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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Caustic Neutralization and Precipitation of Acidic Dissolved Simulated Stainless Steel–Clad Plutonium and Plutonium/Uranium Nuclear Fuel

Simulated dissolved stainless steel (SS) clad Pu and Pu/U nuclear fuel in HNO 3 was neutralized to a free hydroxide (OH - ) concentration of 0.6 M. A thermal neutron poison, Gd, was added to the simulants at concentrations of either ~3 - 6 g/L or ~37 - 38 g/L. The supernate Pu concentration the day of neutralization ranged from 0.48 to 8.75 mg/L. The supernate Pu concentration of a simplified simulant neutralized to 0.6 M OH - above precipitated solids containing Pu was demonstrated to decrease over 18 days. A significant portion of precipitated Pu was found to be insoluble in 8 M HNO 3 at ambient temperature, but essentially quantitative Pu dissolution was achieved in 11.5 M HNO 3 /0.1 M KF at 100 °C. The difficulty in dissolving the Pu precipitate is believed to be due to the formation of refractory PuO 2 •xH 2 O during the neutralization process. Initial Gd concentrations of ~37 – 38 g/L were found to result in a greater Al precipitation when neutralized to 0.6 M OH - than initial Gd concentrations of ~3 – 6 g/L. Physical properties of the resultant slurries were measured and used to calculate limiting flowrates and slurry velocities by gravity only in transfer piping between the Savannah River Site’s H-Canyon Facility and the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). These results were compared to calculated deposition velocities to predict if solids would settle during the transfer. The Newtonian model was found to be reasonable for each diluted slurry evaluated. Deposition velocities of Pu containing slurries are lower than nuclear fuel slurries primarily composed of U due to the high density of Pu solids. In conclusion, dilution of slurries reduces the margin between the slurry and deposition velocities due to the reduction in viscosity because higher viscous forces on the particles promote maintained suspension.

Actinide Neutralization↗
DOE OSTI2022

Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Material

Under the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program H-Canyon will be dissolving aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and then neutralizing that solution without performing head-end strike or uranium recovery operations. After dissolution in H-Canyon the material will be neutralized to a free hydroxide concentration of either 0.6 M or 1.2 M to meet the waste acceptance criteria for transfer to the SRS Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facility (CSTF). In order to ensure the material could be successfully neutralized and transferred, SRNL completed experiments with simulated H-Canyon dissolver solutions. Two bounding simulants were developed based on the expected compositions of ASNF to be dissolved, one containing only Gd as the neutron poison and one containing Fe as an additional poison.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

MOOGLE: A Multi-Objective Optimization tool for three-dimensional nuclear fuel assembly design

MOOGLE is a new genetic algorithm methodology for the three-dimensional design of nuclear fuel assemblies. MOOGLE uses common fuel rod types as the decision variable to develop a suite of three-dimensional fuel assemblies to provide optimized solutions to the design problem. Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies were optimized using IFBA and gadolinium (Gd 2 O 3 ) as burnable poisons in order to compare how burnable poison choice affects optimization results. Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) fuel bundles were also optimized using three unique fuel rod palettes to study how the size of the design space affects optimization results. Burnable poison analysis showed that utilizing IFBA and Gd 2 O 3 as burnable poisons produced the best and widest range of optimized solutions. Further, BWR fuel bundle optimization results indicate that the inclusion of additional fuel rod types produced a wider solution space but did not improve optimization results for regions explored using fewer unique fuel rods. These tests demonstrate MOOGLE's ability to analyze the tradeoffs between the inclusion of different fuel elements and their effects on assembly performance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Strengthening Technical Safeguards of Fresh Fuel Through International Cooperation

Over time, nuclear fuel designs have shifted towards having higher initial enrichments and a greater number of burnable poison rods. This enables increased burnup for commercial reasons. These changes have made safeguards measurements of the 235 U content in modern fresh fuel more challenging.This is addressed here through a re-evaluation of the UNCL (Uranium Neutron Collar–Light Water Reactor Fuel)poison rod correction factor. Coefficients of the poison rod correction factor were updated by simulating response of AngraII PWR fuel with a wide range of both burnable poison rods and Gd 2 O 3 contentper rod. Benchmark comparisons are made to experiments performed at Resende (Brazil) and CNEN/LASAL in Brazil. By updating these coefficients, while maintaining the same mathematical form to allow INCC to be used without software modification,it was possible to reduce error in experimental 235 U linear density assay by an order of magnitude.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Reactivity-initiated accidents in two pressurized water reactor high burnup core designs

Here, this paper presents a safety analysis of two proposed core loadings for 24-month Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycles. This analysis focuses on reactivity-initiated accidents (RIAs) and evaluates core safety performance impacts of rod-averaged burnup limits up to 75 GWD/MTU and less than 7 % enriched UO 2 . The capabilities of Polaris, PARCS, and RELAP5-3D are leveraged to evaluate the core neutronic and thermal–hydraulic behavior for normal-operation, uncontrolled control rod withdrawal (CRW) transients, and control rod ejection (CRE) accidents. The two core designs are compared to identify features of realistic high burnup/extended enrichment core design approaches which have significant safety impact, identify experimental data needs for high-fidelity predictive modeling, and provide recommendations for future high burnup core designs. The first core design evaluated in this study was developed by Southern Nuclear Company and used an ZrB 2 Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) and B 4 C Wet-Annular Burnable Absorber (WABA)-based burnable poison strategy. The second core design assessed in this work used a Gd 2 O 3 -doped UO 2 burnable poison, similar to that used in boiling water reactors or French PWRs. Results indicate that fuel thermal limits are maintained for limiting CRW and hot full power (HFP) CRE transients. Cladding failure is predicted for the highest energy deposition rods in each core during limiting hot zero power (HZP) CRE accidents (where maximum radially averaged enthalpy exceeds 120 cal/g), though licensing may be permissible with a limited number of failed rods. While concerns exist regarding high critical boron concentration during steady state for the IFBA core and large plenum pressures for the gadolinia core design, the analysis demonstrates adequate safety performance during limiting RIA accident scenarios for two representative high burnup core designs. Design changes limiting plenum pressures and implementation of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding features which minimize hydriding and susceptibility to pellet-cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) are recommended for future high burnup fuel concepts. To support the technical basis for burnup limit increases, high-fidelity fuel performance models are needed to address physical effects not considered in this analysis, and high burnup irradiated fuel tests are required to extend applicability of the fuel failure limits and validate existing and future models.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Electrical, thermal, and H 2 O and CO 2 poisoning behaviors of PrNi 0.5 Co 0.5 O 3-δ electrode for intermediate temperature protonic ceramic electrochemical cells

PrNi 0.5 Co 0.5 O 3-δ (PNC) exhibits adequate total electrical conductivity (~300 S/cm at 400–600 °C) and moisture has no significant effect on it. The thermal expansion coefficient of PNC is 17.6 × 10 –6 /K by dilatometry and 18.43 × 10 –6 /K by in situ XRD. PNC also demonstrates chemical stability against H 2 O and CO 2 . However, PNC symmetrical cell over proton-conducting BaZr 0.4 Ce 0.4 Y 0.1 Yb 0.1 O 3-δ (BZCYYb4411) electrolyte shows significant H 2 O and CO 2 poisoning when those are introduced into O 2 –N 2 mixture. In comparison, symmetrical cells with PNC electrode over the oxygen ion conducting Ce 0.9 Gd 0.1 O 2-δ (GDC) electrolyte show no H 2 O and CO 2 poisoning under similar conditions. Here, it is hypothesized that poisoning from H 2 O and CO 2 of the PNC proton conducting symmetrical cell is caused by their adsorption on the BZCYYb4411 electrolyte instead of PNC electrode. Such a hypothesis is supported by the H 2 O and CO 2 adsorption behaviors on PNC and BZCYYb4411 powder surfaces, as measured by temperature programmed desorption (TPD).

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

H-Canyon Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Dissolved Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) Fuel

The H-Canyon facility will be dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel in HNO3 and neutralizing the resulting solution with 50 wt% NaOH with no recovery operations prior to transfer to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). There are two types of FCA fuel, including a Pu-Al metal alloy and a mixed U and Pu oxide. H-Canyon anticipates dissolving 16 batches of the metal fuel and two batches of the oxide fuel. Potassium fluoride will be added to the dissolver solution at 0.05 M to promote dissolution. Gadolinium will be added after the dissolution as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. H-Canyon requested that SRNL evaluate Gd:239Pu equivalent (239PuEq) ratios of 1:1 and 10:1. The neutralization process precipitates metals including actinides, Gd, and cladding components resulting in a slurry. Caustic neutralization is a routine H-Canyon operation, but the FCA dissolver solution will be unique relative to solutions that are typically processed due to the stainless-steel components, high HNO3 concentration of ~8.5 M, and an initial Pu concentration of up to 4 g/L. Previous neutralization studies have been performed for Pu containing solutions but at less than half the initial Pu concentration and much lower initial HNO3 concentrations. Experimental neutralizations targeted a final free hydroxide (OH-) concentration of 0.6 M as this was anticipated to be the final endpoint, but H-Canyon now expects the endpoint to be 1.2 M OH-. The purpose of this study was to characterize the distribution of the actinide, Gd, and cladding components between the precipitate and supernate, determine if the slurry will back up in the header during the transfer to the CSTF, and determine if solids will settle in the pipeline during the transfer.

Mills, Matthew S.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modernizing the active neutron collar poison rod correction using simulations to enhance PWR fresh fuel verification

The declared inventory of 235 U in fresh, low enriched uranium, nuclear fuel assemblies is routinely verified by nuclear safeguards inspectorates using the UNCL (Uranium Neutron Collar – Light Water Reactor Fuel) nondestructive assay instrument. The trend in modern fuels is towards higher initial enrichment, which in turn requires a larger number of burnable poison pins with higher Gadolinia concentration to hold down the initial reactivity. UNCL assay error for modern fuel assemblies typically exceeds 10%. The traditional algorithm used to correct the response for burnable poison content needs revision to achieve accuracy comparable to the $\sigma_\text{R}$ of 4.5% expected for poison-free assemblies. Here we review the problem and use a large set of 287 Monte Carlo simulations based on an experimentally benchmarked model corresponding to the 16×16 PWR array used in Brazilian Angra type II and III fuel. Simulated relative responses are used to evaluate the functional form of the poison correction and determine parameters optimal for 16×16 PWR assemblies. This update is conducted using between 4–24 Gadolinia pins ranging 2–11 wt% Gd 2 O 3 with assemblies having mean enrichments ranging 2.5%–5%. Experimental validation of the updated coefficients using seven measurements shows bias is reduced by an order of magnitude and $\sigma_\text{R}$R reduced from 10% to less than 2%. Two updated sets of coefficients are provided, the most accurate of which is directly useable in the existing analysis code (INCC) in use by inspectorate at fuel fabrication facilities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of 6-OxP-CD, an Oxime-based cyclodextrin as a viable medical countermeasure against nerve agent poisoning: Experimental and molecular dynamic simulation studies on its inclusion complexes with cyclosarin, soman and VX

The ability of the cyclodextrin-oxime construct 6-OxP-CD to bind and degrade the nerve agents Cyclosarin (GF), Soman (GD) and S -[2-[Di(propan-2-yl)amino]ethyl] O -ethyl methylphosphonothioate (VX) has been studied using 31 P-nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) under physiological conditions. While 6-OxP-CD was found to degrade GF instantaneously under these conditions, it was found to form an inclusion complex with GD and significantly improve its degradation (t 1/2 ~ 2 hrs) relative over background (t 1/2 ~ 22 hrs). Consequently, effective formation of the 6-OxP-CD:GD inclusion complex results in the immediate neutralization of GD and thus preventing it from inhibiting its biological target. In contrast, NMR experiments did not find evidence for an inclusion complex between 6-OxP-CD and VX, and the agent’s degradation profile was identical to that of background degradation (t 1/2 ~ 24 hrs). As a complement to this experimental work, molecular dynamics (MD) simulations coupled with Molecular Mechanics-Generalized Born Surface Area (MM-GBSA) calculations have been applied to the study of inclusion complexes between 6-OxP-CD and the three nerve agents. These studies provide data that informs the understanding of the different degradative interactions exhibited by 6-OxP-CD with each nerve agent as it is introduced in the CD cavity in two different orientations (up and down). For its complex with GF, it was found that the oxime in 6-OxP-CD lies in very close proximity (P GF …O Oxime ~ 4–5 Å) to the phosphorus center of GF in the ‘down GF ’ orientation for most of the simulation accurately describing the ability of 6-OxP-CD to degrade this nerve agent rapidly and efficiently. Further computational studies involving the center of masses (COMs) for both components (GF and 6-OxP-CD) also provided some insight on the nature of this inclusion complex. Distances between the COMs (ΔCOM) lie closer in space in the ‘down GF ’ orientation than in the ‘up GF ’ orientation; a correlation that seems to hold true not only for GF but also for its congener, GD. In the case of GD, calculations for the ‘down GD ’ orientation showed that the oxime functional group in 6-OxP-CD although lying in close proximity (P GD …O Oxime ~ 4–5 Å) to the phosphorus center of the nerve agent for most of the simulation, adopts another stable conformation that increase this distance to ~ 12–14 Å, thus explaining the ability of 6-OxP-CD to bind and degrade GD but with less efficiency as observed experimentally (t 1/2 ~ 4 hr. vs. immediate). Lastly, studies on the VX:6-OxP-CD system demonstrated that VX does not form a stable inclusion complex with the oxime-bearing cyclodextrin and as such does not interact in a way that is conducive to an accelerated degradation scenario. Collectively, these studies serve as a basic platform from which the development of new cyclodextrin scaffolds based on 6-OxP-CD can be designed in the development of medical countermeasures against these highly toxic chemical warfare agents.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Understanding Reproducibility of Sputter‐Deposited Metastable Ferroelectric Wurtzite Al 0.6 Sc 0.4 N Films Using In Situ Optical Emission Spectrometry

High‐Sc Al 1– x Sc x N thin films are of tremendous interest because of their attractive piezoelectric and ferroelectric properties, but overall film quality and reproducibility are widely reported to suffer as x increases. In this study, structural and electrical properties of metastable Al 0.6 Sc 0.4 N films are connected with plasma changes during film growth, identified via glow discharge optical emission spectroscopy (GD‐OES), and linked to the target mode changes. This in situ GD‐OES technique uses changes in the N 2 (I) intensity, correlated with DC bias hysteresis behavior of a Al 0.6 Sc 0.4 target in metallic and poisoned modes, to identify films that subsequently exhibit unacceptable structural and electrical performance. Two representative samples deposited under identical conditions but possessing distinct properties related to phases present in the films are focused on. Films sputtered under a poisoned target mode produce pure wurtzite ferroelectric Al 0.6 Sc 0.4 N with a reversible 80 μC cm −1 polarization and 3.1 MV cm −1 coercive field. When identical chamber settings are used but the process starts in metallic mode, a mixed wurtzite/rocksalt film is deposited which exhibits nanometer‐scale changes to the film microstructure and a nonferroelectric response. These results illustrate the utility of optical emission spectroscopy for tracking target mode fluctuations when fabricating metastable materials such as high‐Sc Al 1– x Sc x N films.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Plutonium Solubility and Supernate Concentration for Neutralized Fast Critical Assembly Discards to Savannah River Site Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) plans to dissolve non-irradiated stainless steel (SS)-clad bundles of Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) materials in eighteen batches.1 FCA dissolution is currently underway in the 6.3D dissolver by simultaneous chemical and electrolytic dissolution, which is required to generate the harsh conditions necessary for dissolution of metal-oxide (MOX) and non-aluminum spent nuclear fuels (NASNFs).2 Nitric acid and potassium fluoride are used to promote chemical dissolution.2 Gadolinium will be added during processing as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. There are no plans for recovering plutonium from this waste stream. After FCA dissolution, the acidic (HNO3/KF) “discards” containing the dissolved metals will be neutralized by addition of 50 wt% sodium hydroxide to a final free hydroxide concentration of 1.2 M.1 Neutralization will precipitate a slurry of insoluble solids, predominantly metal oxides/hydroxides of plutonium, uranium, and SS components. Small fractions of the SS components, Pu, U, and Gd will remain dissolved in the supernate. The neutralized slurry will be composited to existing radioactive waste storage tanks within the SRS Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) containing other similar sludge batch (SB) materials.1 The fate of soluble plutonium and freshly-precipitated, colloidal plutonium from this process are of concern since the total Pu can challenge the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) at the downstream SRS Liquid Waste (LW) facility. Supernate decants including the neutralized FCA discards (nFCAd) within the CSTF will be composited with salt batch (StB) materials and transferred to the SRS Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), where total plutonium is also of concern.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗