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Presentation to inform the non-NASA general public of ground systems development and operations activities at Kennedy Space Center, particularly on what GSDO is and does, in a high level overview.
Presentation to inform the non-NASA general public and school children of ground systems development and operations activities at Kennedy Space Center, particularly on what GSDO is and does, in a high level overview.
Presentation to inform the non-NASA general public and school students of ground systems development and operations activities at Kennedy Space Center, particularly on what GSDO is and does, in a high level overview.
Presentation to inform the non-NASA general public and school children of ground systems development and operations activities at Kennedy Space Center, particularly on what GSDO is and does, in a high level overview.
A concept of operations for the Assembly, Integration and Testing (AIT) and the Ground Systems Development Operations (GSDO) of the European Service Module (ESM) propulsion system has been developed. The AIT concept of operations covers all fabrication, integration and testing activities in both Europe and in the United States. The GSDO Program develops the facilities, equipment, and procedures for the loading of hypergolic propellants, the filling of high-pressure gases, and contingency de-servicing operations for the ESM. NASA and ESA along with the Lockheed Martin and Airbus Space and Defense are currently working together for the EM-1 and EM-2 missions in which the ESM will be flown as part of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The NASA/ESA SM propulsion team is collaborating with the AIT personnel from ESA/Airbus and NASA/Lockheed Martin to ensure successful integration of the European designed Service Module propulsion system, the Lockheed Martin designed Crew Module Adapter and the heritage Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System Engines (OMS-E) being provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). This paper will provide an overview of the current AIT and GSDO concept of operations for the ESM propulsion system.
A concept of operations for the Assembly, Integration and Testing (AIT) and the Ground Systems Development Operations (GSDO) of the European Service Module (ESM) propulsion system has been developed. The AIT concept of operations covers all fabrication, integration and testing activities in both Europe and in the United States. The GSDO Program develops the facilities, equipment, and procedures for the loading of hypergolic propellants, the filling of high-pressure gases, and contingency de-servicing operations for the ESM. NASA and ESA along with the Lockheed Martin and Airbus Space and Defense are currently working together for the EM-1 and EM-2 missions in which the ESM will be flown as part of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The NASA/ESA SM propulsion team is collaborating with the AIT personnel from ESA/Airbus and NASA/Lockheed Martin to ensure successful integration of the European designed Service Module propulsion system, the Lockheed Martin designed Crew Module Adapter and the heritage Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System Engines (OMS-E) being provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). This paper will provide an overview of the current AIT and GSDO concept of operations for the ESM propulsion system.
The Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Standing Review Board (SRB) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent review of the plan developed by Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) for identifying models and emulators to create a tool(s) to verify their command and control software. The NESC was requested to identify any issues or weaknesses in the GSDO plan. This document contains the outcome of the NESC review.
Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.
Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.
Hunger Hydraulik of Lohr, Germany has been selected as the vendor to build replacement Jacking, Leveling and Equalization cylinders for one Crawler Transporter. A site visit has been scheduled and a overview of how the Crawler Transporter fits into KSC launch operations will be presented as information. The presentation will be presented on July 11, 2012 by Pepper Phillips, the Program Manager for GSDO.
No abstract available
The New Millennium Program's first Earth-observing mission (EO-1) is a technology validation mission. It is managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland and is scheduled for launch in the summer of 2000. The purpose of this mission is to flight-validate revolutionary technologies that will contribute to the reduction of cost and increase of capabilities for future land imaging missions. In the EO-1 mission, there are five instrument, five spacecraft, and three supporting technologies to flight-validate during a year of operations. EO-1 operations and the accompanying ground system were intended to be simple in order to maintain low operational costs. For purposes of formulating operations, it was initially modeled as a small science mission. However, it quickly evolved into a more complex mission due to the difficulties in effectively integrating all of the validation plans of the individual technologies. As a consequence, more operational support was required to confidently complete the on-orbit validation of the new technologies. This paper will outline the issues and lessons learned applicable to future technology validation missions. Examples of some of these include the following: (1) operational complexity encountered in integrating all of the validation plans into a coherent operational plan, (2) initial desire to run single shift operations subsequently growing to 6 "around-the-clock" operations, (3) managing changes in the technologies that ultimately affected operations, (4) necessity for better team communications within the project to offset the effects of change on the Ground System Developers, Operations Engineers, Integration and Test Engineers, S/C Subsystem Engineers, and Scientists, and (5) the need for a more experienced Flight Operations Team to achieve the necessary operational flexibility. The discussion will conclude by providing several cost comparisons for developing operations from previous missions to EO-1 and discuss some details that might be done differently for future technology validation missions.
This paper discusses our experiences using this XML intensive system and the improvements and tradeoffs of this emerging technology.
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An Orion Crew Module Service Module Structural Weight and Center of Gravity Simulator and a Vehicle Motion Simulator Hoist Structure for Orion Service Module Umbilical Testing were designed during a summer 2014 internship in Kennedy Space Centers Structures and Mechanisms Design Branch. The simulator is a structure that supports ballast, which will be integrated into an existing Orion mock-up to simulate the mass properties of the Exploration Mission-1 flight vehicle in both fueled and unfueled states. The simulator mimics these configurations through the use of approximately 40,000 lbf of steel and water ballast, and a steel support structure. Draining four water tanks, which house the water ballast, transitions the simulator from the fueled to unfueled mass properties. The Ground Systems Development and Operations organization will utilize the simulator to verify and validate equipment used to maneuver and transport the Orion spacecraft in its fueled and unfueled configurations. The second design comprises a cantilevered tripod hoist structure that provides the capability to position a large Orion Service Module Umbilical in proximity to the Vehicle Motion Simulator. The Ground Systems Development and Operations organization will utilize the Vehicle Motion Simulator, with the hoist structure attached, to test the Orion Service Module Umbilical for proper operation prior to installation on the Mobile Launcher. Overall, these two designs provide NASA engineers viable concepts worthy of fabricating and placing into service to prepare for the launch of Orion in 2017.
Analysis methods and testing processes are essential activities in the engineering development and verification of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS). Central to mission success is reliable verification of the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the SLS launch vehicle (LV) flight software. This is particularly difficult because M&FM algorithms integrate and operate LV subsystems, which consist of diverse forms of hardware and software themselves, with equally diverse integration from the engineering disciplines of LV subsystems. M&FM operation of SLS requires a changing mix of LV automation. During pre-launch the LV is primarily operated by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) organization with some LV automation of time-critical functions, and much more autonomous LV operations during ascent that have crucial interactions with the Orion crew capsule, its astronauts, and with mission controllers at the Johnson Space Center. M&FM algorithms must perform all nominal mission commanding via the flight computer to control LV states from pre-launch through disposal and also address failure conditions by initiating autonomous or commanded aborts (crew capsule escape from the failing LV), redundancy management of failing subsystems and components, and safing actions to reduce or prevent threats to ground systems and crew. To address the criticality of the verification testing of these algorithms, the NASA M&FM team has utilized the State Flow environment6 (SFE) with its existing Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) platform which also hosts vendor-supplied physics-based LV subsystem models. The human-derived M&FM algorithms are designed and vetted in Integrated Development Teams composed of design and development disciplines such as Systems Engineering, Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), liquid engines, and the astronaut crew office. Since the algorithms are realized using model-based engineering (MBE) methods from a hybrid of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), SFE methods are a natural fit to provide an in depth analysis of the interactive behavior of these algorithms with the SLS LV subsystem models. For this, the M&FM algorithms and the SLS LV subsystem models are modeled using constructs provided by Matlab which also enables modeling of the accompanying interfaces providing greater flexibility for integrated testing and analysis, which helps forecast expected behavior in forward VMET integrated testing activities. In VMET, the M&FM algorithms are prototyped and implemented using the same C++ programming language and similar state machine architectural concepts used by the FSW group. Due to the interactive complexity of the algorithms, VMET testing thus far has verified all the individual M&FM subsystem algorithms with select subsystem vendor models but is steadily progressing to assessing the interactive behavior of these algorithms with LV subsystems, as represented by subsystem models. The novel SFE applications has proven to be useful for quick look analysis into early integrated system behavior and assessment of the M&FM algorithms with the modeled LV subsystems. This early MBE analysis generates vital insight into the integrated system behaviors, algorithm sensitivities, design issues, and has aided in the debugging of the M&FM algorithms well before full testing can begin in more expensive, higher fidelity but more arduous environments such as VMET, FSW testing, and the Systems Integration Lab7 (SIL). SFE has exhibited both expected and unexpected behaviors in nominal and off nominal test cases prior to full VMET testing. In many findings, these behavioral characteristics were used to correct the M&FM algorithms, enable better test coverage, and develop more effective test cases for each of the LV subsystems. This has improved the fidelity of testing and planning for the next generation of M&FM algorithms as the SLS program evolves from non-crewed to crewed flight, impacting subsystem configurations and the M&FM algorithms that control them. SFE analysis has improved robustness and reliability of the M&FM algorithms by revealing implementation errors and documentation inconsistencies. It is also improving planning efficiency for future VMET testing of the M&FM algorithms hosted in the LV flight computers, further reducing risk for the SLS launch infrastructure, the SLS LV, and most importantly the crew.
NASA and its industry and international partners are embarking on a bold and inspiring development effort to design and build an exploration class space system. The space system is made up of the Orion system, the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) system. All are highly coupled together and dependent on each other for the combined safety of the space system. A key area of system safety focus needs to be in the ground and flight application software system (GFAS). In the development, certification and operations of GFAS, there are a series of safety characteristics that define the approach to ensure mission success. This paper will explore and examine the safety characteristics of the GFAS development. The GFAS system integrates the flight software packages of the Orion and SLS with the ground systems and launch countdown sequencers through the 'agile' software development process. A unique approach is needed to develop the GFAS project capabilities within this agile process. NASA has defined the software development process through a set of standards. The standards were written during the infancy of the so-called industry 'agile development' movement and must be tailored to adapt to the highly integrated environment of human exploration systems. Safety of the space systems and the eventual crew on board is paramount during the preparation of the exploration flight systems. A series of software safety characteristics have been incorporated into the development and certification efforts to ensure readiness for use and compatibility with the space systems. Three underlining factors in the exploration architecture require the GFAS system to be unique in its approach to ensure safety for the space systems, both the flight as well as the ground systems. The first are the missions themselves, which are exploration in nature, and go far beyond the comfort of low Earth orbit operations. The second is the current exploration system will launch only one mission per year even less during its developmental phases. Finally, the third is the partnered approach through the use of many different prime contractors, including commercial and international partners, to design and build the exploration systems. These three factors make the challenges to meet the mission preparations and the safety expectations extremely difficult to implement. As NASA leads a team of partners in the exploration beyond earth's influence, it is a safety imperative that the application software used to test, checkout, prepare and launch the exploration systems put safety of the hardware and mission first. Software safety characteristics are built into the design and development process to enable the human rated systems to begin their missions safely and successfully. Exploration missions beyond Earth are inherently risky, however, with solid safety approaches in both hardware and software, the boldness of these missions can be realized for all on the home planet.
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