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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1982

A digital flight control system verification laboratory

A NASA/FAA program has been established for the verification and validation of digital flight control systems (DFCS), with the primary objective being the development and analysis of automated verification tools. In order to enhance the capabilities, effectiveness, and ease of using the test environment, software verification tools can be applied. Tool design includes a static analyzer, an assertion generator, a symbolic executor, a dynamic analysis instrument, and an automated documentation generator. Static and dynamic tools are integrated with error detection capabilities, resulting in a facility which analyzes a representative testbed of DFCS software. Future investigations will ensue particularly in the areas of increase in the number of software test tools, and a cost effectiveness assessment.

De Feo, P.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Case Study: Test Results of a Tool and Method for In-Flight, Adaptive Control System Verification on a NASA F-15 Flight Research Aircraft

Adaptive control technologies that incorporate learning algorithms have been proposed to enable autonomous flight control and to maintain vehicle performance in the face of unknown, changing, or poorly defined operating environments [1-2]. At the present time, however, it is unknown how adaptive algorithms can be routinely verified, validated, and certified for use in safety-critical applications. Rigorous methods for adaptive software verification end validation must be developed to ensure that. the control software functions as required and is highly safe and reliable. A large gap appears to exist between the point at which control system designers feel the verification process is complete, and when FAA certification officials agree it is complete. Certification of adaptive flight control software verification is complicated by the use of learning algorithms (e.g., neural networks) and degrees of system non-determinism. Of course, analytical efforts must be made in the verification process to place guarantees on learning algorithm stability, rate of convergence, and convergence accuracy. However, to satisfy FAA certification requirements, it must be demonstrated that the adaptive flight control system is also able to fail and still allow the aircraft to be flown safely or to land, while at the same time providing a means of crew notification of the (impending) failure. It was for this purpose that the NASA Ames Confidence Tool was developed [3]. This paper presents the Confidence Tool as a means of providing in-flight software assurance monitoring of an adaptive flight control system. The paper will present the data obtained from flight testing the tool on a specially modified F-15 aircraft designed to simulate loss of flight control faces.

Jacklin, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS1982

An integrated user-oriented laboratory for verification of digital flight control systems: Features and capabilities

A Digital Flight Control Systems Verification Laboratory (DFCSVL) has been established at NASA Ames Research Center. This report describes the major elements of the laboratory, the research activities that can be supported in the area of verification and validation of digital flight control systems (DFCS), and the operating scenarios within which these activities can be carried out. The DFCSVL consists of a palletized dual-dual flight-control system linked to a dedicated PDP-11/60 processor. Major software support programs are hosted in a remotely located UNIVAC 1100 accessible from the PDP-11/60 through a modem link. Important features of the DFCSVL include extensive hardware and software fault insertion capabilities, a real-time closed loop environment to exercise the DFCS, an integrated set of software verification tools, and a user-oriented interface to all the resources and capabilities.

Defeo, P.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Verification of the Space Shuttle ascent flight control

The unique avionics design features of the Space Shuttle ascent flight control are described, along with the test article, test equipment, and test techniques used to verify the ascent flight control prior to commitment to the first orbital flight test. The ascent mission profiles are described, noting that upon ignition of the solid rocket boosters the Shuttle vehicle will rise vertically until achieving tower clearance. The Space Shuttle vehicle uses an integrated avionics system with the Orbiter avionics providing the command, control, and monitoring for the total mated Shuttle vehicle. The sensors and the actuator systems are discussed; the method of ascent flight control system verification is described, and it is concluded that the need for an advanced avionics integration and verification laboratory was recognized early in the program to provide maximum support to all program requirements.

Chambers, T. V.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Integrated guidance, navigation and control verification plan primary flight system

The verification process and requirements for the ascent guidance interfaces and the ascent integrated guidance, navigation and control system for the space shuttle orbiter are defined as well as portions of supporting systems which directly interface with the system. The ascent phase of verification covers the normal and ATO ascent through the final OMS-2 circularization burn (all of OPS-1), the AOA ascent through the OMS-1 burn, and the RTLS ascent through ET separation (all of MM 601). In addition, OPS translation verification is defined. Verification trees and roadmaps are given.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1981

Hierarchical specification of the SIFT fault tolerant flight control system

The specification and mechanical verification of the Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) flight control system is described. The methodology employed in the verification effort is discussed, and a description of the hierarchical models of the SIFT system is given. To meet the objective of NASA for the reliability of safety critical flight control systems, the SIFT computer must achieve a reliability well beyond the levels at which reliability can be actually measured. The methodology employed to demonstrate rigorously that the SIFT computer meets as reliability requirements is described. The hierarchy of design specifications from very abstract descriptions of system function down to the actual implementation is explained. The most abstract design specifications can be used to verify that the system functions correctly and with the desired reliability since almost all details of the realization were abstracted out. A succession of lower level models refine these specifications to the level of the actual implementation, and can be used to demonstrate that the implementation has the properties claimed of the abstract design specifications.

Melliar-Smith, P. M.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Dynamic verification of a digital flight control system.

Development of a digital control system dynamic variation technique which accounts for the limitation of available frequency response analyzers. Digital control system theory is briefly reviewed, and generation of the necessary theoretical frequency responses is discussed. Results of the dynamic verification of a digital control system for a Saturn V launch vehicle are presented, and attention is given to the limitations of this technique along with its applicability to other types of digital control systems. A technique for performing open-loop frequency response analyses of a flight program implemented in a 'flight-type' digital computer and interface hardware with vehicle dynamics simulated on an analog computer is described.

Nabers, J. P., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Formal specification and verification of a fault-masking and transient-recovery model for digital flight-control systems

The formal specification and mechanically checked verification for a model of fault-masking and transient-recovery among the replicated computers of digital flight-control systems are presented. The verification establishes, subject to certain carefully stated assumptions, that faults among the component computers are masked so that commands sent to the actuators are the same as those that would be sent by a single computer that suffers no failures.

Rushby, John↗
NASA NTRS1983

Stress testing of digital flight-control system software

A technique for dynamically testing digital flight-control system software on a module-by-module basis is described. Each test module is repetitively executed faster than real-time with an exhaustive input sequence. Outputs of the test module are compared with outputs generated by an alternate, simpler implementation for the same input data. Discrepancies between the two sets of output indicate the possible presence of a software error. The results of an implementation of this technique in the Digital Flight-Control System Software Verification Laboratory are discussed.

Rajan, N.↗
NASA NTRS2014

IKOS: A Framework for Static Analysis based on Abstract Interpretation (Tool Paper)

The RTCA standard (DO-178C) for developing avionic software and getting certification credits includes an extension (DO-333) that describes how developers can use static analysis in certification. In this paper, we give an overview of the IKOS static analysis framework that helps developing static analyses that are both precise and scalable. IKOS harnesses the power of Abstract Interpretation and makes it accessible to a larger class of static analysis developers by separating concerns such as code parsing, model development, abstract domain management, results management, and analysis strategy. The benefits of the approach is demonstrated by a buffer overflow analysis applied to flight control systems.

Abstract Interpretation↗
NASA NTRS1987

Digital-flight-control-system software written in automated-engineering-design language: A user's guide of verification and validation tools

The user guide of verification and validation (V&V) tools for the Automated Engineering Design (AED) language is specifically written to update the information found in several documents pertaining to the automated verification of flight software tools. The intent is to provide, in one document, all the information necessary to adequately prepare a run to use the AED V&V tools. No attempt is made to discuss the FORTRAN V&V tools since they were not updated and are not currently active. Additionally, the current descriptions of the AED V&V tools are contained and provides information to augment the NASA TM 84276. The AED V&V tools are accessed from the digital flight control systems verification laboratory (DFCSVL) via a PDP-11/60 digital computer. The AED V&V tool interface handlers on the PDP-11/60 generate a Univac run stream which is transmitted to the Univac via a Remote Job Entry (RJE) link. Job execution takes place on the Univac 1100 and the job output is transmitted back to the DFCSVL and stored as a PDP-11/60 printfile.

Saito, Jim↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning vane control system (TVCS) are discussed and the problems and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated system.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning valve control system (TVCS) are discussed, and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated systems.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS2010

Hybrid Decompositional Verification for Discovering Failures in Adaptive Flight Control Systems

Adaptive flight control systems hold tremendous promise for maintaining the safety of a damaged aircraft and its passengers. However, most currently proposed adaptive control methodologies rely on online learning neural networks (OLNNs), which necessarily have the property that the controller is changing during the flight. These changes tend to be highly nonlinear, and difficult or impossible to analyze using standard techniques. In this paper, we approach the problem with a variant of compositional verification. The overall system is broken into components. Undesirable behavior is fed backwards through the system. Components which can be solved using formal methods techniques explicitly for the ranges of safe and unsafe input bounds are treated as white box components. The remaining black box components are analyzed with heuristic techniques that try to predict a range of component inputs that may lead to unsafe behavior. The composition of these component inputs throughout the system leads to overall system test vectors that may elucidate the undesirable behavior

Thompson, Sarah↗
NASA NTRS2010

Experimental Validation of L1 Adaptive Control: Rohrs' Counterexample in Flight

The paper presents new results on the verification and in-flight validation of an L1 adaptive flight control system, and proposes a general methodology for verification and validation of adaptive flight control algorithms. The proposed framework is based on Rohrs counterexample, a benchmark problem presented in the early 80s to show the limitations of adaptive controllers developed at that time. In this paper, the framework is used to evaluate the performance and robustness characteristics of an L1 adaptive control augmentation loop implemented onboard a small unmanned aerial vehicle. Hardware-in-the-loop simulations and flight test results confirm the ability of the L1 adaptive controller to maintain stability and predictable performance of the closed loop adaptive system in the presence of general (artificially injected) unmodeled dynamics. The results demonstrate the advantages of L1 adaptive control as a verifiable robust adaptive control architecture with the potential of reducing flight control design costs and facilitating the transition of adaptive control into advanced flight control systems.

Xargay, Enric↗
NASA NTRS1982

Formal specification and mechanical verification of SIFT - A fault-tolerant flight control system

The paper describes the methodology being employed to demonstrate rigorously that the SIFT (software-implemented fault-tolerant) computer meets its requirements. The methodology uses a hierarchy of design specifications, expressed in the mathematical domain of multisorted first-order predicate calculus. The most abstract of these, from which almost all details of mechanization have been removed, represents the requirements on the system for reliability and intended functionality. Successive specifications in the hierarchy add design and implementation detail until the PASCAL programs implementing the SIFT executive are reached. A formal proof that a SIFT system in a 'safe' state operates correctly despite the presence of arbitrary faults has been completed all the way from the most abstract specifications to the PASCAL program.

Melliar-Smith, P. M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Verification and Validation Challenges for Adaptive Flight Control of Complex Autonomous Systems

Autonomy of aerospace systems requires the ability for flight control systems to be able to adapt to complex uncertain dynamic environment. In spite of the five decades of research in adaptive control, the fact still remains that currently no adaptive control system has ever been deployed on any safety-critical or human-rated production systems such as passenger transport aircraft. The problem lies in the difficulty with the certification of adaptive control systems since existing certification methods cannot readily be used for nonlinear adaptive control systems. Research to address the notion of metrics for adaptive control began to appear in the recent years. These metrics, if accepted, could pave a path towards certification that would potentially lead to the adoption of adaptive control as a future control technology for safety-critical and human-rated production systems. Development of certifiable adaptive control systems represents a major challenge to overcome. Adaptive control systems with learning algorithms will never become part of the future unless it can be proven that they are highly safe and reliable. Rigorous methods for adaptive control software verification and validation must therefore be developed to ensure that adaptive control system software failures will not occur, to verify that the adaptive control system functions as required, to eliminate unintended functionality, and to demonstrate that certification requirements imposed by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can be satisfied. This presentation will discuss some of the technical issues with adaptive flight control and related V&V challenges.

Nguyen, Nhan T.↗