Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Foreign policy interests”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

6 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Embassy Science Fellowship (Final Report)

Argentina is home to the highest number of professional scientists per capita in South America. How those human and natural (biodiversity, critical minerals, e.g.) resources are utilized has significant repercussions for the security of the Western Hemisphere and should be of significant interest to US foreign policy. As outlined in the US Secretary of State’s recent (25 Jan, 2025) op-ed, the current administration is seeking to reforge ties with Latin America through “partnership and co-operation” after several decades of varying levels of neglect, a palpable sentiment amongst Argentine scientists and government ministers. This presents an opportunity to provide specific guidance on how coordinated direct policy making, bilateral cooperation, and guided investment in those areas benefits Argentina directly as well as US interests in the hemisphere.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Revisiting the Temporal Leontief Inverse: New Insights on the Analysis of Regional Technological Economic Change

The current availability of longer series of input-output tables, as well as the release of global input-output databases, has fostered a growing literature analyzing changes in the economic structure and their drivers. In this paper, we take advantage of these time-series by proposing a methodology designed to trace the contribution of different drivers of the change in interindustrial relationships over time. Based on the Temporal Leontief Inverse (TLI), the Extended TLI (ETLI) decomposes the economy-wide effects of changes in direct interindustrial links between years, isolating the impact of different determinants of economic (environmental, energy, etc.) spillovers according to the interests of the researcher. For example, one can explore how the multipliers of a particular industry were affected by changes in technology of other sectors and in the own sector; by changes in trade patterns in specific countries; by indirect changes in intraregional production chains in foreign nations; etc. The ETLI is illustrated by uncovering certain hidden effects not captured in a previous application of the original TLI to the Chicago region between 1980-1997.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Supporting ARPA-E Power Grid Optimization (Final Report)

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Arizona State University (ASU), Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Texas A&M University (TAMU), The University of Texas at Austin (UT), and the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW-M) supported the ARPA-E Grid Optimization (GO) Competition by providing a common problem formulation, data format, datasets, evaluation mechanism, scoring, rules, and results that resulted in the awarding of $\$9.24$ million dollars to teams from academia, industry, and national labs for solving three sets of increasingly difficult non-linear, security- constrained AC Optimal Powerflow (AC-OPF) optimization problems in order to increase the efficiency of the US Electric Grid. It is estimated that a 1% increase in efficiency can save $\$1$ billion. Current industry practices typically use a linear DC model (DC-OPF) in order solve the OPF problem within the time constraints of the operation schedule. The GO Competition challenges the best power engineers, mathematicians, and computer scientists to make possible operational decisions based on accurate physical models. To accomplish this, the GO Competition created a series of Challenges and funded teams to produce the best solver. Challenge 1 was to solve the security constrained Alternating Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) problem. Challenge 2 extended that to by adding adjustable transformer tap ratios, phase shifting transformers, switchable shunts, price-responsive demand, ramp rate constrained generators and loads, and fast-start unit commitment (UC). Furthermore, Challenge 2 was a maximization problem while Challenge 1 was a minimization problem. While Challenge 3 was being developed, the entrants were invited to find better solutions to the Challenge 2 synthetic datasets with no restrictions on time, hardware, or algorithms. The Challenge 2 solutions turned out to be very good. Challenge 3 expanded the Challenge 2 problem further by using multiperiod dynamic markets, including advisory models for extreme weather events, day-ahead markets, and the real-time markets with an extended look-ahead. These problems included active bid-in demand and topology optimization. Together the Challenges used nearly 30 million CPU hours. Since each team was working on the same problem, using the same data, and running on the same hardware, fair comparisons could be drawn as to the best solver. The datasets were varied enough, however, that the best solver for one dataset was not necessarily the best at another, so cumulative scores were used. The process was managed by the PNNL maintained website https://GOCompetition.energy.gov, where Entrants could find information about the problem, the data, the rules, submit their solver for evaluation, and see the scores of all the competing teams on a Leaderboard. Interest was world-wide but only American teams were eligible for prizes. The Competition has produced 34 journal articles 115 papers and been cited over 500 times in the literature, including 12 dissertations (4 from foreign countries; Columbia (2), Germany, and Italy) and 3 from the DOE ExaScale project. Software developed by Pearl Street Technologies for Challenges 1 and 2 is now deployed by Southwest Power Pool (SPP) and Midcontinent Independent Service Operator (MISO). Other teams have received inquiries from venture capitalists. Google DeepMind has thanked the Competition for making the datasets developed for the Competition public. They are using it to train machine learning models. The larger datasets have billions of unknowns to be solved for, but only a small percent matter in the final solution. Knowing what unknowns are important can dramatically speedup the solution.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗