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At least 19 records

Viability Study for an Unattended UF 6 Cylinder Verification Station: Phase I Final Report

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) that could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235 U mass, total uranium mass and identification for all declared UF 6 cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The US Support Program team consisted of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, lead), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Savanah River National Laboratory (SRNL). At the core of the viability study is a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a Westinghouse fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study is a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This report provides context for the UCVS concept and the field trial: potential UCVS implementation concepts at an enrichment facility; an overview of UCVS prototype design; field trial objectives and activities. Field trial results and interpretation are presented, with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an “NDA Fingerprint” concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that the contents of a given cylinder are consistent with previous scans. A modeling study, combined with field-measured instrument uncertainties, provides an assessment of the partial-defect sensitivity of HEVA and PNEM for both one-time assay and (repeated) NDA Fingerprint verification scenarios. The findings presented in this report represent a significant step forward in the community’s understanding of the strengths and limitations of the PNEM and HEVA NDA methods, and the viability of the UCVS concept in front-end fuel cycle facilities. This experience will inform Phase II of the UCVS viability study, should the IAEA pursue it.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sampling and Analysis Plan for Investigation of Undeclared Nuclear Activities - 20104

The nuclear-centered energy policy in South Korea is moving towards a nuclear-free era. It also facilitates an action or progress on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) launched a new R and D project which attempts to verify nuclear activities via analyzing environmental samples. Environmental samples possibly contain significant radiological information relevant to past undeclared activities. In order to precisely verify them, it is essential to provide 1) the concrete information of target facilities, 2) appropriate methodologies and procedures, and 3) well-suited instrumentation and equipment corresponding to sample signatures. It is also important to provide scientific reliability or validity in any process such as sample collection, handling, transportation and laboratory analysis. Therefore, the information of nuclear facilities (fuel fabrication plant, graphite moderated reactor, reprocessing plant) in North Korea are reviewed in order to determine parameters for appropriate sampling methods representing a facility's characteristics. Secondly, a sampling procedure for radioactive elements is being developed based on international and domestic standards such as ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials), KS (Korean industrial Standards), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) manuals. The procedure contains some specific information including sampling process, sampling tools, amount of sample, sample identification, and other related information. Developing the qualified national guidelines is most important since sampling and analyzing results can be used as evidences of nuclear activities. The guideline developed through this work will clearly define various methodologies such as document verification, sampling procedures, collection methods, sample storage criteria, chain of custody, and transportation conditions. The final objective of this work is to establish the infrastructure and regulatory framework for assessment of nuclear activities, and provide a national guideline for sampling and analysis. This will bring confidence in the results and play a critical role in complete denuclearization progress in South Korea. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An integrated approach for the verification of fresh mixed oxide fuel (MOX) assemblies at light water reactor MOX recycle reactors

This paper presents an integrated approach for the verification of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies prior to their being loaded into the reactor. There is a coupling of the verification approach that starts at the fuel fabrication plant and stops with the transfer of the assemblies into the thermal reactor. The key measurement points are at the output of the fuel fabrication plant, the receipt at the reactor site, and the storage in the water pool as fresh fuel. The IAEA currently has the capability to measure the MOX fuel assemblies at the output of the fuel fabrication plants using a passive neutron coincidence counting systems of the passive neutron collar (PNCL) type. Also. at the MOX reactor pool, the underwater coincidence counter (UWCC) has been developed to measure the MOX assemblies in the water. The UWCC measurement requires that the fuel assembly be lifted about two meters up in the storage rack to avoid interference from the fuel that is stored in the rack. This paper presents a new method to verify the MOX fuel assemblies that are in the storage rack without the necessity of moving the fuel. The detector system is called the Underwater MOX Verification System (UMVS). The integration and relationship of the three measurements systems is described.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An unattended verification station for UF 6 cylinders: Field trial findings

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235 U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The first phase of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides a description of the UCVS prototype design and an overview of the long-term field trial. In conclusion, analysis results and interpretation are presented with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an “NDA Fingerprint” concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that material diversion has not occurred.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Viability of an Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Phase I Findings

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. Phase I of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at the Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, USA. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper will provide context for the UCVS and potential implementation concepts, a description of the UCVS prototype design, and an overview of the long-term field trial at a fuel fabrication facility. Selected field-trial results and interpretation are presented, including the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the verification of declared enrichment and 235U mass in over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders. Example results from a modeling study provide a preliminary assessment of sensitivity to material-substitution scenarios, for the as-fielded NDA methods.

Smith, Leon E.↗

FOUR PI CALIBRATION AND MODELING OF A BARE GERMANIUM DETECTOR IN A CYLINDRICAL FIELD SOURCE

In reference 1 the authors described {gamma}-ray holdup assay of a Mossbauer spectroscopy instrument where they utilized two axial symmetric cylindrical shell acquisitions and two disk source acquisitions to determine Am-241 and Np-237 contamination. The measured contents of the two species were determined using a general detector efficiency calibration taken from a 12-inch point source.2 The authors corrected the raw spectra for container absorption as well as for geometry corrections to transform the calibration curve to the applicable axial symmetric cylindrical source - and disk source - of contamination. The authors derived the geometry corrections with exact calculus that are shown in equations (1) and (2) of our Experimental section. A cylindrical shell (oven source) acquisition configuration is described in reference 3, where the authors disclosed this configuration to gain improved sensitivity for holdup measure of U-235 in a ten-chamber oven. The oven was a piece of process equipment used in the Savannah River Plant M-Area Uranium Fuel Fabrication plant for which a U-235 holdup measurement was necessary for its decontamination and decommissioning in 2003.4 In reference 4 the authors calibrated a bare NaI detector for these U-235 holdup measurements. In references 5 and 6 the authors calibrated a bare HpGe detector in a cylindrical shell configuration for improved sensitivity measurements of U-235 in other M-Area process equipment. Sensitivity was vastly improved compared to a close field view of the sample, with detection efficiency of greater than 1% for the 185.7-keV {gamma}-ray from U-235. In none of references 3 - 7 did the authors resolve the exact calculus descriptions of the acquisition configurations. Only the empirical efficiency for detection of the 185.7-keV photon from U-235 decay was obtained. Not until the 2010 paper of reference 1 did the authors derive a good theoretical description of the flux of photons onto the front face of a detector from an axially symmetric cylindrical shell. Subsequent to publication of 1, the theoretical treatment of the cylindrical shell and disk source acquisition sources was recognized by the Los Alamos National Laboratory as suitable for including in the Safeguards Training Program.8 Therefore, we felt it was important to accurately demonstrate the calculus describing the cylindrical shell configuration for the HpGe detector and to theoretically account for the observed bare-detector efficiencies measured in references (3-6). In this paper we demonstrate the applicability of the cylindrical shell derivation to a flexible planar sheet of known Am-241, Eu-152, and Cs-137 activity that we rolled into a symmetrical cylindrical shell of radioactivity. Using the geometry correction equation of reference 1, we calculate geometry correction values using the known detector and source dimensions combined with source to detector distances. We then compare measured detection efficiencies from a cylindrical shell of activity for the 185.7-keV photon (U-235) and for the 414.3-keV photon (Pu-239) with those determined for a 12-inch point source(2,7) to demonstrate agreement between experiment and the theoretically calculated values derived by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) authors of reference 1. We demonstrate this geometry correction first for the 185.7- and 414.3-keV {gamma}-rays. But because the detector was point source calibrated at 12 inches for the energy range (60 -1700) keV (using two distinct sources) to map its intrinsic efficiency, the geometry correction for any acquisition configuration holds for all photon energies.2 We demonstrate that for ten photon energies in the range 121 keV to 967 keV. The good agreement between experiment and calculation is demonstrated at five source to detector distances using the identical shielded HpGe detector of references 4-7 as well as with a separate HpGe detector. We then extend the measurement to include a single acquisition where the flexible source is wrapped around the bare detector in a symmetrical cylinder that radiates on both faces of the detector as well as on to the detector's cylindrical sides of known dimensions. We derive the exact calculus to calculate the flux of the source on to the cylindrical sides of the detector. We then demonstrate outstanding agreement between the measured efficiency for the two primary U-235 and Pu-239 photons in this oven source configuration compared to the point source of activity for which the detector was originally calibrated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Redundancy of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Market: Are Fabrication Services Assured?

For several years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been assessing the reliability of nuclear fuel supply in support of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. Three international low enriched uranium reserves, which are intended back up the existing and well-functioning nuclear fuel market, are currently moving toward implementation. These backup reserves are intended to provide countries credible assurance that of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to operate their nuclear power reactors in the event that their primary fuel supply is disrupted, whether for political or other reasons. The efficacy of these backup reserves, however, may be constrained without redundant fabrication services. This report presents the findings of a recent PNNL study that simulated outages of varying durations at specific nuclear fuel fabrication plants. The modeling specifically enabled prediction and visualization of the reactors affected and the degree of fuel delivery delay. The results thus provide insight on the extent of vulnerability to nuclear fuel supply disruption at the level of individual fabrication plants, reactors, and countries. The simulation studies demonstrate that, when a reasonable set of qualification criteria are applied, existing fabrication plants are technically qualified to provide backup fabrication services to the majority of the world's power reactors. The report concludes with an assessment of the redundancy of fuel supply in the nuclear fuel market, and a description of potential extra-market mechanisms to enhance the security of fuel supply in cases where it may be warranted. This report is an assessment of the ability of the existing market to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical reasons. A forthcoming report will address political disruption scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sharing Experiences within AREVA D and D Project Portfolio: Four Illustrations - 13049

Over the past ten years, AREVA has performed D and D operations on a wide range of nuclear sites, such as Marcoule and La Hague recycling plants, to Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant or Veurey and Annecy metallic Uranium machining plants. Each site is different from the other but some lessons can be shared through this D and D portfolio. In that respect, knowledge management is one of AREVA D and D Technical Department main missions. Four illustrations demonstrate the interest of knowledge share. Waste management is one of the key activities in D and D; It requires a specific characterization methodology, adapted logistics, and optimized waste channels, all of which have been developed over the years by AREVA teams on the site of Marcoule while they are rather new to La Hague, whose main activity remains fuel reprocessing despite the launch of UP2 400 D and D program. The transfer of know how has thus been organized over the past two years. Plasma cutting has been used extensively in Marcoule for years, while prohibited on the site of La Hague following questions raised about the risks associated wit Ruthenium sublimation. La Hague Technical Department has thus developed an experimental protocol to quantify and contain the Ruthenium risk, the result of which will then be applied to Marcoule where the Ruthenium issue has appeared in recent operations. Commissioning and operating fission products evaporators is a rather standard activity on UP2 800 and UP3, while the associated experience has been decreasing in Marcoule following final shutdown in 1998. When the French atomic Energy commission decided to build and operate a new evaporator to concentrate rinsing effluents prior to vitrification in 2009, AREVA La Hague operators were mobilized to test and commission the new equipment, and train local operators. Concrete scabbling is the final stage prior to the free release of a nuclear facility. In the context of Veurey and Annecy final cleanup and declassification, large scale concrete scabbling operations were conducted, and lead to the industrialization of the process and qualification of a new process, NiThrow{sup TM} scabbling technology, developed by AREVA. This experience has now been injected into La Hague D and D scenario and has allowed a significant gain in time and cost for scabbling operations. In short, the variety of experiences and sites under the responsibility of AREVA D and D teams present significant challenges, and yet provide a unique opportunity to innovate and qualify new tools and methods which can then be shared throughout the sites. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A new generation of uranium coincidence fast neutron collars for assay of LWR fresh fuel assemblies

The active uranium neutron coincidence collar provides a means of non-destructively assaying the fissile linear density of Light Water Reactor fresh fuel assemblies containing low enriched uranium. These neutron collars can operate in two modes: a thermal and a fast mode. In fast mode, a neutron collar has an added cadmium (Cd) liner in the sample cavity of the detector to reduce the impact of the burnable poison (thermal neutron absorber) on the detector signal (doubles). The main advantage for operating in fast mode is a detected signal that is less dependent of the burnable neutron poison content and thus less dependent on facility operator declarations. The drawback is that operating in fast mode requires a longer measurement time (~hour vs tens of minutes for thermal mode) to achieve the statistically needed precision in the measurements. The trend in the modern reactor fuel assemblies is moving to higher burnup by using higher initial enrichment and, consequently, a higher number of burnable poison rods to compensate the initial neutron reactivity. The increase of the burnable poison loading has motivated the development of a new generation of high efficiency fast neutron collars to allow practical measurements in-field by nuclear inspectors. This paper describes the development and performance evaluation of a new generation of neutron collars, for both boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels, jointly developed between the US Department of Energy, through Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the European Commission. In this work, we present here calibrations with reference fuel assemblies at Los Alamos National Laboratory as well as the results of in-field measurement campaigns in fuel fabrication plants with modern commercial fuel assemblies. The experimental results show that a typical PWR verification can be made in a total time of 30 min with an uncertainty in the measured mass of 2% at one standard deviation (1σ). A BWR verification can be made in 47 min with an uncertainty in the measured mass of 1.9% at 1σ, or a total time of 20 min with 1σ uncertainty in the measured mass of 2.5%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Belgian regulatory framework for decontamination and decommissioning - lessons learned and new initiatives

Belgium can rely on significant experience in the field of decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Several projects are ongoing and include research reactors (BR3, Thetis), uranium and MOX fuel fabrication plants (FBFC International, Belgonucleaire), fuel reprocessing facilities (Eurochemic) and radwaste processing facilities (Belgoprocess). Additional projects are expected in the coming years with the planned final shutdown of the oldest nuclear power reactor units. Two national authorities are involved in the decontamination and decommissioning process of nuclear facilities. The FANC (together with its subsidiary Bel V) is concerned for all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection, while NIRAS/ONDRAF is concerned for all matters related to radioactive waste and fuel management and financial provisions. These attributions ensure that all safety and material concerns are addressed and that both the licensees and the national authorities bear their own responsibilities. They rely on an existing regulatory framework covering both the procedural and the technical aspects of the decontamination and decommissioning activities. However, opportunities for regulatory improvement were raised after some recent events in Belgium, among which the bankruptcy of a nuclear company producing radioisotopes, involving numerous additional interested parties in a complex judiciary context. Amendments in the current regulations are considered to increase the prerogatives of the authorities regarding the management of radioactive waste by a licensee, the transfer of an operating license from an operator to another, and the general decommissioning strategy of a facility. Furthermore, a dedicated 'waste and decommissioning' working group within WENRA defined new reference levels applying to the decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Belgium committed to include these requirements explicitly in its national legislation, even though most of them were already included in the existing decommissioning authorizations. Amendments will cover the safety provisions inherent to the decontamination and decommissioning phase, such as the decommissioning strategy, the qualification of techniques, the experience feedback valorization, the periodic safety reviews, the radioactive waste management, or the final characterization of the sites. Additionally, requirements regarding the authorization process will be detailed, such as the content of the licensee's application file or the structure of the safety report covering the decontamination and decommissioning phase. These changes will contribute to a more secure regulatory framework for all interested parties. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AUTHENTICATED SENSOR INTERFACE DEVICE FOR JOINT USE SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS - CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

This paper will discuss the key features of the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device that collectively provide the ability to share data among a number of parties while ensuring the authentication of data and protecting both the operator’s and the IAEA’s interests. The paper will also discuss the development of the prototype, the initial testing with an accountancy scale, and future plans and challenges to implementation into the joint use and remote monitoring applications. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent throughout the world and the capacity of plants increases, limited resources of the IAEA are being stretched near a breaking point. A strategy is to increase efficiency in safeguards monitoring using “joint use” equipment that will provide the facility operator process data while also providing the IAEA key safeguards data. The data, however, must be authenticated and validated to ensure the data have not been tampered with. The Authenticated Sensor Interface Device provides the capability to share data and can be a valuable component in the IAEA’s ability to collect accountancy data from scales in Uranium conversion and enrichment plants, as well as nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Likewise, the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device can be configured to accept a diverse array of input signals, ranging from analog voltage, to current, to digital interfaces and more. These modular capabilities provide the ability to collect authenticated, joint-use, data streams from various process monitoring sensors.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Operator Perspective from a Facility Evaluation of an RFID-Based UF6 Cylinder Accounting and Tracking System

An operational field test of a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) system for tracking and accounting UF6 cylinders was conducted at the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas (GNF) fuel fabrication plant in 2009. The Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) was designed and deployed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and evaluated in cooperation with GNF. The system required that passive RFID be attached to several UF6 30B cylinders as they were received at the site; then the cylinders were tracked as they proceeded to interim storage, to processing in an autoclave, and eventually to disposition from the site. This CATS deployment also provided a direct integration of scale data from the site accountability scales. The integration of this information into the tracking data provided an attribute for additional safeguards for evaluation. The field test provided insight into the advantages and challenges of using RFID at an operating nuclear facility. The RFID system allowed operators to interact with the technology and demonstrated the survivability of the tags and reader equipment in the process environment. This paper will provide the operator perspective on utilizing RFID technology for locating cylinders within the facility, thereby tracking the cylinders for process and for Material Control & Accounting functions. The paper also will present the operator viewpoint on RFID implemented as an independent safeguards system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simulated Verification of Fuel Element Inventory in a Small Reactor Core Using the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS)

The International Panel on Climate Change projects that by 2050 the world energy demand may double. Although the primary focus for new nuclear power plants in industrialized nations is on large plants in the 1000-1600 MWe range, there is an increasing demand for small and medium reactors (SMRs). About half of the innovative SMR concepts are for small (<300 MWe) reactors with a 5–30-year life without on-site refueling. This type of reactor is also known as a battery-type reactor. These reactors are particularly attractive to countries with small power grids and for non-electrical purposes such as heating, hydrogen production, and seawater desalination. Traditionally, this type of reactor has been used in a nautical propulsion role. This type of reactor is designed as a permanently sealed unit to prevent the diversion of the uranium in the core by the user. However, after initial fabrication it will be necessary to verify that the newly fabricated reactor core contains the quantity of uranium that initially entered the fuel fabrication plant. In most instances, traditional inspection techniques can be used to perform this verification, but in certain situations the core design will be considered sensitive. Non-intrusive verification techniques must be utilized in these situations. The Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) with imaging uses active interrogation and a fast time correlation processor to characterize fissile material. The MCNP-PoliMi computer code was used to simulate NMIS measurements of a small, sealed reactor core. Because most battery-type reactor designs are still in the early design phase, a more traditional design based on a Russian icebreaker core was used in the simulations. These simulations show how the radiography capabilities of the NMIS could be used to detect the diversion of fissile material by detecting void areas in the assembled core where fuel elements have been removed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Application of Cable Condition Monitoring Technologies to Assess Age-Related Degradation of Industrial Cables Installed in Harsh Environments

The aging of electrical cables has been the subject of substantial research and development (R&D) projects performed by national and international laboratories, universities, and private organizations for many years. This R&D was conducted to develop guidance, equipment, and techniques to support aging management of in-service cables in industrial facilities such as nuclear power plants, research reactors, waste facilities, and fuel fabrication plants. Through these research efforts, condition monitoring technologies have been developed that can determine the severity of age-related degradation that occurs in industrial cables and insulation polymers during service. This paper summarizes the results of aging assessments that were performed for cables installed in two U.S. nuclear power plants, one a pressurized water reactor and one a boiling water reactor. These cables had been in service for over 40 years and during plant operation were exposed to harsh environmental conditions including elevated temperatures and radiation. For these assessments, a comprehensive series of measurements was performed to assess the aged condition of the cables. These cables came from different manufacturers, were manufactured in different years, and were constructed with a variety of jacket and insulation polymers including chloro-sulfonated polyethylene (CSPE), cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE)/cross-linked polyolefin (XLPO), neoprene, and ethylene propylene rubber (EPR). The goal of these assessments was to determine the current aged condition of the cable polymers and provide an estimate of how long the cable insulation materials could remain exposed to their in-service environmental conditions before reaching their end-of-life condition. Both nuclear power plants have received license renewals to extend their operation from 40 to 60 years, and the utilities need objective evidence to show that critical components such as cables will be able to function safely and reliably during the extended operating period. Furthermore, the results of these assessments showed that the cables exhibited different aged conditions depending on the type of polymers they were constructed with and the environment they were exposed to during service. Some of the cables and insulation polymers showed signs of significant age-related degradation and were estimated to have approximately 5 years of remaining service life. Other cables exhibited no signs of significant age-related degradation and were estimated to have 50 years or more of remaining service life. Using the results of these cable aging assessments, plant personnel were able to (1) determine the overall aged condition of cables and insulation polymers using objective test results, (2) identify aged or degraded cables before they caused operability issues, and (3) avoid unnecessary and costly replacement of cables that can continue to operate safely and reliably.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of Cable Aging Acceptance Criteria for Nuclear Facilities

The aging of nuclear power plant electrical cables has been the subject of substantial research and development (R&D) projects in the nuclear industry, national and international laboratories, universities, and vendor organizations for several years. More specifically, these R&D efforts were conducted to develop equipment and techniques for assessing age-related degradation of in-service cables in nuclear facilities including power plants, research reactors, waste facilities and fuel fabrication plants. In recent years, cable R&D efforts in the nuclear arena have also included work to develop new cables for the next generation of reactors. Over time, exposure to harsh environmental conditions such as elevated temperatures, radiation, and humidity in nuclear installations can result in age-related degradation and failure of cables. In the current fleet of nuclear reactors, there are thousands of miles of cabling installed in each plant and many of these cables are exposed to these harsh environmental conditions. For these cables, the jacket and insulation polymers harden and become brittle over time, making them more susceptible to crack formation and growth, moisture intrusion, and other mechanisms that can lead to cable failure. Moreover, the existing U.S. fleet of 98 nuclear reactors has an average operating age of 38 years. Many of these nuclear power plants have applied for and almost all have been granted regulatory approval for license renewals to operate for 60 years, 20 years beyond their original 40-year life. Further, subsequent license renewals (SLRs) are underway with a few commercial nuclear power sites already approved to operate up to 80 years. As these reactors pursue operating life extensions, utilities must find a way to address issues associated with age-related degradation of cables. Designers of small modular reactors are also in need of technologies to evaluate the performance of cables that will be installed in harsher environments (e.g. higher temperatures, radiation doses, dose rates, etc.) than those present in current-generation reactors. Today, a variety of cable condition monitoring (CM) techniques have been developed and successfully used in nuclear facilities. These techniques are used to identify age-related degradation and assess the condition of cables to determine if their performance characteristics have changed with age. However, objective criteria must be developed for these CM tests to help quantify cable condition and thereby develop repair and replacement schedules. With operating life extending to 80 years and more SLRs on the horizon, both nuclear facilities and regulators need an objective means to determine the aged condition of cables.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗