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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

A game theory perspective on environmental assessment: What games are played and what does this tell us about decision making rationality and legitimacy?

Game theory provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the decision process operating in the context of environmental assessment, and to examine the rationality and legitimacy of decision-making subject to Environmental Assessment (EA). The research uses a case study of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Sustainability Appraisal processes undertaken in England. To these are applied an analytical framework, based on the concept of decision windows to identify the decisions to be assessed. The conditions for legitimacy are defined, based on game theory, in relation to the timing of decision information, the behaviour type (competitive, reciprocal, equity) exhibited by the decision maker, and the level of public engagement; as, together, these control the type of rationality which can be brought to bear on the decision. Instrumental rationality is based on self-interest of individuals, whereas deliberative rationality seeks broader consensus and is more likely to underpin legitimate decisions. The results indicate that the Sustainability Appraisal process, conducted at plan level, is better than EIA, conducted at project level, but still fails to provide conditions that facilitate legitimacy. Game theory also suggests that Sustainability Appraisal is likely to deliver ‘least worst’ outcomes rather than best outcomes when the goals of the assessment process are considered; this may explain the propensity of such ‘least worst’ decisions in practise. On the basis of what can be learned from applying this game theory perspective, it is suggested that environmental assessment processes need to be redesigned and better integrated into decision making in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the decisions made. - Highlights: • Decision legitimacy is defined in terms of game theory. • Game theory is applied to EIA and SA decision windows. • Game theory suggests least worst outcomes prevail. • SA is more likely to be perceived legitimate than EIA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic simulations of Agent Based Models (ABMs). Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. Our approach addresses imperfect information and scalability that allows us to also address previous limitations of current stochastic game models. Such models only consider perfect information assuming that the defender is always able to detect attacks; assuming that the state transition probabilities are fixed before the game assuming that the players actions are always synchronous; and that most models are not scalable with the size and complexity of systems under consideration. Our use of ABMs yields results of selected experiments that demonstrate our proposed approach and provides a quantitative measure for realistic information systems and their related security scenarios.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2012

ID201202961, DOE S-124,539, Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic simulations of Agent Based Models (ABMs). Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. Our approach addresses imperfect information and scalability that allows us to also address previous limitations of current stochastic game models. Such models only consider perfect information assuming that the defender is always able to detect attacks; assuming that the state transition probabilities are fixed before the game assuming that the players actions are always synchronous; and that most models are not scalable with the size and complexity of systems under consideration. Our use of ABMs yields results of selected experiments that demonstrate our proposed approach and provides a quantitative measure for realistic information systems and their related security scenarios.

Availablity↗
DOE OSTI2019

Describing nonequilibrium soft matter with mean field game theory

We demonstrate that combining an emerging approach to game theory with self-consistent mean field theory provides realistic treatments of diblock copolymer phase evolution. We especially examine order-order phase transformations upon quenched temperature change involving hexagonal cylinders, lamellae, and the gyroid. Our findings demonstrate that (i) the game theoretical dynamics produce realistic trajectories for the evolution of the local compositions, (ii) the predicted small-angle scattering follows experimentally observed trends, (iii) nucleation and growth is active when the system is quenched far from the critical point, and (iv) epitaxial growth is manifest. Lastly, to our knowledge, the methodology presented provides the first merger of mean field game theory and statistical mechanics for soft matter systems, giving a new inroad to studying polymer dynamics.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2018

Teaching Game Theory to Kids and Limits of Prediction

I have once been asked to read a lecture to a group of 6th graders on Game Theory. After agreeing to it, I realized that explaining the game theory basics to 6th graders my be difficult, given that terms such as Nash equilibrium, minimax, maximin, optimization may not resonate in a 6th grade classroom. Instead I've introduced game theory using the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game. Turns out kids are excellent gametheoreticians. In RPS, they understood both the benefits of randomizing their own strategy and of predicting their opponent's moves. They offered a number of heuristics both for the prediction and opening move. These heuristics included optimizing against past opponent moves, such as not playing rock if the opponent just played scissors, and playing a specific opening hand, such as "paper". Visualizing the effects of such strategic choices on-the-fly would be interesting and educational. This brief essay attempts demonstrating and visualizing the value of a few different strategic options in RPS. Specifically, we would like to illustrate the following: 1) what is the value of being unpredictable?; and 2) what is the value of being able to predict your opponent? In regard to prediction of human players, the question 2) has been reflected in Jon McLoone's entry in Wolfram Blog from January 20, 2014[1]. McLoone created a predictive algorithm for playing against human opponents, that learns to beat human opponents reliably after approximately 30 - 40 games. I use McLoone's implementation to represent a predictive and random strategies. The rest of this documents 1) investigates performance of this predictive strategy against a random strategy (which is optimal in RPS) and in 2) attempts to turn this predictive power against the predictive strategy by allowing the opponent the full knowledge of the predictor's strategy (but not the choices made using the strategy). This exposes a weakness in predictions made without taking risks into account by illustrating that predictive strategy may make the predictor predictable as well.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory in Cybersecurity: A Review of Applications, Models, and Challenges

There are no aspects of society left unchanged by the Internet. From commerce to communication, from entertainment to engineering, every industry and sphere of influence exists in a new state thanks to the advent of the information age. This convenience, rarely controverted, comes with capricious actors, who wish to gain access to these systems for myriad reasons, be it financial, political, or mere intellectual gain. This paper presents information that can help readers to better understand the fundamentals of cybersecurity from a game theory perspective, such as coalitional games, Colonel Blotto systems, or how to find Nash Equilibrium. This paper also reviews how game theory can enhance understanding of cybersecurity through cooperative and non-cooperative methods, such as information sharing, defense modeling, and attacker analysis. The authors use the analysis to serve as a bridge for those in either field who need a way to best comprehend the methodologies of their contrasting fields.

Egan, Matthew↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Genome-driven evolutionary game theory helps understand the rise of metabolic interdependencies in microbial communities

Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial “games”. We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Moreover, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

A Probabilistic-Numerical Approximation for an Obstacle Problem Arising in Game Theory

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given by the solution of a quasilinear partial differential equation with obstacle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2018

A game theory approach for assessing risk value and deploying search-and-rescue resources after devastating tsunamis

Highlights: • Two game theoretic models are designed for search-and-rescue resource allocation. • A simulation based upon 2011 Japan tsunami data. • Shapley value division is more efficient than the proportional division. The current early-warning system and tsunami protection measures tend to fall short because they always underestimate the level of destruction, and it is difficult to predict the level of damage by a devastating tsunami on uncertain targets. As we know, the key to minimizing the total number of fatalities after a disaster is the deployment of search and rescue efforts in the first few hours. However, the resources available to the affected districts for emergency response may be limited. This study proposes two game theoretic models that are designed for search-and-rescue resource allocation. First, the interactions between a compounded disaster and a response agent in the affected district are modelled as a non-cooperative game, after which the risk value is derived for each district from the Nash equilibrium. The risk value represents the threat, vulnerability, and consequence of a specific disaster for the affected district. Second, the risk values for fifteen districts are collected for calculation of each district's Shapley value. Then an acceptable plan for resource deployment among all districts is made based on their expected marginal contribution. The model is verified in a simulation based upon 2011 tsunami data. The experimental results show the proposed approach to be more efficient than the proportional division of rescue resources, for dealing with compounded disaster, and is feasible as a method for planning the mobilization of resources and to improve relief efforts against devastating tsunamis.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

U.S. Patent Pending, Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation, U.S. Patent Application No.: 14/097,840

Vulnerability in security of an information system is quantitatively predicted. The information system may receive malicious actions against its security and may receive corrective actions for restoring the security. A game oriented agent based model is constructed in a simulator application. The game ABM model represents security activity in the information system. The game ABM model has two opposing participants including an attacker and a defender, probabilistic game rules and allowable game states. A specified number of simulations are run and a probabilistic number of the plurality of allowable game states are reached in each simulation run. The probability of reaching a specified game state is unknown prior to running each simulation. Data generated during the game states is collected to determine a probability of one or more aspects of security in the information system.

Availablity↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solving the duck curve in a smart grid environment using a non-cooperative game theory and dynamic pricing profiles

With the intermittency that comes with electricity generation from renewables, utilizing dynamic pricing will encourage the demand-side to respond in a smart way that would minimize the electricity costs and flatten the net electricity demand curve. Determining the optimal dynamic pricing profile that would leverage distributed storage to flatten the curve is a novel idea that needs to be studied. Moreover, the economic feasibility of utilizing distributed electrical energy storage is still not given in the literature. Therefore, in this paper, a novel way of solving a citywide dynamic model using a bilevel programming algorithm is introduced. The problem is developed as a novel non-cooperative Stackelberg game that utilizes air-conditioning systems and electrical storage through the end-users to determine the optimal dynamic pricing profile. The results show that the combined effect of utilizing demand-side air-conditioning systems and distributed storage together can flatten the curve while employing the optimal dynamic pricing profile. An economic study is performed to determine the economic feasibility of 20 different cases with different battery designs and the level of solar penetration. Three metrics were used to evaluate the economic performance of each case: the levelized cost of storage, the levelized cost of energy, and the simple payback period. Most cases had levelized cost of storage values lower than 0.457 $/kWh, which is the lower bound available in the literature. Seven out of 16 cases have a simple payback period shorter than the lifetime of the system (25 years). The case with a 100 MW PV power plant and a battery storage of size 597 MWh, was found to be the most promising case with a simple payback period of 12.71 years for the photovoltaic plant and 19.86 years for the demand-side investments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Identifying Key Drivers of Wildfires in the Contiguous US Using Machine Learning and Game Theory Interpretation

Abstract Understanding the complex interrelationships between wildfire and its environmental and anthropogenic controls is crucial for wildfire modeling and management. Although machine learning (ML) models have yielded significant improvements in wildfire predictions, their limited interpretability has been an obstacle for their use in advancing understanding of wildfires. This study builds an ML model incorporating predictors of local meteorology, land‐surface characteristics, and socioeconomic variables to predict monthly burned area at grid cells of 0.25° × 0.25° resolution over the contiguous United States. Besides these predictors, we construct and include predictors representing the large‐scale circulation patterns conducive to wildfires, which largely improves the temporal correlations in several regions by 14%–44%. The Shapley additive explanation is introduced to quantify the contributions of the predictors to burned area. Results show a key role of longitude and latitude in delineating fire regimes with different temporal patterns of burned area. The model captures the physical relationship between burned area and vapor pressure deficit, relative humidity (RH), and energy release component (ERC), in agreement with the prior findings. Aggregating the contribution of predictor variables of all the grids by region, analyses show that ERC is the major contributor accounting for 14%–27% to large burned areas in the western US. In contrast, there is no leading factor contributing to large burned areas in the eastern US, although large‐scale circulation patterns featuring less active upper‐level ridge‐trough and low RH two months earlier in winter contribute relatively more to large burned areas in spring in the southeastern US.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗