Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “DOE contractors”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

FIU Projects 4 & 5: DOE-FIU Science and Technology Workforce Development Program

The DOE-FIU Science and Technology Workforce Development Program has been designed to build upon the existing DOE/FIU relationship by creating a “pipeline” of minority engineers specifically trained and mentored to enter the Department of Energy workforce in technical areas of need. The main objective of the program is to provide interested students with a unique opportunity to integrate course work, DOE field work, and research work at FIU into a well-structured academic program that leads to entry into DOE EM’s Pathways Program. Students selected as DOE EM Fellows perform research at FIU and at DOE sites, national laboratories, and DOE contractors. Graduation and completion of this fellowship leads to employment opportunities with DOE EM, DOE contractors, DOE national laboratories, other federal agencies, and private industry as well as the pursuit of post-master or post-doctoral positions at DOE national labs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Corrective Maintenance Paradigm Shift at Hanford's Tank Farms - 20077

Hanford's Tank Farms facilities have been used to safely store waste for over 70 years, with the first single-shell tanks being constructed in 1943. Tank Farm facilities consist of 149 single-shell tanks, 28 double-shell tanks, an evaporator facility, and wastewater treatment facilities. Tank Farm facilities are aging, with a tremendous corrective maintenance burden on the Tank Farm contractor. The mission of Tank Farm facilities is soon changing from waste storage to waste staging for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). WTP operations will demand a significant increase in Tank Farm facility operations, in which corrective maintenance outage windows will shrink drastically. This realization has forced the Tank Farm contractor to consider a paradigm shift in Tank Farm facilities Maintenance planning, and the use of reliability Engineering tools. The Tank Farm Production Operations Engineering Cognizant System Engineering (CSE) organization has led the way in motivating this paradigm shift. This shift has been realized through the use of: 1) technical exchange with other Department of Energy (DOE) contractors to develop improvements in the CSE program, 2) a shift from the use of lagging to leading system health indicators, and 3) a Plant Health Committee to unite Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel toward a productive maintenance strategy. The CSE organization has held several technical exchanges with other DOE contractors to discuss CSE concepts, and how to better maintain aging infrastructure. The technical exchange with other contractors has greatly reduced the time required to make improvements in the Tank Farm CSE program. Other DOE contractors have already faced issues surrounding aging infrastructure, and have vast experience in improving the reliability and usable life of structures and components in nuclear facilities. The past CSE program used lagging health indicators to determine the health of systems. The key lagging indicator used to determine system health was availability, which is the percentage of time that a facility was ready for operation compared to the time the facility was demanded for operation. Availability was a good indicator of health in the waste storage mission of Tank Farms, where safe storage was the most important function of the facility, and where maintenance outage windows were typically long-duration. In current and future operations, outage windows are reducing, resulting in the need for much more reliable systems. Systems that have had high availability may suddenly become inoperable due to a failed component or sub-system. In several instances, the use of availability as an indicator of system health failed to predict system/equipment failure before its occurrence. In discussions with other DOE contractors, a set of reliability tools, including leading indicators of health, has been implemented in the CSE program. This primarily involves the use of failure modes and effects analysis and the study of equipment failure to develop system monitoring plans that focus on trending data to detect oncoming equipment failure ahead of time. In addition, the use of a Plant Health Committee has added significantly to the paradigm shift from a corrective maintenance philosophy to the use of predictive and preventive maintenance. The Plant Health Committee is a chartered team consisting of Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel. CSEs use this forum to present the results of their performance monitoring, including the presentation of health via leading health indicators. The most positive aspect of this committee is the communication that it creates within these critical organizations. The Operations and Maintenance organization benefit from focusing maintenance on the reliability-centered focus provided by Engineering. Engineering benefits from the operational experience of the Operations organization and from the failure data that can be provided by Maintenance personnel. The continued use of the Plant Health Committee is expected to further decrease maintenance outage times, in better support of oncoming 24/7 operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enhancing the ATR Primary Coolant System: A 3D Modeling Approach

The project consisted in system inspections to the ATR Primary Coolant System involving welds, fittings, motors, pumps, flanges, and heat exchangers to enhance Inservice Inspection program as required by DOE orders. NOTE: This article is to be published as "DOE & DOE Contractors Only" in the OPEXShare application, which means it will be available for viewing to DOE & DOE Contractor registered users only. This article can also be used by CAES for their training and safety meetings.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Session 058 - Panel: Ensuring Strong Return on Investment for DOE EM Technology Development: DOE Views (1/2) (R1.26)

The panel represented the views of US DOE National Laboratories and DOE Contractors and focused on DOE Technology Development Projects discussing how they approach tech development to maximize return on investment. Successful examples were discussed. Panelists with presentations: Ensuring a Strong ROI for DOE EM Technology Development (Jud Virden); The DOE EM Technology Development Technical Assistance Program (Carol Eddy-Dilek); SRR Liquid Waste Technology Development Program: Encouraging Creativity Maximize Return on Investment (Vijay Jain); Ensuring Strong Return on Investment for DOE EM Technology Development: A Vendor Perspective (Martin Williams)

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Independent Review of Non-Destructive Assay for the K-25/K-27 D&D Project: November 30-December 3, 2004, Oak Ridge, TN

The DOE with concurrence from the D&D contractor has chartered an assessment of the methods and procedures used to obtain the original NDA results of holdup deposits at the K-25 and K-27 uranium gaseous diffusion facilities in Oak Ridge. The assessment has been performed by an external review team with the participation of the D&D contractor, DOE, and DOE/OR. This document is the final report for the assessment. The DOE provided the charter for this review. The review team spent a week in Oak Ridge attending meetings and participating in discussions with expert contractor staff. Substantial additional input for the review came from numerous written materials, unpublished and published. This final report of observations, findings, and recommendations in areas defined by the charter is based on information from the meetings, discussions, and documents. The assessment of the Review Team is that the DOE/OR and BJC approach in using historical NDA data for the D&D of K-25 and K-27 is appropriate and generally acceptable. Resolving issues, addressing findings, and implementing the recommendations documented in this report will reconcile specific technical concerns.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Life cycle Management of 324 Project High-Activity, Mixed/Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 20506

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the 324 Building and is preparing to remotely excavate and disposition the radioactive soil beneath the building to allow further deactivation of the building. The 324 Building is a non-reactor Category 2 Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 liters of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) and strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr) spilled onto the floor of a hot cell, B-Cell, in the 324 Building. The spill contained an estimated 1.3 million curies (Ci) of radioactivity. A breach in the sump of B-Cell was discovered in November 2009 during characterization of the soil under the building. Exposure rates in excess of 10,000 R/hr were detected through a system of access pipes installed under the hot cell, and an estimated 1.557 E+05 Ci of {sup 137}Cs and 6.842 E+04 Ci of {sup 90}Sr are in the soil beneath B-Cell. The magnitude of the soil contamination below B-Cell represents one of the most challenging remediation activities in the DOE complex. The objective of CHPRC's 324 Project is to remotely excavate and disposition the highly contaminated soil under the hot cell so building deactivation and stabilization activities can resume. Depending on the volume and radioactivity of contaminated soil under B-Cell, the material will be dispositioned either at the Hanford Site's Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) or in grout monoliths that will be created in the hot cells (A, C and D) next to B-Cell during future building demolition activities. The current project scope includes installing structural supports under the walls of B-Cell and using remotely operated equipment to remove debris from the hot cell, remove debris mixed with grout on the floor, saw through and remove the cell floor and liner, and excavate contaminated soil under B-Cell to a depth of up to 3.66 meters (12 feet). Addition or removal of debris in A-Cell may be required to support B-Cell cleanout and excavation activities. The base approach is to disposition debris and soil bins in the Radiochemical Engineering Cell (REC) monoliths, and subsequently disposition the monoliths during building demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sludge Removal: Success and Partnership with T Plant - 20510

U.S. DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) has safely and efficiently managed the removal of highly radioactive sludge from the 105-K West Reactor fuel storage basin (105- KW Basin) near the Columbia River. In mid-September 2019, sludge retrieval was completed after 21 storage containers were safely loaded with highly radioactive sludge and transported approximately 13 miles from the 105-KW Basin to T Plant, located in the 200 West Area on the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site. Sludge removal represents the last major source term reduction necessary before the K West Reactor and fuel storage basin can transition to closure activities in preparation for final deactivation and demolition. The technical complexity of the sludge retrieval process, coupled with the challenging physical and radiological characteristics of the waste, necessitated a methodical and deliberate approach using unique design and operational solutions to safely conduct the work. This challenge was further complicated by the need to plan and conduct the work in two separate facilities, each subject to the controls and requirements of its own nuclear facility safety basis. The project overcame these challenges through creating an integrated team that actively engaged, communicated and coordinated each phase of the project to ensure successful completion. This paper will cover how these key elements of the Sludge Removal Project led to its success: - Integrating project planning and management; - Lessons learned from design and construction; - Preparing for a successful campaign (lessons learned from testing and start-up); - Lessons learned from operating in two separate facilities, transporting sludge containers on the Hanford Site and ensuring compliance with a range of regulatory and safety basis requirements. The establishment of an integrated group spanning two facilities and multiple organizations created a team capable of overcoming the challenges necessary to successfully plan and execute the sludge retrieval mission. Sharing lessons learned from this successful project can enhance the ability of teams across the DOE complex to successfully plan and execute complex projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan (Update for 2021)

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Six surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018 one in 2019 and one in 2020. This 2021 update documents what was actually done in 2020 and what is planned for 2021. Deviations from the 2020 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

DARHT : Enduring Lessons from a Technical Project in a National Laboratory Context [Slides]

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the world’s first flash x-ray facility able to take multiple high-resolution radiographs of the interior features of fast-moving dense objects during a single experiment. DARHT’s radiography and complimentary diagnostics makes it an important diagnostic tool in support of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)’s stewardship of the US nuclear deterrent. The project to construct DARHT ran from 1988 through 2003. Initial Operating Capability along a single axis began in 1999. A technical issue delayed Critical Decision 4 for the full dual-axis capability until 2008. DARHT was characterized by several directed changes resulting from an environmental impact study, changes to the global security context resulting from the end of underground nuclear testing, and rapid evolution of applicable technology. Conventional building and lab-space construction were part of the project, but the project was dominated by Special Facility Equipment that, together with the mission to support the nuclear weapons program, required the project to be completed by national laboratories. Although the project pre-dated implementation of DOE Order 413.3, several important lessons for national laboratory projects remain applicable today and will be discussed here, including projects appropriate for the national laboratory environment, scope stability, risk acceptance and mitigation, communication, and collaboration. Finally, considerations for DOE contractor project managers are offered based upon the DARHT experience.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

INL Environmental Monitoring Plan (DOE/ID-11088 Rev. 5)

This plan provides a high-level summary of environmental monitoring performed by various organizations within and around the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Guide DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, and in accordance with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The purpose of these orders is to 1) implement sound stewardship practices that protect the air, water, land, and other natural and cultural resources that may be impacted by DOE operations, and 2) to establish standards and requirements for the operations of DOE and DOE contractors with respect to protection of the environment and members of the public against undue risk from radiation. This plan describes the organizations responsible for conducting environmental monitoring across the INL Site, the rationale for monitoring, the types of media being monitored, where the monitoring is conducted, and where monitoring results can be obtained. Detailed monitoring procedures, program plans, or other governing documents used by contractors or agencies to implement requirements are referenced in this plan. This plan covers all planned monitoring and environmental surveillance. Non-routine activities such as special research studies and characterization of individual sites for environmental restoration are outside the scope of this plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 23: Start-up of Three Major DOE Treatment Facilities - SWPF, IWTU and DFLAW

This panel focused on the DOE-EM planning to complete construction and start up three major treatment facilities in the next 18 months. This included the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) at Savannah River, the Integrated Waste treatment Unit (IWTU) at Idaho and the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) at Hanford. DOE Site Managers from SC, ID and WA introduced each facility then the DOE Contractor provided the details on their biggest challenges in regulatory issues, construction, start-up and operations of each facility. Panelists with presentations: Lessons in Managing Risks in First of a Kind Nuclear Construction and Start-Up (Pamela Marks); Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (Connie Flohr); IWTI-Fluor (Frederick Hughes); Startup and Commissioning (Tom Fletcher)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Whose Gas is it anyway? Differentiating the Source of a Large Soil Vapor Plume beneath Two Adjacent Waste Sites - 20487

DOE contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company is currently responsible for conducting groundwater contamination monitoring at several RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal units located on the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington State. The Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill treatment, storage, and disposal unit presents a distinct groundwater monitoring problem because of a large multi-contaminant soil vapor plume beneath it that is a likely source of low-level volatile organic compound groundwater contamination. Adjacent to Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill is the Solid Waste Landfill. Volatile organic compounds are inventory components of both the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and the Solid Waste Landfill. Therefore, it is possible that both sites could be contributing to the soil vapor plume. For regulatory purposes, it is important to differentiate which site is the primary contributor of volatile organic compounds to the plume. An approach was developed to identify the primary volatile organic compound source of the soil vapor plume beneath Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill. The site conceptual model hypothesis of vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to the dissolved phase in groundwater was tested by a simple mathematical model of vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations at the groundwater/air interface. Once it was shown that vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to groundwater was a valid conceptual model for Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill, spatial and statistical methods were used to determine the primary site contributing to the majority of volatile organic compounds to the soil vapor plume. Average groundwater chloroform, tetrachloroethene, and trichloroethene concentrations from Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill monitoring network wells were plotted on maps of the facilities and immediate vicinities and compared to soil vapor sampling probe locations. Principal component analysis and mixing ratios were used to identify source contributions of each treatment, storage, and disposal unit to the plume. Results of the vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations mathematical model showed that transport phenomena outweigh steady-state equilibria. Estimated vapor/liquid equilibrium concentrations were considerably lower than soil vapor measurements. The results indicate that dynamic vadose zone and groundwater factors such as decreased vapor concentrations with depth, vapor dilution from dispersion in the vadose zone, and advective and diffusional volatile organic compound dilution in groundwater result in groundwater volatile organic compound concentrations much less than would be measured under steady-state equilibrium conditions. Site source contribution differentiation by principal component analysis and mixing ratios was inconclusive using actual soil gas data because of the similarity in concentration values in both datasets for Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill. Similar data populations suggest mixing of the vapor contributions from both sites by dispersion through the soil matrix pore spaces. However, when groundwater volatile organic compound data were compared between the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and Solid Waste Landfill monitoring networks, Solid Waste Landfill mean concentrations were higher, suggesting more vapor-phase volatile organic compound transport to groundwater at those locations. Simulated volatile organic compound soil vapor and groundwater datasets created to test the methods developed for this study show that the method can be successful in source differentiation when significantly different datasets are compared. This paper will describe a method of testing a conceptual model for vapor-phase contaminant transport to groundwater and for differentiating site sources of contaminants comprising a mixed-constituent soil vapor plume. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1978

Proceedings of the DOE chemical/hydrogen energy contractor review systems

Chemical/hydrogen energy system contracts were reviewed. The review served as an effective means to (1) give all contracts an insight into the background and objectives of thirty-nine hydrogen-related tasks, (2) show the status of the studies or technical effort, (3) relate any problems that had impeded the progress, and (4) state projected solutions for resolving the identified problems.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Mentor Protégé Program Brochure

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Mentor Protégé Program is designed to help small businesses obtain mentoring from DOE prime contractors. The program is meant to foster long-term business relationships between small businesses and DOE prime contractors while increasing the overall number of small business entities that receive DOE contract and subcontract awards.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 117: Panel: Operational Excellence Through a Strong Safety Culture (R9.1)

This panel focused on the what the Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors are doing to promote safety and excellence. The Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is crucial, but additional support provided by the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), DOE, and environmental, safety, and health (ES and H) professionals in the field are equally imperative. The panelists discussed the importance of sharing lessons learned as well as are developing performance metrics to track operational and safety successes. This panel focused on current trends in building a strong operational safety culture and will include results from recent national workshops. Safety culture is the foundation of strong operational performance. Panel discussion included best practices from industry, DOE, and US NRC and also review tools being used to measure and evaluate safety culture programs. Panelists with presentations: Strong Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence (Kliss McNeel, Patricia Hughes); Safety Culture (Patricia Allen); DOE Safety Culture Improvement (Julie Goeckner); Supporting Safety Culture on the Front Line (Jan Preston); Interdependence of Safety Culture and Organizational Performance (Rizwan Shah)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2007

Final Results for the GRC Supporting Technology Development Project for the 110-Watt Stirling Radioisotope Generator (SRG110)

From 1999-2006, the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) supported the development of a high-efficiency, nominal 110-We Stirling Radioisotope Generator (SRG110) for potential use on NASA missions, including deep space missions, Mars rovers, and lunar applications. Lockheed Martin (LM) was the system integrator for the SRG110, under contract to the Department of Energy (DOE). Infinia Corporation (formerly Stirling Technology Company) developed the Stirling convertor, first as a contractor to DOE and then under subcontract to LM. The SRG110 development has been redirected, and recent program changes have been made to significantly increase the specific power of the generator. System development of an Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG) has now begun, using a lightweight, advanced convertor from Sunpower, Inc. This paper summarizes the results of the supporting technology effort that GRC completed for the SRG110. GRC tasks included convertor extended-duration testing in air and thermal vacuum environments, heater head life assessment, materials studies, permanent magnet aging characterization, linear alternator evaluations, structural dynamics testing, electromagnetic interference (EMI) and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) characterization, organic materials evaluations, reliability studies, and development of an end-to-end system dynamic model. Related efforts are now continuing in many of these areas to support ASRG development.

Schreiber, Jeffrey G.↗