Radiation Chemistry Simulations: Basis and Application to Dosimeters and DNA Damage
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Ianik Plante↗
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Does the International Space Station Leak DNA? Preliminary Results from the ISS External Microorganisms Payload
Existing crewed spacecraft like the ISS (International Space Station) leak by design. The ISS routinely releases gas to maintain life support systems and when astronauts exit the station to perform space walks. The chemical component of this leakage is well characterized, but the biological components are not. The ISS is not subject to planetary protection requirements, but planned missions to Mars will use similar systems and will be subject to planetary protection requirements. If detectable microorganisms are escaping through vents and or airlocks we may need to redesign our crewed habitats to minimize this type of contamination. To test the hypothesis that microorganisms from inside ISS are detectable on exterior surfaces an astronaut used the ISS External Microorganisms sampling kit (Rucker et al. 2018) to sample exterior surfaces of the ISS during an EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) in January of 2025. These samples were returned to Earth for DNA extraction and sequencing. We successfully, extracted and sequenced bacterial, fungal and viral DNA from these samples that was not present in the negative controls. These results should help NASA refine the planetary protection requirements for crewed missions. Methods: The samples were collected using sterile, DNA free, buccal swabs (23 mm. diameter) housed in custom canisters. Each canister uses a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to maintain sterility as the caddy, holding 8 swabs moves in and out of vacuum. The astronaut sampled the: 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly vent, and 6) the Vacuum Exhaust System vent. The seventh swab was exposed to vacuum during the EVA without touching it to a surface. The eighth swab, a negative control, was not opened until the caddy returned to Earth. DNA was extracted from the swabs using a QIamp UCP Pathogen kit and prepared for sequencing on an Aviti (Element Biosciences) sequencer (Arslan et al. 2024). The resulting sequences were analyzed using the EDGE Bioinformatics platform (Li et al. 2017). The sequences were analyzed individually using tools like BLAST, GOTTCHA2, Kraken2, and PanGIA. The data were also assembled into metagenome assembled genomes) using tools like CONCOCT, MaxBin2 and MetaBAT2. Results: We successfully extracted and sequenced bacterial, archaeal, fungal and viral DNA from all seven samples. The handrail swab had the lowest number of reads (768,651) and the airlock thermal cover had the highest number of reads (8,819,230). These samples contain DNA from human associated bacteria (e.g. Crynebacterium riegelii ), fungi (.e.g. Penicillium rubens ), and viruses (e.g Alphapapillomavirus ). Conclusion: Preliminary interpretation suggest that the airlock and the space suits themselves are the largest sources of contaminant DNA. Most if not all of the DNA is from organisms known to be present inside the ISS. Vents attached to life support systems may be a lesser source of biological contamination. Further analysis should help NASA address planetary protection knowledge gaps for crewed missions.
Aaron B Regberg↗
Assembly of catalytic complexes from randomized oligonucleotides
The early evolution of life relied on catalytic RNAs (ribozymes) for central functions. To test whether early catalysts could have assembled from multiple short nucleic acid fragments in random sequence environments, we performed an in vitro selection from a short RNA library in the presence of 256 different DNA 20-nucleotide oligomers. High-throughput sequencing and biochemical analysis showed that most of the selected 1331 RNA sequences required at least one DNA for activity. Representatives for four of six RNA clusters that depended on DNA cofactors were active even when the 256 DNAs were replaced by completely random DNA 20-nucleotide oligomers. The formation of these catalytic complexes and the recruitment of oligonucleotide cofactors from completely random libraries demonstrate an important principle for the emergence of the earliest oligonucleotide catalysts.
Xu Han↗
Nitrile/Buna N Material Failure Assessment for an O-Ring used on the Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (FCV) of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
After the rollout of Space Shuttle Discovery in April 2005 in preparation for return-to-flight, there was a failure of the Orbiter (OV-103) helium signature leak test in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) system. Leakage was attributed to the Flow Control Valve (FCV) in Main Engine 3. The FCV determined to be the source of the leak for OV-103 is designated as LV-58. The nitrile/Buna N rubber O-ring seal was removed from LV-58, and failure analysis indicated radial cracks providing leak paths in one quadrant. Cracks were eventually found in 6 of 9 FCV O-rings among the three Shuttle Orbiters, though none were as severe as those for LV-58, OV-103. Testing by EM10 at MSFC on all 9 FCV O- rings included: laser dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an Instron tensile machine. The following test data was obtained on the cracked quadrant of the LV-58, OV-103 O-ring: (1) the estimated compression set was only 9.5%, compared to none for the rest of the O-ring; (2) Shore A hardness for the O.D. was higher by almost 4 durometer points than for the rest of the O-ring; and (3) DMA data showed that the storage/elastic modulus E was almost 25% lower than for the rest of the O-ring. Of the 8 FCV O-rings tested on an Instron, 4 yielded tensile strengths that were below the MIL spec requirement of 1350 psi-a likely influence of rubber cracking. Comparisons were made between values of modulus determined by DNA (elastic) and Instron (Young s). Each nitrile/Buna N O-ring used in the FCV conforms to the MIL-P-25732C specification. A number of such O-rings taken from shelf storage at MSFC and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) were used to generate a reference curve of DMA glass transition temperature (Tg) vs. shelf storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. A similar reference curve of TGA onset temperature (of rubber weight loss) vs. shelf storage time was also generated. The DMA and TGA data for the used FCV O-rings were compared to the reference curves. Correlations were also made between the DMA modulus (at 22 C) and Shore A hardness for all 9 of the FCV O-rings used among the three Shuttle Orbiters. The radial cracking in the FCV O-rings was determined to be due to ozone attack, as nitrile/Buna N rubber is susceptible to such attack. Nitrile/Buna N material under MIL-P25732C should be used in a hydraulic fluid environment to help protect it from cracking. However, the FCV O-rings were used in an air only environment. The FCV design has as much as a 9-mil gap that allows the O.D. of the O-ring to be directly exposed to ozone, pressurized air and some elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process that leads to O-ring cracking. Space Shuttle flights will likely not continue past 2010. Therefore, Shuttle management decided to continue using the nitrile/Buna N material for the FCVs, but have each O-ring replaced after 3 years to minimize any chances for crack initiation.
Doug Wingard↗