Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Course for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart during atmospheric re-entry on mission STS-107; the complexity of such an event cannot be underestimated. The Lufkin Disaster Field Office (DFO) served as the primary DFO for all operations, including staging assets and deploying field teams for search, recovery and security. There were many organizations that had operational experience with disaster recovery. Offers to help came from many groups including the White House Liaison Office, the Department of Defense (DOD), branches of local, state and federal government, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state police, fire departments, the Texas Forestry Service, the Texas Army National Guard, medical groups, various rescue forces, contractor companies, the Salvation Army, local businesses, and citizens of our country and especially East Texas. The challenge was to know how much help to accept and how to efficiently incorporate their valuable assistance into a comprehensive and cohesive operational plan. There were more than 2,000 people involved with search and recovery.
The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal emergency response asset whose assistance may be requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. It is an interagency organization with representation from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies. FRMAC, in its present form, was created in 1987 when the radiological support mission was assigned to the DOE’s Nevada Operations Office by DOE Headquarters. The FRMAC asset, including its predecessor entities, was created, grew, and evolved to function as a response to radiological incidents. Radiological emergency response exercises showed the need for a coordinated approach to managing federal emergency monitoring and assessment activities. The mission of FRMAC is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities during a nuclear or radiological incident within the United States in support of state ,local, tribal governments, DHS, and the federal coordinating agency. Radiological emergency response professionals with the DOE’s national laboratories support the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). These teams support the FRMAC to provide: Atmospheric transport modeling; Radiation monitoring; Radiological analysis and data assessments; and Medical advice for radiation injuries In support of field operations, the FRMAC provides geographic information systems, communications, mechanical, electrical, logistics, and administrative support. The size of the FRMAC is tailored to the incident and is comprised of emergency response professionals drawn from across the federal government. State and local emergency response teams may also integrate their operations with FRMAC, but are not required to.
On February 1, 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia, returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts, disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana. Observers on the ground filmed breakup of the spacecraft. Debris fell along a 567 statute mile track from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana; the largest ever recorded debris field. At the time of the accident the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) flight surgeon on-duty at the Mission Control Center (MCC) in Houston, Texas initiated the medical contingency response. The DOD surgeon at Patrick Air Force Base was notified, NASA medical personnel were recalled and the services of Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) were requested. Subsequent to the accident the NASA flight surgeons that had supported the crew on orbit now provided medical support to the crewmember s families. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and numerous other federal, state and local agencies along with the citizens of Texas and Louisiana responded to the disaster. Search and recovery was managed from a Disaster Field Office (DFO) established in Lufkin, Texas. Mishap Investigation Team (MIT) medical operations were managed from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Accident investigation teams (Columbia Accident Investigation Task Force (CAITF) and Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)) appointed immediately after the disaster included current and former authorities in space medicine. In August 2003, the CAIB concluded its investigation and released its findings in a report published in February 2004.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory is currently exploring needs and protocols for the storage of evidentiary items contaminated with radioactive material. While a large body of knowledge on the behavior of storage polymers in radiation fields exists, this knowledge has not been applied to the field of forensics and maintaining evidentiary integrity. The focus of this research was to evaluate the behavior of several traditional evidentiary containment polymers when exposed to significant alpha, beta, gamma, neutron and mixed radiation sources. Doses were designed to simulate exposures possible during storage of materials. Several products were found to be poorly suited for use in this specific application based on standardized mechanical testing results. Remaining products were determined to warrant further investigation for the storage of radiologically contaminated evidence.
Beginning in 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management has sponsored a series of three training courses on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials during Transport. These courses were developed and hosted by Argonne National Laboratory staff with guest lecturers from both the U.S. and international organizations and agencies including the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE national laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Nuclear Transport Institute, and the World Institute for Nuclear Security. Each of the three courses held to date were one week in length. Significant lessons were learned, and have been used to improve the courses as time progressed, along with inclusion of new materials, new exercises, and the use of an advanced electronic voting system that greatly enhanced class interactions. Two options are being considered for adapting the training materials for key audiences in the future: A two-week university credit training course and customized courses for key audiences who may have specific training needs. This paper highlights the lessons learned in previous one-week courses, and discusses the options for university-credit and customized courses/workshops for key audiences. (authors)
In mid-August, nine members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joined nine LANL employees for a three-day cross-training drill in which FBI forensics experts would train fissile material handlers in the work of traditional forensics on nuclear components. The drill was called Audacious Aardvark, reflecting an aardvark’s diligence and fearlessness.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.
Cyber-security challenges have the potential for becoming one of the defining issues of our time. Cyber-attacks have become an ever-increasing threat and the United States (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now ranks cyber-crime as one of its most important law enforcement activities. In addition to the general problems associated with cyber-crime, critical infrastructure (CI) related to energy production, manufacturing, water supply and other systems have come under attack. For example, drinking water utilities are increasingly incorporating computer technology into their routine operations and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cyber- threats. Systems control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage automated physical processes essential to water treatment and distribution systems have become standard in medium to large drinking water utilities and in many small water systems. However, even with the application of standard information technology cybersecurity best practices these types of systems have proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2015, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded to 25 cybersecurity incidents in the Water Sector and to 46 incidents in the Energy Sector. Comparatively, between 2014 and 2015, the reported number of Water Sector incidents actually increased by 78.6% (from 14 to 25). The DHS is in a collaborative partnership with the US Environmental Protection Agency to ensure cybersecurity in the Water Sector. As a result of this partnership a number of guidance documents and techniques have been developed to counter cyber-attacks and minimize cyber vulnerability. These approaches are documented along with a summary of common vulnerabilities. However, a new approach which has great promise in protecting drinking water systems against hacking and cyber-attacks, based on the concept of unidirectional gateways, is presented and discussed.
NASA Lewis Research Center's Life Prediction Branch, in partnership with Sonix, Inc., and Cleveland State University, recently advanced the development of, refined, and commercialized an advanced nondestructive evaluation (NDE) inspection method entitled the Single Transducer Thickness-Independent Ultrasonic Imaging Method. Selected by R&D Magazine as one of the 100 most technologically significant new products of 1996, the method uses a single transducer to eliminate the superimposing effects of thickness variation in the ultrasonic images of materials. As a result, any variation seen in the image is due solely to microstructural variation. This nondestructive method precisely and accurately characterizes material gradients (pore fraction, density, or chemical) that affect the uniformity of a material's physical performance (mechanical, thermal, or electrical). Advantages of the method over conventional ultrasonic imaging include (1) elimination of machining costs (for precision thickness control) during the quality control stages of material processing and development and (2) elimination of labor costs and subjectivity involved in further image processing and image interpretation. At NASA Lewis, the method has been used primarily for accurate inspections of high temperature structural materials including monolithic ceramics, metal matrix composites, and polymer matrix composites. Data were published this year for platelike samples, and current research is focusing on applying the method to tubular components. The initial publicity regarding the development of the method generated 150 requests for further information from a wide variety of institutions and individuals including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Lockheed Martin Corporation, Rockwell International, Hewlett Packard Company, and Procter & Gamble Company. In addition, NASA has been solicited by the 3M Company and Allison Abrasives to use this method to inspect composite materials that are manufactured by these companies.
Beginning in 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP), Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management has sponsored a series of three training courses on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials during Transport. These courses were developed and hosted by Argonne National Laboratory staff with guest lecturers from both the U.S. and international organizations and agencies including the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE national laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). Each of the three courses held to date were one-week in length. The courses delved in detail into the regulatory requirements for transport security, focusing on international and U.S.-domestic requirements and guidance documents. Lectures, in-class discussions and small group exercises, including tabletop (TTX) and field exercises were designed to enhance the learning objectives for the participants. For example, the field exercise used the ARG-US radio frequency identification (RFID) remote surveillance system developed by Argonne for DOE/PCP to track and monitor packages in a mock shipment, following in-class exercises of developing a transport security plan (TSP) for the mock shipment, performing a readiness review and identifying needed corrective actions. Participants were able to follow the mock shipment on the webpage in real time in the ARG-US Command Center at Argonne including “staged” incidents that were designed to illustrate the importance of control, command, communication and coordination in ensuring transport security. Great lessons were learned based on feedback from the participant’s course evaluations with the series of the courses. Since the development of the relevant teaching materials for the course have largely been completed, tailoring the course for targeted audiences becomes a relatively easy task, requiring less effort and providing more flexibility for both the lecturers and future participants. One-day or two-day courses with focus specifically on the U.S. transport security requirements can be delivered, at locations away from Argonne, by one or two principal lecturers to targeted audiences such as regulators, shippers, carriers, state and local law enforcement personnel, and emergency responders. This paper will highlight the lessons learned in hosting previous one-week courses and discuss the development of options for detailed and/or customized courses/workshops for targeted key audiences.
The Nuclear Forensics Analysis Center (NFAC) is a matrixed organization within the Savannah River National Laboratory that supports and is funded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Bacterial membrane vesicles (MVs) mediate diverse microbial processes and are emerging as powerful biomedical tools, but MV population heterogeneity remains an open question. Here, we separate, enumerate, and characterize two MV populations from the soil bacterium Pseudomonas putida during growth with or without lignin-derived carbon, a major carbon source from plant cells in the rhizosphere. Small MVs (MV-S, diameter ~100 nm) were produced from all cultures, whereas large MVs (MV-L, diameter ~300 nm) were observed during the late stationary phase of lignin cultivations. MV-S contained selectively packaged proteins with diverse physiological functions, whereas the MV-L proteome was smaller and largely enriched in outer membrane proteins. Interestingly, enzymes known to mediate the catabolism of lignin-derived aromatic compounds were enriched in MV-S. Overall, this study highlights the need for careful consideration of MV populations in microbial systems.
The Nuclear Forensics Analysis Center (NFAC) is part of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and is one of only two USG National Laboratories accredited to perform nuclear forensic analyses to the requirements of ISO 17025. SRNL NFAC is capable of analyzing nuclear and radiological samples from bulk material to ultra-trace samples. NFAC provides analytical support to the FBI's Radiological Evidence Examination Facility (REEF), which is located within SRNL. REEF gives the FBI the capability to perform traditional forensics on material that is radiological and/or is contaminated. SRNL is engaged in research and development efforts to improve the USG technical nuclear forensics capabilities. Research includes improving predictive signatures and developing a database containing comparative samples.
NEST stands for Nuclear Emergency Support Team. The NEST Mission Statement as first established: (1) Conduct, direct, coordinate search and recovery operations for nuclear material, weapons or devices; and (2) Assist in identification and deactivation of Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). Then in 1980 a very sophisticated improvised explosive device was found at Harvey's Casino at Lake Tahoe, Nevada. The FBI and Bomb Squads were unprepared and it detonated. As a result the additional phrase 'and Sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (SIEDs)' was added to the Mission Statement.