Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Distribution locational marginal price”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

A tri-level distribution locational marginal price-based demand response framework

Here, in this paper, we propose a tri-level, nested, two-stage price-based demand response (PBDR) framework that considers distribution locational marginal price (DLMP) as DR enabler between load-serving entities (LSE), demand response providers (DRPs), and customers in the day-ahead distribution market. It enables LSE and customer interactions by using multiple DRPs, positioned in-between, and independently optimizes their objectives. The problem is formulated using linear power flow with approximated power losses and its application in DLMP as DR pricing. The tri-level problem is solved using a nested reformulation & decomposition (R&D) method and tested on the real Indian-108 bus distribution system under various dynamic pricings. Further, the temporal–spatial variations in DLMPs are assessed using fairness criteria. Numerical analyses demonstrate that DLMP applications can effectively improve economic efficiency, and transparency in DR programs valuation with a favorable fairness margin. The results show that DLMP as DR pricing signal induces (0-2) % variation in DLMP for DR participation up to 10 %. Further, it gives over 90 % fairness over temporal–spatial variation for all the customers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Robust Distribution State Estimation for Reliable Locational Marginal Pricing under Cyber-Attacks

Here this paper examines the impact of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on distribution system state estimation (DSSE) and the resulting distribution locational marginal price (DLMP) in power markets. Two robust high-breakdown regression estimators, namely S- and MM- estimators, are implemented to provide resistance against FDI attacks targeting measurements and grid topology, creating leverage points. The introduced estimators are compared to the weighted least squares (WLS) with a bad data detection and rejection module (BDD) and the robust Huber M-estimator. The proposed estimators are shown to be effective and compare favorably to both existing Huber M- and the WLS with BDD in the presence of topology FDI attacks. Both the S- and MM-estimators provide good performance in the case of clean and corrupted measurements. Their performance is comparable in this case to the Huber M- and the WLS, followed by a BDD module. The simulation considered a modified distribution IEEE 13 and 34-bus systems where the impact of FDI attack scenarios is shown on the state and the DLMP pricing in the presence of distributed Generation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Endogenous Interface Pricing for Consistent Transmission–Distribution Co-Optimization With Discrete Distribution Controls

This paper proposes an endogenous interface pricing model for day-ahead transmission–distribution co-optimization that co-determines the interface locational marginal price (LMP) and the transmission–distribution exchange, ensuring price–dispatch consistency while optimally scheduling discrete distribution controls. The formulation couples a DC optimal power flow (OPF) with a branch-flow AC OPF that schedules distributed energy resources (DERs), tap-changer settings, capacitor banks (CBs), and multi-period energy storage systems (ESSs) under feeder voltage and current limits, and is solved as a mixed-integer second-order cone program (MISOCP). In a T14–D33 system, coordinated device scheduling recovers about 90% of the distribution-to-transmission export achievable in a reference case that ignores distribution network (DN) limits, while satisfying a 1.05 p.u. voltage upper bound. In a T39–D34/D37/D123 system, a sequential decoupled benchmark produces interface LMP distortions up to 12.5% and a 7.28% mismatch in net export energy, whereas the proposed model removes these distortions and the associated settlement mismatches. Second-order cone (SOC) relaxation gaps remain below $10^{-3}$ in all cases.

Noh, Seung-Gil↗

Pricing Strategy of Electric Vehicle Aggregators Based on Locational Marginal Price to Minimize Photovoltaic (PV) Curtailment

The global climate crisis demands urgent action to mitigate global warming. Using renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, for electricity generation is crucial. This shift from centralized to distributed power systems, however, brings challenges, including voltage fluctuations and renewable energy curtailment. The rapid growth of the electric vehicle (EV) industry adds complexity, increasing overall electricity demand and straining the power supply during peak charging times. This paper proposes a scheduling strategy for EV aggregators to reduce renewable energy curtailment and stabilize grid operation by strategically scheduling EV charging. Using Multi -Agent Transport Simulation (MATSim), a traffic simulation tool, EV driving data in Denver, Colorado, USA, were modeled. The EV aggregator adjusts charging fees based on locational marginal prices, encouraging EVs to charge at different stations according to pricing. Simulations on an IEEE 33-bus system with distributed energy resources and EV charging stations validate the proposed algorithm, demonstrating its effectiveness in reducing curtailment by 12.55% and stabilizing grid operation.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Distribution Network Capacity Market Design: Marginal Distribution Capacity Pricing Mechanism for Efficient Investment and Cost Allocation

As electricity markets begin to shift from reliance on large, centralized power plants and towards distributed energy resources (DERs), there is a growing acknowledgement that more efficient planning, operations, and oversight is needed in the distribution system. This paper addresses one step in that direction by proposing an auction mechanism that uses a detailed distribution system planning model that allocates permits to end-used customers who request capacity to install new devices at their location and network upgrade contracts to utilities or 3rd-party companies who offer to upgrade system components. The resulting plan maximizes market surplus, that is, maximizes the total benefit to consumers minus the cost of network upgrades. We apply a marginal pricing scheme to the auction’s results such that the cost of each permits or contracts is differentiated by time and location, based on the Lagrangian multipliers of binding network constraints. These prices are shown to be no greater than the bid price of any awarded contract and no less than the offered cost of any awarded upgrade contract. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of power flows in the planning model result in an additional surplus that would be collected by the entity that hosts the auction, which could then be refunded to market participants or used to cover overhead costs of running the market. We provide four example auction results in a simple three-node distribution feeder to demonstrate the properties of the design. Results suggest that larger or more realistic case studies could be a promising next step.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Progressing Analysis of Variable Electric Rates (PAVER) Study

The Progressing Analysis of Variable Electric Rates (PAVER) study analyzed the impact of a range of time-varying electric rates on the performance of a regional electric grid and the resulting costs for participating and non-participating customers. This analysis leveraged and extended the work of PNNL’s Distribution System Operator with Transactive (DSO+T) study. Five different rate designs were included: a flat volumetric energy charge, a typical Time of Use (TOU) rate, a dynamic energy (DE) rate (based on wholesale locational marginal prices), a dynamic energy and capacity (DE+C) rate, and, finally, a Block and Swing (B&S) rate that billed customers based on their average load profile at constant pricing, but used the DE+C dynamic price for load deviations from their average profile. These rates were analyzed in a large-scale co-simulation of an entire regional grid with a customer population representative of the current state. A large fraction (80%) of residential and commercial customers were assumed to participate in these time-varying rates with automatically controlled HVAC, water heaters, electric vehicles, and batteries. This study assumed no industrial sector participation. The DE and DE+C rates saw system peak loads reduced by 6-7%, while the large participation in the TOU rate case saw a significant rebound effect and a resulting peak load increase of >5%. The impacts to the annual and peak system demand impacted system wholesale prices and the overall grid operating costs. This cost structure determined the revenue needed to be collected from customers by each rate design. Participating customers on the DE and DE+C rates (located in one of the modeled DSOs) saw reductions in average annual electricity bills of 11-17% with average increases in monthly bill variation of no more than 13%. At such high participation levels, TOU customers saw 10% higher average annual bills (due to system-wide rebound effects) and average increased monthly bill variation of 16%. Residential owners of large flexible loads (such as electric vehicles) saw larger bill savings (17-20%) when on a fully dynamic rate. The presence of on-site generation (such as rooftop solar) did not appear to appreciably change customer outcomes. Customers on the Block and Swing rate did see 6% lower monthly bill variation (as intended) than the flat rate case, but at the expense of appreciable bill savings, which were only 3%, comparable to the savings seen by non-participants. Given this finding we recommend that additional research be conducted into how best various bill protection mechanisms can balance minimizing customer bill variation with providing financial incentives commensurate with the flexibility customers provide. We also recommend that customer outcomes be explored across a range of regions using current actual customer and system cost data.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Tax Credits for Clean Electricity: The Distributional Impacts of Supply-Push Policies in the Power Sector

We evaluate distributional and efficiency consequences of the bulk power clean electricity tax credits authorized by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. To do so, we link detailed electricity capacity expansion, computable general equilibrium, data-rich microsimulation, and air pollution models to estimate the policy incidence in terms of economic welfare and health impacts across a wide range of demographic groups. We evaluate the tradeoff between policy efficiency and income progressivity by comparing the tax credits to cap-and-trade policies that vary revenue recycling approaches. Under the scenarios analyzed the bulk power tax credits lead to increased clean electricity technology deployment resulting in a reallocation of capital from elsewhere in the economy, higher prices for capital and other goods, lower power prices, and lower emissions. The tax credits yield progressive outcomes for both economic welfare and health impacts. The health benefits exceed total policy costs and provide greater benefits for low-income and historically-marginalized households given the coincidence of household and emission source locations.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Tax Credits for Clean Electricity: The Distributional Impacts of Supply-Push Policies in the Power Sector

We evaluate distributional and efficiency consequences of the bulk power clean electricity tax credits authorized by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. To do so, we link detailed electricity capacity expansion, computable general equilibrium, microsimulation, and air pollution models to estimate economic welfare and health incidence across demographic groups. We evaluate trade-offs between policy efficiency and income progressivity by comparing the tax credits to cap-and-trade policies. The tax credits encourage increased clean electricity investment, resulting in a reallocation of capital from elsewhere in the economy, higher prices for capital and other goods, lower power prices, and lower emissions. The tax credits yield progressive outcomes for economic welfare at the expense of efficiency while all modeled policies demonstrate progressivity in health impacts. The health benefits, absent climate benefits, exceed total policy costs and provide greater benefits for low-income and historically marginalized households given coincidence of household locations and emissions exposure intensity.

distributional impacts↗

The Effect of Prosumer Duality on Power Market: The Effect of Market Regulation

Electricity prosumers are energy subsystems that not only consume, but also produce electricity. They are present in distribution level networks as traditional utility customers who have installed distributed energy resources. They are also present in transmission level networks as large conglomerates own both generation assets and large industrial loads. Previous work on the economics of prosumers has demonstrated that prosumers in a market have incentives to behave more competitively compared to producers and consumers in traditional markets. This paper further explores the behavior of prosumers and their response to market policies including the allocation of network losses and the impact of net metering. We extend a Cournot model of a dual prosumer and find that prosumers respond with higher supply quantities if network losses are allocated to demand base. They respond with lower supply quantities if network losses are allocated to supply base. Allocating network losses to demand base also causes equilibrium prices to decline. Markets where prosumers first satisfy their own load and then sell the balance of electricity to the grid have lower quantities and higher prices compared to markets where prosumers buy and sell at locational marginal price.

Tsybina, Eve↗