Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Digital Instrumentation and Control”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Digital Instrumentation & Controls Study with Operating Experience Data

The slides present the plan and working progress on the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) study with nuclear industry operating experience data. They were originally prepared as a working document and presented to the NRC, but then was asked by the NRC to present to an EPRI/NRC meeting on DI&C. The slides will also be distributed to the meeting participants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safety Assurance of Software and Machine Learning Development for Nuclear Instrumentation and Controls

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems monitor and control parameters in nuclear power plants. Ensuring their safety is a critical part of ensuring overall plant safety. Nuclear power plant licensing generates thousands of safety documents that could be organized more effectively using a safety assurance case (SAC). We conducted a literature survey of SACs and created a SAC framework for DI&C software using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). This framework focuses on four software development processes: management & assurance, pre-developed software (PDS) qualification, the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), and the Machine Learning Development Life Cycle (MLDLC). We organized our framework using a novel level structure that can be applied to other SACs to improve their clarity. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be incorporated as part of a SAC for a larger reactor system.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of PRADIC on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In PRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that PRADIC can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Approach to Automate tools for the Risk Assessment of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Reliable digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C) are integral for sustaining the continued operation of nuclear power plants. These systems ensure that nuclear reactors operate safely, efficiently, and within regulatory requirements. Yet, the cost of designing and licensing new nuclear DI&C can be prohibitively expensive. Under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, Idaho National Laboratory has developed a framework for supporting the risk-informed design of DI&C systems by offering methods to support the identification, quantification, and evaluation of risks for various DI&C design architectures. The framework indicates potential software failure modes and provides pathways for quantifying the potential for these software failures, including common cause failures. Using the framework’s systematic approach, challenges for assessing risks within new and existing nuclear DI&C systems can be reduced. Nevertheless, the current framework can be further improved using the convenience of automation. This paper introduces the development of Software for the Hazard Identification and Evaluation of Digital Systems (SHIELDS). SHIELDS is an engineering software package that enables the identification, elimination, and mitigation of potential risks and reduces the burden of deploying reliable DI&C systems. This work introduces plans and techniques to digitize and improve the manual risk assessment modules of the framework. These improvements will save time and increase the repeatability and usability of the framework, making it more accessible to a wider range of users. Ultimately, this introduces SHIELDS and how its modules support efficient development of safe and reliable DI&C systems.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Safety Assurance Framework for Nuclear Digital Instrumentation and Control Software

Software in digital instrumentation and control (D&C) systems poses unique challenges for the safety assurance of nuclear power plants. Through a literature survey of 21 sources, we analyzed various claims, arguments, and evidence used in safety assurance cases across industries. These were organized into a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety assurance case framework to organize and visualize the various arguments for DI&C safety. We developed a classification for the levels of the framework, which can be used in other safety assurance cases to improve clarity.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using IRADIC Technology

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes an integrated risk assessment technology for DI&C systems (IRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of the IRADIC technology on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In IRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that the IRADIC technology can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantitative evaluation of common cause failures in high safety-significant safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems at nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems. They are proven to be more reliable, cheaper, and easier to maintain given obsolescence of analog components. However, they also pose new engineering and technical challenges, such as possibility of common cause failures (CCFs) unique to digital systems. Here this paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) that is developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). A methodology for evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs was developed as part of the framework. The framework integrates three stages of a typical risk assessment—qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analyses. The quantified risks compared with respective acceptance criteria provide valuable insights for system architecture alternatives allowing design optimization in terms of risk reduction and cost savings. A comprehensive case study performed to demonstrate the framework's capabilities is documented here in this paper. Results show that the PRADIC is a powerful tool capable to identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their probabilities, and evaluate their impacts on system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Spurious actuations in digital instrumentation and control systems - evaluation framework - 137

When a digital Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system or its associated components produce an unintended operation, it is known as a spurious actuation. Spurious actuations could lead to unnecessary challenges to safety equipment, challenge the ability of safety systems to provide their intended functions, or place the plant in an un-analyzed state. There is arguably a lack of clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations. In an attempt to address this guidance gap, this paper provides a generic framework for evaluating spurious actuations in digital I and C systems, components, or supporting systems that are important to safety. The framework provides a methodology for: (1) defining the scope of the evaluation including supporting assumptions; (2) providing options for excluding a spurious actuation from the evaluation; (3) assessing the potential consequences from the assessed spurious actuations; and, (4) defining a high-level acceptance criteria. The methodology discussed by this paper is not to be construed as a requirement, regulation, or acceptable guidance by either domestic or international regulators; instead, it is intended to serve as a potential foundation or technical basis to be used for developing clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations in digital I and C systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Redundancy-Guided Approach for the Hazard Analysis of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Advanced Nuclear Power Plants

We report digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for the nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs), which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis and fault tree analysis for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-Guided Systems-Theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, the RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense in depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control

As nuclear reactors transition from analog to digital technology, the benefits of enhanced operational capabilities and improved efficiencies are potentially offset by cyber risks. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that can be used by engineers and staff to characterize and reduce new cyber risks in digital instrumentation and control systems. CIE provides guidance that can be applied throughout the entire systems engineering lifecycle, from conceptual design to decommissioning. In addition to outlining the use of CIE in nuclear reactor applications, this chapter provides a brief primer on nuclear reactor instrumentation and control and the associated cyber risks in existing light water reactors as well as the digital technology that will likely be used in future reactor designs and applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Effect of Degraded Digital Instrumentation and Control systems on Human-system Interfaces and Operator Performance

Integrated digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in new and advanced nuclear power plants (NPPs) will support operators in monitoring and controlling the plants. Even though digital systems typically are expected to be reliable, their potential for degradation or failure significantly could affect the operators performance and, consequently, jeopardize plant safety. This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) research investigated the effects of degraded I&C systems on human performance and on plant operations. The objective was to develop technical basis and guidance for human factors engineering (HFE) reviews addressing the operator's ability to detect and manage degraded digital I&C conditions. We reviewed pertinent standards and guidelines, empirical studies, and plant operating experience. In addition, we evaluated the potential effects of selected failure modes of the digital feedwater control system of a currently operating pressurized water reactor (PWR) on human-system interfaces (HSIs) and the operators performance. Our findings indicated that I&C degradations are prevalent in plants employing digital systems, and the overall effects on the plant's behavior can be significant, such as causing a reactor trip or equipment to operate unexpectedly. I&C degradations may affect the HSIs used by operators to monitor and control the plant. For example, deterioration of the sensors can complicate the operators interpretation of displays, and sometimes may mislead them by making it appear that a process disturbance has occurred. We used the findings as the technical basis upon which to develop HFE review guidance.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Recent results from a testbed for the reliability of the digital instrumentation and control systems and cybersecurity in nuclear power plants - 392

Transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems requires a systematic study of the modifications, and assessment of their reliability. Such studies are often carried out on a test bed. The test bed developed earlier includes a commercially available triple modular redundant (TMR) programmable logic controller (PLC) for testing not only the reliability of the digital I and C but also the cyber-security of the system during plant operation. This paper reports results of our preliminary analyses carried out using the test bed following the injection of faults mimicking faulty sensors. The fault injection tool generates faulty signals in single or multiple sensors located in the primary loop. These scenarios studied under steady-state operation conditions simulate a bad sensor, a cut wire, noise, etc. The faults injected can lead to information being displayed in the main control room (MCR) to not match the conditions in the plant. In addition to a fault injection module, a result analyzer module is also a part of this testbed. Operator actions can be based on information displayed in the MCR, or they can be informed by the result analyzer. Potential operator actions following these single- or multiple faulty signals are assessed. It is concluded that the result analyzer in some cases can be helpful in guiding operators to make the right decisions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Operating Experience Data Analysis for Digital Instrumentation and Control System Reliability and Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants

The implementation of advanced digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) can bring significant advancements in reliability, monitoring, and control capabilities. However, these systems also introduce new challenges, particularly in assessing risks such as common-cause failures (CCFs) and establishing robust reliability estimates for DI&C components. Addressing these challenges is critical for ensuring the safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Recently, Idaho National Laboratory was tasked by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct a DI&C reliability study using operating experience data from the nuclear industry. The two operating experience data sources for the study are the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations’ Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS) and the NRC’s Licensee Event Report database which is hosted at Idaho National Laboratory at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx. This report provides a comprehensive examination of DI&C systems, including their architecture, operational advantages, and associated challenges. It reviews existing industry DI&C studies and failure mode taxonomies, along with reliability data from various industries. Through a detailed analysis of these databases, the study provides insights into DI&C system performance. Considerations should be given to incorporate DI&C failure data into the NRC's Integrated Data Collection and Coding System and updating the Reliability and Availability Data System to support ongoing DI&C reliability studies. Recommendations are also provided for modeling DI&C reliability and CCF in probabilistic risk assessment, thereby supporting risk-informed decision-making and enhancing the reliability and safety of NPPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Effects of Degraded Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems on Human-system Interfaces and Operator Performance: HFE Review Guidance and Technical Basis

New and advanced reactors will use integrated digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to support operators in their monitoring and control functions. Even though digital systems are typically highly reliable, their potential for degradation or failure could significantly affect operator performance and, consequently, impact plant safety. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) supported this research project to investigate the effects of degraded I&C systems on human performance and plant operations. The objective was to develop human factors engineering (HFE) review guidance addressing the detection and management of degraded digital I&C conditions by plant operators. We reviewed pertinent standards and guidelines, empirical studies, and plant operating experience. In addition, we conducted an evaluation of the potential effects of selected failure modes of the digital feedwater system on human-system interfaces (HSIs) and operator performance. The results indicated that I&C degradations are prevalent in plants employing digital systems and the overall effects on plant behavior can be significant, such as causing a reactor trip or causing equipment to operate unexpectedly. I&C degradations can impact the HSIs used by operators to monitor and control the plant. For example, sensor degradations can make displays difficult to interpret and can sometimes mislead operators by making it appear that a process disturbance has occurred. We used the information obtained as the technical basis upon which to develop HFE review guidance. The guidance addresses the treatment of degraded I&C conditions as part of the design process and the HSI features and functions that support operators to monitor I&C performance and manage I&C degradations when they occur. In addition, we identified topics for future research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Investigation of Digital Instrumentation and Control System Failure Modes

A study sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission study was conducted to investigate digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems and module-level failure modes using a number of databases both in the nuclear and non-nuclear industries. The objectives of the study were to obtain relevant operational experience data to identify generic DI&C system failure modes and failure mechanisms, and to obtain generic insights, with the intent of using results to establish a unified framework for categorizing failure modes and mechanisms. Of the seven databases studied, the Equipment Performance Information Exchange database was found to contain the most useful data relevant to the study. Even so, the general lack of quality relative to the objectives of the study did not allow the development of a unified framework for failure modes and mechanisms of nuclear I&C systems. However, an attempt was made to characterize all the failure modes observed (i.e., without regard to the type of I&C equipment under consideration) into common categories. It was found that all the failure modes identified could be characterized as (a) detectable/preventable before failures, (b) age-related failures, (c) random failures, (d) random/sudden failures, or (e) intermittent failures. The percentage of failure modes characterized as (a) was significant, implying that a significant reduction in system failures could be achieved through improved online monitoring, exhaustive testing prior to installation, adequate configuration control or verification and validation, etc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Summary of Technical Peer Review on the Risk Assessment Framework proposed in Report INL/RPT-22-68656 for Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

This report summarizes the peer review activities initiated by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2023 for the evaluation and improvement of the methodology developed under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. The R&D efforts of this project from FY 2019 through FY 2022 were focused on methodology improvement and demonstration of the proposed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. Collaborations with the nuclear industry have been initiated to support the reliability and risk assessment of their DI&C systems by using the proposed framework. In FY 2023, the framework has reached to a point for a technical peer review and obtain stakeholder feedback. This peer review activity includes coordination of the reviews performed by a group of industry stakeholders, documentation of the peer review suggestions, providing resolutions and responses to the peer review comments. The objective of this technical peer review is to obtain representative feedback on the proposed framework to improve the technical qualities of its methodology and readiness for deployment to the industry. Feedback may identify potential areas for improvement and further development. The Subject Matter experts were invited to review the latest project report documenting the methodology developed in the project and provide evaluations of the technical qualities of the proposed framework and relevant methods. The reviewed project report is “An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration” INL/RPT-22-68656 (short as “INL/RPT-22-68656” in this report). This peer review report documents the technical questions provided for technical peer review and introduces the technical peer reviewers from the stakeholders including nuclear utilities, regulators, and universities. Comments from technical peer reviewers and the resolutions and responses to these comments are outlined. Insights and lessons learned from the technical peer review are summarized in conclusions and future work. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Advancement and Application

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2024 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Digital Instrumentation and Control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. The goal of the RISA Pathway is to optimize safety margins and minimize uncertainties to achieve economic efficiencies while maintaining high levels of safety. This is accomplished by providing scientific basis to better represent safety margins and factors that contribute to cost and safety, and by developing new technologies that reduce operating costs. The research efforts for FY 2024 encompass methodology refinement and exploration. The efforts include: (1) The implementation of a natural language processing tool to expedite key aspects of the reliability analysis methods developed by INL; (2) advances to support intersystem CCF analysis by providing guidance for and identification of coupling mechanisms that may contribute to CCF; (3) the investigation of how generative artificial intelligence tools can aid in hazard analysis and diversity and defense in depth (i.e., D3) assessments; (4) Industry collaboration, allowing the demonstration of and INL's risk assessment tools to support risk assessment of DI&C systems at early and late stages of development; (4) a roadmap for the development of a software for each of INL's risk assessment tools; (5) The development of a theory and methodology manual for a risk quantification methodology; (6) the development of a reliability analysis for machine learning (ML)-integrated control systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗