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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
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NASA NTRS2021

Accessible Telemetry Streams using a Zero Trust Architecture for the Flight Operations Directorate

As a result of information technology based work becoming increasingly distributed, unique challenges have been presented within the realm of defined network perimeters, namely with respect to secure access to resources. Historically, and from a simplistic abstract perspective, the common approach has been to adopt the, so-called, moat model whereby a physical network perimeter (or interconnected perimeters) is defined to encapsulate resources behind a boundary protected by a firewall. Users are provisioned access through a virtual private network (VPN) and may be further constrained to resources through specific firewall allow and disallow rulesets. Virtual Private Networks and firewall rulesets lead to common problems, particularly at scale and, as a result, perimeter-less architectures provided over the public internet are increasingly becoming prevalent, particularly with its more popular implementation, the Zero Trust Architecture. We present a proposed implementation of the Zero Trust Architecture with a particular concrete example utilizing a de-perimeterized network that requires authentication and authorization for each action between nodes and does not operate within an implicit trust boundary. It should be noted that this paper is not an attempt at providing comprehensive resolutions for the specific problem space with respect to perimeter based security and is more directed at providing information with regard to our proposed implementation of a Zero Trust Architecture for the Flight Operations Directorate. We direct the reader to our Introduction and Background section for more details on specific documentation and where it can be located as it relates to de-perimeterization and Zero Trust.

Paul Shoemaker↗
NASA NTRS1972

Pilot dynamics for instrument approach tasks: Full panel multiloop and flight director operations

Measurements and interpretations of single and mutiloop pilot response properties during simulated instrument approach are presented. Pilot subjects flew Category 2-like ILS approaches in a fixed base DC-8 simulaton. A conventional instrument panel and controls were used, with simulated vertical gust and glide slope beam bend forcing functions. Reduced and interpreted pilot describing functions and remmant are given for pitch attitude, flight director, and multiloop (longitudinal) control tasks. The response data are correlated with simultaneously recorded eye scanning statistics, previously reported in NASA CR-1535. The resulting combined response and scanning data and their interpretations provide a basis for validating and extending the theory of manual control displays.

Weir, D. H.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Get the Power You Need, When and Where You Need It Aboard the International Space Station (ISS) Using the ISS Plug-In Plan (IPiP) Requirement Request Process

Trying to get your experiment aboard ISS? You likely will need power. Many enditem providers do. ISS Plug-In Plan (IPiP) supports power and data for science, Payloads (or Utilization), vehicle systems, and daily operations through the Electrical Power System (EPS) Secondary Power/Data Subsystem. Yet limited resources and increasing requirements continue to influence decisions on deployment of ISS end items. Given the fluid launch schedule and the rapidly- increasing number of end item providers requiring power support, the focus of the Plug-In Plan has evolved from a simple FIFO recommendation to provide power to end item users, to anticipating future requirements by judicious development and delivery of support equipment (cables, power supplies, power strips, and alternating current (AC) power inverters), employing innovative deployment strategies, and collaborating on end item development. This paper describes the evolution of the ISS Program Office, Engineering Directorate, Flight Operations Directorate (FOD), International Partners and the end item provider relationship and how collaboration successfully leverages unique requirements with limited on- board equipment and resources, tools and processes which result in more agile integration, and describes the process designed for the new ISS end item provider to assure that their power requirements will be met.

Moore, Kevin D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) suit is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared to the current EMU and Apollo era suits and additional features will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS suit progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury. History has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight; therefore, currently planned training events to prepare for lunar missions and tasks during lunar surface EVAs were considered. Each scenario is ranked with likelihood and consequence scorings based on our current understanding of suit and application of Artemis design reference missions. The scoring allowed identification of the high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Mechanisms of injury, injury outcomes, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team; ergonomists; suit engineers; safety engineers; the flight operations directorate; flight doctors; astronauts; astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS); and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using these, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/longdistance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Tessa Reiber↗
NASA NTRS2016

Utilizing the ISS Mission as a Testbed to Develop Cognitive Communications Systems

The ISS provides an excellent opportunity for pioneering artificial intelligence software to meet the challenges of real-time communications (comm) link management. This opportunity empowers the ISS Program to forge a testbed for developing cognitive communications systems for the benefit of the ISS mission, manned Low Earth Orbit (LEO) science programs and future planetary exploration programs. In November, 1998, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) started the ISS Antenna Manager (IAM) project to develop a single processor supporting multiple comm satellite tracking for two different antenna systems. Further, the processor was developed to be highly adaptable as it supported the ISS mission through all assembly stages. The ISS mission mandated communications specialists with complete knowledge of when the ISS was about to lose or gain comm link service. The current specialty mandated cognizance of large sun-tracking solar arrays and thermal management panels in addition to the highly-dynamic satellite service schedules and rise/set tables. This mission requirement makes the ISS the ideal communications management analogue for future LEO space station and long-duration planetary exploration missions. Future missions, with their precision-pointed, dynamic, laser-based comm links, require complete autonomy for managing high-data rate communications systems. Development of cognitive communications management systems that permit any crew member or payload science specialist, regardless of experience level, to control communications is one of the greater benefits the ISS can offer new space exploration programs. The IAM project met a new mission requirement never previously levied against US space-born communications systems management: process and display the orientation of large solar arrays and thermal control panels based on real-time joint angle telemetry. However, IAM leaves the actual communications availability assessment to human judgment, which introduces unwanted variability because each specialist has a different core of experience with comm link performance. Because the ISS utilizes two different frequency bands, dynamic structure can be occasionally translucent at one frequency while it can completely interdict service at the other frequency. The impact of articulating structure on the comm link can depend on its orientation at the time it impinges on the link. It can become easy for a human specialist to cross-associate experience at one frequency with experience at the other frequency. Additionally, the specialist's experience is incremental, occurring one nine-hour shift at a time. Only the IAM processor experiences the complete 24x7x365 communications link performance for both communications links but, it has no "learning capability." If the IAM processor could be endowed with a cognitive ability to remember past structure-induced comm link outages, based on its knowledge of the ISS position, attitude, communications gear, array joint angles and tracking accuracy, it could convey such experience to the human operator. It could also use its learned communications link behaviors to accurately convey the availability of future communications sessions. Further, the tool could remember how accurately or inaccurately it predicted availability and correct future predictions based on past performance. The IAM tool could learn frequency-specific impacts due to spacecraft structures and pass that information along as "experience." Such development would provide a single artificial intelligence processor that could provide two different experience bases. If it also "knew" the satellite service schedule, it could distinguish structure blockage from schedule or planet blockage and then quickly switch to another satellite. Alternatively, just as a human operator could judge, a cognizant comm system based on the IAM model could "know" that the blockage is not going to last very long and continue tracking a comm satellite, waiting for it to track away from structure. Ultimately, once this capability was fully developed and tested in the Mission Control Center, it could be transferred on-orbit to support development of operations concepts that include more advanced cognitive communications systems. Future applications of this capability are easily foreseen because even more dynamic satellite constellations with more nodes and greater capability are coming. Currently, the ISS fully employs a 300 million bit-per-second (Mbps) return link for harvesting payload science. In the coming eighteen months, it will step up to 600 Mbps. Already there is talk of a 1.2 billion bit-per-second (Gbps) upgrade for the ISS and laser comm links have already been tested from the ISS. Every data rate upgrade mandates more complicated and sensitive communications equipment which implies greater expertise invested in the human operator. Future on-orbit cognizant comm systems will be needed to meet greater performance demands aboard larger, far more complicated spacecraft. In the LEO environment, the old-style one-satellite-per-spacecraft operations concept will give way to a new concept of a single customer spacecraft simultaneously using multiple comm satellites. Much more highly-dynamic manned LEO missions with decades of crew members potentially increase the demand for communications link performance. A cognizant on-board communications system will meet advanced communications demands from future LEO missions and future planetary missions. The ISS has fledgling components of future exploration programs, both LEO and planetary. Further, the Flight Operations Directorate, through the IAM project, has already begun to develop a communications management system that attempts to solve advanced problems ideally represented by dynamic structure impacting scheduled satellite service. With an earnest project to integrate artificial intelligence into the IAM processor, the ISS Program could develop a cognizant communications system that could be adapted and transferred to future on-orbit avionics designs.

Jackson, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2016

Utilizing the ISS Mission as a Testbed to Develop Cognitive Communications Systems

The ISS provides an excellent opportunity for pioneering artificial intelligence software to meet the challenges of real-time communications (comm) link management. This opportunity empowers the ISS Program to forge a testbed for developing cognitive communications systems for the benefit of the ISS mission, manned Low Earth Orbit (LEO) science programs and future planetary exploration programs. In November, 1998, the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) started the ISS Antenna Manager (IAM) project to develop a single processor supporting multiple comm satellite tracking for two different antenna systems. Further, the processor was developed to be highly adaptable as it supported the ISS mission through all assembly stages. The ISS mission mandated communications specialists with complete knowledge of when the ISS was about to lose or gain comm link service. The current specialty mandated cognizance of large sun-tracking solar arrays and thermal management panels in addition to the highly-dynamic satellite service schedules and rise/set tables. This mission requirement makes the ISS the ideal communications management analogue for future LEO space station and long-duration planetary exploration missions. Future missions, with their precision-pointed, dynamic, laser-based comm links, require complete autonomy for managing high-data rate communications systems. Development of cognitive communications management systems that permit any crew member or payload science specialist, regardless of experience level, to control communications is one of the greater benefits the ISS can offer new space exploration programs. The IAM project met a new mission requirement never previously levied against US space-born communications systems management: process and display the orientation of large solar arrays and thermal control panels based on real-time joint angle telemetry. However, IAM leaves the actual communications availability assessment to human judgement, which introduces unwanted variability because each specialist has a different core of experience with comm link performance. Because the ISS utilizes two different frequency bands, dynamic structure can be occasionally translucent at one frequency while it can completely interdict service at the other frequency. The impact of articulating structure on the comm link can depend on its orientation at the time it impinges on the link. It can become easy for a human specialist to cross-associate experience at one frequency with experience at the other frequency. Additionally, the specialist's experience is incremental, occurring one nine-hour shift at a time. Only the IAM processor experiences the complete 24x7x365 communications link performance for both communications links but, it has no "learning capability." If the IAM processor could be endowed with a cognitive ability to remember past structure-induced comm link outages, based on its knowledge of the ISS position, attitude, communications gear, array joint angles and tracking accuracy, it could convey such experience to the human operator. It could also use its learned communications link behaviors to accurately convey the availability of future communications sessions. Further, the tool could remember how accurately or inaccurately it predicted availability and correct future predictions based on past performance. The IAM tool could learn frequency-specific impacts due to spacecraft structures and pass that information along as "experience." Such development would provide a single artificial intelligence processor that could provide two different experience bases. If it also "knew" the satellite service schedule, it could distinguish structure blockage from schedule or planet blockage and then quickly switch to another satellite. Alternatively, just as a human operator could judge, a cognizant comm system based on the IAM model could "know" that the blockage is not going to last very long and continue tracking a comm satellite, waiting for it to track away from structure. Ultimately, once this capability was fully developed and tested in the Mission Control Center, it could be transferred on-orbit to support development of operations concepts that include more advanced cognitive communications systems. Future applications of this capability are easily foreseen because even more dynamic satellite constellations with more nodes and greater capability are coming. Currently, the ISS fully employs its high-data-rate return link for harvesting payload science. In the coming months, it will double that data rate and is forecast to fully utilize that capability. Already there is talk of an upgrade that quadruples the current data rate allocated to ISS payload science before the end of its mission and laser comm links have already been tested from the ISS. Every data rate upgrade mandates more complicated and sensitive communications equipment which implies greater expertise invested in the human operator. Future on-orbit cognizant comm systems will be needed to meet greater performance demands aboard larger, far more complicated spacecraft. In the LEO environment, the old-style one-satellite-per-spacecraft operations concept will give way to a new concept of a single customer spacecraft simultaneously using multiple comm satellites. Much more highly-dynamic manned LEO missions with decades of crew members potentially increase the demand for communications link performance. A cognizant on-board communications system will meet advanced communications demands from future LEO missions and future planetary missions. The ISS has fledgling components of future exploration programs, both LEO and planetary. Further, the Flight Operations Directorate, through the IAM project, has already begun to develop a communications management system that attempts to solve advanced problems ideally represented by dynamic structure impacting scheduled satellite service. With an earnest project to integrate artificial intelligence into the IAM processor, the ISS Program could develop a cognizant communications system that could be adapted and transferred to future on-orbit avionics designs.

Jackson, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (ORION)

NASA uses two HRA assessment methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is still expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a PRA model that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more problematic. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

JETT3: A Holistic, Integrated Analog for Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration

Since 1972, NASA astronauts have performed hundreds of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in support of Skylab, Space Shuttle and International Space Station missions. Not since Apollo, however, have EVAs been driven by discovery-based principles of scientific exploration. Upcoming Artemis missions are challenged to build on lessons learned from Apollo, merging 50 years of EVA experience with the planetary science community’s expertise in the remote surface exploration of Mars. The highest-fidelity preparation for Artemis includes both operational and scientific underpinning to represent the complete, complex picture of lunar surface operations. The Joint EVA & Human Surface Mobility Test Team (JETT) is an interdisciplinary team providing such an environment for collaborative analog testing. JETT builds upon prior analog campaigns (e.g., [1, 2]) to provide high-fidelity environments for hardware and concept of operations development. Sponsored by the NASA EVA & Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), JETT includes representatives from EHP, NASA Engineering, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), Human Health & Performance, and the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD). JETT tests evaluate NASA reference designs for EVA (e.g., suits and tools), address gaps and risks for Artemis lunar surface operations, develop capabilities for EVA and science tasks, enable technology maturation, and provide training for Artemis EVA operations. JETT3, the final JETT field test of FY22, occurred Oct 3-11, 2022 in the San Francisco Volcanic Field north of Flagstaff, AZ. The test focused on developing the Artemis concept of operations and systems, including integrating an Artemis-like Science Team into a NASA Flight Control Team (FCT) to plan and execute a series of simulated lunar EVAs in an environment analogous to Artemis 3.

T. E. Caswell↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

JETT3: A Holistic, Integrated Analog for Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration

Since 1972, NASA astronauts have performed hundreds of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in support of Skylab, Space Shuttle and International Space Station missions. Not since Apollo, however, have EVAs been driven by discovery-based principles of scientific exploration. Upcoming Artemis missions are challenged to build on lessons learned from Apollo, merging 50 years of EVA experience with the planetary science community’s expertise in the remote surface exploration of Mars. The highest-fidelity preparation for Artemis includes both operational and scientific underpinning to represent the complete, complex picture of lunar surface operations. The Joint EVA & Human Surface Mobility Test Team (JETT) is an interdisciplinary team providing such an environment for collaborative analog testing. JETT builds upon prior analog campaigns (e.g., [1, 2]) to provide high-fidelity environments for hardware and concept of operations development. Sponsored by the NASA EVA & Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), JETT includes representatives from EHP, NASA Engineering, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), Human Health & Performance, and the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD). JETT tests evaluate NASA reference designs for EVA (e.g., suits and tools), address gaps and risks for Artemis lunar surface operations, develop capabilities for EVA and science tasks, enable technology maturation, and provide training for Artemis EVA operations. JETT3, the final JETT field test of FY22, occurred Oct 3-11, 2022 in the San Francisco Volcanic Field north of Flagstaff, AZ. The test focused on developing the Artemis concept of operations and systems, including integrating an Artemis-like Science Team into a NASA Flight Control Team (FCT) to plan and execute a series of simulated lunar EVAs in an environment analogous to Artemis 3.

T. E. Caswell↗
NASA NTRS2023

Earth Independent Medical Operations (EIMO) Training Technical Interchange Meeting, 26th October 2023: Background and Summary of Discussion

On 26th October 2023, ExMC convened a panel of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from NASA, broadly representing Headquarters, the Human Research Program, Medical Operations, the Human Health and Performance Directorate at JSC, the Health and Medical Technical Authority, the Flight Operations Directorate, and representation from other Centers including: Ames Research Center (ARC), and Glenn Research Center (GRC). Representatives from the Canadian Space Agency also participated in this TIM. In addition, SMEs from industry included representation from the following entities: Axiom Space, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, Level Ex, Shiny Box Interactive. Additional SMEs from academia included: University of Houston, Touro University, Weill Cornell Medical College and the Translational Research Institute for Space Health at Baylor College of Medicine. This group of stakeholders discussed the training issues related to facilitating EIMO. Sub-topics for this discussion included the following: - Pre-launch medical curriculum development - Ground-based training on medical hardware - Dental health - Behavioral health - Telemedicine - Just-in-time training - Simulation-based training (extended reality)

CMO Training↗
NASA NTRS2016

Propellant Savings during Soyuz Undock from the International Space Station

As a vehicle continuously orbiting Earth for over a decade, the International Space Station (ISS) must be conscious of ways to conserve consumables to maximize the efficiency of cargo flights to ISS. One such consumable is propellant. As part of an ongoing effort to minimize propellant usage onboard ISS and use control moment gyroscopes as much as possible for ISS control, an effort was made in late 2014 to allow Soyuz manned vehicle undockings without requiring the use of thrusters. This method, which has been used for four Soyuz undockings, saves up to 160 kg of propellant each year. Fiona completed a B.S. is Mechanical Engienering at Washington University in St. Louis in 2009, after which she moved to Houston, TX to begin working at NASA Johnson Space Center. She currently works in the Flight Operations Directorate as an ADCO (Attitude Determination and Control Officer) flight controller and MCG (Motion Control Group) instructor. Her responsibilities include operating the motion control systems of the ISS in Mission Control, interfacing with Russian colleagues, mentoring and teaching flight controller trainees, and training astronauts for their missions to ISS.

Turett, Fiona↗
NASA NTRS2024

MAGIK Animation of Robotic Operations for Flight SpaceX-31 to ISS

The MAGIK Robotics analysis team provides kinematic feasibility assessments for the ISS and has produced an animation to showcase Extravehicular Robotics (EVR) activities for Flight SpaceX (SpX)-31. Shown EVR activities were developed by Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) Robotics (ROBO). The animation also displays the current ISS configuration at the time of the flight in Increment 72. Flight SpX-31 includes a SpaceX Cargo Dragon vehicle docked to Node 2 Forward (N2F) and consists of the delivery of the Coronal Observation Experiment (CODEX) payload. Robotic operations shown include utilization the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) based on the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS), survey of the cargo trunk, extraction of CODEX from the trunk, stow of SPDM, SSRMS walkoff to the Mobile Remote Servicer (MRS) Base System (MBS), SSRMS grapple of SPDM, translate of the Mobile Transporter (MT), and install of CODEX to Express Logistics Carrier 3 (ELC-3) Site 3. There is no disposal payload for this flight.

ISS↗
NASA NTRS2024

MAGIK Animation of Robotic Operations for Flight SpaceX-30 to ISS

The MAGIK Robotic analysis team provides kinematic feasibility assessments for the ISS and has produced an animation to evaluate Extravehicular Robotics (EVR) activities for the SpaceX (SpX)-30 flight. Shown EVR activities are preliminary and final operations will be developed by Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) Robotics (ROBO). The animation also displays the current ISS configuration at the time of the flight. Flight SpX-30 includes a SpaceX Cargo Dragon vehicle docked to Node 2 Zenith (N2Z) International Docking Adapter (IDA) and consists of the delivery of the Pump Module (PM) Integrated Assembly (IA). Robotic operations shown include the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) based on the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) for Trunk extraction of the PM IA, maneuvering to the External Stowage Platform 3 (ESP-3), temporary removal of the Control Moment Gyro (CMG) from ESP-3 Site 4, install of the PM IA at ESP-3 Site 3 and re-install of the CMG to ESP-3 Site4. There is no disposal payload for this flight.

ISS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗