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At least 19 records

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Fire Protection Program Manual (Revision 3.0)

This manual documents the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Fire Protection Program. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 420.1B, Facility Safety, requires LLNL to have a comprehensive and effective fire protection program that protects LLNL personnel and property, the public and the environment. The manual provides LLNL and its facilities with general information and guidance for meeting DOE 420.1B requirements. The recommended readers for this manual are: fire protection officers, fire protection engineers, fire fighters, facility managers, directorate assurance managers, facility coordinators, and ES and H team members.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Heat Transfer Through a Passive Fire Protective Board from an Impinging Hydrogen Flame

This report documents analysis to determine whether a hydrogen jet flame impinging on a tunnel ceiling structure could result in permanent damage to the Callahan tunnel in Boston, Massachusetts. This tunnel ceiling structure consists of a passive fire protective board supported by stainless steel hangers anchored to the tunnel ceiling with epoxy. Three types of fire protective boards were considered to determine whether heat from the flame could reach the stainless-steel hangers and the epoxy and cause the ceiling structure to collapse. Heat transfer analyses performed showed that the temperature remains constant where the steel hangers are attached to the passive fire protective board. According to these results, the passive fire protective board should provide adequate protection to the tunnel structure in this release scenario. Tunnel structures with similar suspended fire-resistant liner board materials should protect the integrity of the structure against the extremely low probability of an impinging hydrogen jet flame.

08 HYDROGEN↗

FY24 – FY25 Efforts to Revive the ANS-54.8 Liquid Metal Fire Protection in LMR Plants Standard

The current multi-year effort seeks to utilize national laboratory support from Argonne to expedite revival of the ANS-54.8 standard titled “Liquid Metal Fire Protection in LMR Plants.” To achieve that objective, the following tasks were identified: Task 1 involves working directly with ANS to revive the ANS-54.8 Working Group. This was to be accomplished by completing necessary paperwork, submitting that paperwork to ANS for approval, enlisting potential working group members from industry, the NRC, national laboratories, and universities, and organizing and leading Working Group activities. The overall purpose of the Working Group is to develop an updated draft of ANS-54.8 for review and approval by ANS consensus committees, the ANS Standards Board, and certification from ANSI. Task 2 focuses on leveraging historical information and expertise at Argonne related to sodium fire protection systems and strategies. For more than a decade, Argonne has worked on both international and domestic projects related to sodium fire protection system development and evaluation. The goal of this task is to utilize that experience to help inform the ANS-54.8 Working Group on important considerations that may be addressed in an updated draft of ANS-54.8. Task 3 focuses on leveraging Argonne experience in the development of and use of analysis methods and tools for the simulation of sodium fire scenarios and evaluation of the effectiveness of sodium fire protection systems and strategies. For more than a decade, Argonne has recovered, modified, and utilized several historical sodium fire analysis software tools. The goal of this task is to utilize that experience to help inform the ANS-54.8 Working Group of best practices for sodium fire progression analysis that may be addressed in an updated draft of ANS-54.8.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Effects of alpha-zirconium phosphate on thermal degradation and flame retardancy of transparent intumescent fire protective coating

Graphical abstract: - Highlights: • A transparent intumescent fire protective coating was obtained by UV-cured technology. • OZrP could enhance the thermal stability and anti-oxidation of the coating. • OZrP could reduce the combustion properties of the coatings. - Abstract: Organophilic alpha-zirconium phosphate (OZrP) was used to improve the thermal and fire retardant behaviors of the phenyl di(acryloyloxyethyl)phosphate (PDHA)-triglycidyl isocyanurate acrylate (TGICA)-2-phenoxyethyl acrylate (PHEA) (PDHA-TGICA-PHEA) coating. The morphology of nanocomposite coating was characterized by X-ray diffraction (XRD) and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The effect of OZrP on the flame retardancy, thermal stability, fireproofing time and char formation of the coatings was investigated by microscale combustion calorimeter (MCC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), laser Raman spectroscopy (LRS) and scanning electric microscope (SEM). The results showed that by adding OZrP, the peak heat release rate and total heat of combustion were significantly reduced. The highest improvement was achieved with 0.5 wt% OZrP. XPS analysis indicated that the performance of anti-oxidation of the coating was improved with the addition of OZrP, and SEM images showed that a good synergistic effect was obtained through a ceramic-like layer produced by OZrP covered on the surface of char.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

LLNL Fire Protection Engineering Standard 5.8 Facility Survey Program (Rev.5)

This standard describes the LLNL Fire Protection Facility Survey Program. The purpose of this standard is to describe the type of facility surveys required to fulfill the requirements of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety. Nothing in this standard is intended to prevent the development of a FHA using alternative approaches. Alternate approaches, including formatting, will be by exception only, and approved by the Fire Marshal/Fire Protection Engineering Subject Matter Expert in advance of their use.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Audit Report, "Fire Protection Deficiencies at Los Alamos National Laboratory"

The Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) maintains some of the Nation's most important national security assets, including nuclear materials. Many of Los Alamos' facilities are located in close proximity to one another, are occupied by large numbers of contract and Federal employees, and support activities ranging from nuclear weapons design to science-related activities. Safeguarding against fires, regardless of origin, is essential to protecting employees, surrounding communities, and national security assets. On June 1, 2006, Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS), became the managing and operating contractor for Los Alamos, under contract with the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In preparation for assuming its management responsibilities at Los Alamos, LANS conducted walk-downs of the Laboratory's facilities to identify pre-existing deficiencies that could give rise to liability, obligation, loss or damage. The walk-downs, which identified 812 pre-existing fire protection deficiencies, were conducted by subject matter professionals, including fire protection experts. While the Los Alamos Site Office has overall responsibility for the effectiveness of the fire protection program, LANS, as the Laboratory's operating contractor, has a major, day-to-day role in minimizing fire-related risks. The issue of fire protection at Los Alamos is more than theoretical. In May 2000, the 'Cerro Grande' fire burned about 43,000 acres, including 7,700 acres of Laboratory property. Due to the risk posed by fire to the Laboratory's facilities, workforce, and surrounding communities, we initiated this audit to determine whether pre-existing fire protection deficiencies had been addressed. Our review disclosed that LANS had not resolved many of the fire protection deficiencies that had been identified in early 2006: (1) Of the 296 pre-existing deficiencies we selected for audit, 174 (59 percent) had not been corrected; and, (2) A substantial portion of the uncorrected deficiencies, 86 (49 percent) were considered by the walk-down teams to be significant enough to warrant compensatory actions until the deficiency was corrected or was tracked to closure through implementation of corrective actions. Further, we found that 32 of the significant deficiencies had been closed by the previous Los Alamos contractor, prior to LANS assuming responsibility for operation of the Laboratory, even though the deficiencies had not been corrected. A fire protection expert provided technical support during the audit. As an example of uncorrected problems, LANS had not resolved, by performing periodic tests, a deficiency identified in 2006 regarding a kitchen hood fire suppression system in a facility located within the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. Such systems are required to be tested twice a year by the National Fire Protection Association standard, a standard that had been adopted by Department of Energy under DOE Order 420.1B. Yet, in 2006, the LANS walk-down team recognized that this system had not been inspected since May 2004 and noted that deficient suppression systems could result in significantly high levels of property damage and loss. After we brought this issue to management's attention on February 6, 2009, LANS officials stated that the Laboratory would correct this deficiency. As with the problems involving the fire suppression system, we observed that LANS had not always corrected life safety deficiencies involving building exits at one of its primary facilities. This included providing a secondary emergency exit for a building with occupants on multiple floor levels. LANS had removed personnel from the third floor and improved the sprinkler system of the facility, but it had still not provided a secondary exit for personnel on the second floor by the time we completed our review. NNSA has since stated that this fire protection issue will be completely addressed by relocating personnel from the second floor. Perhaps most serious, our testing revealed that a number of deficiencies were formally closed even though actual corrective action had not been completed. Notably, we observed that action had not been taken to resolve a recommendation to replace a fire alarm panel found to be unreliable. After the walk-down was conducted but prior to contract transition, the former contractor closed the recommendation in its action tracking database even though the panel had not been replaced. The walk-down team had categorized the fire alarm system as requiring replacement since it had been modified many times, was old and obsolete, and had very limited available spare parts. In fact, the walk-down team concluded that the panel 'must be considered to be unreliable and should have a very high priority for replacement'.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

GLOVEBOX WINDOWS, FIRE PROTECTION AND VOICES FROM THE PAST

'Study the past--what is past is prologue'. These words appear as the motto on a pair of statues at the National Archives Building in Washington DC. They are also the opening sentence in the preface of a document written in August of 1956 entitled 'A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving Radiation in Atomic Energy Activities--June 1945 thru December 1955'. This document, one of several written by D.F. Hayes of the Safety and Fire Protection Branch, Division of Organization and Personnel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in Washington DC, and many others are often forgotten even though they contain valuable glovebox fire protection lessons for us today.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Fire Protection Engineering Technical Report for Electric Vehicles and Lithium-Ion Batteries

This fire protection engineering technical report discusses and presents the properties, data, and safety of select lithium-ion batteries. Lithium-ion batteries have increased in usage and a fire scenario analysis must be created for each situation where they may be introduced in buildings to determine the risk associated if a battery failure were to occur.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP) P-108

This report includes the following outline of the course presented: Day 1: –Module 1: Introduction to Fire SDP Philosophy and Example Problem –Module 2: Concepts, Terminology, and Fire Scenario Introduction –Module 3: Process Overview •A quick trip through Phases 1 and 2 •Day 2: –Module 4: Phase 1 Details –Module 5: Phase 2 Details •Day 3: –Module 5: Phase 2 Details (continued) –Module 6: Special Topics •Module 6A – High Energy Arcing Faults in Electrical Distribution and Switching Equipment •Module 6B – Cable Tray Fires •Module 6C – Reverse Engineering The Hot Gas Layer •Module 6D: Flexibility –Discussion and Closing.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Neutron Generator Production Facility (NGPF), Building 870: Structural Fire Protection Analysis and Basis of Design Report

This report was prepared to provide an explanation of the prescriptive-based code approach for the Neutron Generator Production Facility’s (NGPF) structural fire protection and construction classification determinations based upon the original code-of-record (1991-UBC) and current International Building Code (2012-IBC) requirements. The code approach presented in this report included a determination of the required construction type in accordance with the 2012-IBC. Through the evaluation of the record design drawings and subsequent site surveys, a determination was made of the existing types of materials used to construct the columns, beams, floor assemblies, roof assembly, and exterior and interior walls and partitions. A summary is provided for the fire resistance requirements of the different elements of the building. In addition, a determination was made in regards to the fire resistance hourly ratings of the columns, beams, floor assemblies, roof assembly, exterior walls, interiors walls and partitions, door openings, joints and penetrations. Through design evaluation, site survey, code verification, and review of record documents, the actual construction classification (Type II-B) was confirmed to be compliant with the 2012-IBC.

42 ENGINEERING↗