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At least 19 records

Experimental and Modeling Study of the Flammability of Fuel Tank Headspace Vapors from Ethanol/Gasoline Fuels; Phase 3: Effects of Winter Gasoline Volatility and Ethanol Content on Blend Flammability; Flammability Limits of Denatured Ethanol

This study assessed differences in headspace flammability for summertime gasolines and new high-ethanol content fuel blends. The results apply to vehicle fuel tanks and underground storage tanks. Ambient temperature and fuel formulation effects on headspace vapor flammability of ethanol/gasoline blends were evaluated. Depending on the degree of tank filling, fuel type, and ambient temperature,fuel vapors in a tank can be flammable or non-flammable. Pure gasoline vapors in tanks generally are too rich to be flammable unless ambient temperatures are extremely low. High percentages of ethanol blended with gasoline can be less volatile than pure gasoline and can produce flammable headspace vapors at common ambient temperatures. The study supports refinements of fuel ethanol volatilityspecifications and shows potential consequences of using noncompliant fuels. E85 is flammable at low temperatures; denatured ethanol is flammable at warmer temperatures. If both are stored at the same location, one or both of the tanks' headspace vapors will be flammable over a wide range of ambient temperatures. This is relevant to allowing consumers to splash -blend ethanol and gasoline atfueling stations. Fuels compliant with ASTM volatility specifications are relatively safe, but the E85 samples tested indicate that some ethanol fuels may produce flammable vapors.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Self-Flammability of Gases Generated by Hanford Tank Waste and the Potential of Nitrogen Inerting to Eliminate Flammability Safety Concerns

Through radiolytic and thermolytic reactions, Hanford tank wastes generate and retain a variety of gases, including hydrogen, nitrous oxide, methane (and other hydrocarbons), ammonia, and nitrogen. This gas generation can be expected to continue during processing in the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The generation rates in the WTP will change from those for the in-situ tank waste because of different process temperatures, different dose rates produced by in-process changes in the proportions of solid and liquid, and dilution of the waste liquid. The flammability of the generated gas that is continuously released, and of any retained gas that might be released into a vessel headspace in quantity due to a spontaneous release, depends on the concentrations not only of the fuel gases—primarily hydrogen (H2), methane, other hydrocarbons, and ammonia—but of the oxidizer nitrous oxide (N2O). As a result of high concentrations of N2O, some gas mixtures are “self-flammable” (i.e., ignition can occur when no air is present because N2O provides the only oxidizer needed). Self-flammability could potentially reduce the effectiveness of using a nitrogen (N2) purge in the headspace as a flammability control, if its effects are not accounted for. A given amount of inertant gas (N2) can accommodate only a certain amount of a generated self-flammable gas before the mixture with inertant gas becomes flammable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

STEADY STATE FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE RATE CALCULATION AND LOWER FLAMMABILITY LEVEL EVALUATION FOR HANFORD TANK WASTE

This report assesses the steady state flammability level under off normal ventilation conditions in the tank headspace for 28 double-shell tanks (DST) and 149 single shell-tanks (SST) at the Hanford Site. Flammability was calculated using estimated gas release rates, Le Chatelier's rule, and lower flammability limits of fuels in an air mixture. This revision updates the hydrogen generation rate input data for al1 177 tanks using waste composition information from the Best Basis Inventory Detail Report (data effective as of August 4,2008). Assuming only barometric breathing, the shortest time to reach 25% of the lower flammability limit is 13 days for DSTs (i.e., tank 241-AZ-102) and 36 days for SSTs (i.e., tank 241-B-203). Assuming zero ventilation, the shortest time to reach 25% of the lower flammability limit is 12 days for DSTs (i.e., tank 241-AZ-102) and 34 days for SSTs (i.e., tank 241-B-203).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

STEADY STATE FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE RATE CALCULATION AND LOWER FLAMMABILITY LEVEL EVALUATION FOR HANFORD TANK WASTE

This report assesses the steady state flammability level under off normal ventilation conditions in the tank headspace for 28 double-shell tanks (DST) and 149 single shell-tanks (SST) at the Hanford Site. Flammability was calculated using estimated gas release rates, Le Chatelier's rule, and lower flammability limits of fuels in an air mixture. This revision updates the hydrogen generation rate input data for all 177 tanks using waste composition information from the Best Basis Inventory Detail Report (data effective as of August 4,2008). Assuming only barometric breathing, the shortest time to reach 25% of the lower flammability limit is 11 days for DSTs (i.e., tank 241-AZ-10l) and 36 days for SSTs (i.e., tank 241-B-203). Assuming zero ventilation, the shortest time to reach 25% of the lower flammability limit is 10 days for DSTs (i.e., tank 241-AZ-101) and 34 days for SSTs (i.e., tank 241-B-203).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Space Systems - Safety and Compatibility of Materials - Method to Determine the Flammability Thresholds of Materials

Spacecraft fire safety emphasizes fire prevention, which is achieved primarily through the use of fire-resistant materials. Materials selection for spacecraft is based on conventional flammability acceptance tests, along with prescribed quantity limitations and configuration control for items that are non-pass or questionable. ISO 14624-1 and -2 are the major methods used to evaluate flammability of polymeric materials intended for use in the habitable environments of spacecraft. The methods are upward flame-propagation tests initiated in static environments and using a well-defined igniter flame at the bottom of the sample. The tests are conducted in the most severe flaming combustion environment expected in the spacecraft. The pass/fail test logic of ISO 14624-1 and -2 does not allow a quantitative comparison with reduced gravity or microgravity test results; therefore their use is limited, and possibilities for in-depth theoretical analyses and realistic estimates of spacecraft fire extinguishment requirements are practically eliminated. To better understand the applicability of laboratory test data to actual spacecraft environments, a modified ISO 14624 protocol has been proposed that, as an alternative to qualifying materials as pass/fail in the worst-expected environments, measures the actual upward flammability limit for the material. A working group established by NASA to provide recommendations for exploration spacecraft internal atmospheres realized the importance of correlating laboratory data with real-life environments and recommended NASA to develop a flammability threshold test method. The working group indicated that for the Constellation Program, the flammability threshold information will allow NASA to identify materials with increased flammability risk from oxygen concentration and total pressure changes, minimize potential impacts, and allow for development of sound requirements for new spacecraft and extravehicular landers and habitats. Furthermore, recent research has shown that current normal gravity materials flammability tests do not correlate with flammability in ventilated, micro- or reduced-gravity conditions. Currently, the materials selection for spacecraft is based on the assumption of commonality between ground flammability test results and spacecraft environments, which does not appear to be valid. Materials flammability threshold data acquired in normal gravity can be correlated with data obtained in microgravity or reduced-gravity experiments, and consequently a more accurate assessment of the margin of safety of the material in the real environment can be made. In addition, the method allows the option of selecting better or best space system materials, as opposed to what would be considered just acceptable from a flammability point of view and realistic assessment of spacecraft fire extinguishment needs, which could result in significant weight savings. The knowledge afforded by this technique allows for limited extrapolations of flammability behavior to conditions not specifically tested and that could potentially result in significant cost and time savings. The intent of this Technical Specification is to bring to the attention of International Aerospace Community the importance of correlating laboratory test data with real-life space systems applications. The method presented is just one of the possibilities that are believed will lead to better understanding the applicability of laboratory aerospace materials flammability test data. International feedback on improving the proposed method, as well as suggestions for correlating other laboratory aerospace test data with real-life applications relevant to space systems are being sought.

Hirsch, David↗

Flammability and dispersion of tritium in confined release scenarios

Ignition of a flammable tritium-air mixture is the most probable means to produce the water form (T 2 O or HTO), which is more easily absorbed by living tissue and is hence ~10,000 times more hazardous to human health when uptake occurs compared to the gaseous form (T 2 or HT; per Mishima and Steele, 2002). Tritium-air mixtures with T 2 concentrations below 4 mol% are considered sub-flammable and will not readily convert to the more hazardous water form. It is therefore desirable from a safety perspective to understand the dispersion behavior of tritium under different release conditions, especially since tritium is often stored in quantities and pressures much lower than is typical for normal hydrogen. The formation of a flammable layer at the ceiling is a scenario of particular concern because the rate of dispersion to nonflammable conditions is slowest in this configuration, which maximizes the time window over which the flammable tritium may encounter an ignition source. This report describes the processes of buoyant rise and dispersion of tritium. Accumulation of flammable concentrations of tritium next to the ceiling is a common safety concern for hydrogen, but this situation can only occur if dispersion rates are slow with respect to rates of release and rise. Theory and simulations demonstrate that buoyancy does not cause regions with flammable concentrations to form within buildings from sources that have previously been mixed to sub-flammable concentrations. A simulated series of tritium release events with their associated dispersion behavior are reported herein; these simulations apply computational fluid dynamics to rooms with three different ceiling heights and a variety of tritium release rates. Safety related quantities from these simulations are reported, including the mass and volume of tritium occurring in a flammable mixture, the presence or absence of a flammable layer at the ceiling, and the time required for dispersion to nonflammable conditions after the end of the tritium release event. These safety metrics are influenced by the magnitude and rate of the tritium release with respect to the air volume in the room and also the momentum of the plume or jet with respect to the ceiling height. Several screening criteria are recommended to assess whether a specific tritium release scenario is likely to form a flammable layer at the ceiling. The methods and results in this modeling study have applicability to explosion safety analysis for other buoyant flammable gases, including the lighter isotopes of hydrogen.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

The Effect of the Presence of Ozone on the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) of Hydrogen in Vessels Containing Savannah River Site High Level Waste - 12387

The Enhanced Chemical Cleaning (ECC) process uses ozone to effect the oxidation of metal oxalates produced during the dissolution of sludge in the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks. The ozone reacts with the metal oxalates to form metal oxide and hydroxide precipitants, and the CO{sub 2}, O{sub 2}, H{sub 2}O and any unreacted O{sub 3} gases are discharged into the vapor space. In addition to the non-radioactive metals in the waste, however, the SRS radioactive waste also contains a variety of radionuclides, hence, hydrogen gas is also present in the vapor space of the ECC system. Because hydrogen is flammable, the impact of this resultant gas stream on the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) of hydrogen must be understood for all possible operating scenarios of both normal and off-normal situations, with particular emphasis at the elevated temperatures and pressures of the typical ECC operating conditions. Oxygen is a known accelerant in combustion reactions, but while there are data associated with the behavior of hydrogen/oxygen environments, recent, relevant studies addressing the effect of ozone on the flammability limit of hydrogen proved scarce. Further, discussions with industry experts verified the absence of data in this area and indicated that laboratory testing, specific to defined operating parameters, was needed to comprehensively address the issue. Testing was thus designed and commissioned to provide the data necessary to support safety related considerations for the ECC process. A test matrix was developed to envelope the bounding conditions considered credible during ECC processing. Each test consists of combining a gas stream of high purity hydrogen with a gas stream comprised of a specified mixture of ozone and oxygen in a temperature and pressure regulated chamber such that the relative compositions of the two streams are controlled. The gases are then stirred to obtain a homogeneous mixture and ignition attempted by applying 10J of energy to a fuse wire. A gas combination is considered flammable when a pressure rise of 7% of the initial absolute pressure is observed. The specified testing methodology is consistent with guidelines established in ASTM E-918-83 (2005) 'Standard Practices for Determining Limits of Flammability of Chemicals at Elevated Temperature and Pressure'. The LFL of hydrogen in air was determined and is in good agreement with the literature data. Ozone-oxygen mixtures were found to be flammable at concentrations above 8.3 vol.% based on the ASTM E918 7% pressure rise criteria for flame propagation. This result is lower than previously reported values which can be explained through the variations in the test setup and procedure. It is believed that the lower values obtained in this work are a result of improvements of the test methodology. Tests performed with hydrogen in various concentrations of ozone in oxygen have shown that the LFL of hydrogen decreases as the concentration of ozone in the mixture increases. This testing was designed to provide data under the conditions considered most optimal to produce deflagration. The geometry and materials of construction of the testing vessel; the location of the fuse wire; the magnitude of the supplied energy; the careful minimization of diluents and other contaminants; and meticulous procedural detail to maintain integrity of the ozone to the maximum extent practical, result in data that reflect not the expected process conditions, but those that enhance the possibility of flame propagation. For this reason, there is believed to be considerable conservatism in the indicated results. Per the vendor, the maximum possible ozone concentration producible by the planned ECC Ozone generator is 8 volume percent (the typical maximum operating setpoint concentration is 6.8 vol%), less than the 8.3 minimum volume % concentration shown to be flammable in a 99.999% pure O{sub 2} environment at the optimally conservative conditions established in this testing. Further, the feed to the ECC ozone generator is only 87% oxygen, the remainder, water vapor and nitrogen, both powerful diluents. It is, thus, believed not credible that deflagration can occur at this maximum feed concentration condition. In addition, once the ozone stream contacts the waste stream, the many simultaneous oxidizing reactions will rapidly decompose available ozone to well below flammable levels. Further, because the radiolytically generated hydrogen quantity is negligible compared to the supplied ozone/oxygen stream (0.0004 moles per minute H{sub 2} vs 76 moles per minute ozone/oxygen), even the total H{sub 2}/O{sub 3} mixture, without crediting decomposition reactions, does not approach flammable concentrations. Finally, even at the 'end' of the ECC batch cycle, when most of the metal oxalates have been decomposed, testing has indicated that the ozone concentration in the vapor space of the ECC process vessel reaches a concentration of no more than 3 vol%, remaining well below concentrations of concern. The major issue for the ECC operation established by this testing is the impact of the data when applied to off normal conditions. While it is possible to discontinue ozone addition to the reaction vessel at any time, the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate continues, varying slightly as ambient pressures and temperatures change. Relative to the data generated and analyzed in this testing, the ECC hazards analysis team will re-evaluate off normal conditions (e.g. those during which process exhaust ventilation is lost) such that issues involving mixtures of hydrogen and ozone in the vapor space can be appropriately controlled. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impacts of Crust Properties on the Waste Feed Delivery of Hanford Tanks with Flammability Concerns - 18161

Mitigation of flammability concerns within Hanford waste tanks is essential to Safe Storage and Waste Feed Delivery sub-functions of the River Protection Project Mission. The tanks that have a higher propensity for the generation, retention, and release of flammable gas are considered Waste Group A tanks. Group A tanks include 241-SY-103, 241-AN-103, 241-AN-104, 241-AN-105, and 241-AW-101. Successful mitigation of flammability concerns in these tanks is necessary, as they are critical to the completion of the River Protection Project Mission as indicated in the Integrated Waste Feed Delivery Plan. The benchmark for examination of tank flammability issues is 241-SY-101. Studies of Tank 241-SY-101 gas release events showed that the mechanism of gas retention and release was highly dependent on the volume and configuration of a floating crust layer. Beginning in 1993, 241-SY-101 underwent water additions and mixer pump operations resulting in dissolution of the crust. These efforts mitigated the flammability concerns of the tank. A similar mitigation approach was recommended for Tank 241-SY103 and is recommended for the other Waste Group A tanks. However, this recommended mitigation will be more or less effective based on the expected thickness of the crust present in each of the Group A tanks. Considerations of flammable gas generation and release mechanisms were essential in the development of a successful mitigation strategy for Tank 241-SY-101, and will be essential in the development of future mitigation strategies. Because crust properties are difficult to measure, tank surface level trends and current temperature profiles are evaluated to understand crust properties. 241-AN-103 and 241-AW-101 are the only two tanks with a net increase in surface level, indicating a higher generation and retention of flammable gas. Additionally, these are the two tanks with the thickest crusts, which causes both a higher retention of gas and a reduced evaporation rate. Given the current temperature profile, crust thickness for 241-AW-101 was re-evaluated to be 145 cm (57 in) ± 30 cm (12 in) which is different from its historic value. This gives 241-AW-101 the thickest crust, second only to 241-SY-101 prior to mitigation. The crust thickness for 241-AN-103, however, retains its historic value of 89 cm (35 in) ± 16 cm (6 in). These crust properties suggest modifications to the mitigation strategy are needed for each tank. For example, 241-AN-103 and 241-AW-101 will require additional water to dissolve the crust layer before flammability concerns are mitigated and further operations could commence. Implementation of the modified mitigation strategies will mitigate flammability issues and help fulfill the Safe Storage and Waste Feed Delivery sub-functions of the River Protection Project Mission safely and efficiently. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Completion of initial reduced-order model for flammable refrigerant dispersal in residential spaces

Environmental regulations aimed at reducing global warming impacts of HVAC&R refrigerants have resulted in the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in 2010 and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by 2030 in developed countries with additional restrictions on the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) set to take effect in 2036. Many of the remaining alternative refrigerants that have lower global warming potential (GWP) and that are suitable for use in HVAC&R systems (e.g., propane, difluoromethane) are flammable to some degree. Flammable refrigerants introduce new challenges and hazards to property and personal safety related to potential deflagration during system maintenance or due to leakage of the refrigerant accumulating in the conditioned space. Standards have been developed to set maximum charge limits for flammable refrigerants in HVAC&R systems; however, existing safety standards and codes still restrict their use. The bodies that maintain and update these codes need publicly available, science-based information to enable credible guidelines for setting safe charge limits for different flammable refrigerants in different HVAC&R applications. In 2016, the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, the Air-Conditioning Heating and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI), ASHRAE, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the State of California began efforts to develop such information. As part of this effort, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) began the current, ongoing project to examine imposed charge limits for flammable refrigerants and identify reasonable adjustments to these limits when found appropriate. Past tasks under this project have included development of experimentally vetted, computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation approaches to study the results of leakage of flammable refrigerants from various HVAC&R systems into different types of commercial and residential spaces. In this report, we discuss recent efforts to develop a predictive model of the flammable volume fraction and accumulated refrigerant mass in a single-room residential space resulting from the leak of a flammable refrigerant from a small room air conditioning (RAC) unit. The eventual goal is development of a model suitable for public release which could simulate a range of scenarios. In discussions with the AHRTI Flammable Refrigerant Subcommittee (FRS) at the beginning of this effort, a total of 9 input parameters were chosen for consideration including room area, room/door opening area, ventilation fan flow rate, unit/leak height, leak area, leak rate, total refrigerant charge, refrigerant molecular weight, and state of the unit fan.

42 ENGINEERING↗

THE IMPACT OF OZONE ON THE LOWER FLAMMABLE LIMIT OF HYDROGEN IN VESSELS CONTAINING SAVANNAH RIVER SITE HIGH LEVEL WASTE

The Savannah River Site, in conjunction with AREVA Federal services, has designed a process to treat dissolved radioactive waste solids with ozone. It is known that in this radioactive waste process, radionuclides radiolytically break down water into gaseous hydrogen and oxygen, which presents a well defined flammability hazard. Flammability limits have been established for both ozone and hydrogen separately; however, there is little information on mixtures of hydrogen and ozone. Therefore, testing was designed to provide critical flammability information necessary to support safety related considerations for the development of ozone treatment and potential scale-up to the commercial level. Since information was lacking on flammability issues at low levels of hydrogen and ozone, a testing program was developed to focus on filling this portion of the information gap. A 2-L vessel was used to conduct flammability tests at atmospheric pressure and temperature using a fuse wire ignition source at 1 percent ozone intervals spanning from no ozone to the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) of ozone in the vessel, determined as 8.4%(v/v) ozone. An ozone generator and ozone detector were used to generate and measure the ozone concentration within the vessel in situ, since ozone decomposes rapidly on standing. The lower flammability limit of hydrogen in an ozone-oxygen mixture was found to decrease from the LFL of hydrogen in air, determined as 4.2 % (v/v) in this vessel. From the results of this testing, Savannah River was able to develop safety procedures and operating parameters to effectively minimize the formation of a flammable atmosphere.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Flow Effects on the Flammability Diagrams of Solid Fuels: Microgravity Influence on Ignition Delay

The possibility of an accidental fire in space-based facilities is a primary concern of space exploration programs. Spacecraft environments generally present low velocity air currents produced by ventilation and heating systems (of the order of 0.1 m/s), and fluctuating oxygen concentrations around that of air due to CO2 removal systems. Recent experiments of flame spread in microgravity show the spread rate to be faster and the limiting oxygen concentration lower than in normal-gravity. To date, there is not a material flammability-testing protocol that specifically addresses issues related to microgravity conditions. The present project (FIST) aims to establish a testing methodology that is suitable for the specific conditions of reduced gravity. The concepts underlying the operation of the LIFT apparatus, ASTM-E 1321-93, have been used to develop the Forced-flow Ignition and flame-Spread Test (FIST). As in the LIFT, the FIST is used to obtain the flammability diagrams of the material, i.e., graphs of ignition delay time and flame spread rate as a function of the externally applied radiant flux, but under forced flow rather than natural convection conditions, and for different oxygen concentrations. Although the flammability diagrams are similar, the flammability properties obtained with the FIST are found to depend on the flow characteristics. A research program is currently underway with the purpose of implementing the FIST as a protocol to characterize the flammability performance of solid materials to be used in microgravity facilities. To this point, tests have been performed with the FIST apparatus in both normal-gravity and microgravity conditions to determine the effects of oxidizer flow characteristics on the flammability diagrams of polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA) fuel samples. The experiments are conducted at reduced gravity in a KC- 135 aircraft following a parabolic flight trajectory that provides up to 25 seconds of low gravity. The objective of the experiments is to obtain data of ignition delay and flame spread rate at low flow velocities (0.1 to 0.2 m/s), which cannot be obtained under normal gravity because of the natural convection induced flows (approx. 0.5 m/s). Due to the limited reduced gravity time, the data can only be obtained for high radiant fluxes, and are consequently limited in scope. These tests do, however, provide insight into the flammability diagram characteristics at low velocity and reduced gravity, and also into the implications of the flow-dependence of the flammability properties under environments similar to those encountered in space facilities.

Cordova, J. L.↗

Flammability: A Review and Analysis

With its founding in 1975, Committee G-4 of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) embarked on the process of defining the flammability of metallic materials in oxygen-enriched atmospheres. In this process, they are joined by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the Compressed Gas Association (CGA). Although none of these organizations has explicitly defined flammability, the following definitions and statements provide a composite understanding of the concept: 1. "This Standard Guide (ASTM G94-92) is concerned primarily with the properties of a material associated with its relative susceptibility to ignition and propagation of combustion." 2. "A material is considered flammable at the maximum use pressure if at least one sample burns more than 6 in. (15.2 cm). At least, five samples must be tested." NASA 3. "Flammable: Capable, when ignited of maintaining combustion under the specified environmental conditions." NFPA 53. 4. "Combustion: A complex sequence of chemical reactions between a fuel and an oxidant accompanied by the evolution of heat, and usually, the emission of light." NFPA 53. and 5. "A safe oxygen-piping transmission or distribution system is one that is designed and installed in accordance with all applicable codes and regulations for the service conditions and locations involved and further meets the special requirements for oxygen services." CGA-G4 Flammability thus equates, after ignition, to propagation of combustion, synonymous with steady state burning, under specified environmental conditions. Properties for which quantitative values are given in ASTM G94-92 and which are used to describe metals flammability consistent with the concept of steady state burning are either system independent properties, such as, enthalpies of reaction, burn ratios, flame temperatures, thermal conductivity, and heat release; or system dependent properties, such as, oxygen index, promoted combustion, threshold pressure and burn rates. Each property is reviewed and analyzed as to whether it provides an absolute or relative measure for flammability. It is shown that burn ratio, as applied to the actual steady state combustion condition, approaches the desired absolute measure of flammability.

Wilson, D. Bruce↗

Flammability Test Method for Materials Intended for Use as Fire Barriers in Crewed Habitats

In some crewed-spacecraft applications, onboard materials are intentionally selected to function as hazard control barriers to prevent powered hardware and/or ignited flammable items from igniting nearby flammable materials by acting as non-breaching, non-flammable containment (e.g., cargo transfer bags, zero gravity stowage racks, and jettison stowage bags on the International Space Station). Historically, flammability self-extinguishment testing of broad acreage or outermost layer materials alone was believed to be sufficient to verify overall flammability compliance. Though required, testing on design features such as threaded seams and zippers was not performed due to the incorrect assumption that flammability performance would not be impacted. However, recent coupon level testing of layups and configurations consisting of multiple materials have revealed that these features may be more susceptible to ignition and fire propagation than the bulk material. Additionally, configurational coupon ignition and propagation testing does not explicitly determine a material’s ability to provide protection to vulnerable flammable hardware. The need to evaluate this gap in assessing material or layup effectiveness as fire barriers between ignition sources and flammable materials led to the development of a new configuration-based fire barrier test. Test setup, relevant configurations, and test validation are discussed. The new barrier test method establishes a configuration for the test apparatus, identifies a conservative ignitor configuration, and defines pass/fail criteria. Test setup, relevant configurations, and test validation are discussed.

Susana Harper↗

Oxygen Limit for Flammability of a Gas Mixture of Helium – Hydrogen – Oxygen in the U.S. Department of Energy Standard Canister

The radiolytic breakdown of residual free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed waters is anticipated in the sealed dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), releasing H 2 gas into the initial cover gas of helium. For aluminum-clad SNF (ASNF) in particular, the expected total hydrogen in the canister is enough to dominate the cover gas mixture if fully released, and based on experimental rates of H 2 generation, H 2 percentages exceeding the lower flammability limit appear likely. However, no evidence of radiolytic generation of O 2 has been observed to date, so the potential for flammability is averted due to the lack O 2 . Lack of oxygen has been credited for avoiding flammability in some existing storage and transportation approaches for SNF and other waste. This report reviews literature on flammability limits with a focus on the limiting oxygen concentration to provide technical underpinnings to refine a flammability criterion for gas mixtures of helium, hydrogen, and oxygen where the oxygen is expected to be the limiting species. While there is general consensus on H 2 flammability limits at standard temperature and pressure, the decay heat and gas generation within ASNF sealed dry storage canisters could push them to elevated temperatures and pressures, so the goal is to identify an oxygen threshold that will bound the behavior over the temperature and pressure range of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The information reviewed in this document supports the criterion that the oxygen concentration in a He-H 2 -O 2 mixture should be less than 1.5% to avoid flammability at temperatures and pressures relevant to sealed dry storage of ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister, i.e., up to 343°C (650°F) and 500 psig, respectively. Note that while data covering the full range of temperature at atmospheric pressure and nearly the full range of pressure at room temperature were available, data for the combined effects was available only at moderate temperatures and pressures; the recommended 1.5% O 2 threshold is based on the breadth of available data reported here and apparent trends therein.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Effect of Evaporation on Vapor Space Flammability in DWPF Process Vessels - 20278

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes liquid high-level waste (HLW) and encapsulates it in glass within stainless-steel containers suitable for safe, long-term storage and disposal. Radiolytic and chemical decomposition of the liquid waste generates hydrogen and other flammable gases creating a hazard. The rate of flammable gas generation increases by an order of magnitude as temperature increases from sub-boiling to boiling. DWPF controls this hazard in process tanks by ensuring a minimum purge flow through each tank's head space. The minimum purge flow rate is established assuming dry air and neglecting evaporation. However, this study determined that steam from boiling in a representative process tank is sufficient to dilute flammable gases and, thereby, preclude flammability. For sub-boiling, water vapor is an insufficient diluent considering hydrogen's lower flammable limit (LFL) in air. However, the upper and lower flammable limits approach each other in a hydrogen-air-water-vapor environment as the water vapor concentration increases. This effect may preclude flammable conditions if water vapor concentration is about 60 volume percent or higher. A saturated, constant-pressure air-water system would achieve 60 volume percent water vapor at 86 deg. C. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Selected Parametric Effects on Materials Flammability Limits

NASA-STD-(I)-6001B Test 1 is currently used to evaluate the flammability of materials intended for use in habitable environments of U.S. spacecraft. The method is a pass/fail upward flame propagation test conducted in the worst case configuration, which is defined as a combination of a material s thickness, test pressure, oxygen concentration, and temperature that make the material most flammable. Although simple parametric effects may be intuitive (such as increasing oxygen concentrations resulting in increased flammability), combinations of multi-parameter effects could be more complex. In addition, there are a variety of material configurations used in spacecraft. Such configurations could include, for example, exposed free edges where fire propagation may be different when compared to configurations commonly employed in standard testing. Studies involving combined oxygen concentration, pressure, and temperature on flammability limits have been conducted and are summarized in this paper. Additional effects on flammability limits of a material s thickness, mode of ignition, burn-length criteria, and exposed edges are presented. The information obtained will allow proper selection of ground flammability test conditions, support further studies comparing flammability in 1-g with microgravity and reduced gravity environments, and contribute to persuasive scientific cases for rigorous space system fire risk assessments.

Hirsch, David B.↗