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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Criticality Safety Evaluation Project Development for University of California Berkely Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparative Analysis of Confidence Metrics for Nuclear Criticality Safety

Nuclear criticality safety standards provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations to establish confidence in computerized model results used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving the analysts free to determine how various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. This report compares the analyses and key assumptions behind four notable methodologies documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Because of the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the results of these methodologies are often difficult to interpret. Also, they are augmented by additional large administrative margins, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems focused on economizing operation—including advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts—there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of uncertainties and their fusion methodologies to reduce uncertainties in a scientifically defensible manner. This report offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the four noted methodologies, their adequacy, and their limitations, to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems. These systems are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

In Silico Versus In Situ: The Challenging Landscape of Nuclear Criticality Safety Training

Nuclear criticality safety grew out of the ranks of experimentalists studying the physics of chain-reacting systems at critical experiment facilities. Consequently, critical experiment facilities provide the best forum for conducting training in nuclear criticality safety. As the nuclear renaissance gains traction, there is an increased demand to train personnel in nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Strides have been made in both on-line and virtual reality based NCS training. While these are perhaps a necessary component of NCS training, hands-on training at critical experiments facilities remains the most effective means of developing competency for fissionable material handlers, managers of fissionable material operations, criticality safety analysts, and experimentalists. This paper explores the challenges of developing and maintaining workforce competency in nuclear criticality safety to support safe and efficient fissionable material operations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Elevated CO2 Could Undermine an Exploration Crew's Ability to Independently Respond to Unanticipated, Time- and Safety-Critical Anomalies

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve some time- and safety-critical anomalies on their own. The HRP, HFBP, Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk refers to the possibility that, during communication blackouts and thus the absence of vast ground expertise, a small crew may not be able to independently respond to unanticipated, time-critical malfunctions or to detect safety critical procedure errors.

carbon dioxide↗
NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety-critical computer systems must be engineered to meet system and software safety requirements. For legacy safety-critical computer systems, software safety requirements may not have been formally specified during development. When process-oriented software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, where software development artifacts don't exist or are incomplete, the question becomes 'how can this be done?' The risks associated with only meeting certain software safety requirements in a legacy safety-critical computer system must be addressed should such systems be selected as candidates for reuse. This paper proposes a method for ascertaining formally, a software safety risk assessment, that provides measurements for software safety for legacy systems which may or may not have a suite of software engineering documentation that is now normally required. It relies upon the NASA Software Safety Standard, risk assessment methods based upon the Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire, and the application of reverse engineering CASE tools to produce original design documents for legacy systems.

Hill, Janice↗
NASA NTRS2008

Product Engineering Class in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Building Safety-Critical Systems

When software safety requirements are imposed on legacy safety-critical systems, retrospective safety cases need to be formulated as part of recertifying the systems for further use and risks must be documented and managed to give confidence for reusing the systems. The SEJ Software Development Risk Taxonomy [4] focuses on general software development issues. It does not, however, cover all the safety risks. The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy [8] was developed which provides a construct for eliciting and categorizing software safety risks in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we present extended work on the taxonomy for safety that incorporates the additional issues inherent in the development and maintenance of safety-critical systems with software. An instrument called a Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based Questionnaire (TBQ) is generated containing questions addressing each safety attribute in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. Software safety risks are surfaced using the new TBQ and then analyzed. In this paper we give the definitions for the specialized Product Engineering Class within the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. At the end of the paper, we present the tool known as the 'Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool' that is used to collect and analyze the data required to show traceability to a particular safety standard

Hill, Janice↗
DOE OSTI2023

Internal Collaboration on Recent Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessments

Prevention of inadvertent criticality at facilities with large quantities of fissionable materials is one of the most important requirements those facilities grapple with. Given that criticality cannot be mitigated, only eliminated, a hard line must be taken on this requirement. The facilities and sites with the possibility of such an event must abide by a plethora of requirements, most stemming from the ANSI/ANS-8 series of consensus standards. One such standard, ANSI/ANS-8.19, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, gives requirements and recommendations necessary for establishing a nuclear criticality safety program for a given facility or site. One of those requirements includes periodic assessments of the NCS program. To meet the assessment requirement, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conducts periodic assessments on individual facilities and overall programmatic health aspects. The teams developed to perform these assessments include people both inside and outside the LANL NCS program. Recently, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the Critical Experiments Team of the Advanced Nuclear Technology Group established a collaboration to aid in fulfilling the assessment requirement.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Status of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) has continued its work generating evaluations of new and historical criticality benchmark experiments since the last update to the nuclear criticality safety community at the 11th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety (ICNC 2019) in Paris, France. Three additional versions of the ICSBEP Handbook have been published since that update, and the Technical Review Group (TRG) held two in-person (in 2019 and 2023) and three virtual (2020 and 2021) meetings to review and approve additional benchmarks. The 2019 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook included five new evaluations with 79 new configurations, the 2020 version of the ICSBEP Handbook contained five new evaluations totaling 76 new configurations, and the 2021 version of the ICSBEP handbook contained five new evaluations with a total of 57 different configurations. The ICSBEP TRG met in October and December 2021, to review benchmarks for potential inclusion in the 2022 ICSBEP Handbook, with seven evaluations receiving provisional approval pending resolution of review group comments. Final comment resolution for some of these evaluations is currently underway and handbook publication should be completed soon. The ICSBEP TRG met again in person in April 2023 to review benchmarks for the 2023 ICSBEP Handbook, provisionally approving 7 new evaluations. The ICSBEP continues to deliver high-quality, peer reviewed evaluations of experiments relevant to the nuclear criticality safety community.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The role of AI in detecting and mitigating human errors in safety-critical industries: A review

For safety-critical industries, human error (HE) presents continual risks to system productivity, reliability and safety. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) methods have emerged as promising approaches to understand, categorize and mitigate the risk of HE in safety-critical industries. Furthermore, this review offers an examination of the current landscape regarding the utilization of AI/ML with regards to HE in safety-critical industries, categorizing literature into descriptive modeling, predictive modeling, prescriptive modeling, and generative modeling techniques. Additionally, the review aims to provide insights regarding themes in literature, challenges, and future research directions. Findings of the review suggest that AI/ML methods can prove useful in addressing the HE problem across safety-critical industries.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

Hill, Janice L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Assembly Transportation Cask Model Description for Criticality Safety Validation Basis Assessment

Criticality safety analyses are completed on a transportation cask used for microreactor assembly shipment to provide an example of model and analysis to industry for reproducing this type of study on their microreactor fuel shipment. The fuel assembly considered is based on a gas-cooled microreactor (GC-MR), which utilizes HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and utilizes various design options considered in industry designs. Various versions of this GC-MR assembly were studied, with and without YH2 moderator, providing similar conclusions. The shipment cask design is revised based on an existing design ES-3100, developed by Y-12 for the transport of highly enriched uranium (HEU), but is enlarged to hold the GC-MR fuel assembly. Criticality safety analysis for the cask/GC-MR fuel assembly package was performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE6.3.2, utilizing the ENDF/B-VII.1 based continuous energy neutron library, and the analysis strictly follows the guideline from NRC reference reports. Different scenarios, e.g. normal operation, undamaged cask with water flooded, damaged cask with optimal water moderation, have been analyzed and it could be concluded the package would always have a large margin of subcriticality even packed in an infinite array. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with Intermediate and Mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems together with additional ones that are sponsored by the DNCSH program. These similarity analyses indicate that dry cases have no similar benchmark experiments (ck values greater than 0.8), which may become problematic if more assemblies are shipped together (or a fully loaded core is shipped) and margin to criticality is reduced. However, the damaged cask models with flooded assemblies exhibited similarities to many experiments with ck values greater than 0.8.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Microreactor Core Transportation Cask Model Description for Criticality Safety Validation Basis Assessment (Rev. 1)

Criticality safety analyses are completed on transportation casks used for microreactor whole core shipment to provide examples of models and analyses to industry, regulators, and nuclear community at large to be used in verification and validation analyses of similar applications. The microreactors considered are based on a Gas-Cooled Microreactor (GCMR) and a Heat-Pipe Microreactor (HPMR), both utilize HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and various other design options considered in industry microreactor designs. Variant design options of GCMR and HPMR were also investigated to provide a wider application range for each technology. Criticality safety analyses for the GCMR and HPMR packages were performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE 6.3.2 with the ENDF/B-VII.1-based continuous energy neutron libraries. Different scenarios were investigated, including normal operation and water flooded conditions to represent nominal and hypothetical accident scenarios. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE 6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with Intermediate and mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems, together with additional experiments that are sponsored by the DNCSH program. Many experiments were found marginally similar to the GCMR and HPMR models, with similarity index (ck) values greater than 0.8 but less than 0.9. Among all the experiments analyzed, no case has a ck value greater than 0.9, indicating that additional critical experiments might be needed to further validate the criticality safety models for microreactors transport packages.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Microreactor Core Transportation Cask Model Description for Criticality Safety Validation Basis Assessment (Rev. 2)

Criticality safety analyses are completed on transportation casks used for microreactor whole core shipment to provide examples of models and analyses to industry, regulators, and nuclear community at large to be used in verification and validation analyses of similar applications. The microreactors considered are based on a Gas-Cooled Microreactor (GCMR) and a Heat-Pipe Microreactor (HPMR), both utilize HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and various other design options considered in industry microreactor designs. Variant design options of GCMR and HPMR were also investigated to provide a wider application range for each technology. Criticality safety analyses for the GCMR and HPMR packages were performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE 6.3.2 with the ENDF/B-VII.1-based continuous energy neutron libraries. Different scenarios were investigated, including normal operation and water flooded conditions to represent nominal and hypothetical accident scenarios. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE 6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with High Enriched Uranium (HEU), Intermediate and mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems. Many ICSBEP experiments were found marginally similar, with similarity index (ck) values greater than 0.8, to the GCMR and HPMR cask models, especially in flooded conditions that may be more constraining due to reduced reactivity margins. Some experiments using TRISO fuel particles and graphite moderator, including the recent THETA and Deimos experiments from LANL, together with some IRPhEP experiments, were also used for the similarity analyses. These TRISO-fueled and graphite moderated experiments behaved similarly to the GCMR models, with maximum ck value greater than 0.9, but they are less similar to the HPMR models. This observation indicates that additional critical experiments might be needed to further validate the criticality safety models, especially for heat-pipe based microreactor transport packages and for non-flooded transportation configurations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

ANS-8 Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Standards - Current Initiatives

The nuclear criticality safety (NCS) consensus standards are developed as using rigorous procedures of the Standards Board of the American Nuclear Society. These procedures have been accredited by the American National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American National Standards. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC) that approved all 18 NCS consensus standards is balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have had an opportunity to participate. The ANS-8 subcommittee (ANS-8) consists of 17 NCS experts with many years of experience as end users of ANS standards who serve on standard working groups to develop and maintain standards. ANS-8 ensures that the technical content of the standards is adequate for NCS community use. Attempts are made to ensure that ANS-8 consists of NCS professionals with a diverse range of experience such that all standards are applicable to as many sites as possible. ANS-8 is a very active subcommittee, and some active projects in progress are discussed in this paper: basis statement development for all standards, development of a glossary for consistency of definitions across all ANS-8 standards, and Considering the Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG) Recommendation 2016-04 to the ANS Standards Board for changes in several ANS-8 standards.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
DOE OSTI2025

Status of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) has continued its work generating evaluations of new and historical benchmark experiments since the last update to the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community at the 12th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Conference held in 2023. One additional version of the ICSBEP Handbook has been published since that update, and the Technical Review Group (TRG) held two in-person meetings to review and approve additional benchmarks. The 2022 and 2023 editions of the handbook were combined into one release (published in November 2024) and contained 13 new evaluations with 46 different configurations and two major revisions to existing evaluations. The 2024 version of the handbook, currently under publication review, will contain two new evaluations with 15 new configurations and one major revision to HEU-MET-FAST-028, the evaluation of Flattop with a uranium core. The ICSBEP TRG met again in person in April 2025 to review benchmarks for the 2025 ICSBEP Handbook and final comment resolution is currently ongoing. Many of the new benchmarks represent contemporaneous experiments that have been specifically optimized to provide validation cases relevant to the NCS community. One major area of focus for new critical experiments is to target the sparsely populated intermediate energy (or resonance) region. Another focus of many of the new benchmarks is to provide experiments sensitive to different materials, such as chlorine, hafnium, tantalum, titanium, molybdenum, chromium, and polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA, or Lucite). The ICSBEP continues to deliver high-quality, peer reviewed evaluations of integral experiments relevant to the nuclear data community.

HEU-MET-FAST-028↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Integral Experiment Covariance Determination

Integral benchmarks for criticality safety and nuclear data validation require expensive uncertainty quantification studies. Commonly, the uncertainty quantification ignores correlations between experiments that share components. Experiments such as the TEX (Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments) campaigns consist of many shared parts, such as fuel, which create a strong correlation in their uncertainties. While these correlations are known to exist, they are often not estimated due to the complexity of such calculations. This paper describes a software package that uses an intuitive method of determining the covariance for each of the experimental components, providing a correlation matrix for each family of parts across the multiple cases examined within a benchmark. The code uses the TEX-HEU campaign as a proof of concept, and we show that the correlations can be calculated with information commonly found in ICSBEP (International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project) benchmarks. The estimated covariances are used in χ 2 trending studies to evaluate their impact on nuclear data validation. Without covariances, χ 2 per degree of freedom was calculated as 2.203 and with covariances it was 1.179. The difference shows that omitting covariance information may cause overly pessimistic bias quantifications. The covariance determination code can be easily integrated into current benchmark evaluations as well as reevaluating legacy benchmark uncertainties. Uncertainty correlation calculations should become the baseline for criticality safety integral experiment benchmarks and can now be easily calculated with the described software package.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗