A Novel Interior-Exterior Approach for the TSO-DSO Based Bilevel Optimal Power Flow
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Information asymmetry between the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators (DERAs) obstructs designing effective incentives for voltage regulation. To capture this effect, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, where the DSO seeks to overcome the information asymmetry and refine its incentive strategies by learning from DERA behavior over multiple iterations. We introduce a model-based online learning algorithm for the DSO, aimed at inferring the relationship between incentives and DERA responses. Given the uncertain nature of these responses, we also propose a distributionally robust incentive design model to control the probability of voltage regulation failure and then reformulate it into a convex problem. This model allows the DSO to periodically revise distribution assumptions on uncertain parameters in the decision model of the DERA. Finally, we present a gradient-based method that permits the DSO to adaptively modify its conservativeness level, measured by the size of a Wasserstein metric-based ambiguity set, according to historical voltage regulation performance. The effectiveness of our proposed method is demonstrated through numerical experiments.
Information asymmetry between the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators (DERAs) obstructs designing effective incentives for voltage regulation. To capture this effect, we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, where the DSO seeks to overcome the information asymmetry and refine its incentive strategies by learning from DERA behavior over multiple iterations. We introduce a model-based online learning algorithm for the DSO, aimed at inferring the relationship between incentives and DERA responses. Given the uncertain nature of these responses, we also propose a distributionally robust incentive design model to control the probability of voltage regulation failure and then reformulate it into a convex problem. This model allows the DSO to periodically revise distribution assumptions on uncertain parameters in the decision model of the DERA. Finally, we present a gradient-based method that permits the DSO to adaptively modify its conservativeness level, measured by the size of a Wasserstein metric-based ambiguity set, according to historical voltage regulation performance. The effectiveness of our proposed method is demonstrated through numerical experiments.
We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources downstream of a regulated distribution system operator's (DSO) net energy metering revenue meter. Due to the elevated risk of grid constraint violations and to ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, the proposed community market mechanism maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while every community member abides by its own operating envelopes. We show that the proposed market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. Lastly, a numerical study is implemented to showcase and compare the community's welfare under the proposed operating-envelopes-aware mechanisms to others, including the welfare of customers under the DSO's regime.
This paper proposes a TSO-DSO framework including DER set-point dispatch using sensitivity analysis. We address all three steps of TSO-DSO integration stating by estimating the capability curve of an unbalanced distribution system and then modeling of capability curve on the transmission side grid and estimating the reactive power needed from DSO during emergencies, and ending by dispatching the requested reactive power from TSO. The proposed interaction framework is tested on an IEEE 37-node distribution network connected to IEEE 9 bus transmission system. The simulation shows that using sensitivity-based dispatch would reduce the number of communication signals between DERs and DSO and that can decrease the risk of communication contingency.
Here, we propose an operating envelopes (OEs) aware energy community market mechanism that dynamically charges/rewards its members based on two-part pricing. The OEs are imposed exogenously by a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) on the energy community's revenue meter and is subject to a generalized net energy metering (NEM) tariff design. By formulating the interaction of the community operator and its members as a Stackelberg game, we show that the proposed two-part pricing achieves a Nash equilibrium and maximizes the community's social welfare in a decentralized fashion while ensuring that the community's operation abides by the OEs. The market mechanism conforms with the cost-causation principle and guarantees community members a surplus level no less than their maximum surplus when they autonomously face the DSO. The dynamic and uniform community price is a monotonically decreasing function of the community's aggregate renewable generation. We also analyze the impact of exogenous parameters such as NEM rates and OEs on the value of joining the community. Lastly, through numerical studies, we showcase the community's welfare, and pricing, and compare its members' surplus to customers under the DSO's regime.
We propose an operating-envelope-aware, prosumer-centric, and efficient energy community that aggregates individual and shared community distributed energy resources and transacts with a regulated distribution system operator (DSO) under a generalized net energy metering tariff design. To ensure safe network operation, the DSO imposes dynamic export and import limits, known as dynamic operating envelopes, on end-users' revenue meters. Given the operating envelopes, we propose an incentive-aligned community pricing mechanism under which the decentralized optimization of community members' benefit implies the optimization of overall community welfare. The proposed pricing mechanism satisfies the cost-causation principle and ensures the stability of the energy community in a coalition game setting. Numerical examples provide insights into the characteristics of the proposed pricing mechanism and quantitative measures of its performance.
The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy-sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.
This paper presents an inter-microgrid peer-topeer (P2P) transactive market mechanism to support the coordination of multiple microgrids in a mixed-ownership environment, while enabling prosumers to actively participate in the market to get their own benefits. An equitable P2P transactive energy market is designed, in which the energy burden to customers within microgrids is fairly distributed by leveraging a peer-to-peer communication network among MG owners and the distribution system operator (DSO). To reach the market settlement, a consensus-based distributed optimization algorithm is introduced to enable each MG owner and the DSO to distributedly determine the cleared price which is compensated by a household-income-based discount factor to encourage the energy-burden equity among customers in networked microgrids service territory. Numerical results on the modified 123 node test feeder including 6 microgrids are used to demonstrate the operation of the introduced equitable transactive energy market.
This report includes two main accomplishments of the peer-to-peer communication control for resilient operation of networked microgrids project in FY24, which include a scheme for cyberattack-aware coordination of networked microgrids for supporting voltages of bulk power systems and a scheme for price signal-based operations of EV-rich networked microgrids with mixed ownership. First, the cyberattack-aware scheme enables networked microgrids to distributedly determine the amount of reactive power injection to support the voltage of bulk power system (BPS) in a fair manner. In this scheme, a risk-informed algorithm is presented to generate the peer-to- peer (P2P) communication graph with minimal risk of attack on communication links. To deal with cyberattacks on MG controllers, the resilient consensus algorithm (CA) is utilized for MG controllers to robustly estimate the total reactive power headroom, from which the MGs can accurately provide the needed amount of reactive power injection for supporting the voltage of BPS. The CA implementation and performance within the P2P communication framework are demonstrated on the IEEE 39-bus system with 6 microgrids contained in the distribution feeder under different cyberattack scenarios. Second, the price-based scheme enables the usage of the real-time price signal for the operations of electric vehicle (EV)-rich networked-microgrids with mixed ownership, in which not all the microgrids can communicate with the distribution system operator (DSO). In this scheme, a max consensus is introduced to enable the real-time price signal to be propagated from the DSO to all the microgrids, from which each microgrid controller will manage the DERs to balance the load demand and the power injection from the EV charging stations within its microgrid. Numerical results over one day with 288 slots of 5-minute intervals on the modified 123-node test feeder including 3 microgrids with high penetration of EV are presented to evaluate how the price signal affects the operations of networked microgrids under different charging strategies of the EV charging stations. The result indicates that our proposed EVCS (dis)charging strategy, which leverages the flexibility of EVs to support the grid through discharging during peak demand, proves to be a cost-effective solution that reduces operational costs while improving the social welfare of EV charging.
The proliferation of behind-the-meter (BTM) distributed energy resources (DER) within the electrical distribution network presents significant supply and demand flexibilities, but also introduces operational challenges such as voltage spikes and reverse power flows. In response, this paper proposes a network-aware dynamic pricing framework tailored for energy-sharing coalitions that aggregate small, but ubiquitous, BTM DER downstream of a distribution system operator's (DSO) revenue meter that adopts a generic net energy metering (NEM) tariff. By formulating a Stackelberg game between the energy-sharing market leader and its prosumers, we show that the dynamic pricing policy induces the prosumers toward a network-safe operation and decentrally maximizes the energysharing social welfare. The dynamic pricing mechanism involves a combination of a locational ex-ante dynamic price and an ex-post allocation, both of which are functions of the energy sharing's BTM DER. The ex-post allocation is proportionate to the price differential between the DSO NEM price and the energy sharing locational price. Simulation results using real DER data and the IEEE 13-bus test systems illustrate the dynamic nature of network-aware pricing at each bus, and its impact on voltage.
The Progressing Analysis of Variable Electric Rates (PAVER) study analyzed the impact of a range of time-varying electric rates on the performance of a regional electric grid and the resulting costs for participating and non-participating customers. This analysis leveraged and extended the work of PNNL’s Distribution System Operator with Transactive (DSO+T) study. Five different rate designs were included: a flat volumetric energy charge, a typical Time of Use (TOU) rate, a dynamic energy (DE) rate (based on wholesale locational marginal prices), a dynamic energy and capacity (DE+C) rate, and, finally, a Block and Swing (B&S) rate that billed customers based on their average load profile at constant pricing, but used the DE+C dynamic price for load deviations from their average profile. These rates were analyzed in a large-scale co-simulation of an entire regional grid with a customer population representative of the current state. A large fraction (80%) of residential and commercial customers were assumed to participate in these time-varying rates with automatically controlled HVAC, water heaters, electric vehicles, and batteries. This study assumed no industrial sector participation. The DE and DE+C rates saw system peak loads reduced by 6-7%, while the large participation in the TOU rate case saw a significant rebound effect and a resulting peak load increase of >5%. The impacts to the annual and peak system demand impacted system wholesale prices and the overall grid operating costs. This cost structure determined the revenue needed to be collected from customers by each rate design. Participating customers on the DE and DE+C rates (located in one of the modeled DSOs) saw reductions in average annual electricity bills of 11-17% with average increases in monthly bill variation of no more than 13%. At such high participation levels, TOU customers saw 10% higher average annual bills (due to system-wide rebound effects) and average increased monthly bill variation of 16%. Residential owners of large flexible loads (such as electric vehicles) saw larger bill savings (17-20%) when on a fully dynamic rate. The presence of on-site generation (such as rooftop solar) did not appear to appreciably change customer outcomes. Customers on the Block and Swing rate did see 6% lower monthly bill variation (as intended) than the flat rate case, but at the expense of appreciable bill savings, which were only 3%, comparable to the savings seen by non-participants. Given this finding we recommend that additional research be conducted into how best various bill protection mechanisms can balance minimizing customer bill variation with providing financial incentives commensurate with the flexibility customers provide. We also recommend that customer outcomes be explored across a range of regions using current actual customer and system cost data.
San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) installed America’s first and largest utility-scale microgrid in Borrego Springs in 2013. The first generation Borrego Springs Microgrid utilized diesel generators to form and stabilize the microgrid island, with support from grid-scale batteries and local solar photovoltaic (PV) generation. In this project, SDG&E in partnership with National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) demonstrated through modeling, simulation and utility field testing that blackstart and islanding of the microgrid can be led with 100% renewable, inverter based resources (IBRs), to help reduce community reliance on conventional generation resources. Through equipment upgrades, grid-forming island leader capability was transitioned to a battery IBR instead of the Borrego Springs Microgrid diesel generators. A new microgrid controller was integrated to the microgrid and programmed to control and manage multiple energy storage systems. Synchrophasor and other power quality data verified autonomous, high-speed response of the IBRs through blackstart, islanding, and load step testing. Results of project field evaluations provide distribution systems operators (DSO) with increased confidence that renewable, IBR can replace traditional generators to blackstart and island microgrids and rapidly establish stable island frequency with rapid changes in peak power demand. Importantly, the project validated the integration feasibility of a distributed energy resource management system (DERMS) controller that manages multiple grid-forming and grid-following IBRs, establishing a standard design interface to reduce the complexity of integrating new DERs in the future and supporting replication by the industry. As a result of learnings in this project, SDG&E has implemented the microgrid controller strategy at multiple other microgrid sites, thereby validating the replicability of the solution. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulations including power and controller HIL hardware — along with electromagnetic transient (EMT) simulations of Borrego Springs Microgrid —informed adjustments to inverter parameters and were important to characterize the performance of the IBRs in relevant operating conditions before deployment. The EMT and HIL simulations of islanding the entire community are important contributions in providing confidence in IBR performance prior to future islanding of the community in the field. High-fidelity EMT and/or HIL simulation of IBRs can de-risk field operations, and its relevance and importance as a tool is increasing as distribution grids and microgrids become more complex and dynamic with an increasing proportion of renewable generation, distributed energy storage, and two-way power and energy flows.
Rising penetration of consumer-owned Distribution Grid Resources (DGRs), increasingly managed by third party aggregators and enrolled in grid services and wholesale market programs, can create localized congestion in distribution networks. Managing these constraints is challenging due to a persistent coordination and information gap: utilities are accountable for reliability and have network topology and state visibility, while aggregators control the DGR capability needed to relieve congestion. This survey synthesizes congestion management solutions for distribution systems with high DGR penetration, covering both market-based mechanisms (distribution level markets, locational pricing, flexibility auctions) and non-market-based solutions (network reconfiguration, direct DGR control, demand response, curtailment, etc.). The literature is organized across three decision horizons: long term planning, operational planning, and real-time operation. Special attention is devoted to emerging distribution system operator architectures and coordination frameworks spanning transmission system operators, aggregators, and microgrids. Drawing on recent case studies and implementations, we distill best practices, identify key technical and economic barriers, and outline research directions. The evidence points to a shift toward integrated congestion management that combines market signals with technical controls, enabled by improved monitoring, forecasting, and closed loop control capabilities.
Co-simulation is a modeling technique that allows analysts to combine simulation tools and their corresponding models to exchange data during run-time, allowing the creation of larger and more complex models across heterogeneous domains. HELICS is a co-simulation platform developed over the past six years that has been shown to be effective for these multi-domain analysis. Recently, a HELICS-based analysis was completed where the ERCOT electrical interconnect in the United States was modeled in high detail from bulk power system generation to individual customer loads. This model was used to evaluate a flat-rate and transactive energy tariff with integrated wholesale and retail real-time and day-ahead energy markets. This modeling allows detailed analysis showing how the operations of the power system under these tariffs impact all actors in the power system, from individual customers to bulk power system operators.
Distributed energy resources (DERs) are continuing to grow due to regulatory, policy, and market shifts, and it needs to be ensured that small DERs are given a level playing field with traditional resources. Legacy market processes such as unit-commitment problems were designed for a power grid consisting largely of centralized power plants. In contrast, DERs consist of many small devices with distinct operating characteristics that may or may not be connected at the transmission interconnection points, limiting their visibility to the independent system operators (ISOs) who operate wholesale electricity markets. This report details the development and initial results from a simulation platform that integrates state-of-the-art security-constrained unit commitment software, detailed feeder models, and a DER aggregator model to quantify potential DER integration issues. Quantitative results to date illustrate potential infeasible scheduling solutions from SCUC when the DERA includes aggregations of energy-limited energy storage resources. Likewise, if aggregations are not penalized for dispatch deviations, they may have incentives to deviate from the SCUC-determined resource schedules. Assumptions about the amount of aggregated demand response resources (DRRs) and the ability of DERAs to follow profit incentives have an important impact – DRRs have significant flexibility and can typically feasibly meet their SCUC schedule, but on the other hand, their profit incentives can cause unscheduled increases in load before and after DRR dispatch. Computation time results on the SCUC solver and simulation platform only show a modest increase in SCUC solution time as the number of DERAs is increased, but results to date only reflect the RTS-GMLC test system; results may show more significant solver slowdown in larger transmission systems. The largest contribution to simulation time is attributed to the DERA offer generation method, which is suggested for future improvements.