Search NASASearch

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “DIGITAL COMMAND SYSTEM”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

Implementation and Demonstration of the Digital Twin Certification System Remote Operations Framework

Microreactors are one promising advanced-reactor concept being pursued by the nuclear industry. They are distinguished by a relatively low power output of 20 MWth or less. These microreactors are intended for deployment in applications where conventional small-capacity power solutions, such as diesel generators, are either economically unfeasible or logistically challenging. Such applications include providing electric power and/or heat for remote communities, mining sites, defense installations, and humanitarian and disaster-relief missions. An important feature for the successful deployment of microreactors is their capability to be operated remotely. This capability can significantly reduce staffing costs by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be physically present at each reactor site. Instead, operators can be centralized in a single remote operations center placed in an economically advantageous location, thereby optimizing resources by consolidating expertise and enhancing operational efficiency. However, the implementation of a remote operation system for nuclear reactors raises new concerns regarding the security, reliability, and resilience of such a system. One way in which remote operations can be supported in a manner that maintains system security, reliability, and resilience is through the use of digital twins in a novel framework designed to verify and validate sensor data and commands communicated between the remote operations center and reactor. This framework, known as the Digital Twin Certification System (DTCS), has previously been proposed as an operations architecture that can bring security and resiliency levels of remote nuclear-reactor operations to a level acceptable for commercial deployment. This paper moves the proposed DTCS architecture from concept to reality by presenting the implementation and testing of the system. The rationale and implementation of the DTCS using tools such as DeepLynx and Apache Airflow, is covered in-depth. This is followed by a demonstration of the DTCS by applying the implemented system architecture to the Single Primary Heat Extraction and Removal Emulator, a small-scale non-nuclear test bed that emulates thermal behavior of a microreactor. The demonstration includes both normal and abnormal operating scenarios to highlight how the DTCS can increase the security, reliability, and resilience of a remote operations system.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Implementation and Demonstration of the Digital Twin Certification System Remote Operations Framework

Microreactors are one promising advanced-reactor concept being pursued by the nuclear industry. They are distinguished by a relatively low power output of 20 MWth or less. These microreactors are intended for deployment in applications where conventional small-capacity power solutions, such as diesel generators, are either economically unfeasible or logistically challenging. Such applications include providing electric power and/or heat for remote communities, mining sites, defense installations, and humanitarian and disaster-relief missions. An important feature for the successful deployment of microreactors is their capability to be operated remotely. This capability can significantly reduce staffing costs by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be physically present at each reactor site. Instead, operators can be centralized in a single remote operations center placed in an economically advantageous location, thereby optimizing resources by consolidating expertise and enhancing operational efficiency. However, the implementation of a remote operation system for nuclear reactors raises new concerns regarding the security, reliability, and resilience of such a system. One way in which remote operations can be supported in a manner that maintains system security, reliability, and resilience is through the use of digital twins in a novel framework designed to verify and validate sensor data and commands communicated between the remote operations center and reactor. This framework, known as the Digital Twin Certification System (DTCS), has previously been proposed as an operations architecture that can bring security and resiliency levels of remote nuclear-reactor operations to a level acceptable for commercial deployment. This paper moves the proposed DTCS architecture from concept to reality by presenting the implementation and testing of the system. The rationale and implementation of the DTCS using tools such as DeepLynx and Apache Airflow, is covered in-depth. This is followed by a demonstration of the DTCS by applying the implemented system architecture to the Single Primary Heat Extraction and Removal Emulator, a small-scale non-nuclear test bed that emulates thermal behavior of a microreactor. The demonstration includes both normal and abnormal operating scenarios to highlight how the DTCS can increase the security, reliability, and resilience of a remote operations system.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

Preliminary proof-of-concept of real-time divertor heat flux control from infrared cameras with nitrogen injection in the DIII-D tokamak

In future tokamak reactors like ITER and the Fusion Pilot Plant (FPP), real-time feedback control of heat flux to the plasma-facing components (PFC) will be critical for steady-state operation. This work presents the first experimental demonstration of real-time divertor heat flux estimation with infrared thermography and feedback control with impurity seeding on the DIII-D tokamak. The flexible infrastructure of the Plasma Control System (PCS) on DIII-D makes this new capability possible. The PCS software runs on a gateway computer system, and five real-time compute nodes. An array of low latency streaming digitizers from D-TACQ Solutions connects to these real-time computers to collect and process data, and send commands to actuators during plasma discharges. This system handles the signal IO from the tokamak and allows the PCS to utilize the diagnostic data necessary to perform control in real-time. Feedback control on heat flux was accomplished by feeding infrared camera data from the “Infrared TV” (IRTV) camera to a custom-developed User Datagram Protocol (UDP) server. This server transmits infrared data to a newly developed PCS algorithm that estimates the heat flux to PFC. Here, a proportional integral derivative (PID) controller minimizes the error between a heat flux reference and the real-time estimate by injecting nitrogen gas into the divertor.

Algorithm development

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems

Graphical User Interface for a Biasing Board for the PSEC6

The PSEC6 is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) designed for a readout system for a large area picosecond photodetector (LAPPD). The PSEC6 is currently in fabrication and pending testing. The testing system for the PSEC5, the previous iteration of the ASIC, required expensive and non-portable equipment, because the ASIC needs twelve adjustable reference voltages. The new testing system consists of an low-cost, open-source, cross-platform graphical user interface (GUI), a digital system, and a biasing board. The digital system is the interface between the GUI and biasing board, and can be implemented on a microcontroller or field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The biasing board contains twelve digital-to-analog converters (DACs) that are configurable via the GUI, which gives users the ability to write voltage values to all or specific DACs. The GUI was developed in C on Linux using the widget library GTK4 and cross-compiled for Windows compatibility. I2C and SPI protocols were implemented on an Adafruit Feather ESP32-S3 microcontroller to write commands to the DACs and PSEC6. A hardware implementation of the I2C protocol is in development on an FPGA. Since LAPPDs will be used by the Accelerator Neutrino Neutron Interaction Experiment (ANNIE) at Fermilab, the PSEC6 testing system in this internship project can potentially benefit future neutrino research. The project is relevant to the Department of Energy’s microelectronics mission, because the PSEC6 is an ASIC that will handle fast time signals arriving from the detector for readout. It also provided experience with building a cross-platform user interface, practicing digital design and implementation in hardware description language (HDL), and using simulations to inform new design iterations.

Guerrero, Sasha Camila [North Central Coll.]

Graphical User Interface for a Biasing Board for the PSEC6

The PSEC6 is an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) designed for a readout system for a large area picosecond photodetector (LAPPD). The PSEC6 is currently in fabrication and pending testing. The testing system for the PSEC5, the previous iteration of the ASIC, required expensive and non-portable equipment, because the ASIC needs twelve adjustable reference voltages. The new testing system consists of an low-cost, open-source, cross-platform graphical user interface (GUI), a digital system, and a biasing board. The digital system is the interface between the GUI and biasing board, and can be implemented on a microcontroller or field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The biasing board contains twelve digital-to-analog converters (DACs) that are configurable via the GUI, which gives users the ability to write voltage values to all or specific DACs. The GUI was developed in C on Linux using the widget library GTK4 and cross-compiled for Windows compatibility. I2C and SPI protocols were implemented on an Adafruit Feather ESP32-S3 microcontroller to write commands to the DACs and PSEC6. A hardware implementation of the I2C protocol is in development on an FPGA. Since LAPPDs will be used by the Accelerator Neutrino Neutron Interaction Experiment (ANNIE) at Fermilab, the PSEC6 testing system in this internship project can potentially benefit future neutrino research. The project is relevant to the Department of Energy’s microelectronics mission, because the PSEC6 is an ASIC that will handle fast time signals arriving from the detector for readout. It also provided experience with building a cross-platform user interface, practicing digital design and implementation in hardware description language (HDL), and using simulations to inform new design iterations.

Guerrero, Sasha Camila [North Central Coll.]

Real-Time Testbed for Studying Cyberattacks and Defense in DER-integrated Smart Inverter Systems

In this paper, we propose a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) simulation testbed suitable for the implementation and testing of realistic cyberattacks on grid-tied smart inverter systems integrated with Distributed Energy Resources (DER) that use the Distributed Network Protocol-3 (DNP3) protocol for communications between grid components. Specifically, our testbed combines a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) NovaCor device, outfitted with GNETx2 network interface cards, a gridtied DER topology implemented via the RTDS software package RSCAD, and a custom virtual network that emulates a man in the middle attacker. The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker captures DNP3 traffic and falsifies telemetry data in DNP3 packets to trigger unwarranted commands from a DNP3 controller that exploit smart inverter grid support functions. We choose DNP3 and implement grid support functions according to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018 mandated for the interconnection and interoperability of DER power systems with associated power components. Furthermore, we develop a protocol payload agnostic attack detection framework that leverages the round-trip time (RTT) anomalies between DNP3 requests and responses and can detect the presence of attacks without having to analyze the payload’s contents, while balancing trade-offs between false alarm counts, missed detections, and time to detection. To facilitate further research, we publicly release benign and attack network traffic exchanged between various sensors, controllers, and actuators in our grid-tied inverter testbed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer