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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Risk Progression by Flight

Understanding the early mission risk and progression of risk as a vehicle gains insights through flight is important: . a) To the Shuttle Program to understand the impact of re-designs and operational changes on risk. . b) To new programs to understand reliability growth and first flight risk. . Estimation of Shuttle Risk Progression by flight: . a) Uses Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) and current knowledge to calculate early vehicle risk. . b) Shows impact of major Shuttle upgrades. . c) Can be used to understand first flight risk for new programs.

Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA NTRS2001

E057: Renal Stone Risk Assessment During Space Flight: Assessment and Countermeasure Validation

Exposure to the microgravity environment results in many metabolic and physiological changes to humans. Body fluid volumes, electrolyte levels, and bone and muscle undergo changes as the human body adapts to the weightless environment. Changes in the urinary biochemistry occur as early as flight day 3-4 in the short duration Shuttle crewmembers. Significant decreases were observed both in fluid intake and urinary output. Other significant changes were observed in the urinary pH, calcium, potassium and uric acid levels. During Shuttle missions, the risk of calcium oxalate stone formation increased early in the flight, continued at elevated levels throughout the flight and remained in the increased risk range on landing day. The calcium phosphate risk was significantly increased early in-flight and remained significantly elevated throughout the remainder of the mission. Results from the long duration Shuttle-Mir missions followed a similar trend. Most long duration crewmembers demonstrated increased urinary calcium levels despite lower dietary calcium intake. Fluid intake and urine volumes were significantly lower during the flight than during the preflight. The calcium oxalate risk was increased relative to the preflight levels during the early in-flight period and continued in the elevated risk range for the remainder of the space flight and through two weeks postflight. Calcium phosphate risk for these long duration crewmembers increased during flight and remained in the increased risk range throughout the flight and following landing. The complexity, expense and visibility of the human space program require that every effort be made to protect the health of the crewmembers and ensure the success of the mission. Results from our early investigations clearly indicate that exposure to the microgravity environment of space significantly increases the risk of renal stone formation. The early studies have indicated specific avenues for development of countermeasures for the increased renal stone risk observed during and following space flight. Increased hydration and implementation of pharmacological countermeasures are being tested for their efficacy in mitigating the in-flight risk of renal stones. Maintaining the health and well-being of crewmembers during space flight requires a means of minimizing potential detrimental health effects of microgravity. The formation of a renal stone during flight obviously has severe consequences for the affected crewmember as well as the success of the mission.

Whitson, Peggy A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure probabilities in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Work on a new methodology originally started with ARES I-X and the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) for range safety applications. CSWG consists of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Air Force, and NASA. Historical launch vehicle data was viewed as the best predictor of success/failure for launches of new vehicles. A launch vehicle database was developed that includes all launches from 1980-2017 (both US and foreign). Entries to the database include: Vehicle by model type; Launch dates; Failure description; Failure Result (Loss Of Vehicle (LOV)/Loss Of Mission (LOM); Failure cause (when available); Vehicle designs (stages/engines/etc.)

Early flight risk↗
NASA NTRS2014

Range Safety Flight Elevation Limit Calculation Software

This program was developed to fill a need within the Wallops Flight Facility workflow for automation of the development of vertical plan limit lines used by flight safety officers during the conduct of expendable launch vehicle missions. Vertical plane present-position-based destruct lines have been used by range safety organizations at numerous launch ranges to mitigate launch vehicle risks during the early phase of flight. Various ranges have implemented data submittal and processing workflows to develop these destruct lines. As such, there is significant prior art in this field. The ElLimits program was developed at NASA's Wallops Flight Facility to automate the process for developing vertical plane limit lines using current computing technologies. The ElLimits program is used to configure launch-phase range safety flight control lines for guided missiles. The name of the program derives itself from the fundamental quantity that is computed - flight elevation limits. The user specifies the extent and resolution of a grid in the vertical plane oriented along the launch azimuth. At each grid point, the program computes the maximum velocity vector flight elevation that can be permitted without endangering a specified back-range location. Vertical plane x-y limit lines that can be utilized on a present position display are derived from the flight elevation limit data by numerically propagating 'streamlines' through the grid. The failure turn and debris propagation simulation technique used by the application is common to all of its analysis options. A simulation is initialized at a vertical plane grid point chosen by the program. A powered flight failure turn is then propagated in the plane for the duration of the so-called RSO reaction time. At the end of the turn, a delta-velocity is imparted, and a ballistic trajectory is propagated to impact. While the program possesses capability for powered flight failure turn modeling, it does not require extensive user inputs of vehicle characteristics (e.g., thrust and aerodynamic data), nor does it require reams of turn data after the traditional fashion of the Air Force ranges. The program requires a nominal trajectory table (time, altitude, range, velocity, and flight elevation) and makes heavy use of it to initialize and model a failure turn.

Lanzi, Raymond J↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders: Evidence Report

In April 2010, President Obama declared a space pioneering goal for the United States in general and NASA in particular. "Fifty years after the creation of NASA, our goal is no longer just a destination to reach. Our goal is the capacity for people to work and learn and operate and live safely beyond the Earth for extended periods of time, ultimately in ways that are more sustainable and even indefinite." Thus NASA's Strategic Objective 1.1 emerged as "expand human presence into the solar system and to the surface of Mars to advance exploration, science, innovation, benefits to humanity, and international collaboration" (NASA 2015b). Any space flight, be it of long or short duration, occurs in an extreme environment that has unique stressors. Even with excellent selection methods, the potential for behavioral problems among space flight crews remain a threat to mission success. Assessment of factors that are related to behavioral health can help minimize the chances of distress and, thus, reduce the likelihood of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders arising within a crew. Similarly, countermeasures that focus on prevention and treatment can mitigate the cognitive or behavioral conditions that, should they arise, would impact mission success. Given the general consensus that longer duration, isolation, and confined missions have a greater risk for behavioral health ensuring crew behavioral health over the long term is essential. Risk, which within the context of this report is assessed with respect to behavioral health and performance, is addressed to deter development of cognitive and behavioral degradations or psychiatric conditions in space flight and analog populations, and to monitor, detect, and treat early risk factors, predictors and other contributing factors. Based on space flight and analog evidence, the average incidence rate of an adverse behavioral health event occurring during a space mission is relatively low for the current conditions. While mood and anxiety disturbances have occurred, no behavioral emergencies have been reported to date in space flight. Anecdotal and empirical evidence indicate that the likelihood of an adverse cognitive or behavioral condition or psychiatric disorder occurring greatly increases with the length of a mission. Further, while cognitive, behavioral, or psychiatric conditions might not immediately and directly threaten mission success, such conditions can, and do, adversely impact individual and crew health, welfare, and performance.

Slack, Kelley J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Resource Prospector Propulsion System Cold Flow Testing

Resource Prospector (RP) is a NASA mission being led by NASA Ames Research Center with current plans to deliver a scientific payload package aboard a rover to the lunar surface. As part of an early risk reduction activity, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Johnson Space Flight Center (JSC) have jointly developed a government-version concept of a lunar lander for the mission. The spacecraft consists of two parts, the lander and the rover which carries the scientific instruments. The lander holds the rover during launch, cruise, and landing on the surface. Following terminal descent and landing the lander portion of the spacecraft become dormant after the rover embarks on the science mission. The lander will be equipped with a propulsion system for lunar descent and landing, as well as trajectory correction and attitude control maneuvers during transit to the moon. Hypergolic propellants monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide will be used to fuel sixteen 70-lbf descent thrusters and twelve 5-lbf attitude control thrusters. A total of four metal-diaphragm tanks, two per propellant, will be used along with a high-pressure composite-overwrapped pressure vessel for the helium pressurant gas. Many of the major propulsion system components are heritage missile hardware obtained by NASA from the Air Force. In parallel with the flight system design activities, a simulated propulsion system based on flight drawings was built for conducting a series of water flow tests to characterize the transient fluid flow of the propulsion system feed lines and to verify the critical operation modes such as system priming, waterhammer, and crucial mission duty cycles. The primary objective of the cold flow testing was to simulate the RP propulsion system fluid flow operation through water flow testing and to obtain data for anchoring analytical models. The models will be used to predict the transient and steady state flow behaviors in the actual flight operations. All design and build efforts, including the analytical modeling, have been performed. The cold flow testing of the propulsion system was set up and conducted at a NASA MSFC test facility. All testing was completed in the summer of 2014, and this paper documents the results of that testing and the associated fluid system modeling efforts.

Williams, Hunter↗
NASA NTRS2011

Full-Scaled Advanced Systems Testbed: Ensuring Success of Adaptive Control Research Through Project Lifecycle Risk Mitigation

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Dryden Flight Research Center completed flight testing of adaptive controls research on the Full-Scale Advance Systems Testbed (FAST) in January of 2011. The research addressed technical challenges involved with reducing risk in an increasingly complex and dynamic national airspace. Specific challenges lie with the development of validated, multidisciplinary, integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques to enable safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage, control surface failures, or aerodynamic upsets. The testbed is an F-18 aircraft serving as a full-scale vehicle to test and validate adaptive flight control research and lends a significant confidence to the development, maturation, and acceptance process of incorporating adaptive control laws into follow-on research and the operational environment. The experimental systems integrated into FAST were designed to allow for flexible yet safe flight test evaluation and validation of modern adaptive control technologies and revolve around two major hardware upgrades: the modification of Production Support Flight Control Computers (PSFCC) and integration of two, fourth-generation Airborne Research Test Systems (ARTS). Post-hardware integration verification and validation provided the foundation for safe flight test of Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion and Model Reference Aircraft Control adaptive control law experiments. To ensure success of flight in terms of cost, schedule, and test results, emphasis on risk management was incorporated into early stages of design and flight test planning and continued through the execution of each flight test mission. Specific consideration was made to incorporate safety features within the hardware and software to alleviate user demands as well as into test processes and training to reduce human factor impacts to safe and successful flight test. This paper describes the research configuration, experiment functionality, overall risk mitigation, flight test approach and results, and lessons learned of adaptive controls research of the Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed.

Pavlock, Kate M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Agile: From Software to Mission Systems

To maximize efficiency and flexibility in Mission Operations System (MOS) design, we are evolving principles from agile and lean methods for software, to the complete mission system. This allows for reduced operational risk at reduced cost, and achieves a more effective design through early integration of operations into mission system engineering and flight system design. The core principles are assessment of capability through demonstration, risk reduction through targeted experiments, early test and deployment, and maturation of processes and tools through use.

Trimble, Jay↗
NASA NTRS2016

Surgical Capabilities for Exploration and Colonization Space Flight - An Exploration Symposium

Surgical capabilities in human space flight, whether on a space-based platform in low Earth orbit or on a long duration planetary exploration mission, will be challenging to conduct for a variety of reasons, some of which will be ameliorated by training, technology, and pre-flight planning. Nevertheless, inherent risks and challenges remain. Early space missions did not have any surgical capability. It was not until NASA's Skylab mission that serious consideration was given to this fundamental medical care capability. Over the past 30 years, subject matter experts have been brought together for discussion on the myriad of challenges and opportunities in this endeavor. The last such meeting was held in 2005 at the NASA Johnson Space Center. As we continue to move forward with human space flight activities for the International Space Station and beyond, the capabilities of information technology, robotics, sensors and imaging have rapidly changed since the last gathering of expertise. In December 2015, through sponsorship of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI), a diverse group of individuals from government, academia, and industry representing three countries gathered at the NSBRI Space 4 Biomedicine facility in Houston, TX. This two day symposia included comprehensive sessions that addressed the challenges that we all face in developing, deploying, and utilizing surgical care capabilities in all human space missions, regardless of mission duration or profile. The symposium benefited from the knowledge and experience of three seasoned NASA physician astronauts, Drs. Jay Buckey, Thomas Marshburn, and Lee Morin. At the end of the first day, the assembled group heard from the crew members about their experiences and their ideas. It is clear that the discussion of surgical capabilities is part of the larger discussion of consideration of advanced healthcare, including critical care, on exploration space missions. This report represents the culmination of the symposium, capturing knowledge, experience, conceptual dialogue, and a narrative that can be used in supporting the development of future programs and potential policy. Each of the presentations that were provided by the guest speakers is included in the appendices. Those presentations that are not included were due to sensitivity of the material or at the request of the speaker. In addition, each speaker was offered an opportunity to provide comments in a 'lightning round' format. All of these comments and speaker abstracts also appear in the appendices. At the conclusion of the second day, a discussion was held that reviewed the priorities that perhaps add value to decision makers. These are also summarized. This report will serve as the final product of this symposium. Additional material may be produced for the peer-reviewed literature.

Doarn, Charles R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk Reduction through Early Software Prototyping for the Mars Ascent Vehicle

Despite the critical nature flight software plays in the development of spacecraft, software development teams are often brought on to the project after initial requirements definition and design efforts have started, and well after the conceptual design phase has completed. The flight software development team for the Mars Ascent Vehicle has supported the project from project formulation and conceptual design into the formal design and development. This approach has allowed for the development of a robust software prototype that supported risk reduction in numerous areas for the project. Early software prototyping supported decision making in the areas of hardware selection and considerations, software architecture, and simulation requirements. The prototype software actively supported ongoing trade studies and analyses for the project and enable valuable collaboration across multiple subsystems as well as between MSFC and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This early development also allowed the team to leverage past projects’ lessons learned to make valuable process improvements.

Stefanie Justice↗
NASA NTRS2009

From Research to Flight: Surviving the TRL Valley of Death for Robotic and Human Space Exploration

There must be a plan or opportunities for flight validation: a) To reduce the bottleneck of new technologies at the TRL Valley of Death; b) To allow frequent infusion of new technologies into flight missions. Risk must be tolerated for new technology flight experiments. Risk must also be accepted on early-adopting missions to enable new capabilities. Fundamental research is critical to taking the next giant leap in the scientific exploration of space. Technology push is often required to meet current mission requirements. Technology management requires more than issuing NRAs and overseeing contracts.

Johnson, Les↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS1996

Success Criteria and Risk Management for the New Millennium Program

The NASA New Millennium Program (NMP) is a technology development and validation program that will flight-validate advanced, new technologies with space flight applications. NMP's purpose is twofold. First, it will develop technologies that will enable future spacecraft to be smaller, more capable and reliable, and to be launched more frequently. Second, it will validate the technologies in flight to reduce the risks to future science missions in flying these technologies for the first time. To measure the program's success, NMP has devised a set of criteria that stresses the relevance of technologies selected for flight validation to NASA's 21st-century science mission needs. Also, NMP has instituted a 'risk management' policy, where, through a combination of adequate resources and early risk assessment and risk mitigation plans for the technologies, the overall risk of the NMP flights can be rendered acceptable.

New↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Case Study of Measuring Process Risk for Early Insights into Software Safety

In this case study, we examine software safety risk in three flight hardware systems in NASA's Constellation spaceflight program. We applied our Technical and Process Risk Measurement (TPRM) methodology to the Constellation hazard analysis process to quantify the technical and process risks involving software safety in the early design phase of these projects. We analyzed 154 hazard reports and collected metrics to measure the prevalence of software in hazards and the specificity of descriptions of software causes of hazardous conditions. We found that 49-70% of 154 hazardous conditions could be caused by software or software was involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition. We also found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control. The application of the TPRM methodology identified process risks in the application of the hazard analysis process itself that may lead to software safety risk.

Layman, Lucas↗
NASA NTRS1972

SEMMS - Understanding the solar electric multimission concept.

The feasibility of developing a solar electric multimission spacecraft (SEMMS) is examined with emphasis on understanding the effect of solar electric propulsion elements on a spacecraft system design. The applicability of Mariner, Viking, and thermoelectric outer planet spacecraft (TOPS) technologies to postulated mission/science objectives is investigated. A Mariner/Viking-based, modular spacecraft evolves which, with minimum modifications, is capable of performing a variety of interplanetary missions, including comet and asteroid rendezvous and orbit of Mercury, Jupiter, and Saturn. An early technology-evaluation flight is recommended to minimize the risk in subsequent missions.

Irace, W. R.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Nutrition and renal stone disease in space

There is a growing body of evidence from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Russian space program showing that humans exposed to the microgravity environment of space have a greater risk for developing renal stones. Increased bone resorption and the attendant hypercalciuria and hyperphosphaturia contribute significantly to raising the urinary state of saturation with respect to the calcium salts, namely calcium oxalate and calcium phosphate. In addition, other environmental and dietary factors may adversely affect urine composition and increase stone formation risk during space flight. For example, reductions in urinary volume, pH, and citrate contribute to raising stone formation risk. In addition to raising the risk for calcium stone formation, this metabolic profile is conducive to the formation of uric acid stones. Although observations to date have suggested that there may actually be a reduced food intake during the early phase of flight, crew members on longer-duration flights may increase food intake and be at increased risk for stone formation. Taken together, these findings support the use of nutritional recommendations for crew members that would serve to reduce the stone-forming propensity of the urinary environment. Pharmacologic intervention should be directed at raising urinary volumes, diminishing bone losses, and preventing reductions in urinary pH and citrate. Success in reducing the risk for stone formation in astronauts would also be of potential major benefit to the estimated 20 million Americans with nephrolithiasis.

Review↗