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Retaining Systems Engineering Model Meaning Through Transformation: Demo 2

Digital engineering strategies typically assume that digital engineering models interoperate seamlessly across the multiple different engineering modeling software applications involved, such as model- based systems engineering (MBSE), mechanical computer-aided design (MCAD), electrical computer-aided design (ECAD), and other engineering modeling applications. The presumption is that the data schema in these modeling software applications are structured in the familiar flat- tabular schema like any other software application. Engineering domain-specific applications (e.g., systems, mechanical, electrical, simulation) are typically designed to solve domain-specific problems, necessarily excluding explicit representations of non-domain information to help the engineer focus on the domain problems (system definition, design, simulation). Such exclusions become problematic in inter-domain information exchange. The obvious assumptions of one domain might not be so obvious to experts in another domain. Ambiguity in domain-specific language can erode the ability to enable different domain modeling applications to interoperate, unless the underlying language is understood and used as the basis for translation from one application to another. The engineering modeling software application industry has struggled for decades to enable these applications to interoperate. Industry standards have been developed, but they have not unified the industry. Why is this? The authors assert that the industry has relied on traditional database integration methods. The basic issue prohibiting successful application integration then is that traditional database-driven integration does not consider the distinct languages of each domain. An engineering models meaning is expressed through the underlying language of that engineering domain. In essence, traditional integration methods do not retain the semantic context (meaning) of the model. The basis of this research stems from the widely held assumption that systems engineering models are (or can be) structured according to the underlying semantic ontology of the model. This assumption can be imagined from two thoughts. 1) Digital systems engineering models are often represented using graph theory (the graph of a complex systems model can contain millions of nodes and edges). When examining the nodes one at a time and following the outbound edges of each node one by one, one can end up with rudimentary statements about the model (i.e., node A relates to node B), as in a semantic graph. 2) Likewise, from the study of natural languages, a sentence can be structured into unambiguous triples of subject-predicate-object within formal and highly expressive semantic ontologies. The rudimentary statements about a systems model discerned with graph theory closely mimic the triples used in the ontologies that try to structure natural languages. In other words, a systems models semantic graph can be (or is) structured into an ontology. Additionally, it is well established in industry that through natural language processing (NLP), which provides the means to create language structures, that computers can interpret ontological graphs. Therefore, the authors hypothesized that if the integrity of the underlying semantic structure of a systems model is retained, the contextual meaning of the model is retained. By structuring system models into the triples of the underlying ontology during the transformation from one MBSE application to another, the authors have provided a proof of the concept that the meaning of a system model can be retained during transformation. The authors assert that this is the missing ingredient in effective systems model-to-model interoperability. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank the FY19 Model Interoperability team members who provided a solid foundation for the FY20 team to leverage: John McCloud, for the work he did to guide us toward the right use of technology that will appropriately discover and manipulate ontologies. Carlos Tafoya, for the work he did to develop an application programming interface (API)/Adapter that would export ontology-based data from GENESYS. Peter Chandler, for the work he did to architect our overall integration solution, with an eye toward the future that would influence a large-scale federated production-level systems engineering digital model ecosystem.

42 ENGINEERING↗

What Questions Would a Systems Engineer Ask to Assess Systems Engineering Models as Credible

Digital Systems Engineering strategies typically call for digital Systems Engineering models to be retained in repositories and certified as an authoritative source of truth (enabling model reuse, qualification, and collaboration). In order for digital Systems Engineering models to be certified as authoritative (credible), they need to be assessed - verified and validated - and with the amount of uncertainty in the model quantified (consider reusing someone else's model without knowing the author). Due to this increasing model complexity, the authors assert that traditional human-based methods for validating, verifying, and uncertainty quantification - such as human-based peer-review sessions - cannot sufficiently establish that a digital Systems Engineering model of a complex system is credible. Digital Systems Engineering models of complex systems can contain millions of nodes and edges. The authors assert that this level of detail is beyond the ability of any group of humans - even working for weeks at a time - to discern and catch every minor model infraction. In contrast, computers are highly effective at discerning infractions with massive amounts of information. The authors suggest that a better approach might be to focus the humans at what model patterns should be assessed and enable the computer to assess the massive details in accordance with those patterns - by running through perhaps 100,000 test loops. In anticipation of future projects to implement and automate the assessment of models at Sandia National Laboratories, a study was initiated to elicit input from a group of 25 Systems Engineering experts. The authors positioning query began with - 'What questions would a Systems Engineer ask to assess Systems Engineering models for credibility?" This report documents the results of that survey.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Demonstration of Model-Based Design for Digital Controller Using Formal Methods

This report describes work originally performed in FY19 that assembled a workflow enabling formal verification of high-consequence digital controllers. The approach builds on an engineering analysis strategy using multiple abstraction levels (Model-Based Design) and performs exhaustive formal analysis of appropriate levels – here, state machines and C code – to assure always/never properties of digital logic that cannot be verified by testing alone. The operation of the workflow is illustrated using example models and code, including expected failures of verification when properties are violated.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

On the Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE)

The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy has recommended a transition to secure-by-design methodologies in critical infrastructure. This paper presents the adoption of the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy as initiated by the U.S. DOE’s CESER office, advocating for the integration of cybersecurity at the earliest stages of system design. The strategy targets design engineers responsible for energy infrastructure to embed CIE principles within the engineering lifecycle, thus enhancing cyber resilience. This paper discusses the expansion of secure-by-design concepts to cyber-physical systems, moving beyond traditional IT security to include engineering considerations that can mitigate cyber risks through design choices. The paper introduces Digital Risk Management, balancing traditional cybersecurity with CIE to reduce both likelihood and impact of cyber threats. A set of CIE starter questions derived from 12 core principles is detailed, aiding engineers to consider cybersecurity in their designs and highlights the importance of CIE in anticipating and reducing the impacts of cyber attacks, suggesting that such integration is essential for national security and infrastructure resilience.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Design and Operations

Pursuant to the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy published in 2022, INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of why we need CIE and what it is, a discussion of the major implications of CIE for electric power systems design and operations, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

ENABLING BUSINESS-DRIVEN INNOVATION THROUGH HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

For existing United States nuclear power plant fleet to remain economically viable, the nuclear industry needs to fundamentally change the way in which these plants are operated, maintained, and supported. A digital transformation is a key strategy to address this challenge. Though, guidance in this area is a continued effort. One framework to support innovation in the nuclear industry has taken a broader perspective by focusing on how technology can be used to meet specific business needs and work for the people and processes at hand. This work discusses the role and value of human factors engineering within this nuclear innovation framework. Human factors methods are presented here regarding how they address the phases of nuclear innovation. This work seeks to describe how human factors can be applied in nuclear innovation by strengthening the alignment of technology, people, processes, and regulations such that the needs of the business is addressed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Exploring the Psychometrics of Common Post-Scenario Human Factors Questionnaires of Workload, Situation Awareness, and Perceived Difficulty

Abstract: The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program has the primary mission of sustaining operation of the existing commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) through a multi-pathway approach in conducting research and development (R&D). In this effort, the role of human factors engineering (HFE) has been an integral in ensuring new digital upgrades that are part of the overall main control room modernization strategy for various U.S. NPPs optimize human-system performance and do not introduce new human failure modes. In this process, testing and evaluation of concept (i.e., prototype) human machine interfaces (HMIs) are done in operator-in-the-loop studies at various stages of the HFE modification process, such as during design and verification and validation (V&V) [1]. During these studies, licensed operators go through select scenarios using a testbed, such as a full-scale simulator or at a NPP’s training simulator, to identify potential usability issues and provide general design feedback regarding the new digital HMIs. Human-system performance is measured and evaluated through a range of objective and self-report measures that capture aspects of plant performance, task performance, workload, situation awareness, and anthropometric and ergonomic concerns [2]. The use of post-scenario questionnaires is an acceptable method for gathering measures of workload and situation awareness. To this end, the NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) [e.g., 3, 4, & 5] and Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) [e.g., 6 & 7] are common standardized questionnaires used for evaluating workload and situation awareness, respectively. When combined, these questionnaires consist of a total of 15 questions, each using a different rating scale. Debriefs are also done through interviews with operators to gather design insight after each scenario. Since operator- and training simulator-time is limited, a concern during this post-scenario period of operator-in-the-loop studies is the limited time available to run scenarios, administer post-scenario questionnaires, and debrief within the allotted simulator time. To address this potential problem, this paper explores the psychometric characteristics of NASA-TLX, SART, and a common one-question post-scenario usability questionnaire (i.e., the single ease question – SEQ [8]) in effort to inform future development of a condensed questionnaire that captures aspects of workload and situation awareness. This exploratory work uses data from four different operator-in-the-loop studies completed under prior LWRS operator-in-the-loop studies. Findings from this paper should support future development of a consolidated questionnaire that may be used in operator-in-the-loop studies, when time is compressed, that conforms to the HFE scientific and regulatory requirements set for NPP control room modernization.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages

Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Visible to NIR‐II Photoluminescence of Atomically Precise Gold Nanoclusters

Abstract Atomically precise gold nanoclusters (NCs) have emerged as a new class of precision materials and attracted wide interest in recent years. One of the unique properties of such nanoclusters pertains to their photoluminescence (PL), for it can widely span visible to near‐infrared–I and –II wavelengths (NIR‐I/II), and even beyond 1700 nm by manipulating the size, structure, and composition. The current research efforts focus on the structure–PL correlation and the development of strategies for raising the PL quantum yields, which is nontrivial when moving from the visible to the near‐infrared wavelengths, especially in the NIR–II regions. This review summarizes the recent progress in the field, including i) the types of PL observed in gold NCs such as fluorescence, phosphorescence, and thermally activated delayed fluorescence, as well as dual emission; ii) some effective strategies that are devised to improve the PL quantum yield (QY) of gold NCs, such as heterometal doping, surface rigidification, and core phonon engineering, with double‐digit QYs for the NIR PL on the horizons; and iii) the applications of luminescent gold NCs in bioimaging, photosensitization, and optoelectronics. Finally, the remaining challenges and opportunities for future research are highlighted.

Liu, Zhongyu↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Strategy for Migration of Traditional to Hybrid Control Boards in a Nuclear Power Plant

This strategy document describes the NUREG-0711 based human factors engineering (HFE) phases and associated elements required to support design, verification and validation (V&V), and implementation of new digital control room elements in a legacy analog main control room (MCR). Information from previous planning and analysis work serves as the foundation for creating a human-machine interface (HMI) specification for distributed control systems (DCSs) to be implemented as part of nuclear power plant (NPP) modernization. This document reviews ways to take the HMSI specification and use it when migrating legacy displays or designing displays with new functionality. These displays undergo iterative usability testing during the design phase and then an integrated system validation (ISV) in the full-scope control room training simulator. Following successful demonstration of operator performance using the systems during the ISV, the new DCS is implemented at the plant, first in the training simulator and then in the MCR. This document concludes with a sample project plan, including a 15-month timeline from DCS design through implementation. Included is a discussion of how the U.S. Department of Energy’s Human System Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) can be used to support design and V&V activities. This report completes a Level 4 (M4) milestone under the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies – GETs and HPCs Session 1: ATT Foundations and Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs)

The INL TADA GETs Cohort Session 1, held on November 4, 2025, convened experts to address the integration of advanced transmission technologies, including Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs) and High Performance Conductors (HPCs), with a focus on digital assurance challenges. The session highlighted the growing importance of cybersecurity, supply chain transparency, reliability, and business risk management in deploying GETs, especially Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs). Participants examined how expanded attack surfaces, limited vendor pools, and new regulatory requirements—such as FERC Orders 881, 2023, and 1920—are influencing utilities and technology providers. The workshop underscored the need for cyber-informed engineering, secure-by-design principles, and practical risk management strategies, while fostering collaboration and knowledge sharing among industry peers. Technical discussions covered the evolution from static to dynamic line ratings, complexities of cloud-based architectures, and NERC CIP compliance challenges. The session concluded with a collaborative risk exercise and a preview of future workshops on advanced power flow control and transmission topology optimization, reinforcing the cohort’s commitment to advancing digital assurance in the energy sector.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The ARENA Test Bed – A Versatile Resource for I&C Development and Validation

The Accelerated and Real-time Experimental Nodal Assessment (ARENA) Test Bed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is a versatile resource for development and validation of instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies. This capability was created to facilitate in-situ testing of nuclear electrical cables in various simulated operational environments. Using cable trays, a control box, and selected test components, low voltage cables can be staged to experience local adverse environments such as elevated temperature and water immersion. Cable condition can be continuously monitored over time to track the effect of local stresses using nondestructive assessment tools. A heads-up display (ARENA TV) plots key data in real-time for users. The ARENA Test Bed has recently been used to evaluate the potential for spread spectrum time domain reflectometry (SSTDR) to monitor thermal aging of a portion of live cable powering a three-phase motor. The arrangement provided the opportunity to directly compare the performance of the novel online SSTDR method with offline results from the more standard frequency domain reflectometry (FDR) method. The ability of SSTDR and FDR to identify the presence of water in immersed shielded and unshielded cables and to detect ground faults was also assessed. A digital twin is being developed to track and predict FDR signals from a thermally aging conceptual cable region to compare with measured signals from the ARENA physical counterpart. The test bed concept addresses an important need in nuclear I&C monitoring tool development. New tools and techniques can be developed in the test bed and validated versus known methods and physical measurements. Digital twins and machine learning engines can be populated with measured data in a controlled environment that would not be readily available in the actual nuclear power plant. Proposed monitoring strategies can be confirmed for effectiveness through objective evaluation. It is anticipated that the PNNL ARENA Test Bed will be a valuable resource in advancing nuclear plant instrumentation.

nuclear electrical cables, ARENA Test Bed, conditi↗

Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗