming yearly report. In the upcoming year, we will continue to collect data in analog missions and begin summarizing our recommended standards and guidelines.

user experience↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Autonomy Through Self-Scheduling: Guidelines for Crew Scheduling Performance Envelope and Mitigation Strategies

NASA’s future long duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will encounter increasing communication transmission delays as they move farther from Earth-based ground stations. Because crews can no longer rely on real-time support from ground planners, they will have to self-schedule their own operational timelines effectively and efficiently. To enable this, our team develops Playbook, a mission planning and scheduling tool. Our research focuses on quantifying scheduling performance using Playbook to inform the design and development of future features aimed at streamlining timeline creation. We also aim to propose standards and guidelines for autonomous crews in LDEMs. This year, we discuss preliminary results from HERA Campaign 6.

self-scheduling↗
NASA NTRS1994

Crew factors in flight operations 9: Effects of planned cockpit rest on crew performance and alertness in long-haul operations

This study examined the effectiveness of a planned cockpit rest period to improve alertness and performance in long-haul flight operations. The Rest Group (12 crew members) was allowed a planned 40 minute rest period during the low workload, cruise portion of the flight, while the No-Rest Group (9 crew members) had a 40 minute planned control period when they maintained usual flight activities. Measures used in the study included continuous ambulatory recordings of brain wave and eye movement activity, a reaction time/vigilance task, a wrist activity monitor, in-flight fatigue and alertness ratings, a daily log for noting sleep periods, meals, exercise, flight and duty periods, and the NASA Background Questionnaire. The Rest Group pilots slept on 93 percent of the opportunities, falling asleep in 5.6 minutes and sleeping for 25.8 minutes. This nap was associated with improved physiological alertness and performance compared to the No-Rest Group. The benefits of the nap were observed through the critical descent and landing phases of flight. The nap did not affect layover sleep or the cumulative sleep debt. The nap procedures were implemented with minimal disruption to usual flight operations and there were no reported or identified concerns regarding safety.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗
NASA NTRS1999

STS-96 Crew Training, Mission Animation, Crew Interviews, STARSHINE, Discovery Rollout and Repair of Hail Damage

Live footage shows the crewmembers of STS-96, Commander Kent V. Rominger, Pilot Rick D. Husband, Mission Specialists Ellen Ochoa, Tamara E. Jernigan, Daniel T. Barry, Julie Payette and Valery Ivanovich Tokarev during various training activities. Scenes include astronaut suit-up, EVA training in the Virtual Reality Lab, Orbiter space vision training, bailout training, and crew photo session. Footage also shows individual crew interviews, repair activities to the external fuel tank, and Discovery's return to the launch pad. The engineers are seen sanding, bending, and painting the foam used in repairing the tank. An animation of the deployment of the STARSHINE satellite, International Space Station, and the STS-96 Mission is presented. Footage shows the students from Edgar Allen Poe Middle School sanding, polishing, and inspecting the mirrors for the STARSHINE satellite. Live footage also includes students from St. Michael the Archangel School wearing bunny suits and entering the clean room at Goddard Space Flight Center.

Source record↗