SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
An Automated Analytical Electrophoresis Apparatus (AAEA) was designed, developed, assembled, and preliminarily tested. The AAEA was demonstrated to be a feasible apparatus for automatically acquiring, displaying, and storing (and eventually analyzing) electrophoresis mobility data from living blood cells. The apparatus and the operation of its major assemblies are described in detail.
The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) is an integral part of NASA s exploration architecture that will provide crew and cargo access to the International Space Station as well as low earth orbit support for lunar missions. Currently in the system definition phase, the CLV is planned to replace the Space Shuttle for crew transport in the post 2010 time frame. It is comprised of a solid rocket booster (SRB) first stage derived from the current Space Shuttle SRB, a liquid oxygen/hydrogen fueled second stage utilizing a derivative of the Apollo upper stage engine for propulsion, and a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) composed of command and service modules. This paper deals with current design, development, test, and evaluation planning for the CLV first stage SRB. Described are the current overall point-of-departure design and booster subsystems, systems engineering approach, and milestone schedule requirements.
While human-system interaction occurs in all phases of system development and operation, this chapter on Human Factors in the DDT&E for Reliable Spacecraft Systems is restricted to the elements that involve "direct contact" with spacecraft systems. Such interactions will encompass all phases of human activity during the design, fabrication, testing, operation, and maintenance phases of the spacecraft lifespan. This section will therefore consider practices that would accommodate and promote effective, safe, reliable, and robust human interaction with spacecraft systems. By restricting this chapter to what the team terms "direct contact" with the spacecraft, "remote" factors not directly involved in the development and operation of the vehicle, such as management and organizational issues, have been purposely excluded. However, the design of vehicle elements that enable and promote ground control activities such as monitoring, feedback, correction and reversal (override) of on-board human and automation process are considered as per NPR8705.2A, Section 3.3.
The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) is an integral part of NASA's Exploration architecture that will provide crew and cargo access to the International Space Station as well as low earth orbit support for lunar missions. Currently in the system definition phase, the CLV is planned to replace the Space Shuttle for crew transport in the post 2010 time frame. It is comprised of a solid rocket booster first stage derived from the current Space Shuttle SRB, a LOX/hydrogen liquid fueled second stage utilizing a derivative of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) for propulsion, and a Crew Exploration Vehicle (GEV) composed of Command and Service Modules. This paper deals with current DDT&E planning for the CLV first stage solid rocket booster. Described are the current overall point-of-departure design and booster subsystems, systems engineering approach, and milestone schedule requirements.
A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.
A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.
The Advanced Exploration Systems Program's Atmosphere Resource Recovery and Environmental Monitoring (ARREM) project is working to mature optimum atmosphere revitalization and environmental monitoring system architectures. It is the project's objective to enable exploration beyond Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) and improve affordability by focusing on three primary goals: 1) achieving high reliability, 2) reducing dependence on a ground-based logistics resupply model, and 3) maximizing commonality between atmosphere revitalization subsystem components and those needed to support other exploration elements. The ARREM project's strengths include using existing developmental hardware and testing facilities, when possible, and and a well-coordinated effort among the NASA field centers that contributed to past ARS and EMS technology development projects.
This paper is a summary overview of a study conducted a t the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) during the initial phases of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program to evaluate a large number of technical problems associated with the design, development, test, evaluation and operation of several major liquid propellant rocket engine systems (i.e., SSME, Fastrac, J-2, F-1). The results of this study was the identification of the "Fundamental Root Causes" that enabled the technical problems to manifest, and practices that can be implemented to prevent them from recurring in future engine development efforts. This paper will discus the Fundamental Root Causes, cite some examples of how the technical problems arose from them, and provide a discussion of how they can be mitigated or avoided.
This paper is a summary overview of a study conducted at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA MSFC) during the initial phases of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program to evaluate a large number of technical problems associated with the design, development, test, evaluation and operation of several major liquid propellant rocket engine systems (i.e., SSME, Fastrac, J-2, F-1). One of the primary results of this study was the identification of the Fundamental Root Causes that enabled the technical problems to manifest, and practices that can be implemented to prevent them from recurring in future propulsion system development efforts, such as that which is currently envisioned in the field of nuclear thermal propulsion (NTF). This paper will discuss the Fundamental Root Causes, cite some examples of how the technical problems arose from them, and provide a discussion of how they can be mitigated or avoided in the development of an NTP system
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
A safety analysis was conducted to identify the efforts required to assure relatively hazard free operation of the EPS and to meet the safety requirements of the program. Safety engineering criteria, principles, and techniques in applicable disciplines are stressed in the performance of the system and subsystem studies; in test planning; in the design, development, test, evaluation, and checkout of the equipment; and the operating procedures for the EPS program.
Preliminary resistojet design requirements were established based on initial technical requirements imposed by the results of NASA and Rocketdyne studies. The requirements are directed toward long life, simplicity, flexibility, and commonality with other space station components. The resistojet assembly is comprised of eight resistojets, fluid components downstream of the waste fluid storage system, a power controller, structure, and shielding. It consists of two identical subassemblies, one of which is redundant. Each subassembly consists of four 500-W resistojets, series redundant latch values, a power controller, a water vaporizer, two pressure regulators, filters, check valves, disconnects, fluid tubing, and electrical cables. All components are packaged at the end of the stinger aft of the JEM and Columbus modules. Different flow and power control methods were studied. A constant inlet pressure and a two-power setting controller were tentatively selected based on simplicity and reasonably high specific impulse for the range of waste gas compositions that are anticipated. The constant pressure is supplied by pressure regulators. The two set point power control includes individual power supplies to each resistojet heater and water vaporizer. An embedded data processor, a multiplexer-demultiplexer, and a network interface unit that are standard space station components are included in the power controller. The total dry weight of the resistojet assembly is approximately 172 lb. The total cost for design, development, test, evaluation, qualification, and flight hardware is estimated to be $16 million.
A mass and cost estimating computerized methology for predicting advanced manned space vehicle weights and costs was developed. The user friendly methology designated MERCER (Mass Estimating Relationship/Cost Estimating Relationship) organizes the predictive process according to major vehicle subsystem levels. Design, development, test, evaluation, and flight hardware cost forecasting is treated by the study. This methodology consists of a complete set of mass estimating relationships (MERs) which serve as the control components for the model and cost estimating relationships (CERs) which use MER output as input. To develop this model, numerous MER and CER studies were surveyed and modified where required. Additionally, relationships were regressed from raw data to accommodate the methology. The models and formulations which estimated the cost of historical vehicles to within 20 percent of the actual cost were selected. The result of the research, along with components of the MERCER Program, are reported. On the basis of the analysis, the following conclusions were established: (1) The cost of a spacecraft is best estimated by summing the cost of individual subsystems; (2) No one cost equation can be used for forecasting the cost of all spacecraft; (3) Spacecraft cost is highly correlated with its mass; (4) No study surveyed contained sufficient formulations to autonomously forecast the cost and weight of the entire advanced manned vehicle spacecraft program; (5) No user friendly program was found that linked MERs with CERs to produce spacecraft cost; and (6) The group accumulation weight estimation method (summing the estimated weights of the various subsystems) proved to be a useful method for finding total weight and cost of a spacecraft.
The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) encompasses the design, development, test, evaluation, verification, launch, assembly, and operation and utilization of a set of spacecraft in low earth orbit (LEO) and their supporting facilities. The spacecraft set includes: the Space Station Manned Base (SSMB), a European Space Agency (ESA) provided Man-Tended Free Flyer (MTFF) at an inclination of 28.5 degrees and nominal attitude of 410 km, a USA provided Polar Orbiting Platform (POP), and an ESA provided POP in sun-synchronous, near polar orbits at a nominal altitude of 822 km. The SSMB will be assembled using the National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The POPs and the MTFF will be launched by Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs): a Titan 4 for the US POP and an Ariane for the ESA POP and MTFF. The US POP will for the most part use derivatives of systems flown on unmanned LEO spacecraft. The SSMB portion of the overall program is presented.
In 2005-06, the Prometheus program funded a number of tasks at the NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to support development of a Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) system for future manned exploration missions. These tasks include the following: 1. NTP Design Develop Test & Evaluate (DDT&E) Planning 2. NTP Mission & Systems Analysis / Stage Concepts & Engine Requirements 3. NTP Engine System Trade Space Analysis and Studies 4. NTP Engine Ground Test Facility Assessment 5. Non-Nuclear Environmental Simulator (NTREES) 6. Non-Nuclear Materials Fabrication & Evaluation 7. Multi-Physics TCA Modeling. This presentation is a overview of these tasks and their accomplishments
This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe key issues and findings from several of the recent GN&C-related independent assessments and consultations performed and/or supported by the NESC GN&C TDT. Among the examples of the GN&C TDT s work that will be addressed in this paper are the following: the Space Shuttle Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) assessment, the ISS CMG failure root cause assessment, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies (DART) spacecraft mishap consultation, the Phoenix Mars lander thruster-based controllability consultation, the NASA in-house Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Smart Buyer assessment and the assessment of key engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) of robust and reliable GN&C systems for human-rated spacecraft.
Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.
The optimization tool described herein addresses and emphasizes the use of computer tools to model a system and focuses on a concept development approach for a liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen single-stage-to-orbit system, but more particularly the development of the optimized system using new techniques. This methodology uses new and innovative tools to run Monte Carlo simulations, genetic algorithm solvers, and statistical models in order to optimize a design concept. The concept launch vehicle and propulsion system were modeled and optimized to determine the best design for weight and cost by varying design and technology parameters. Uncertainty levels were applied using Monte Carlo Simulations and the model output was compared to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space Shuttle Main Engine. Several key conclusions are summarized here for the model results. First, the Gross Liftoff Weight and Dry Weight were 67% higher for the design case for minimization of Design, Development, Test and Evaluation cost when compared to the weights determined by the minimization of Gross Liftoff Weight case. In turn, the Design, Development, Test and Evaluation cost was 53% higher for optimized Gross Liftoff Weight case when compared to the cost determined by case for minimization of Design, Development, Test and Evaluation cost. Therefore, a 53% increase in Design, Development, Test and Evaluation cost results in a 67% reduction in Gross Liftoff Weight. Secondly, the tool outputs define the sensitivity of propulsion parameters, technology and cost factors and how these parameters differ when cost and weight are optimized separately. A key finding was that for a Space Shuttle Main Engine thrust level the oxidizer/fuel ratio of 6.6 resulted in the lowest Gross Liftoff Weight rather than at 5.2 for the maximum specific impulse, demonstrating the relationships between specific impulse, engine weight, tank volume and tank weight. Lastly, the optimum chamber pressure for Gross Liftoff Weight minimization was 2713 pounds per square inch as compared to 3162 for the Design, Development, Test and Evaluation cost optimization case. This chamber pressure range is close to 3000 pounds per square inch for the Space Shuttle Main Engine.