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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Engineering Risk Assessment of Space Thruster Challenge Problem

The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center utilizes dynamic models with linked physics-of-failure analyses to produce quantitative risk assessments of space exploration missions. This paper applies the ERA approach to the baseline and extended versions of the PSAM Space Thruster Challenge Problem, which investigates mission risk for a deep space ion propulsion system with time-varying thruster requirements and operations schedules. The dynamic mission is modeled using a combination of discrete and continuous-time reliability elements within the commercially available GoldSim software. Loss-of-mission (LOM) probability results are generated via Monte Carlo sampling performed by the integrated model. Model convergence studies are presented to illustrate the sensitivity of integrated LOM results to the number of Monte Carlo trials. A deterministic risk model was also built for the three baseline and extended missions using the Ames Reliability Tool (ART), and results are compared to the simulation results to evaluate the relative importance of mission dynamics. The ART model did a reasonable job of matching the simulation models for the baseline case, while a hybrid approach using offline dynamic models was required for the extended missions. This study highlighted that state-of-the-art techniques can adequately adapt to a range of dynamic problems.

Assessment↗
NASA NTRS1998

Space Shuttle Main Engine Quantitative Risk Assessment: Illustrating Modeling of a Complex System with a New QRA Software Package

During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).

Smart, Christian↗
NASA NTRS2018

GSFC Risk Assessment Process for Inherited Items

The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate is implementing an alternate process for approval of Spacecraft Inherited Items in accordance with Goddard Procedural Requirements 8730.5. A Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer is performing an Inherited Item Risk Assessment (I2RA) for the use of Spacecraft Standard Components (items generally necessary to control the spacecraft, e.g. reaction wheel assemblies) and payload flight spares or Built-to-Print items. The I2RA may take into account prior space flight performance, criticality of the component, qualification records, quality and reliability records, storage conditions, manufacturer assessments, and mission specific parameters like mission environment and duration. The I2RA provides a means to accept for the entire item materials, parts or workmanship non-conformances, that do not significantly increase risk.

Risk Assessment↗
NASA NTRS2014

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗
NASA NTRS1977

Engine non-containment: UK risk assessment methods

More realistic guideline data must be developed for use in aircraft design in order to comply with recent changes in British civil airworthiness requirements. Unrealistically pessimistic results were obtained when the methodology developed during the Concorde SST certification program was extended to assess catastrophic risks resulting from uncontained engine rotors.

Wallin, J. C.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Risk Assessment Matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center

This paper describes a study, which had as its principal goal the development of a sufficiently detailed 5 x 5 Risk Matrix Scorecard. The purpose of this scorecard is to outline the criteria by which technical issues can be qualitatively and initially prioritized. The tool using this score card has been proposed to be one of the information resources the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) takes into consideration when making decisions with respect to incoming information on safety concerns across the entire NASA agency. The contents of this paper discuss in detail each element of the risk matrix scorecard, definitions for those elements and the rationale behind the development of those definitions. This scorecard development was performed in parallel with the tailoring of the existing Futron Corporation Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) software tool. IRMA was tailored to fit NESC needs for evaluating incoming safety concerns and was renamed NESC Assessment Risk Management Application (NAFMA) which is still in developmental phase.

Malone, Roy W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2010

A Risk Assessment Architecture for Enhanced Engine Operation

On very rare occasions, in-flight emergencies have occurred that required the pilot to utilize the aircraft's capabilities to the fullest extent possible, sometimes using actuators in ways for which they were not intended. For instance, when flight control has been lost due to damage to the hydraulic systems, pilots have had to use engine thrust to maneuver the plane to the ground and in for a landing. To assist the pilot in these situations, research is being performed to enhance the engine operation by making it more responsive or able to generate more thrust. Enabled by modification of the propulsion control, enhanced engine operation can increase the probability of a safe landing during an inflight emergency. However, enhanced engine operation introduces risk as the nominal control limits, such as those on shaft speed, temperature, and acceleration, are exceeded. Therefore, an on-line tool for quantifying this risk must be developed to ensure that the use of an enhanced control mode does not actually increase the overall danger to the aircraft. This paper describes an architecture for the implementation of this tool. It describes the type of data and algorithms required and the information flow, and how the risk based on engine component lifing and operability for enhanced operation is determined.

Litt, Jonathan S.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Closed Environment Air Revitalization System Based on Metal Organic Framework Adsorbents

This project utilized a systems engineering methodology to develop a vacuum swing adsorption system with full Labview automated control. The project was successful and provided students with an introduction to systems engineering and air revitalization. Specifically, two stainless steel adsorption beds were custom designed and manufactured and a sequence of computer controlled valves were used to deliver CO 2 laden, humid air, to the adsorbent where the CO 2 was removed from the air stream. Runs were completed using 13X zeolite and bed timing and switching was controlled by the computer based on the data output of a CO 2 detector. Adsorption runs using the MOF have not been completed upon the writing of this report; however, the MOF material is currently being synthesized and the runs will be completed upon receipt of the material. A follow up meeting with NASA has been tentatively planned to discuss the output of these experiments. Consistent with systems engineering practice, an end of project assessment of the class was conducted with the students and several items were realized. Specifically, the short period of performance of this grant makes it necessary to maintain a narrowly focused scope on the project such that multiple experiments after systems development (T&E) need to be limited to ensure timely completion of the proposed tasks. Also, procurement of parts may need to be moved forward in time to allow for delivery delays, and it may be necessary to request SDR, PDR, and CDR dates from NASA that are ahead of the NASA anticipated schedule. These types of lessons provided valuable to both the PI and the students and ultimately illustrate the necessity of proper systems engineering schedule risk assessment. The class met the objectives of the project and provided an introduction to systems engineering to undergraduate students. As a metric of that success, the lead engineer of the undergraduate design team acquired a job with an aerospace defense contractor, which he attributed to his knowledge of systems engineering concepts that were acquired via the X-Hab class.

T. Grant Glover↗
NASA NTRS2019

Scaling Evaluation of Ice-Crystal Icing on a Modern Turbofan Engine in PSL Using the COMDES-MELT Code

This paper presents preliminary ice-crystal icing (ICI) altitude scaling evaluation results of a Honeywell Uncertified Research Engine (HURE) that was tested in the NASA Glenn Research Center Propulsion Systems Laboratory (PSL) during January of 2018. This engine geometry features a hidden core design to keep the core less exposed. The engine was fitted with internal video cameras to observe various ice buildup processes at multiple selected locations within the engine core flow path covering the fan stator, the splitter-lip/shroud/strut, and the high pressure compressor (HPC) variable inlet guide vane (IGV) regions. The potential ice accretion risk was pre-determined to occur by using NASA’s in-house 1D Engine Icing Risk assessment code, COMDES-MELT. The code was successful in predicting the risk of ice accretion in adiabatic regions like the fan-stator of the HURE at specific engine operating points. However at several operating points during the test, liquid water was observed running along the shroud toward the variable IGV of the HPC regions with an air temperature well below freezing, thus no particle melting could have occurred due to heating from the air alone. It was reasoned that other sources of heat were present in that region. To account for these heat sources the inlet total temperature was adjusted to give a wet bulb temperature of 24 F below the standard minimum wet bulb temperature of 492 R to allow ice to accrete in the splitter-lip/shroud/strut region, which was determined from a reference case where hard ice was observed in that region. With that adjustment the COMDES-MELT code was successful in providing operating points where there was a risk of ice accretion during the test campaign. In addition to calculating possible conditions at different selected lower altitudes, simulations were run to determine potential inlet conditions that could lead to ice-crystal accretion along the prescribed stations where the cameras were available. From there, scaled test conditions were determined by best matching the following three icing related parameters of the reference condition: (1) the local air total wet bulb temperature, (2) the local ice crystal cloud melt ratio and (3) the engine fan face ice/water to air mass flux ratio of the ice crystal cloud. Instantaneous images taken from the time-lapsed movies of ice buildup were used along with the relevant thermodynamic data of air, water vapor and local icing condition to help evaluate how closely the proposed altitude scaling method could be used in ground based test facility to duplicate selected reference ICI features observed at specific location inside this engine at different scale altitudes. Discussions on observed limitation for engine icing scaling application from this test campaign and needed improvement are provided. A scaling test procedure to help identify potential ICI risk conditions and possible ice accretion locations of a new turbofan engine is evaluated in PSL.

Engine Testing in PSL↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Future of Integrated Performance Modeling in the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project

The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault-tree probabilistic techniques to classify risks in the space environment by taking advantage of the inherent knowledge of complex spaceflight system design and testing to quantify failure risk. In harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of ‘How do we balance health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on long duration space missions?’ remains a deeply challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Human Research Program’s Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was a significant step forward in efforts to robustly quantify the risk to crew health for exploration missions. However, there remains a significant gap in the ability to comprehensively assess and characterize risk across the disparate functionalities and capabilities which comprise the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. The Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project seeks to characterize CHP risks by expanding beyond the foundation established by its PRA predecessors like IMM and MEDPRAT, that simulate medical risk metrics like loss of crew life and evacuations. One of the new risk measures in the CHP-PRA system is embodied in our Performance Risk Model (PRisM). PRisM provides a novel way of assessing crew performance on mission tasks, using a generalized framework which relates back to NASA-STD-3001. This approach allows PRisM to capture and integrate data from a variety of different domains into a single, unified, reproducible representation of astronaut performance. In this presentation, we discuss the motivation for the CHP-PRA work and give a high level overview of the goals of the project, outline the forward work for PRisM, and discuss collaboration opportunities for the community who might explore if their domain knowledge and data could be represented, integrated, and quantified with these tools, whose outcomes are metrics useful for supporting operational mission planning and decision making.

Lauren McIntyre↗
NASA NTRS2008

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Unsteady Analyses and Risk Assessment - Part 2

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Design Support of the feasibility of operating conditions and procedures is critical in such cases due to the possibility of startup/shutdown transients, moving shock structures, unsteady shock-boundary layer interactions and engine and diffuser unstart modes that can result in catastrophic failure. Analyses of such systems is difficult due to resolution requirements needed to accurately capture moving shock structures, shock-boundary layer interactions, two-phase flow regimes and engine unstart modes. In a companion paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD, steady analyses advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in the sub-scale A-3 facility. In this paper we will address transient issues with the operation of the facility especially at startup and shutdown, and assess risks related to afterburning due to the interaction of a fuel rich plume with oxygen that is a by-product of the steam ejectors. The primary areas that will be addressed in this paper are: (1) analyses of unstart modes due to flow transients especially during startup/ignition, (2) engine safety during the shutdown process (3) interaction of steam ejectors with the primary plume i.e. flow transients as well as probability of afterburning. In this abstract we discuss unsteady analyses of the engine shutdown process. However, the final paper will include analyses of a staged startup, drawdown of the engine test cell pressure, and risk assessment of potential afterburning in the facility. Unsteady simulations have been carried out to study the engine shutdown process in the facility and understand the physics behind the interactions between the steam ejectors, the test cell and the supersonic diffuser. As a first approximation, to understand the dominant unsteady mechanisms in the engine test cell and the supersonic diffuser, the turning duct in the facility was removed. As the engine loses power a rarefaction wave travels downstream that disrupts the shock cell structure in the supersonic diffuser. Flow from the test cell is seen to expand into the supersonic diffuser section and re-pressurizes the area around the nozzle along with a upstream traveling compression wave that emanates from near the first stage ejectors. Flow from the first stage ejector expands to the center of the duct and a new shock train is formed between the first and second stage ejectors. Both stage ejectors keep the facility pressurized and prevent any large amplitude pressure fluctuations from affecting the engine nozzle. The resultant pressure loads the nozzle experiences in the shutdown process are small.

Ahuja, Vineet↗
NASA NTRS2016

Preliminary Results From a Heavily Instrumented Engine Ice Crystal Icing Test in a Ground Based Altitude Test Facility

Preliminary results from the heavily instrumented ALF502R-5 engine test conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center Propulsion Systems Laboratory are discussed. The effects of ice crystal icing on a full scale engine is examined and documented. This same model engine, serial number LF01, was used during the inaugural icing test in the Propulsion Systems Laboratory facility. The uncommanded reduction of thrust (rollback) events experienced by this engine in flight were simulated in the facility. Limited instrumentation was used to detect icing on the LF01 engine. Metal temperatures on the exit guide vanes and outer shroud and the load measurement were the only indicators of ice formation. The current study features a similar engine, serial number LF11, which is instrumented to characterize the cloud entering the engine, detect/characterize ice accretion, and visualize the ice accretion in the region of interest. Data were acquired at key LF01 test points and additional points that explored: icing threshold regions, low altitude, high altitude, spinner heat effects, and the influence of varying the facility and engine parameters. For each condition of interest, data were obtained from some selected variations of ice particle median volumetric diameter, total water content, fan speed, and ambient temperature. For several cases the NASA in-house engine icing risk assessment code was used to find conditions that would lead to a rollback event. This study further helped NASA develop necessary icing diagnostic instrumentation, expand the capabilities of the Propulsion Systems Laboratory, and generate a dataset that will be used to develop and validate in-house icing prediction and risk mitigation computational tools. The ice accretion on the outer shroud region was acquired by internal video cameras. The heavily instrumented engine showed good repeatability of icing responses when compared to the key LF01 test points and during day-to-day operation. Other noticeable observations are presented.

Enigine Icing↗
NASA NTRS2016

Preliminary Results From a Heavily Instrumented Engine Ice Crystal Icing Test in a Ground Based Altitude Test Facility

Preliminary results from the heavily instrumented ALF502R-5 engine test conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center Propulsion Systems Laboratory are discussed. The effects of ice crystal icing on a full scale engine is examined and documented. This same model engine, serial number LF01, was used during the inaugural icing test in the Propulsion Systems Laboratory facility. The uncommanded reduction of thrust (rollback) events experienced by this engine in flight were simulated in the facility. Limited instrumentation was used to detect icing on the LF01 engine. Metal temperatures on the exit guide vanes and outer shroud and the load measurement were the only indicators of ice formation. The current study features a similar engine, serial number LF11, which is instrumented to characterize the cloud entering the engine, detect/ characterize ice accretion, and visualize the ice accretion in the region of interest. Data were acquired at key LF01 test points and additional points that explored: icing threshold regions, low altitude, high altitude, spinner heat effects, and the influence of varying the facility and engine parameters. For each condition of interest, data were obtained from some selected variations of ice particle median volumetric diameter, total water content, fan speed, and ambient temperature. For several cases the NASA in-house engine icing risk assessment code was used to find conditions that would lead to a rollback event. This study further helped NASA develop necessary icing diagnostic instrumentation, expand the capabilities of the Propulsion Systems Laboratory, and generate a dataset that will be used to develop and validate in-house icing prediction and risk mitigation computational tools. The ice accretion on the outer shroud region was acquired by internal video cameras. The heavily instrumented engine showed good repeatability of icing responses when compared to the key LF01 test points and during day-to-day operation. Other noticeable observations are presented.

turbomachinery↗
NASA NTRS2014

Some Challenges in the Design of Human-Automation Interaction for Safety-Critical Systems

Increasing amounts of automation are being introduced to safety-critical domains. While the introduction of automation has led to an overall increase in reliability and improved safety, it has also introduced a class of failure modes, and new challenges in risk assessment for the new systems, particularly in the assessment of rare events resulting from complex inter-related factors. Designing successful human-automation systems is challenging, and the challenges go beyond good interface development (e.g., Roth, Malin, & Schreckenghost 1997; Christoffersen & Woods, 2002). Human-automation design is particularly challenging when the underlying automation technology generates behavior that is difficult for the user to anticipate or understand. These challenges have been recognized in several safety-critical domains, and have resulted in increased efforts to develop training, procedures, regulations and guidance material (CAST, 2008, IAEA, 2001, FAA, 2013, ICAO, 2012). This paper points to the continuing need for new methods to describe and characterize the operational environment within which new automation concepts are being presented. We will describe challenges to the successful development and evaluation of human-automation systems in safety-critical domains, and describe some approaches that could be used to address these challenges. We will draw from experience with the aviation, spaceflight and nuclear power domains.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2003

Upward Flammability Testing: A Probabilistic Measurement

Examination of NASA-STD-6001 Test 1 data suggests burn length outcome for a given environment has a large statistical variation from run to run. Large data sets show that burn length data form cumulative probability distribution curves, which describe a material's characteristic to burn in a specific environment, suggesting that the current practice of testing three samples at specific conditions is inadequate. Sufficient testing can establish material characteristics probability curves to provide the probability that a material will sustain a burn length of at least 15.24 cm (6.0 in.) or will sustain burning until all material is consumed. A simple pasdfail criterion may not be possible or practical. Future application of flammability data for some material classes may require the engineer to assess risk based on the probability of an occurrence and the probable outcome with different materials as characterized with cumulative burn length distributions for specific use conditions.

Davis, Samuel E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

The X-43 Fin Actuation System Problem - Reliability in Shades of Gray

Following the loss of the first X-43 during launch, the mishap investigation board indicated the Fin Actuator System (FAS) needed to have a larger torque margin. To supply this added torque, a second actuator was added. The consequences of what seemed to be a simple modification would trouble the X-43 program. Because of the second actuator, a new computer board was required. This proved to be subject to electronic noise. This resulted in the actuator latch up in ground tests of the FAS for the second launch. Such a latch up would cause the Pegasus booster to fail, as the FAS was a single string system. The problem was corrected and the second flight was successful. The same modifications were added to the FAS for flight three. When the FAS underwent ground tests, it also latched up. The failure indicated that each computer board had a different tolerance to electronic noise. The problem with the FAS was corrected. Subsequently, another failure occurred, raising questions about the design, and the probability of failure for the X-43 Mach 10 flight. This was not simply a technical issue, but illuminated the difficulties facing both managers and engineers in assessing risk, design requirements, and probabilities in cutting edge aerospace projects.

Peebles, Curtis↗