Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Design products required for Engineering”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2007

The MSFC Systems Engineering Guide: An Overview and Plan

As systems and subsystems requirements become more complex in the pursuit of the exploration of space, advanced technology will demand and require an integrated approach to the design and development of safe and successful space vehicles and there products. System engineers play a vital and key role in transforming mission needs into vehicle requirements that can be verified and validated. This will result in a safe and cost effective design that will satisfy the mission schedule. A key to successful vehicle design within systems engineering is communication. Communication, through a systems engineering infrastructure, will not only ensure that customers and stakeholders are satisfied but will also assist in identifying vehicle requirements; i.e. identification, integration and management. This vehicle design will produce a system that is verifiable, traceable, and effectively satisfies cost, schedule, performance, and risk throughout the life-cycle of the product. A communication infrastructure will bring about the integration of different engineering disciplines within vehicle design. A system utilizing these aspects will enhance system engineering performance and improve upon required activities such as Development of Requirements, Requirements Management, Functional Analysis, Test, Synthesis, Trade Studies, Documentation, and Lessons Learned to produce a successful final product. This paper will describe the guiding vision, progress to date and the plan forward for development of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Systems Engineering Guide (SEG), a virtual systems engineering handbook and archive that will describe the system engineering processes that are used by MSFC in the development of complex systems such as the Ares launch vehicle. It is the intent of this website to be a "One Stop Shop" for our systems engineers that will provide tutorial information, an overview of processes and procedures and links to assist system engineering with guidance and references, and provide an archive of systems engineering artifacts produced by the many NASA projects developed and managed by MSFC over the years.

Shelby, Jerry A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Leadership Development Program Final Project

TOSC is NASA's prime contractor tasked to successfully assemble, test, and launch the EM1 spacecraft. TOSC success is highly dependent on design products from the other NASA Programs manufacturing and delivering the flight hardware; Space Launch System(SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle(MPCV). Design products directly feed into TOSC's: Procedures, Personnel training, Hardware assembly, Software development, Integrated vehicle test and checkout, Launch. TOSC senior management recognized a significant schedule risk as these products are still being developed by the other two (2) programs; SVE and ACE positions were created.

Design products required for Engineering↗
NASA NTRS1993

Advanced transportation system studies, technical area 3. Alternate propulsion subsystem concepts: J-2S restart study

The objectives were to assess what design changes would be required to remit late production of the J-2S engine for use as a large high energy upper stage engine. The study assessed design changes required to perform per the J-2S model specification, manufacturing changes required due to obsolescence or improvements in state-of-the-practice, availability issues for supplier provided items, and provided cost and schedule estimates for this configuration. The confidence that J-2S production could be reinitiated within reasonable costs and schedules was provided. No significant technical issues were identified in either the producibility study or in the review of previous technical data. Areas of potential cost reduction were identified which could be quantified to a greater extent with further manufacturing planning. The proposed schedule can be met with no foreseeable impacts. The results of the study provided the necessary foundation for the detailed manufacturing and test plans and non-recurring and recurring cost estimates that are needed to complete the effort to reinitiate production of the J-2S engine system.

Vilja, John↗
NASA NTRS2010

Cost/Effort Drivers and Decision Analysis

Engineering trade study analyses demand consideration of performance, cost and schedule impacts across the spectrum of alternative concepts and in direct reference to product requirements. Prior to detailed design, requirements are too often ill-defined (only goals ) and prone to creep, extending well beyond the Systems Requirements Review. Though lack of engineering design and definitive requirements inhibit the ability to perform detailed cost analyses, affordability trades still comprise the foundation of these future product decisions and must evolve in concert. This presentation excerpts results of the recent NASA subsonic Engine Concept Study for an Advanced Single Aisle Transport to demonstrate an affordability evaluation of performance characteristics and the subsequent impacts on engine architecture decisions. Applying the Process Based Economic Analysis Tool (PBEAT), development cost, production cost, as well as operation and support costs were considered in a traditional weighted ranking of the following system-level figures of merit: mission fuel burn, take-off noise, NOx emissions, and cruise speed. Weighting factors were varied to ascertain the architecture ranking sensitivities to these performance figures of merit with companion cost considerations. A more detailed examination of supersonic variable cycle engine cost is also briefly presented, with observations and recommendations for further refinements.

Seidel, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS1993

Gaining the Competitive Edge: Design for Manufacturing

The successful design of a commercial aircraft which is intended to be in direct competition with existing aircraft requires a market analysis to establish design requirements, the development of a concept to achieve those goals. and the ability to economically manufacture the aircraft. It is often the case that an engineer designs system components with only the perspective of a particular discipline. The relationship of that component to the entire system is often a minor consideration. In an effort to highlight the interaction that is necessary during the design process, the students were organized into design/build teams and required to integrate aspects of market analysis, engineering design, production and economics into their concepts. In order to facilitate this process a hypothetical "Aeroworld" was established. Having been furnished relevant demographic and economic data for "Aeroworld". students were given the task of designing and building an aircraft for a specific market while achieving an economically competitive design. Involvement of the team in the evolution of the design from market definition to technical development to manufacturing allowed the students to identify critical issues in the design process and to encounter many of the conflicting requirements which arise in an aerospace systems design.

Batill, Stephen M.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Energy Efficient Engine: Flight propulsion system final design and analysis

The Energy Efficient Engine (E3) is a NASA program to create fuel saving technology for future transport engines. The Flight Propulsion System (FPS) is the engine designed to achieve E3 goals. Achieving these goals required aerodynamic, mechanical and system technologies advanced beyond that of current production engines. These technologies were successfully demonstrated in component rigs, a core engine and a turbofan ground test engine. The design and benefits of the FPS are presented. All goals for efficiency, environmental considerations, and economic payoff were met. The FPS has, at maximum cruise, 10.67 km (35,000 ft), M0.8, standard day, a 16.9 percent lower installed specific fuel consumption than a CF6-50C. It provides an 8.6 percent reduction in direct operating cost for a short haul domestic transport and a 16.2 percent reduction for an international long distance transport.

Davis, Donald Y.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Holistic Design for Total Product Well Being

Recent hardware development work at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center creates and argument for the use of a holistic design approach as opposed to a piece part design approach. A piece part design approach being one where individual pieces are developed to their finished state having to meet certain interface and human engineering requirements without much consideration to the final product as a whole. A holistic design approach being one where the final product is evaluated early and frequently during the design process, and individual parts are developed with consideration to how they interact a whole,and how they interact with the user and environment. Examples from the development of the Materials Science Research Rack - 1 will illustrate: a design failure due to piece part design; a design save, due to a failure of piece part design, but saved by evaluating the design holistically; and a design success due to a holistic design approach.

Adams, Chris W.↗
NASA NTRS1988

A software engineering approach to expert system design and verification

Software engineering design and verification methods for developing expert systems are not yet well defined. Integration of expert system technology into software production environments will require effective software engineering methodologies to support the entire life cycle of expert systems. The software engineering methods used to design and verify an expert system, RENEX, is discussed. RENEX demonstrates autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations, including replanning trajectory events and subsystem fault detection, onboard a space vehicle during flight. The RENEX designers utilized a number of software engineering methodologies to deal with the complex problems inherent in this system. An overview is presented of the methods utilized. Details of the verification process receive special emphasis. The benefits and weaknesses of the methods for supporting the development life cycle of expert systems are evaluated, and recommendations are made based on the overall experiences with the methods.

Bochsler, Daniel C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned for composite structures

Lessons learned for composite structures are presented in three technology areas: materials, manufacturing, and design. In addition, future challenges for composite structures are presented. Composite materials have long gestation periods from the developmental stage to fully matured production status. Many examples exist of unsuccessful attempts to accelerate this gestation period. Experience has shown that technology transition of a new material system to fully matured production status is time consuming, involves risk, is expensive and should not be undertaken lightly. The future challenges for composite materials require an intensification of the science based approach to material development, extension of the vendor/customer interaction process to include all engineering disciplines of the end user, reduced material costs because they are a significant factor in overall part cost, and improved batch-to-batch pre-preg physical property control. Historical manufacturing lessons learned are presented using current in-service production structure as examples. Most producibility problems for these structures can be traced to their sequential engineering design. This caused an excessive emphasis on design-to-weight and schedule at the expense of design-to-cost. This resulted in expensive performance originated designs, which required costly tooling and led to non-producible parts. Historically these problems have been allowed to persist throughout the production run. The current/future approach for the production of affordable composite structures mandates concurrent engineering design where equal emphasis is placed on product and process design. Design for simplified assembly is also emphasized, since assembly costs account for a major portion of total airframe costs. The future challenge for composite manufacturing is, therefore, to utilize concurrent engineering in conjunction with automated manufacturing techniques to build affordable composite structures. Composite design experience has shown that significant weight savings have been achieved, outstanding fatigue and corrosion resistance have been demonstrated, and in-service performance has been very successful. Currently no structural design show stoppers exist for composite structures. A major lesson learned is that the full scale static test is the key test for composites, since it is the primary structural 'hot spot' indicator. The major durability issue is supportability of thin skinned structure. Impact damage has been identified as the most significant issue for the damage tolerance control of composite structures. However, delaminations induced during assembly operations have demonstrated a significant nuisance value. The future challenges for composite structures are threefold. Firstly, composite airframe weight fraction should increase to 60 percent. At the same time, the cost of composite structures must be reduced by 50 percent to attain the goal of affordability. To support these challenges it is essential to develop lower cost materials and processes.

Whitehead, R. S.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Understanding Workforce Agility at NASA Kennedy Space Center

NASA leads the world in space research and provides other government agencies, educational institutions, and companies opportunities to explore, launch, and conduct research in and around space. NASA has 11 formal locations based around the United States, and each has different goals and objectives to help NASA meet its overall mission. 2004, President George Bush announced a new vision for the Space Exploration program. During his grand announcement, he discussed that the Space Shuttles would retire due to the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia accident, where the crew and the space vehicle were lost. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) would no longer manage the day-to-day operations of maintaining the US Space Shuttle fleet. Our NASA teams would continue working to finish the Space Shuttle program's mission to build the International Space Station. Afterward, NASA would transition to develop and test a new spacecraft, the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The third goal was to return to the moon by 2020 as the launching point for missions beyond, to get humans from lower Earth orbit to the moon and Mars. (Secretary, 2004) The KSC engineering workforce had to prepare to transition from Operational support of the Space Shuttle program to the design and development of over 50 subsystems for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at the Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate followed a comprehensive design process that required several different product deliverables during various phases for each subsystem. (Schafer et al., 2013) What allowed these systems to be successful? What enabled NASA KSC to complete over 130 Artemis 1 Design Certification and System Acceptance Reviews, closing over 21,656 Requirements to deem the Artemis 1 rocket ready for launch? Little is known about the NASA engineering workforce agility characteristics that enabled the organization to transition from the Space Shuttle program that ended in 2011 and launch the Artemis Program's SLS rocket on November 16, 2022.

Workforce Agility↗
NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

PRA methodology is one of the probabilistic analysis methods that NASA brought from the nuclear industry to assess the risk of LOM, LOV and LOC for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability and statistical data to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: What can go wrong? How likely is it? What is the severity of the degradation? Since 1986, NASA, along with industry partners, has conducted a number of PRA studies to predict the overall launch vehicles risks. Planning Research Corporation conducted the first of these studies in 1988. In 1995, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) conducted a comprehensive PRA study. In July 1996, NASA conducted a two-year study (October 1996 - September 1998) to develop a model that provided the overall Space Shuttle risk and estimates of risk changes due to proposed Space Shuttle upgrades. After the Columbia accident, NASA conducted a PRA on the Shuttle External Tank (ET) foam. This study was the most focused and extensive risk assessment that NASA has conducted in recent years. It used a dynamic, physics-based, integrated system analysis approach to understand the integrated system risk due to ET foam loss in flight. Most recently, a PRA for Ares I launch vehicle has been performed in support of the Constellation program. Reliability, on the other hand, addresses the loss of functions. In a broader sense, reliability engineering is a discipline that involves the application of engineering principles to the design and processing of products, both hardware and software, for meeting product reliability requirements or goals. It is a very broad design-support discipline. It has important interfaces with many other engineering disciplines. Reliability as a figure of merit (i.e. the metric) is the probability that an item will perform its intended function(s) for a specified mission profile. In general, the reliability metric can be calculated through the analyses using reliability demonstration and reliability prediction methodologies. Reliability analysis is very critical for understanding component failure mechanisms and in identifying reliability critical design and process drivers. The following sections discuss the PRA process and reliability engineering in detail and provide an application where reliability analysis and PRA were jointly used in a complementary manner to support a Space Shuttle flight risk assessment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA Software Documentation Standard

The NASA Software Documentation Standard (hereinafter referred to as "Standard") is designed to support the documentation of all software developed for NASA; its goal is to provide a framework and model for recording the essential information needed throughout the development life cycle and maintenance of a software system. The NASA Software Documentation Standard can be applied to the documentation of all NASA software. The Standard is limited to documentation format and content requirements. It does not mandate specific management, engineering, or assurance standards or techniques. This Standard defines the format and content of documentation for software acquisition, development, and sustaining engineering. Format requirements address where information shall be recorded and content requirements address what information shall be recorded. This Standard provides a framework to allow consistency of documentation across NASA and visibility into the completeness of project documentation. The basic framework consists of four major sections (or volumes). The Management Plan contains all planning and business aspects of a software project, including engineering and assurance planning. The Product Specification contains all technical engineering information, including software requirements and design. The Assurance and Test Procedures contains all technical assurance information, including Test, Quality Assurance (QA), and Verification and Validation (V&V). The Management, Engineering, and Assurance Reports is the library and/or listing of all project reports.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage Configuration Selection Process

The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), a key component of NASA's blueprint for the next generation of spacecraft to take humans back to the moon, is being designed and built by engineers at NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The vehicle s design is based on the results of NASA's 2005 Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), which called for development of a crew-launch system to reduce the gap between Shuttle retirement and Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Initial Operating Capability, identification of key technologies required to enable and significantly enhance these reference exploration systems, and a reprioritization of near- and far-term technology investments. The Upper Stage Element (USE) of the CLV is a clean-sheet approach that is being designed and developed in-house, with element management at MSFC. The USE concept is a self-supporting cylindrical structure, approximately 115' long and 216" in diameter, consisting of the following subsystems: Primary Structures (LOX Tank, LH2 Tank, Intertank, Thrust Structure, Spacecraft Payload Adaptor, Interstage, Forward and Aft Skirts), Secondary Structures (Systems Tunnel), Avionics and Software, Main Propulsion System, Reaction Control System, Thrust Vector Control, Auxiliary Power Unit, and Hydraulic Systems. The ESAS originally recommended a CEV to be launched atop a four-segment Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) CLV, utilizing an RS-25 engine-powered upper stage. However, Agency decisions to utilize fewer CLV development steps to lunar missions, reduce the overall risk for the lunar program, and provide a more balanced engine production rate requirement prompted engineers to switch to a five-segment design with a single Saturn-derived J-2X engine. This approach provides for single upper stage engine development for the CLV and an Earth Departure Stage, single Reusable Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) development for the CLV and a Cargo Launch Vehicle, and single core SSME development. While the RSRB design has changed since the CLV Project's inception, the USE design has remained essentially a clean-sheet approach. Although a clean-sheet upper stage design inherently carries more risk than a modified design, it does offer many advantages: a design for increased reliability; built-in extensibility to allow for commonality/growth without major redesign; and incorporation of state-of-the-art materials, hardware, and design, fabrication, and test techniques and processes to facilitate a potentially better, more reliable system. Because consideration was given in the ESAS to both clean-sheet and modified USE designs, this paper will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches and provide a detailed discussion of trades/selections made that led to the final upper stage configuration.

Davis, Daniel J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

ISO 9000 and/or Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model?

For businesses and organizations to remain competitive today they must have processes and systems in place that will allow them to first identify customer needs and then develop products/processes that will meet or exceed the customers needs and expectations. Customer needs, once identified, are normally stated as requirements. Designers can then develop products/processes that will meet these requirements. Several functions, such as quality management and systems engineering management are used to assist product development teams in the development process. Both functions exist in all organizations and both have a similar objective, which is to ensure that developed processes will meet customer requirements. Are efforts in these organizations being duplicated? Are both functions needed by organizations? What are the similarities and differences between the functions listed above? ISO 9000 is an international standard of goods and services. It sets broad requirements for the assurance of quality and for management's involvement. It requires organizations to document the processes and to follow these documented processes. ISO 9000 gives customers assurance that the suppliers have control of the process for product development. Systems engineering can broadly be defined as a discipline that seeks to ensure that all requirements for a system are satisfied throughout the life of the system by preserving their interrelationship. The key activities of systems engineering include requirements analysis, functional analysis/allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system analysis and control. The systems engineering process, when followed properly, will lead to higher quality products, lower cost products, and shorter development cycles. The System Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SE-CMM) will allow companies to measure their system engineering capability and continuously improve those capabilities. ISO 9000 and SE-CMM seem to have a similar objective, which is to document the organization's processes and certify to potential customers the capability of a supplier to control the processes that determine the quality of the product or services being produced. The remaining sections of this report examine the differences and similarities between ISO 9000 and SE-CMM and make recommendations for implementation.

Sampson E. Gholston↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA software documentation standard software engineering program

The NASA Software Documentation Standard (hereinafter referred to as Standard) can be applied to the documentation of all NASA software. This Standard is limited to documentation format and content requirements. It does not mandate specific management, engineering, or assurance standards or techniques. This Standard defines the format and content of documentation for software acquisition, development, and sustaining engineering. Format requirements address where information shall be recorded and content requirements address what information shall be recorded. This Standard provides a framework to allow consistency of documentation across NASA and visibility into the completeness of project documentation. This basic framework consists of four major sections (or volumes). The Management Plan contains all planning and business aspects of a software project, including engineering and assurance planning. The Product Specification contains all technical engineering information, including software requirements and design. The Assurance and Test Procedures contains all technical assurance information, including Test, Quality Assurance (QA), and Verification and Validation (V&V). The Management, Engineering, and Assurance Reports is the library and/or listing of all project reports.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

System Engineering Processes at Kennedy Space Center for Development of the SLS and Orion Launch Systems

There are over 40 subsystems being developed for the future SLS and Orion Launch Systems at Kennedy Space Center. These subsystems developed at the Kennedy Space Center Engineering Directorate follow a comprehensive design process which requires several different product deliverables during each phase of each of the subsystems. This Paper describes this process and gives an example of where the process has been applied.

Schafer, Eric J.↗