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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Why does cyber deterrence fail and when might it succeed? A framework for cyber scenario analysis

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Technical and Policy Toolkit for Cyber Deterrence and Stability

In the post-World War II era, nuclear deterrence and arms control established a strategic equilibrium between the superpowers that has come under increasing threat as cyber conflict becomes more prevalent. This study seeks to assist policymakers and scholars build a theoretical, policy, and technical framework to address cyber conflict. Based on an analysis of deterrence theory and application and prior arms control regimes, the study presents a toolkit of policies and actions for national governments based on elements of deterrence and arms control that is applicable to cyber conflict. The study illustrates how these could be prospectively applied in a treaty framework to facilitate attribution of hostile cyber actions.

Cyber Deterrence, Cyber Stability, Cyber Conflict,↗
DOE OSTI2017

Cyber Deterrence and Stability

Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Resilience as a Deterrence Strategy

This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Cyberspace, Information Strategy and International Security (Workshop Summary)

In recent years, the Center for Global Security Research has hosted a number of events to inform strategic thought on key areas of concern to national security and laboratory planning. This was the first dedicated workshop that CGSR has hosted seeking to convene a community of experts around issues of cybersecurity and Internet governance as they pertain to national security. The goal of this work was to bridge policy, academic, military, technical and other expert communities that often have limited contact with each other’s concerns and specialized knowledge. This workshop brought together over 80 experts from government, military, national labs, academic institutions, think tanks, the private sector, and civil society and hailing from 10 countries. While focusing on the national security challenges and military strategy emerging in and through cyberspace, the workshop aimed to address the cross-cutting interests and concerns of different stakeholders in the development and future governance of cyberspace, including those of the private sector, and civilian publics. To this end, the first day of the workshop focused particularly on issues directly relevant to military strategy in the cyber domain, while the second day addressed questions bridging national security and military concerns and their connections to the domestic and international politics of Internet governance. Topics discussed included the evolving cyber strategies of the U.S., U.S. allies and potential adversaries, as well as the complex characteristics of the cyber domain, the potential for deterrence in or through cyberspace, the domain’s escalation risks, and the ways in which the “dual use” nature of much of the underlying technology of cyberspace connects actions in the domain with broader questions of global Internet governance. Issues of online disinformation and information warfare and the unique conceptual tensions and governance challenges posed by these forms of conflict were addressed. The workshop also examined the roles and interests of different stakeholders in addressing cybersecurity challenges, as well as the possibility of norms, international law, and other potential mechanisms of constraint.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Paradigms and Challenges for Deterrence in Cyberspace

In 2018 Sandia National Laboratories launched the Civilian Cyber Strategic Initiative, an ongoing multi-year effort to characterize future threats to civilian cyber infrastructures, to inform research and development efforts to detect, attribute, counter, and recover from cyber attacks, and to inform program and capability investment decisions across the Energy and Homeland Security portfolio at Sandia. One of the primary objectives of the Civilian Cyber Strategic initiative is to leverage Sandia's systems analysis capabilities to characterize future threats and to support a new theory of deterrence. Towards the goal of supporting a new theory of deterrence in cyberspace, the purpose of this study was to understand how new and existing deterrence paradigms can be applied to cyberspace, to identify unique challenges and pitfalls associated with deterring adversaries in cyberspace, and to develop preliminary ideas for how our ability to deter cyber adversaries might be improved. Our approach combined literature reviews of relevant policy documents and the academic literature with interviews of experts both at Sandia and beyond.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

5th Annual LLNL Deterrence Workshop -- Multi-Domain Strategic Competition: Rewards and Risks

A fundamental uncertainty in the U.S. approach to strategic competition is about the long-term goals. It remains unclear to what end the U.S. is competing. One answer is that the U.S. aims to preserve and expand its influence to secure economic and political interests while safeguarding a global order that serves these interests. The competition, thus, is about using political, economic, and military instruments to achieve limited national aims by changing Russia’s and China’s behavior. Yet, if this is the U.S. goal, it has not been clearly articulated. The NSS and the NDS provide over a dozen different answers about the goals of strategic competition. In addition, senior administration officials have set out their own ideas of what the goals of the competition should be. The question of long-term goals is especially sharp at the strategic level of war. It is unclear whether the United States seeks “over-matching” capabilities for “strategic dominance” in cyber space, outer space, missile defense, conventional strike, and nuclear deterrence, or if the U.S. goals are more limited.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Potential Academic Research Topics of National Security Relevance

Since even before its establishment as an independent national security laboratory in 1949, Sandia has been devoted to an overarching mission of developing advanced technologies for global peace. These technologies have taken a variety of forms, and they exist in and must address an ever-changing global security environment. An understanding of that global security environment and its possible or likely evolution is therefore critical to ensuring that Sandia can maintain its focus on strategic technology investments that will benefit the nation in the next 20- 30 years. Sandia sustains multiple Systems Analysis organizations whose responsibility includes maintaining an understanding of the global security environment as it applies across multiple mission domains. The topics below include two from Sandia's emerging threats and biodefense mission, three with relevance to Sandia's cyber defense mission, and four of particular but not exclusive relevance to Sandia's nuclear deterrence mission. All are intended to spur independent academic thought that could assist Sandia as well as the broader national security community in anticipating and adapting to a continually changing world. Sandia anticipates periodic interactions between Sandia Systems Analysis staff and SciPol Scholars Program faculty and students who choose to expand upon these topics in order to provide opportunities for feedback and communication throughout 2020-2021.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar

In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗