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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
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NASA NTRS1992

Mission management aircraft operations manual

This manual prescribes the NASA mission management aircraft program and provides policies and criteria for the safe and economical operation, maintenance, and inspection of NASA mission management aircraft. The operation of NASA mission management aircraft is based on the concept that safety has the highest priority. Operations involving unwarranted risks will not be tolerated. NASA mission management aircraft will be designated by the Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities. NASA mission management aircraft are public aircraft as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Maintenance standards, as a minimum, will meet those required for retention of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification. Federal Aviation Regulation Part 91, Subparts A and B, will apply except when requirements of this manual are more restrictive.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

Discovering the Regulatory Considerations of the Federal Aviation Administration: Interviewing the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for aviation mechanics has become mandatory in many industrialized countries since 1998. Yet, to date, MRM training remains optional in the U.S. Interestingly, a similar safety discipline, namely Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), is mandatory for pilots, flight engineers, flight attendants, and dispatchers and is regulated in the Federal Aviation Administration s (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). If MRM training is important to enhance aviation technicians working behavior, the rationale to not regulate it opens a window for study. This research aims to inductively investigate the FAA s regulatory rationale concerning MRM training based on direct inputs from the FAA s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) members. Delphi methodology associated with purposive sampling technique was adopted. The result revealed that the FAA cannot regulate MRM because the aviation industry is strongly opposed to it due to the lack of training budgets, the need of a quantifiable cost-effect analysis, concern over the FAA s inspection workforce, an ongoing voluntary alternative called the Air Transportation Surveillance System (ATOS), the government s lower priority on maintenance after 9/11, and the airlines tight embracement of operational flexibility without regulation.

Lu, Chien-tsung↗
NASA NTRS2019

Comparisons of Cloud In-Situ Microphysical Properties of Deep Convective Clouds to Appendix D/P, Using Data from the HAIC-HIWC and HIWC RADAR I Flight Campaigns

In-situ cloud data from three international flight campaigns is compared to the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 33 Appendix D mixed-phase/glaciated environmental envelope (1), and the corresponding identical European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) CS-25 Appendix P envelope (2) (hereafter "Appendix D/P"). Appendix D/P consists of a temperature-altitude envelope, a 99th percentile total water content (TWC99) envelope at the 17.4 Nm distance scale, a distance factor to estimate TWC99 values at other distance scales, ice crystal median mass diameter (MMD), and recommended liquid water content (LWC) levels in mixed-phase icing conditions. The dataset is from 45 flight missions in 3 tropical locations, with 472 runs in approximately 115 clouds, providing about 29,600 Nm of in-cloud data in deep convection over four targeted temperature intervals: 10, 30, 40, and 50 +5 C. The measurements span altitueds from about 17,000' to 39,000'. The comparisons will serve as a basis for regulatory and industry assessment of the efficacy of Appendix D/P.

Strapp, J. Walter↗
NASA NTRS2009

Collaborative Approaches in Developing Environmental and Safety Management Systems for Commercial Space Transportation

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) licenses and permits U.S. commercial space launch and reentry activities, and licenses the operation of non-federal launch and reentry sites. ASTs mission is to ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial space transportation activities and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. commercial space transportation. AST faces unique challenges of ensuring the protection of public health and safety while facilitating and promoting U.S. commercial space transportation. AST has developed an Environmental Management System (EMS) and a Safety Management System (SMS) to help meet its mission. Although the EMS and SMS were developed independently, the systems share similar elements. Both systems follow a Plan-Do-Act-Check model in identifying potential environmental aspects or public safety hazards, assessing significance in terms of severity and likelihood of occurrence, developing approaches to reduce risk, and verifying that the risk is reduced. This paper will describe the similarities between ASTs EMS and SMS elements and how AST is building a collaborative approach in environmental and safety management to reduce impacts to the environment and risks to the public.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)↗
NASA NTRS2015

Second Annual Transformative Vertical Flight Concepts Workshop: Enabling New Flight Concepts Through Novel Propulsion and Energy Architectures

On August 3rd and 4th, 2015, a workshop was held at the NASA Ames Research Center, located at the Moffett Federal Airfield in California to explore the aviation communities interest in Transformative Vertical Flight (TVF) Concepts. The Workshop was sponsored by the AHS International (AHS), the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and hosted by the NASA Aeronautics Research Institute (NARI). This second annual workshop built on the success and enthusiasm generated by the first TVF Workshop held in Washington, DC in August of 2014. The previous Workshop identified the existence of a multi-disciplinary community interested in this topic and established a consensus among the participants that opportunities to establish further collaborations in this area are warranted. The desire to conduct a series of annual workshops augmented by online virtual technical seminars to strengthen the TVF community and continue planning for advocacy and collaboration was a direct outcome of the first Workshop. The second Workshop organizers focused on four desired action-oriented outcomes. The first was to establish and document common stakeholder needs and areas of potential collaborations. This includes advocacy strategies to encourage the future success of unconventional vertiport capable flight concept solutions that are enabled by emerging technologies. The second was to assemble a community that can collaborate on new conceptual design and analysis tools to permit novel configuration paths with far greater multi-disciplinary coupling (i.e., aero-propulsive-control) to be investigated. The third was to establish a community to develop and deploy regulatory guidelines. This community would have the potential to initiate formation of an American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) F44 Committee Subgroup for the development of consensus-based certification standards for General Aviation scale vertiport capable flight systems. These standards need to accommodate novel fixed wing concepts that do not fit within the existing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rotorcraft certification framework (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C, Part 27). The fourth desired outcome was to launch an information campaign to ensure key U.S. Government agencies understand the potential benefits and industry interest in establishing new vertiport capable flight markets. This record of the Workshop proceedings documents Workshop activities and products including summaries of the video recorded technical presentations, overviews of three breakout sessions (Missions Operational Concepts, Prioritized Technical Challenges, Regulatory Roadmap), and a preliminary draft roadmap framework for TVF.

V/STOL↗
NASA NTRS2010

Causal Factors and Adverse Conditions of Aviation Accidents and Incidents Related to Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control

The causal factors of accidents from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database and incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) database associated with loss of control (LOC) were examined for four types of operations (i.e., Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121, Part 135 Scheduled, Part 135 Nonscheduled, and Part 91) for the years 1988 to 2004. In-flight LOC is a serious aviation problem. Well over half of the LOC accidents included at least one fatality (80 percent in Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the studied time period occurred in conjunction with LOC. An adverse events table was updated to provide focus to the technology validation strategy of the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project. The table contains three types of adverse conditions: failure, damage, and upset. Thirteen different adverse condition subtypes were gleaned from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the FAA Accident and Incident database, and the NTSB database. The severity and frequency of the damage conditions, initial test conditions, and milestones references are also provided.

Reveley, Mary S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Activities relating to understanding the initiation, organization and structure of moist convection in the Southeast environment

In the spring and summer of 1986, NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will sponsor the Satellite Precipitation And Cloud Experiment (SPACE) to be conducted in the Central Tennessee, Northern Alabama, and Northeastern Mississippi area. The field program will incorporate high altitude flight experiments associated with meteorological remote sensor development for future space flight, and an investigation of precipitation processes associated with mesoscale and small convective systems. In addition to SPACE, the MIcroburst and Severe Thunderstorm (MIST) program, sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the FAA-Lincoln Laboratory Operational Weather Study (FLOWS), sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), will take place concurrently within the SPACE experiment area. All three programs (under the joint acronym COHMEX (COoperative Huntsville Meteorological EXperiment)) will provide a data base for detailed analysis of mesoscale convective systems while providing ground truth comparisons for remote sensor evaluation. The purpose of this document is to outline the experiment design criteria for SPACE, and describe the special observing facilities and data sets that will be available under the COHMEX joint program. In addition to the planning of SPACE-COHMEX, this document covers three other parts of the program. The field program observations' main activity was the operation of an upper air rawinsonde network to provide ground truth for aircraft and spacecraft observations. Another part of the COHMEX program involved using boundary layer mesoscale models to study and simulate the initiation and organization of moist convection due to mesoscale thermal and mechanical circulations. The last part of the program was the collection, archival and distribution of the resulting COHMEX-SPACE data sets.

Mcnider, Richard T.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Ramifications of the recent FAA rule for windshear systems on the development of forward-looking systems

The recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rule requiring windshear systems with flight guidance may have severe ramifications for the development of infrared and other forward-looking systems. The industry needs to have and can have a more cost effective option through the use of a forward-looking system with a reactive backup instead of a reactive system with flight guidance. However, because of the short time for compliance with the new FAA rule, it is possible that existing transport aircraft will be in full compliance before a comprehensive investigation of all forward-looking systems can be completed. If this occurs, it is possible that the market for forward-looking systems will be severely reduced, thereby eliminating the economic incentive to develop these much needed systems. Thus, to assure that this option is available for the airlines, it beehoves the industry to immediately support an in-service evaluation of all available forward-looking systems.

Adamson, H. Patrick↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Study to Estimate the Effectiveness of Visual Testing Training for Aviation Maintenance Management

The Air Commerce Act of 1926 set the beginning for standards in aviation maintenance. Even after deregulation in the late l970s, maintenance standards and requirements still have not changed far from their initial criteria. After a potential candidate completes Federal Aviation Administration training prerequisites, they may test for their Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) certificate. Performing maintenance in the aviation industry for a minimum of three years, the technician may then test for their Inspection Authorization (IA). After receiving their Airframe and Powerplant certificate, a technician is said to have a license to perform. At no time within the three years to eligibility for Inspection Authorization are they required to attend higher-level inspection training. What a technician learns in the aviation maintenance industry is handed down from a seasoned technician to the new hire or is developed from lessons learned on the job. Only in Europe has the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) required higher-level training for their aviation maintenance technicians in order to control maintenance related accidents (Lu, 2005). Throughout the 1990s both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made public that the FAA is historically understaffed (GAO, 1996). In a safety recommendation the NTSB stated "The Safety Board continues to lack confidence in the FAA's commitment to provide effective quality assurance and safety oversight of the ATC system (NTSB, 1990)." The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been known to be proactive in creating safer skies. With such reports you would suspect the FAA to also be proactive in developing more stringent inspection training for aviation maintenance technicians. The purpose of this study is to estimate the effectiveness of higher-level inspection training, such as Visual Testing (VT) for aviation maintenance technicians, to improve the safety of aircraft and to make recommendations to management with regard to the value of such training.

Law, Lewis Lyle↗
NASA NTRS2014

Aviation Trends Related to Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project Technical Challenges

Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project's three technical challenges (engine icing characterization and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability; and atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation technology capability) were assessed by examining the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database (1989 to 2008), incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident/incident database (1989 to 2006), and literature from various industry and government sources. The accident and incident data were examined for events involving fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 for atmospheric conditions related to airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST technical challenges were identified after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction, icing/ice detection, loss of control in flight, super density operations, and runway safety.

Reveley, Mary S.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Summary of Results from Two Full-Scale Fokker F28 Fuselage Section Drop Tests

During 2017, two vertical drop tests were conducted on two partial sections removed from a Fokker F28 MK4000 aircraft as a part of a joint NASA / Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) effort to investigate the crashworthiness characteristics of Transport Category Aircraft, as defined by 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 25. The first test was a pure vertical drop test of a relatively uniform forward section, which included an underfloor area for luggage. The second test was a canted drop test onto a sloped surface of a portion of the fuselage representing the wingbox stiffened structure. In both tests, accelerometers were installed on the floor, seat track, luggage, and overhead bin to measure responses in the two airframe sections. In addition, ten Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, a.k.a. crash test dummies) were included in each test to measure the potential of onboard occupant injury. Self-contained data recorders, logging accelerations and rotational rates, were also used on the seat tracks and lower structure for evaluation as potential crash recording devices in future tests. Finally, the starboard side of each section was painted with a stochastic black and white speckle pattern for use in full field photogrammetric imaging techniques. The results collected show notable differences in the Forward and Wingbox Section responses. The Forward Section floor accelerations showed a relatively uniform response of approximately 7 g throughout the impact event. This section exhibited large amounts of subfloor crushing, floor stiffener failures and seat deformation upon impact. These results are contrasted by the Wingbox Section accelerations, which showed large differences when comparing accelerations recorded from either the rear or the front portion of the section reaching peaks of 39 g in some locations. Additionally, the Wingbox Section test induced a forward motion caused from the rotation at impact. With the exception of the lower cavity, there was minimal deformation in the Wingbox Section, and ATD responses were consistently higher than those for the Forward Section. A complete set of results are presented for the airframe, seat, ATD, overhead bin, and subfloor regions for each section. The ATD results are compared to current injury criteria, and determinations will be made on the likelihood of injury. Additional results for cargo-hold stored luggage are presented in an attempt to provide a component-level characterization for better understanding of under-floor loading. Finally, a discussion of the relevance of the results for a proposed airframe level crashworthiness guideline are presented.

Littell, Justin D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Simulating Secure Data Exchange and Storage for Urban Air Mobility Environments

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) defines an environment for managing operations of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) and short takeoff and landing (STOL) vehicles in an urban environment. Within a UAM environment, UAM operators manage fleets of vehicles, relying on Providers of Services for UAM (PSUs) for managing flights in a region of airspace. Flight plan deconfliction is primarily performed by the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintains control over the UAM space via the FAA-Industry Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). UAM is a federated environment with many different entities owning and operating vehicles, PSUs, and other services. These entities often need to interoperate or access data generated by other organizations. This paper demonstrates the feasibility of using blockchain to facilitate a secure data exchange and storage for this flight information in a UAM environment. In particular, this paper is focused on flight plans and telemetry data. A blockchain network was developed with a set of smart contracts for managing relevant flight data. Hyperledger Fabric was chosen as it is performent, scalable, and allows organizations to reuse existing public key infrastructure (PKI) for identity management. A set of simulated UAM services were also developed. These services propose flight plans and negotiate with other UAM services for airspace access. All interactions between UAM services, as well as vehicle telemetry data, is recorded onto the blockchain. Vehicle telemetry data is generated by a vehicle flight simulation service. This paper successfully demonstrates the feasibility of using blockchain as a secure data exchange and storage mechanism in a UAM environment.

UAM↗
NASA NTRS2016

Rationales for the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria

Since natural and triggered lightning are demonstrated hazards to launch vehicles, payloads, and spacecraft, NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) follow the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) for launches from Federal Ranges. The LLCC were developed to prevent future instances of a rocket intercepting natural lightning or triggering a lightning flash during launch from a Federal Range. NASA and DoD utilize the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) to establish and develop robust rationale from which the criteria originate. The rationale document also contains appendices that provide additional scientific background, including detailed descriptions of the theory and observations behind the rationales. The LLCC in whole or part are used across the globe due to the rigor of the documented criteria and associated rationale. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted the LLCC in 2006 for commercial space transportation and the criteria were codified in the FAA's Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for Safety of an Expendable Launch Vehicle (Appendix G to 14 CFR Part 417, (G417)) and renamed Lightning Flight Commit Criteria in G417.

Lightning Advisory Panel↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project: Advanced Collision Avoidance System for UAS (ACAS Xu) Interoperability White Paper Presentation

The Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) provided requirements for two classes of DAA equipment: equipment Class 1 contains the basic DAA equipment required to assist a pilot in remaining well clear, while equipment Class 2 integrates the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) II system. Thus, the Class 1 system provides RWC functionality only, while the Class 2 system is intended to provide both RWC and Collision Avoidance (CA) functionality, in compliance with the Minimum Aviation System Performance (MASPS) for the Interoperability of Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems. The FAAs TCAS Program Office is currently developing Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) to support the objectives of the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) Next Generation Air Transportation System Program (NextGen). ACAS X has a suite of variants with a common underlying design that are intended to be optimized for their intended airframes and operations. ACAS Xu being is designed for UAS and allows for new surveillance technologies and tailored logic for platforms with different performance characteristics. In addition to Collision Avoidance (CA) alerting and guidance, ACAS Xu is being tuned to provide RWC alerting and guidance in compliance with the SC 228 DAA MOPS. With a single logic performing both RWC and CA functions, ACAS Xu will provide industry with an integrated DAA solution that addresses many of the interoperability shortcomings of Phase I systems. While the MOPS for ACAS Xu will specify an integrated DAA system, it will need to show compliance with the RWC alerting thresholds and alerting requirements defined in the DAA Phase 2 MOPS. Further, some functional components of the ACAS Xu system such as the remote pilots displayed guidance might be mostly references to the corresponding requirements in the DAA MOPS. To provide a seamless, integrated, RWC-CA system to assist the pilot in remaining well clear and avoiding collisions, several issues need to be addressed within the Phase 2 SC-228 DAA efforts. Interoperability of the RWC and CA alerting and guidance, and ensuring pilot comprehension, compliance and performance, will be a primary research area.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2020

A Summary of Airframe Results from a Fokker F28 Full-Scale Crash Test

On June 20, 2019, a full-scale crash test was conducted on a Fokker F28 MK1000 aircraft as a part of a joint NASA / Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) research effort to investigate the crashworthiness characteristics of a Transport Category Aircraft (TCA), as defined by 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 25. The test was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center’s Landing and Impact Research Facility and was the third in a test series to further understand TCA crashworthiness characteristics. The test article featured 24 Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, a.k.a. crash test dummies), and over 700 channels of instrumentation covering major aircraft structures such as the wings, tail, nose, cockpit and cabin, along with recording seat, overhead bin and ATD accelerations. Five different U.S. Government agencies collaborated on the test including: NASA, the FAA, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). This report will covertest article build up, which includes weight and balance measurements and pre-test laser scans. It will also cover the events of the test, which includes the test sequence of events and post-test damage inspections. Finally, it will show airframe level accelerations at all positions measured, with discussion on correlation to the airframe damage witnessed. The test build up consisted of outfitting the main cabin section of the aircraft with 24 ATDs seated in 12 rows of seats, overhead mass and the under floor cargo area with foam representing the luggage. The main cabin also included all of the onboard data system pallets, which recorded711 channels of data from the test. All major portions of the aircraft were instrumented, including locations at the floor / frame junction locations in the cabin where the ATDs were located along with other major exterior components such as the nose, the tail, each engine cowling, and at overhead hat rack ballast locations. The aircraft impacted a soil surface at65.3 ft/s horizontal and 31.8 ft/s vertical velocities. The aircraft plowed through the soil and slid a distance of 32.5 feet from the initial impact location. There was a secondary impact occurring 0.9 s due to the “slap down” of the nose during the post-impact response. The duration of the event from impact to rest was1.62 seconds. There was major structural damage in the lower fuselage areas around the Wingbox and Aft Fuselage sections. The Aft Fuselage section deformation caused some cabin intrusion from the keel beams pushing the aft cabin floor into the cabin. Other structural deformations occurred around the tail and at transition regions in the aircraft structure; mainly in locations of differing overall stiffness. The data obtained showed average vertical accelerations between 12 and 16 g with spikes reaching almost 40 g at certain floor locations. Average horizontal accelerations were approximately 10 g for all floor locations measured with spikes reaching approximately 25 g in some locations. The report includes a full set of results on aircraft deformation and accelerations along with discussions as to the effect on the aircraft structure.

Justin D Littell↗
NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗
NASA NTRS1980

Development of SCR Aircraft takeoff and landing procedures for community noise abatement and their impact on flight safety

Piloted simulator studies to determine takeoff and landing procedures for a supersonic cruise transport concept that result in predicted community noise levels which meet current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards are discussed. The results indicate that with the use of advanced procedures, the subject simulated aircraft meets the FAA traded noise levels during takeoff and landing utilizing average flight crew skills. The advanced takeoff procedures developed involved violating three of the current Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) noise test conditions. These were: (1) thrust cutbacks at altitudes below 214 meters (700 ft); (2) thrust cutback level below those presently allowed; and (3) configuration change, other than raising the landing gear. It was not necessary to violate any FAR noise test conditions during landing approach. It was determined that the advanced procedures developed do not compromise flight safety. Automation of some of the aircraft functions reduced pilot workload, and the development of a simple head-up display to assist in the takeoff flight mode proved to be adequate.

Grantham, W. D.↗