SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “Flight Failure”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Investigation of TC-1 flight failure using power spectral analysis
During the Titan Centaur 1 test flight a failure involving at least one of the Centaur propellant boost pumps occurred. Also, neither of the boost pump speed instruments indicated pump rotation. Accelerometer data from the Titan Centaur 1 flight failure were analyzed using power spectral density methods to determine boost pump speed during attempted starts of the Centaur. The technique was demonstrated on a reference flight. The hydrogen boost pump speed transient was determined for the TC-1 flight. Other trends are seen in the data. However, these are not believed to be the oxygen boost pump. Discussion of data enhancement techniques is also presented.
Study for a flight failure warning and analysis PEM system Final report
Airborne digital computer and pulse code modulator for flight failure warning system
Pyrotechnic Devices Flight Failure History, Reliability Issues, and Current Needs
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Remote Diagnosis and Operational Response to an In-Flight Failure of the Drill Feed Mechanism Onboard the Mars Science Laboratory Rover
On November 30th, 2016 (Sol 1536 of the mission), the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) flight operations team commanded the Curiosity rover to drill into a Martian rock to acquire the mission’s 16th rock powder sample. The drilling operation was halted when the drill feed mechanism unexpectedly stalled shortly after disengaging its magnetically-actuated friction brake at the start of a long move to extend the drill bit into contact with the target rock. The drilling campaign was put on hold and later abandoned as diagnostic experimentation revealed a tendency for the actuator to transition in and out of a high-drag state in which the mechanism could not actuate. In the subsequent months, the team conducted a variety of in-flight and ground-based investigations to determine root cause and identify mitigation strategies for continued operation. Mechanism reliability continued to degrade and by June 2017, it became clear that the mechanism could not be relied upon to support drilling operations. The team succeeded in fully extending the feed, enabling the development of new sampling techniques that would not rely on the feed mechanism. The first feed-extended drilling sample was successfully collected on Sol 2057, 521 sols after the initial feed stall. This paper discusses the anomaly investigation process, failure analysis, and feed mechanism operation mitigation strategies. It concludes with key lessons learned about mechanism design, mission architecture, and operational best practices.
Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During an In-Flight Airspeed Failure
Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport fatal accidents. Yet a well-trained and well-qualified crew is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral component of the entire commercial aviation system. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as an independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions and responses while dealing with an in-flight airspeed failure. Accident statistics often cite flight crew error (Baker, 2001) as the primary contributor in accidents and incidents in transport category aircraft. However, the Air Line Pilots Association (2011) suggests "a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of the aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system." This is generally acknowledged but cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how or how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggest crews handle failures on a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program data generally supports this assertion, even if the data is not released to the public. However without hard evidence, the contribution and means by which pilots achieve safety of flight is difficult to define. Thus, ways to improve the human ability to contribute or overcome deficiencies are ill-defined.
Apollo 13 Mission: Cryogenic Oxygen Tank 2 Anomaly Report
There were two investigative aspects associated with the loss of the cryogenic oxygen tank pressure during the Apollo 13 flight. First, what was the cause of the flight failure of cryogenic oxygen tank 2. Second, what possible contributing factors during the ground history of the tank could have led to the ultimate failure in flight. The first flight indication of a problem occurred when the quantity measurement in the tank went full scale about 9 hours before the incident. This condition in itself could not have contributed to ignition in the tank, since the energy in the circuit is restricted to about 7 milli-joules. Data from the electrical system provided the second indication of a problem when the fans in tank 2 were activated to reduce any stratification which might have been present in the supercritical oxygen in the tank. Several short-circuits were detected and have been isolated to the fan circuits of tank 2. The first short-circuit could have contained as much as 160 joules of energy, which is within the current-protection level of the fan circuits. Tests have shown that two orders of magnitude less energy than this is sufficient to ignite the polytetrafluoroethylene insulation on the fan circuits in the tank. Consequently, the evidence indicates that the insulation on the fan wiring was ignited by the energy in the short-circuit.
Dynamic model investigation of two tail-sitter vertically rising airplanes to determine the altitude required to approach normal flight conditions under power failure in hovering flight
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The impact of the flight specifications on semiconductor failure rates.
Flight specifications effects on failure rates of semiconductor parts in Apollo Guidance Computer, detailing procurement, screen, burn-in and field history
Integration of Multiple Non-Normal Checklist Procedures into a Single Checklist Procedure for Transport Aircraft: A Preliminary Investigation
Checklists are used by the flight crew to properly configure an aircraft for safe flight and to ensure a high level of safety throughout the duration of the flight. In addition, the checklist provides a sequential framework to meet cockpit operational requirements, and it fosters cross-checking of the flight deck configuration among crew members. This study examined the feasibility of integrating multiple checklists for non-normal procedures into a single procedure for a typical transport aircraft. For the purposes of this report, a typical transport aircraft is one that represents a midpoint between early generation aircraft (B-727/737-200 and DC-10) and modern glass cockpit aircraft (B747-400/777 and MD-11). In this report, potential conflicts among non-normal checklist items during multiple failure situations for a transport aircraft are identified and analyzed. The non-normal checklist procedure that would take precedence for each of the identified multiple failure flight conditions is also identified. The rationale behind this research is that potential conflicts among checklist items might exist when integrating multiple checklists for non-normal procedures into a single checklist. As a rule, multiple failures occurring in today's highly automated and redundant system transport aircraft are extremely improbable. In addition, as shown in this analysis, conflicts among checklist items in a multiple failure flight condition are exceedingly unlikely. The possibility of a multiple failure flight condition occurring with a conflict among checklist items is so remote that integration of the non-normal checklists into a single checklist appears to be a plausible option.
Evaluation of detectability and distinguishability of aircraft control element failures using flight test data
This paper examines the detectability and distinguishability of control element failures on the B-737 aircraft. The results of Weiss (1985) are used to define decentralized residuals from analytic redundancy relationships, and the results of Weiss et al. (1984) are used to define the probabilistic distance measures which provide bounds on the minimum achievable probabilities or error. The residual signals are then generated using data which were recorded during a landing approach of the NASA-Langley Advanced Transport Operations (ATOPS) transportation systems research vehicle (TSRV). The distance measures are computed using estimates of the statistics of these residual signals.
Accommodating Actuator Failures in Flight Control Systems
A technique for the design of flight control systems that can accommodate a set of actuator failures is presented. As employed herein, an actuator failure is defined as any change in the parametric model of the actuator which can adversely affect actuator performance. The technique is based upon the formulation of a fixed feedback topology which ensures at least stability in the presence of the failures in the set. The fixed compensation is obtained from a loop-shaping design procedure similar to Quantitative Feedback Theory and provides stability robustness in the presence of uncertainty in the vehicle dynamics caused by the failures. System adaptation to improve performance after actuator failure(s) occurs through a static gain adjustment in the compensator followed by modification of the system prefilter. Precise identification of the vehicle dynamics is unnecessary. Application to a single-input, single-output design using a simplified model of the longitudinal dynamics of the NASA High Angle of Attack Research Vehicle is discussed. Non-real time simulations of the system including a model of the pilot demonstrate the effectiveness and limitations of the approach.
The System Complexity Metric (SCM) Predicts System Costs and Failure Rates
A complex system has many parts and interactions and so is difficult to understand. Systems with higher complexity generally have higher costs and failure rates. A System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined to be the sum of the number of nodes, N, in the system block diagram plus the number of one-way interactions, I, between the nodes. SCM = N + I. SCMs are easily determined by direct inspection of high level block diagrams of life support systems. System cost was found to be directly proportional to SCM. The system MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure) is the inverse of the system failure rate. MTBF = 1/f. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.2) for estimated preflight MTBFs. As is typical for systems that are not extensively tested and redesigned to eliminate unexpected failure modes, the life support flight failure rates were about ten times higher than the preflight estimates and the MTBFs one-tenth the preflight estimates. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.6) for observed flight MTBFs.
A Chief Engineer's View of the NASA X-43A Scramjet Flight Test
This paper presents an overview of the preparation and execution of the first two flights of the NASA X-43A scramjet flight test project. The project consisted of three flights, two planned for Mach 7 and one for Mach 10. The first flight, conducted on June 2, 2001, was unsuccessful and resulted in a nine-month mishap investigation. A two-year return to flight effort ensued and concluded when the second Mach 7 flight was successfully conducted on March 27, 2004. The challenges faced by the project team as they prepared the first ever scramjet-powered airplane for flight are presented. Modifications made to the second flight vehicle as a result of the first flight failure and the return to flight activities are discussed. Flight results and lessons learned are also presented.
The evaluation of the OSGLR algorithm for restructurable controls
The detection and isolation of commercial aircraft control surface and actuator failures using the orthogonal series generalized likelihood ratio (OSGLR) test was evaluated. The OSGLR algorithm was chosen as the most promising algorithm based on a preliminary evaluation of three failure detection and isolation (FDI) algorithms (the detection filter, the generalized likelihood ratio test, and the OSGLR test) and a survey of the literature. One difficulty of analytic FDI techniques and the OSGLR algorithm in particular is their sensitivity to modeling errors. Therefore, methods of improving the robustness of the algorithm were examined with the incorporation of age-weighting into the algorithm being the most effective approach, significantly reducing the sensitivity of the algorithm to modeling errors. The steady-state implementation of the algorithm based on a single cruise linear model was evaluated using a nonlinear simulation of a C-130 aircraft. A number of off-nominal no-failure flight conditions including maneuvers, nonzero flap deflections, different turbulence levels and steady winds were tested. Based on the no-failure decision functions produced by off-nominal flight conditions, the failure detection performance at the nominal flight condition was determined. The extension of the algorithm to a wider flight envelope by scheduling the linear models used by the algorithm on dynamic pressure and flap deflection was also considered. Since simply scheduling the linear models over the entire flight envelope is unlikely to be adequate, scheduling of the steady-state implentation of the algorithm was briefly investigated.
Applications of the pilot transition response model to flight control system failure analysis
Pilot transition response model application to flight control failure analysis
Stage Separation Failure: Model Based Diagnostics and Prognostics
Safety of the next-generation space flight vehicles requires development of an in-flight Failure Detection and Prognostic (FD&P) system. Development of such system is challenging task that involves analysis of many hard hitting engineering problems across the board. In this paper we report progress in the development of FD&P for the re-contact fault between upper stage nozzle and the inter-stage caused by the first stage and upper stage separation failure. A high-fidelity models and analytical estimations are applied to analyze the following sequence of events: (i) structural dynamics of the nozzle extension during the impact; (ii) structural stability of the deformed nozzle in the presence of the pressure and temperature loads induced by the hot gas flow during engine start up; and (iii) the fault induced thrust changes in the steady burning regime. The diagnostic is based on the measurements of the impact torque. The prognostic is based on the analysis of the correlation between the actuator signal and fault-induced changes in the nozzle structural stability and thrust.
A study of Mariner 10 flight experiences and some flight piece part failure rate computations
The problems and failures encountered in Mariner flight are discussed and the data available through a quantitative accounting of all electronic piece parts on the spacecraft are summarized. It also shows computed failure rates for electronic piece parts. It is intended that these computed data be used in the continued updating of the failure rate base used for trade-off studies and predictions for future JPL space missions.