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Design safety criteria for Space Transportation System propulsion system payloads are discussed. Terms such as inhibit, monitoring, safing, safe distance, safe and arm device, and flow control device are defined and their use in design of safety requirements described.
An integrated safety design and radionuclide (RN) retention strategy is developed to support the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR) demonstration. This demonstration aims to showcase viability for rapid deployment of a novel reactor by leveraging the advances in materials, manufacturing, and computational sciences through a highly integrated and agile design and development approach. This strategy provides a logical description and understanding of how RNs are contained within the facility. Rather than discussing fission product barriers individually between separate design and safety basis reports, this paper provides a consistent description and narrative to better facilitate regulatory interactions and focus safety design efforts. The principal barriers credited include the various coating layers in the tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel particle, the silicon carbide (SiC) matrix hosting the particles within the fuel element, the helium pressure boundary, and the confinement system. The choice and assumed performance of the credited barriers are highly conservative, which is a direct reflection of the low hazard that the TCR demonstration presents and the need to simplify and focus the safety review process accordingly. However, the strategy and the associated framework are generalized and may be adopted and tailored to support other advanced reactor demonstration efforts.
Safety for pyrotechnic ignition systems is becoming a major concern for the military. In the past twenty years, stray electromagnetic fields have steadily increased during peacetime training missions and have dramatically increased during battlefield missions. Almost all of the ordnance systems in use today depend on an electrical bridgewire for ignition. Unfortunately, the bridgewire is the cause of the majority of failure modes. The common failure modes include the following: broken bridgewires; transient RF power, which induces bridgewire heating; and cold temperatures, which contracts the explosive mix away from the bridgewire. Finding solutions for these failure modes is driving the costs of pyrotechnic systems up. For example, analyses are performed to verify that the system in the environment will not see more energy than 20 dB below the 'No-fire' level. Range surveys are performed to determine the operational, storage, and transportation RF environments. Cryogenic tests are performed to verify the bridgewire to mix interface. System requirements call for 'last minute installation,' 'continuity checks after installation,' and rotating safety devices to 'interrupt the explosive train.' As an alternative, MDESC has developed a new approach based upon our enabling laser diode technology. We believe that Microlaser initiated ordnance offers a unique solution to the bridgewire safety concerns. For this presentation, we will address, from a system safety viewpoint, the safety design and the test requirements for a Microlaser ordnance system. We will also review how this system could be compliant to MIL-STD-1576 and DOD-83578A and the additional necessary requirements.
Safety Design Strategy for the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) Project ) documents the expectations and the format for integrating the major modifications to the TREAT facility and describes the actions necessary to update or revise the existing TREAT facility safety basis.
In this chapter, we review the current practice of engineering safety design of large water management infrastructures. Those large infrastructures are designed using probable maximum precipitation (PMP) to withstand extreme conditions, but climate change has been posing challenges on the conventional PMP estimation approach. We discuss multiple limitations of the current approaches, and propose a few possible solutions based on the advancement of atmospheric modeling and statistical analysis of extreme precipitation mechanisms.
The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy. The VTR is utilizing a risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) approach for design support and authorization by the DOE, derived from recent efforts by the US industry led Licensing Modernization Project (LMP). This document contains an overview of the implementation of the LMP approach in support of the VTR Conceptual Safety Design Report (CSDR). The work reported here is the result of studies supporting a VTR conceptual design, cost, and schedule estimate for DOE-NE to make a decision on procurement. As such, it is preliminary. The VTR RIPB authorization approach utilizes information from the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), coupled with deterministic analyses, to aid in decision-making regarding the identification and categorization of safety basis events (SBEs), the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and the evaluation of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy. As part of initial reactor design efforts, a VTR conceptual design PRA was developed to support the RIPB process, which focused on at-power internal events, with scoping analyses for seismic and sodium fire hazards. In addition to supporting numerous design studies, preliminary results from the RIPB approach and the VTR conceptual design PRA were utilized as the basis of the VTR CSDR. The initial identification and categorization of SBEs, SSC classification, and DID evaluation were contained within the CSDR, which was submitted to DOE in 2019 as part of the CD-1 submittal package. Following review, DOE approved the CSDR in April 2020 and the CD-1 package in late 2020. Valuable experience was gained through the implementation of the RIPB approach for design and authorization during the VTR conceptual design phase, which is summarized in this document. To the extent possible, this experience has been shared with the advanced reactor industry, through publications and participation in licensing tabletops, in addition to informing DOE:NE advanced reactor regulatory development efforts. Furthermore, the approval of the CSDR by the DOE as part of CD-1 represents a significant milestone in the use of RIPB approaches for advanced reactor licensing.
Graphite is an important material being used for core components in next-generation high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactors. The selection of graphite grade for a specific Designer is a complex task, dependent on reactor conditions, component functionality, and required reliability. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides two semi-probabilistic design-by-analysis assessments to evaluate graphite core components against design reliability targets. The simplified assessment uses a 2-parameter Weibull distribution to describe the graphite grade’s tensile-strength distribution to establish component stress limits. The full assessment uses the 3-parameter Weibull distribution and a modified Weakest-Link Theory approach to calculate a component design probability of failure. The paper defines recommended assessment rules, which are the as-written simplified assessment and the full assessment with parameter lower bounds, the modulus update with threshold reduction, and the 2027 grouping rules. Code rules are applied to three grades: 2114, IG-110, and NBG-18. The baseline margin calculation is developed using the experimental tensile dogbone specimen. Percent margin is defined as the percent reduction in the median experimental load to obtain the allowable load per ASME assessments. Under the recommended rules, the SRC–1 margin in the simplified assessment ranged from 40.2 % to 52.7 % among the grades in this study and from 36.1 % to 49.8 % in the full assessment. The full assessment only decreases the margins by 2.5–4.5 % for the SRC-1 components and 0–1.5 % for the SRC-2 components for this baseline case. Margin is inversely related to material median strength (i.e., the strongest grade, 2114, has the lowest margin).
This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.
Deployment Objectives Flexibly co-locate with new industry users of nuclear energy Steam and electric cogeneration applications Direct process heat with temperature ranges from 700°C to 950°C Enabling Requirements Meet regulatory dose limits at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) 25 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) for duration of the release from 10 CFR 50.34 (10 CFR 52.79) at Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) for design basis accidents EAB is estimated approximately 400 meters from the modular HTGR plant (to support co-location with industrial facilities) Meet safety goals for cumulative individual risk for normal and off-normal operation Design goal: meet EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at EAB 1 rem TEDE for sheltering Design basis and beyond design basis events are considered Realistically evaluated at the EAB Emergency planning and protection
During the design phase of the Mobile Quarantine Facility (MQF), a primary consideration was fire safety. Therefore, appropriate criteria and ground rules were used in the design and construction of the facility. The fire codes and fire-requirement listings that are used by commerical airlines were supplied to the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) by the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). After these codes were reviewed, a basic ground rule was adopted that flame protection for all combustible materials should be at least equivalent to or better than the standards for commercial aircraft. Because the MQF was designed to operate with an interior atmosphere of air rather than with an oxygen-enriched atmosphere such as that of the Apollo spacecraft cabin, the requirements for MQF material were not as stringent as those for the spacecraft.
The desire to understand and explore space has driven man to overcome the confines of the Earth's atmosphere and accept the challenge of spaceflight. With our increasing ability to travel, work, and explore in space comes a need for a better understanding of the hazards in this relatively new endeavor. One of the most important and immediate needs is to be able to predict the ignition, spread, and growth of fire on board spacecraft. Fire safety aboard spacecraft has always been a concern; however, with the increasing number and duration of proposed missions, it is imperative that the spacecraft be designed with a solid understanding of fire hazards, insuring that all risks have been minimized and extinguishment systems are available.
The SP-100 Program is developing a nuclear reactor power system that can enhance and/or enable future civilian and military space missions. The program is directed to develop space reactor technology to provide electrical power in the range of tens to hundreds of kilowatts. The major nuclear assembly test is to be conducted at the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and is designed to validate the performance of the 2.4-MWt nuclear and heat transport assembly.
Single cell tests were benign for external short, inadvertent charge and overdischarge into reversal up to 4.5 A. At lower current loads cells die (may be due to excessive dendrite formation) benignly. String level external short circuits lead to an unbalanced overdischarge, with one cell going into reversal. The result is catastrophic violent venting. Unbalanced string overdischarges at different currents causes catastrophic violent venting also. Heat-to-vent is very dramatic displaying violent venting Simulated internal short is also catastrophic and displays violent venting. Battery is not UL-rated; hence does not have dual-fault tolerance or tolerance to inherent cell tolerance to failures Battery Design for NASA JSC's human-rated application for use on ISS was changed to include two bypass diodes per cell to provide for two-failure tolerance to overdischarge into reversal (and external short) hazards.
The national airspace system is exceptionally safe, specifically in terms of commercial air traffic operations. The introduction of innovative aircraft (such as electric vertical takeoff and landing vehicles) undergoing novel operations (such as for an urban air passenger carrying mission) is a potential disruptor to the current means of regulating and ensuring the safety of air travel. The aviation industry and associated regulatory bodies are adapting their approaches to assuring system safety to enable these new paradigms. However, any system safety analysis requires that a hazard assessment be performed. In this work, we consider the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) techniques for hazard assessment and evaluate whether they can be used in a complementary fashion for regulatory approval purposes. We perform an FHA and an STPA on an electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) vehicle undergoing an urban air mobility (UAM) passenger carrying reference scenario and present excerpts of this analysis. We then draw parallels between the techniques and highlight elements where they naturally reinforce to each other’s results, specifically in the consideration of hazard severity with respect to flight phases, the design of hazard mitigations, and the applicability of the results to all types of regulatory approvals (e.g., type certification, operational approval, and crew training).
Flutter may sound like a benign word when associated with a flag in a breeze, a butterfly, or seaweed in an ocean current. When used in the context of aerodynamics, however, it describes a highly dangerous, potentially deadly condition. Consider the case of the Lockheed L-188 Electra Turboprop, an airliner that first took to the skies in 1957. Two years later, an Electra plummeted to the ground en route from Houston to Dallas. Within another year, a second Electra crashed. In both cases, all crew and passengers died. Lockheed engineers were at a loss as to why the planes wings were tearing off in midair. For an answer, the company turned to NASA s Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT) at Langley Research Center. At the time, the newly renovated wind tunnel offered engineers the capability of testing aeroelastic qualities in aircraft flying at transonic speeds near or just below the speed of sound. (Aeroelasticity is the interaction between aerodynamic forces and the structural dynamics of an aircraft or other structure.) Through round-the-clock testing in the TDT, NASA and industry researchers discovered the cause: flutter. Flutter occurs when aerodynamic forces acting on a wing cause it to vibrate. As the aircraft moves faster, certain conditions can cause that vibration to multiply and feed off itself, building to greater amplitudes until the flutter causes severe damage or even the destruction of the aircraft. Flutter can impact other structures as well. Famous film footage of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington in 1940 shows the main span of the bridge collapsing after strong winds generated powerful flutter forces. In the Electra s case, faulty engine mounts allowed a type of flutter known as whirl flutter, generated by the spinning propellers, to transfer to the wings, causing them to vibrate violently enough to tear off. Thanks to the NASA testing, Lockheed was able to correct the Electra s design flaws that led to the flutter conditions and return the aircraft to safe flight. Today, all aircraft must have a flutter boundary 15 percent beyond the aircraft s expected maximum speed to ensure that flutter conditions are not encountered in flight. NASA continues to support research in new aircraft designs to improve knowledge of aeroelasticity and flutter. Through platforms such as Dryden Flight Research Center s Active Aeroelastic Wing (AAW) research aircraft, the Agency researches methods for in-flight validation of predictions and for controlling and taking advantage of aeroelastic conditions to enhance aircraft performance.
The HFVMTF (High Field Vertical Magnet Test Facility) is a new experimental facility under development at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL) to test large superconducting magnets (up to 20 tons weight and 1.3 m diameter) in a double bath superfluid helium cryostat (1.9 K and 1.2 bar). Coupled with a superconducting dipole magnet fabricated by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), this facility will be able to test future high-temperature superconductor (HTS) cables under a background magnetic field of 15 T for fusion magnets. This paper describes the design of the cryostat and its 1.4-meter diameter lambda plate, as well as the different components for a safe operation of the facility, even during critical events such a magnet quench or a vacuum breaking situation. The project is funded by US DOE Offices of Science, High Energy Physics (HEP), and Fusion Energy Sciences (FES).
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The Skylab Program is presenting a unique set of requirements by extending the capabilities of both men and equipment to withstand extended periods of time in space. The progression of space programs which preceded Skylab have provided a set of building blocks of knowledge and experience coupled with an extensive ground test program which makes it possible to plan its flight program without earlier, unmanned test flights. This approach, however, makes it mandatory that to the maximum extent possible, we factor into the design review process all the 'lessons learned' which are applicable. It is this conscious review of the Skylab design, based on checklists prepared from design criteria, gleaned from a variety of sources and experiences, which is the subject of this paper. A brief description of the Skylab Program, its objectives, and the missions planned for it are presented briefly to better understand the degree of extrapolation of hardware development from previous programs.