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Nitrile/Buna N Material Failure Assessment for an O-Ring used on the Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (FCV) of the Space Shuttle Main Engine

After the rollout of Space Shuttle Discovery in April 2005 in preparation for return-to-flight, there was a failure of the Orbiter (OV-103) helium signature leak test in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) system. Leakage was attributed to the Flow Control Valve (FCV) in Main Engine 3. The FCV determined to be the source of the leak for OV-103 is designated as LV-58. The nitrile/Buna N rubber O-ring seal was removed from LV-58, and failure analysis indicated radial cracks providing leak paths in one quadrant. Cracks were eventually found in 6 of 9 FCV O-rings among the three Shuttle Orbiters, though none were as severe as those for LV-58, OV-103. Testing by EM10 at MSFC on all 9 FCV O- rings included: laser dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an Instron tensile machine. The following test data was obtained on the cracked quadrant of the LV-58, OV-103 O-ring: (1) the estimated compression set was only 9.5%, compared to none for the rest of the O-ring; (2) Shore A hardness for the O.D. was higher by almost 4 durometer points than for the rest of the O-ring; and (3) DMA data showed that the storage/elastic modulus E was almost 25% lower than for the rest of the O-ring. Of the 8 FCV O-rings tested on an Instron, 4 yielded tensile strengths that were below the MIL spec requirement of 1350 psi-a likely influence of rubber cracking. Comparisons were made between values of modulus determined by DNA (elastic) and Instron (Young s). Each nitrile/Buna N O-ring used in the FCV conforms to the MIL-P-25732C specification. A number of such O-rings taken from shelf storage at MSFC and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) were used to generate a reference curve of DMA glass transition temperature (Tg) vs. shelf storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. A similar reference curve of TGA onset temperature (of rubber weight loss) vs. shelf storage time was also generated. The DMA and TGA data for the used FCV O-rings were compared to the reference curves. Correlations were also made between the DMA modulus (at 22 C) and Shore A hardness for all 9 of the FCV O-rings used among the three Shuttle Orbiters. The radial cracking in the FCV O-rings was determined to be due to ozone attack, as nitrile/Buna N rubber is susceptible to such attack. Nitrile/Buna N material under MIL-P25732C should be used in a hydraulic fluid environment to help protect it from cracking. However, the FCV O-rings were used in an air only environment. The FCV design has as much as a 9-mil gap that allows the O.D. of the O-ring to be directly exposed to ozone, pressurized air and some elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process that leads to O-ring cracking. Space Shuttle flights will likely not continue past 2010. Therefore, Shuttle management decided to continue using the nitrile/Buna N material for the FCVs, but have each O-ring replaced after 3 years to minimize any chances for crack initiation.

Wingard, Doug↗

Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) Flow Control Valve (FCV) Poppet Eddy Current (EC) Inspection Probability of Detection (POD) Study

The Director of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), requested an independent assessment of the anomalous gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow incident on the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Vehicle (OV)-105 during the Space Transportation System (STS)-126 mission. The main propulsion system (MPS) engine #2 GH2 flow control valve (FCV) LV-57 transition from low towards high flow position without being commanded. Post-flight examination revealed that the FCV LV-57 poppet had experienced a fatigue failure that liberated a section of the poppet flange. The NESC assessment provided a peer review of the computational fluid dynamics (CFD), stress analysis, and impact testing. A probability of detection (POD) study was requested by the SSP Orbiter Project for the eddy current (EC) nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques that were developed to inspect the flight FCV poppets. This report contains the findings and recommendations from the NESC assessment.

Piascik, Robert S.↗

Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) Flow Control Valve (FCV) Poppet Eddy Current (EC) Inspection Probability of Detection (POD) Study: Appendices - Volume 2

The Director of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), requested an independent assessment of the anomalous gaseous hydrogen (GH2) flow incident on the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Orbiter Vehicle (OV)-105 during the Space Transportation System (STS)-126 mission. The main propulsion system (MPS) engine #2 GH2 flow control valve (FCV) LV-57 transition from low towards high flow position without being commanded. Post-flight examination revealed that the FCV LV-57 poppet had experienced a fatigue failure that liberated a section of the poppet flange. The NESC assessment provided a peer review of the computational fluid dynamics (CFD), stress analysis, and impact testing. A probability of detection (POD) study was requested by the SSP Orbiter Project for the eddy current (EC) nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques that were developed to inspect the flight FCV poppets. This report contains the Appendices to the main report.

Piascik, Robert S.↗

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Breakage

The Main Propulsion System (MPS) uses three Flow Control Valves (FCV) to modulate the flow of pressurant hydrogen gas from the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) to the hydrogen External Tank (ET). This maintains pressure in the ullage volume as the liquid level drops, preserving ET structural integrity and assuring the engines receive a sufficient amount of head pressure. On Space Transportation System (STS)-126 (2009), with only a handful of International Space Station (ISS) assembly flights from the end of the Shuttle program, a portion of a single FCV?s poppet head broke off at about a minute and a half after liftoff. The risk of the poppet head failure is that the increased flow area through the FCV could result in excessive gaseous hydrogen flow back to the external tank, which could result in overboard venting of hydrogen ullage pressure. If the hydrogen venting were to occur in first stage (i.e., lower atmosphere), a flammability hazard exists that could lead to catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle. Other failure risks included particle impact damage to MPS downstream hardware. Although the FCV design had been plagued by contamination-related sluggish valve response problems prior to a redesign at STS-80 (1996), contamination was ruled out as the cause of the STS-126 failure. Employing a combination of enhanced hardware inspection and a better understanding of the consequences of a poppet failure, safe flight rationale for subsequent flights (STS-119 and later) was achieved. This paper deals with the technical lessons learned during the investigation and mitigation of this problem at a time when assembly flights were each in the critical path to Space Station success.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

Adaptive Fault Detection on Liquid Propulsion Systems with Virtual Sensors: Algorithms and Architectures

Prior to the launch of STS-119 NASA had completed a study of an issue in the flow control valve (FCV) in the Main Propulsion System of the Space Shuttle using an adaptive learning method known as Virtual Sensors. Virtual Sensors are a class of algorithms that estimate the value of a time series given other potentially nonlinearly correlated sensor readings. In the case presented here, the Virtual Sensors algorithm is based on an ensemble learning approach and takes sensor readings and control signals as input to estimate the pressure in a subsystem of the Main Propulsion System. Our results indicate that this method can detect faults in the FCV at the time when they occur. We use the standard deviation of the predictions of the ensemble as a measure of uncertainty in the estimate. This uncertainty estimate was crucial to understanding the nature and magnitude of transient characteristics during startup of the engine. This paper overviews the Virtual Sensors algorithm and discusses results on a comprehensive set of Shuttle missions and also discusses the architecture necessary for deploying such algorithms in a real-time, closed-loop system or a human-in-the-loop monitoring system. These results were presented at a Flight Readiness Review of the Space Shuttle in early 2009.

Matthews, Bryan L.↗

Effect of Crack Opening on Penetrant Crack Detectability

Results: From the testing we were able to determine all the cracks within the test range were detectable or better with developer. Many of the indications after development lost their linearity and gave circular indications. Our tests were performed in a laboratory and our procedure would be difficult in an industrial setting. Conclusions: The "V" did not significantly affect our ability to detect the POD cracks with fluorescent penetrant. Conduct same experiment with more cracks. The 0.025 and 0.050 POD specimens are clean and documented with the SEM. Conduct water-wash fluorescent penetrant test at EAFB. The poppet cracks are tighter than the POD specimen cracks. Flight FCV poppets: 0.01 mils (0.3 microns) Langley fatigue cracked poppets: 0.02 mils (0.5 microns) POD specimen (post 5 mils): 0.05 mils (1.4 microns) We could not detect cracks in Langley fatigue-cracked poppets with fluorescent penetrant. Investigate inability of penetrant to wet the poppet surface.

Weaver, Devin↗

Failure Analysis of Fractured Poppet from Space Shuttle Orbiter Flow Control Valve

This slide presentation reviews the failure analysis of a fractured poppet from a flow control valve (FCV) used on the space shuttle. This presentation has focused on the laboratory analysis of the failed hardware. The use of Scanning electron fractography during the investigation led to the conclusion that the poppet failed due to fatigue cracking that, most likely, occurred under changing loading conditions. The initial investigation led to a more thorough test of poppets that had been retired, this testing led to the conclusion that the thumbnail cracks in the flight hardware had existed for the life of the shuttle program. This led to a program to develop an eddy current technique that was capable of detecting small very tight cracks.

Russell, Richard↗

Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Failure

The presentation provides background information pertinent to the MPS GH2 Flow Control Valve Poppet failure which occurred on the Space Shuttle Endeavour during STS-126 flight. The presentation provides general MPS system operating information which is pertinent to understanding the failure causes and affects. The presentation provides additional background information on the operating environment in which the FCV functions and basic design history of the flow control valve. The presentation provides an overview of the possible flight failure modes and a brief summary of the flight rationale which was developed for this failure event. This presentation is an introductory presentation to 3 other speakers at the conference who will be speaking on M&P aspects of the investigation, non destructive inspection techniques development, and particle impact testing.

Zeitler, Rick↗

On-Orbit Engineering and Vehicle Integration Poster Presentation

One of the duties of the MER Managers is getting the consoles to review and sign Electronic Flight Notes (EFN) and Mission Action Requests (Chit) before they are due. Chits and EFNs and are accessible through the Mission Control Center - Houston (MCC-H) Gateway. Chits are the official means of documenting questions and answers, technical direction, real-time changes to Flight Rules (FR) and procedures, request for analysis, etc. between various consoles concerning on-orbit operations. EFNs are documents used by the Flight Control Team (FCT) to communicate precise details between console positions and manage real time changes to FR and Systems Operation Data File (SODF) procedures. On GMT 2013/345 the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) on the Columbus (COL) Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) shut down due to low temperatures. Over the next couple of days, the core temperature of COL MT IFHX dropped due to the failure of the Flow Control Valve (FCV). After the temperature drop was discovered, heaters were turned on to bring the temperatures back to nominal. After the incident occurred, a possible freeze threat was discovered that could have ruptured the heat exchanger. The COL MT IFHX rupturing would be considered a catastrophic failure and potentially result in a loss of the vehicle and/or the lives of the International Space Station (ISS) crew members

Heimerdinger, Madison↗

ISS Columbus Heat Exchanger Close Call Investigation Case Study

During International Space Station (ISS) Expedition 38, just days before Christmas 2013, the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) on the ISS Columbus Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) shut down due to low temperatures. Engineers on the ground scrambled for several days to troubleshoot a pump module Flow Control Valve (FCV) problem, however; no one recognized that the core temperature of the Columbus MTL IFHX was continuing to drop, to the point that water in the system could freeze. Freezing could rupture the core, resulting in high pressure ammonia entering the cabin of the ISS. With no way to clean up the ammonia, ISS crew would have to evacuate the U.S. segment of the station. Columbus MTL IFHX rupture is considered a catastrophic failure and could potentially result in a loss of crew/loss of vehicle. How did engineers miss this potentially catastrophic issue?

Joyce B Abbey↗