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NASA NTRS2000

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A Bibliography

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a bottom-up analytical process that identifies process hazards, which helps managers understand vulnerabilities of systems, as well as assess and mitigate risk. It is one of several engineering tools and techniques available to program and project managers aimed at increasing the likelihood of safe and successful NASA programs and missions. This bibliography references 465 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, failure modes or failure analysis, in either the basic index of the major subject terms.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1996

Meteorological Satellites (METSAT) and Earth Observing System (EOS) Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL)

This Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is for the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) instruments that are being designed and manufactured for the Meteorological Satellites Project (METSAT) and the Earth Observing System (EOS) integrated programs. The FMEA analyzes the design of the METSAT and EOS instruments as they currently exist. This FMEA is intended to identify METSAT and EOS failure modes and their effect on spacecraft-instrument and instrument-component interfaces. The prime objective of this FMEA is to identify potential catastrophic and critical failures so that susceptibility to the failures and their effects can be eliminated from the METSAT/EOS instruments.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Assistant Tool Feasibility Study

An effort to determine the feasibility of a software tool to assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been completed. This new and unique approach to FMEA uses model based systems engineering concepts to recommend failure modes, causes, and effects to the user after they have made several selections from pick lists about a component s functions and inputs/outputs. Recommendations are made based on a library using common failure modes identified over the course of several major human spaceflight programs. However, the tool could be adapted for use in a wide range of applications from NASA to the energy industry.

Flores, Melissa↗
NASA NTRS1988

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor

The recertification of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) has included an extensive rewriting of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The evolution of the groundrules and methodology used in the analysis is discussed and compared to standard FMEA techniques. Especially highlighted are aspects of the FMEA/CIL which are unique to the analysis of an SRM. The criticality category definitions are presented and the rationale for assigning criticality is presented. The various data required by the CIL and contribution of this data to the retention rationale is also presented. As an example, the FMEA and CIL for the SRM nozzle assembly is discussed in detail. This highlights some of the difficulties associated with the analysis of a system with the unique mission requirements of the Space Shuttle.

Russell, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Framework for Creating a Function-based Design Tool for Failure Mode Identification

Knowledge of potential failure modes during design is critical for prevention of failures. Currently industries use procedures such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree analysis, or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality analysis (FMECA), as well as knowledge and experience, to determine potential failure modes. When new products are being developed there is often a lack of sufficient knowledge of potential failure mode and/or a lack of sufficient experience to identify all failure modes. This gives rise to a situation in which engineers are unable to extract maximum benefits from the above procedures. This work describes a function-based failure identification methodology, which would act as a storehouse of information and experience, providing useful information about the potential failure modes for the design under consideration, as well as enhancing the usefulness of procedures like FMEA. As an example, the method is applied to fifteen products and the benefits are illustrated.

Arunajadai, Srikesh G.↗
NASA NTRS2000

NASA GRC Technology Development Project for a Stirling Radioisotope Power System

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and Stirling Technology Company (STC) are developing a Stirling convertor for an advanced radioisotope power system to provide spacecraft on-board electric power for NASA deep space missions. NASA GRC is conducting an in-house project to provide convertor, component, and materials testing and evaluation in support of the overall power system development. A first characterization of the DOE/STC 55-We Stirling Technology Demonstration Convertor (TDC) under the expected launch random vibration environment was recently completed in the NASA GRC Structural Dynamics Laboratory. Two TDCs also completed an initial electromagnetic interference (EMI) characterization at NASA GRC while being tested in a synchronized, opposed configuration. Materials testing is underway to support a life assessment of the heater head, and magnet characterization and aging tests have been initiated. Test facilities are now being established for an independent convertor performance verification and technology development. A preliminary Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), initial finite element analysis (FEA) for the linear alternator, ionizing radiation survivability assessment, and radiator parametric study have also been completed. This paper will discuss the status, plans, and results to date for these efforts.

Thieme, Lanny G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) Connectors in Space Flight Applications

This report documents the current status of CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors in GSFC spaceflight applications. To the extent the information is known, this report summarizes to what component quality level each NASA contractor (referred to as OEM in this report) procured the parts, and what board level and system level testing was performed. The report also provides the current status of the reliability assessment for each GSFC project based on the results of testing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effects Analysis). This report addresses how the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors came into existence, and how these became the connector style chosen by many designers of space flight hardware. It identifies the design philosophy and the lack of robustness which has led to several known failure modes. These failure modes include fretting of connector pins during vibration, shock and thermal cycling, exposure of underplating, and increased resistance, including brief excursions to very high resistance. Each of these are signs of aging, which becomes an increasing concern for long duration orbiting space flight applications. This report addresses the mitigation strategy to replace CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors with space qualified Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors. The Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connectors are pin-to-pin compatible with the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors and meet all of the same technical requirements, except the ability to hot mate, and to mate directly with a CompactPCI of the opposite gender. A detailed comparison of the CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connector and the Hypertronics 2mm cPCI connector is provided to describe the ruggedness of Hypertronics connector for space flight applications. Finally, this report makes recommendations for flight hardware for the future missions where the hardware is yet to be built, as well as for the hardware which has already been built with CompactPCI(Registered TradeMark) connectors.

Williams, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2008

Contamination Sources Effects Analysis (CSEA) - A Tool to Balance Cost/Schedule While Managing Facility Availability

A CSEA is similar to a Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA). A CSEA tracks risk, deterrence, and occurrence of sources of contamination and their mitigation plans. Documentation is provided spanning mechanical and electrical assembly, precision cleaning, thermal vacuum bake-out, and thermal vacuum testing. These facilities all may play a role in contamination budgeting and reduction ultimately affecting test and flight. With a CSEA, visibility can be given to availability of these facilities, test sequencing and trade-offs. A cross-functional team including specialty engineering, contamination control, electrostatic dissipation, manufacturing, testing, and material engineering participate in an exercise that identifies contaminants and minimizes the complexity of scheduling these facilities considering their volatile schedules. Care can be taken in an efficient manner to insure correct cleaning processes are employed. The result is reduction in cycle time ("schedule hits"), reduced cost due to rework, reduced risk and improved communication and quality while achieving adherence to the Contamination Control Plan.

Wilcox, Margaret↗
NASA NTRS1989

Model 0A wind turbine generator FMEA

The results of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) conducted for the Wind Turbine Generators are presented. The FMEA was performed for the functional modes of each system, subsystem, or component. The single-point failures were eliminated for most of the systems. The blade system was the only exception. The qualitative probability of a blade separating was estimated at level D-remote. Many changes were made to the hardware as a result of this analysis. The most significant change was the addition of the safety system. Operational experience and need to improve machine availability have resulted in subsequent changes to the various systems which are also reflected in this FMEA.

Klein, William E.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Mod 1 wind turbine generator failure modes and effects analysis

A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was directed primarily at identifying those critical failure modes that would be hazardous to life or would result in major damage to the system. Each subsystem was approached from the top down, and broken down to successive lower levels where it appeared that the criticality of the failure mode warranted more detail analysis. The results were reviewed by specialists from outside the Mod 1 program, and corrective action taken wherever recommended.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Systems Health Monitoring: Integrating FMEA into Bayesian Networks

The foreseeable high traffic density suggests that a large number of electric propulsion systems will enter the airspace, and that they will also operate at high frequency, e.g., large number of take offs and landings per unit time. The reliability of such critical systems is therefore key to ensure high safety standards in the low-altitude airspace. Diagnostic systems, which aim at identifying incipient faults, can mitigate unexpected failures or lower-than-expected reliability by performing early fault detection by monitoring the systems. A key element of fault diagnosis is fault detection and isolation (FDI), which complexity increases with the complexity of the system itself, namely the number of subsystems and components, interactions among sub-systems, and the number of sensors available. The proposed approach leverages combination of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) integrated with Bayesian networks, thus introducing dependability structures into a diagnostic framework to aid FDI. Faults and failure events from the FMEA are mapped within a Bayesian network, where network edges replicate the links embedded within FMEAs. The integrated framework enables the fault isolation process by identifying the probability of occurrence of specific faults or root causes given evidence observed through sensor signals. In this work, sub systems of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) type vehicle like avionics, structures, power-train etc. are taken into account to show the approach at the system level. This work integrates early design phase in the development of UAM type vehicles with diagnostic tools, which are often developed later in the product life-cycle, or retrofitted at a later time on systems. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) derived for the system in the design phase is embedded within a Bayesian network (BN).

UAM↗
NASA NTRS1998

Space Shuttle Main Engine Quantitative Risk Assessment: Illustrating Modeling of a Complex System with a New QRA Software Package

During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).

Smart, Christian↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and NASA FMEA/CIL to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Bradway, M. W.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bradway, M. W.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Experiments hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Program consists of a multiple set of experiments for the purpose of gathering environmental and aerodynamic data to develop more accurate ground models for Shuttle performance and to facilitate the design of future spacecraft. This assessment only addresses currently manifested experiments and their support systems. Specifically this list consists of: Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS); Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS); Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX (FFSSO); Shuttle Infrared Laced Temperature Sensor (SILTS); Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP); and Support System for OEX (SSO). There are only two potential critical items for the OEX, since the experiments only gather data for analysis post mission and are totally independent systems except for power. Failure of any experiment component usually only causes a loss of experiment data and in no way jeopardizes the crew or mission.

Compton, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.

Gardner, J. R.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the life support and airlock support subsystems

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Life Support System (LSS) and Airlock Support System (ALSS). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The LSS provides for the management of the supply water, collection of metabolic waste, management of waste water, smoke detection, and fire suppression. The ALSS provides water, oxygen, and electricity to support an extravehicular activity in the airlock.

Arbet, Jim↗