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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

H-Canyon Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Dissolved Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) Fuel

The H-Canyon facility will be dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel in HNO3 and neutralizing the resulting solution with 50 wt% NaOH with no recovery operations prior to transfer to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). There are two types of FCA fuel, including a Pu-Al metal alloy and a mixed U and Pu oxide. H-Canyon anticipates dissolving 16 batches of the metal fuel and two batches of the oxide fuel. Potassium fluoride will be added to the dissolver solution at 0.05 M to promote dissolution. Gadolinium will be added after the dissolution as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. H-Canyon requested that SRNL evaluate Gd:239Pu equivalent (239PuEq) ratios of 1:1 and 10:1. The neutralization process precipitates metals including actinides, Gd, and cladding components resulting in a slurry. Caustic neutralization is a routine H-Canyon operation, but the FCA dissolver solution will be unique relative to solutions that are typically processed due to the stainless-steel components, high HNO3 concentration of ~8.5 M, and an initial Pu concentration of up to 4 g/L. Previous neutralization studies have been performed for Pu containing solutions but at less than half the initial Pu concentration and much lower initial HNO3 concentrations. Experimental neutralizations targeted a final free hydroxide (OH-) concentration of 0.6 M as this was anticipated to be the final endpoint, but H-Canyon now expects the endpoint to be 1.2 M OH-. The purpose of this study was to characterize the distribution of the actinide, Gd, and cladding components between the precipitate and supernate, determine if the slurry will back up in the header during the transfer to the CSTF, and determine if solids will settle in the pipeline during the transfer.

Mills, Matthew S.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Development of an L-Edge X-ray Absorbance Spectrometer for Monitoring Dissolver Solutions in H-Canyon

Savannah River National Laboratory has developed a monitor to measure plutonium and uranium concentrations in solutions of dissolved nuclear fuel. The monitor will be installed in the sample aisle location for the 6.3D Dissolver in the Savannah River Site’s H-Canyon and used in support of the electrolytic dissolution such as Fast Critical Assembly fuel. The monitor is based on the atomic absorbance of x-rays. Elements are differentiated by the appearance of absorbance features at specific energies of the x-ray spectrum that correspond to L-edge transitions of inner core electrons. Hence, the technique is called L-Edge X-Ray Absorbance Spectroscopy (L-XRAS). The technique is suitable for nuclear fuel processing due to its relative insensitivity to other components of the dissolver solution, such as nitric acid, transition metals (Fe, Cr, Ni, Mn) such as those from stainless steel, particulates, and catalysts and additives. The instrumentation consists of a commercially available x-ray source and detector, a sample cell designed to interface with the airlift sampler associated with H-Canyon Tank 6.3D, and a stainless steel enclosure. SRNL wrote instrument control software and developed chemometric models to interpret x-ray intensity spectra and estimate analyte concentrations and uncertainties in real time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Equivalency Factors and Mixed Isotope Subcritical Limits in H-Canyon [Slides]

Accurate references and documentation are of upmost importance, especially with the current workforce makeup. Tribal knowledge is likely to be lost with turnover. Using a questioning attitude is a great way to find gaps in existing analysis and “normal practices.” Most of the references reviewed are from the 1970’s, with the most recent authored in 1994. Many of these references have been revised and/or superseded in the years since. Though safe, many of the values are likely overconservative, as improvements with modeling and additional critical experiments have been performed in the years since. It would be prudent to reevaluate, clarify, and simplify the values used in H-Canyon.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Review and Revalidation of Equivalency Factors in H-Canyon

In recent years, an effort has begun to validate and reaffirm long-existing limits and equivalency factors in use at the H-Canyon (HCA) facility located at the Savanah River Site. Equivalency factors (EF) are coefficients used to express the reactivity of a quantity of a given isotope in terms of an equivalent amount of another isotope’s reactivity, commonly termed Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE). For criticality safety purposes, EFs are often used to conservatively determine if a given mixed-isotope system is within previously established limits. These EFs are calculated by taking ratios of established subcritical limits for a given system or process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Continued Evaluation of the Use of a Raman Spectrometer for H-Canyon Dissolver Monitoring

Remote monitoring of dissolver activities in H-Canyon can help operators avoid delays associated with excessive levels of fuel fragments remaining after a run. SRNL has proposed that effective monitoring can be achieved by using a Raman spectrometer to measure NO 2 concentrations in the offgas stream sampled from the facility stack. Prior work (SRNL-STI-2021-00451) measuring the offgas from one dissolution batch of High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel suggested a relationship between %NO 2 levels and fragment height. Herein, we report the results of monitoring and analysis of the dissolution of four batches of Material Test Reactor (MTR) fuel. A rigorous quantitative relationship between %NO 2 measurements and fragment heights could not be established, due to high uncertainties associated with both measurements. Uncertainties with gas measurements are associated with the %NO 2 levels in the offgas being close to the detection limit for the analyzer. Alternative gas measurement strategies are discussed which could improve sensitivity and reduce uncertainty. Limitations to the precision of the probe measurements are also discussed. It is also noted that the offgas is an average of the products from simultaneous dissolution of elements in multiple wells. Detection of a high fragment height level in an individual well may be hindered by low levels in other wells.

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DOE OSTI2024

Uranium Solubility and Supernate Enrichment Testing for Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Discards to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities

After future Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) enriched uranium discards into sludge batches (SB), portions of supernate decants during SB preparation will be blended into salt batches (StB) and the resulting feeds must meet the nuclear safety requirements for the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). During previous SB10 sampling and testing, which involved H-Canyon material containing enriched uranium being mixed with Tank 51 sludge shortly after the H-Canyon stream was neutralized, it was identified that the uranium isotopic enrichment in the supernate deviated from the uranium isotopic enrichment in the slurry. The higher uranium isotopic enrichment in the supernate introduced the risk of challenging the feed requirements of SWPF. The ABD material added to SB11 was isotopically diluted with depleted uranium, mitigating any downstream impacts. However, H-Canyon desires to eliminate or minimize future depleted uranium additions in order to meet the mission schedule.

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DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of the Potential for Precipitation of Solids during Storage of Non-Aluminum SNF Solutions

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuels (NASNF) stored in the L-Area basin will be dissolved in H-Canyon using the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. The solutions will be stored in either the hot or warm canyon until the preparation of a sludge batch for the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Spent nuclear fuel solutions could be stored for 1-2 years before transfer to the H-Area Tank Farm depending on the interval between sludge batches. The solution level in the storage tanks will be maintained; therefore, precipitation of solids due to evaporation is not an issue. However, the precipitation of solids from completely dissolved SNF due to solution instabilities has been observed during intermediate storage of solutions generating hydrated oxides.The presence of fissile material in these solids is generally associated with zirconium molybdate, which is known to act as a host lattice for Pu and can carry the actinides upon precipitation. The formation of zirconium molybdate solids which carry fissile material is a potential concern for the storage of NASNF solutions. To address this concern, the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a literature review to identify knowledge gaps which may require experimental work to determine if the formation of solids is a concern during storage of these solutions. Based on the literature review, the precipitation of zirconium molybdate solids from the Campaign 1 NASNF solutions during intermediatestorage is expected. This conclusion is supported by the identification of zirconium molybdate solids found on the H-Canyon 6.1D Dissolver MK-12 insert spacer. The formation of the zirconium molybdate solids is attributed to hydrolysis and radiolytic processes in the nitric acid solution. As the molybdate solids form, U and Pu can substitute for Zr in the crystal lattice resulting in co-precipitation. Generally, the Pu substitutes directly into the crystal lattice during precipitation while the U associated with the molybdate solids more likely absorbs from the solution. The U in the NASNF solutions is present as uranyl nitrate, a 2+ cation which will not substitute as easily into the molybdate crystal lattice for the Zr 4+ ion.

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DOE OSTI2025

Flowsheet Development for the University of Tokyo YAYOI (UTY) Fuel

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by H-Canyon Engineering to determine the flowsheet parameters needed to dissolve and store the YAYOI Material Test Reactor (MTR) uranium fuel safely and efficiently. In response to this request, a literature review of existing SRNL MTR dissolution flowsheets and general fuel dissolution literature in the nuclear fuel processing industry was performed to evaluate chemical dissolution parameters required to dissolve the YAYOI fuel and the tin-plated carbon steel product cans (PC). Based on past dissolutions of similar fuel in the H-Canyon and open literature reviews on chemical dissolution of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the following conclusions and flowsheet recommendations were made.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Bench-Scale Electrolytic Dissolution of Quarter-Scale FCA Cans

In 2016, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) led, in support of and under sponsorship of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), the removal and transfer of the plutonium based Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Tokai facility to the Savannah River Site (SRS). The team also included JAEA, multiple organizations in Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), International Nuclear Services, and many other entities. The FCA fuel removal project completion was a key deliverable for M3 to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and constituted the largest inventory of weapons-usable plutonium removed under the nonproliferation program. The FCA materials consist of thousands of stainless steel (SS) clad plates and hundreds of SS clad rods. The FCA fuel elements were packaged in a carrier can and stored at SRS pending disposition of the fuel. Following an assessment of candidate disposition options, SRNS identified electrolytic dissolution (ED) as the most promising disposition option for the FCA plates and their preferred option was endorsed by DOE. This option entails electrochemically dissolving the entire FCA carrier can with fuel elements and was based on bench-scale laboratory testing and historical work on processing SS-clad and zirconium-clad uranium-based fuel in the H-Canyon electrolytic dissolver (last operated in 1980). The FCA plate consists of a plutonium-aluminum metal alloy core hermitically sealed in SS cladding.

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DOE OSTI2024

Metallurgical Analysis of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Carrier Lifting Bails (Rev.1)

The dissolution rates of the aluminum alloys in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) element carriers and the Material Test Reactor (MTR) L-bundles in the H-Canyon facility have been identified as the possible cause of extended dissolutions that result in significant time and financial expenditures. A study, carried out by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to determine relationships between the dissolution rates and the metallurgical properties of the aluminum alloy materials of construction of the HFIR carriers and the L-bundles, considered the dissolution rates of aluminum alloy (AA) series 1100, 6061, and 6063. The study determined that the aluminum alloy compositions played a principal role in the dissolution rate of the carrier/bundle components. Higher dissolution rates were correlated with lower concentrations of the minor element additions in the alloys and with specific element concentrations. Aluminum alloys 1100 and 6063 were found to have similar dissolution rates that were approximately two orders of magnitude (100X) greater than those of AA6061. Based on the results of the dissolution behavior study, a Technical Assistance Request (TAR) was first issued to determine if the replacement of AA6061-T6 with AA6063-T6 is feasible for the HFIR carrier lifting bails. A Technical Task Request was then issued to consider AA6063-T5 as well as other alloys to improve possible supply chain issues. The metallurgical properties of the L-bundle (specifically the end caps) were not evaluated in this report because L-Bundle drawings already allow for the use of AA6063-T6 in all structural components. The HFIR carriers are composed of thin-walled components with significant surface areas that allow for relatively quick overall dissolution times. Conversely, the carrier lifting bails and the supporting constituents are composed of solid bars and thick plate regions with relatively small surface areas that experience longer overall dissolution times. While the MTR L-bundle design includes allowances for the materials of construction to be either AA6061-T6 or AA6063-T6, the HFIR carriers are specified to be constructed fully with AA6061-T6 alloy. This report analyzes the recommendations of the dissolution behavior study to replace the materials of construction of the HFIR carrier lifting bails. The analysis considers the operational requirements of the lifting bail and its supporting structures. To decrease dissolution times, the analysis considers direct replacement of the material as well as reductions in the thicknesses of the components to decrease the mass of the elements. Material reductions are considered on options for using either AA6061 and/or AA6063. The calculations are based on specifications from the American Society of Mechanical Engineer (ASME) and The Aluminum Association, Inc. design codes. The analysis finds that direct replacement of the lifting bail material of construction with AA6063-T6, and AA6063-T5 as well as reductions in the dimensions of the lifting bail components are acceptable. Note that this study considers the structural suitability of the alloys. It does not consider their dissolution rates in the dissolvers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Caustic Neutralization and Precipitation of Acidic Dissolved Simulated Stainless Steel–Clad Plutonium and Plutonium/Uranium Nuclear Fuel

Simulated dissolved stainless steel (SS) clad Pu and Pu/U nuclear fuel in HNO 3 was neutralized to a free hydroxide (OH - ) concentration of 0.6 M. A thermal neutron poison, Gd, was added to the simulants at concentrations of either ~3 - 6 g/L or ~37 - 38 g/L. The supernate Pu concentration the day of neutralization ranged from 0.48 to 8.75 mg/L. The supernate Pu concentration of a simplified simulant neutralized to 0.6 M OH - above precipitated solids containing Pu was demonstrated to decrease over 18 days. A significant portion of precipitated Pu was found to be insoluble in 8 M HNO 3 at ambient temperature, but essentially quantitative Pu dissolution was achieved in 11.5 M HNO 3 /0.1 M KF at 100 °C. The difficulty in dissolving the Pu precipitate is believed to be due to the formation of refractory PuO 2 •xH 2 O during the neutralization process. Initial Gd concentrations of ~37 – 38 g/L were found to result in a greater Al precipitation when neutralized to 0.6 M OH - than initial Gd concentrations of ~3 – 6 g/L. Physical properties of the resultant slurries were measured and used to calculate limiting flowrates and slurry velocities by gravity only in transfer piping between the Savannah River Site’s H-Canyon Facility and the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). These results were compared to calculated deposition velocities to predict if solids would settle during the transfer. The Newtonian model was found to be reasonable for each diluted slurry evaluated. Deposition velocities of Pu containing slurries are lower than nuclear fuel slurries primarily composed of U due to the high density of Pu solids. In conclusion, dilution of slurries reduces the margin between the slurry and deposition velocities due to the reduction in viscosity because higher viscous forces on the particles promote maintained suspension.

Actinide Neutralization↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Fast Critical Assembly Fuel Discards on Liquid Waste Processes

The Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) mission is reestablishing the electrolytic dissolver for processing of Pu and Pu-U materials clad in stainless steel (SS). H-Canyon is planning to dissolve and neutralize FCA fuel without recovering the special nuclear material (i.e., Pu) prior to discarding to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) operated by the Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) Liquid Waste (LW) Organization. The FCA discards will be combined with sludge in the CSTF after Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) if needed. The combined waste will be washed, concentrated, and vitrified at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The high level waste canisters produced will be temporarily stored in the Glass Waste Storage Buildings prior to transfer to a future federal repository. Decants from LTAD and sludge washing will be combined with DWPF recycle and dissolved salt cake to prepare salt batches for processing in the Salt Waste Processing Facility. The resulting decontaminated salt solution will be processed in the Saltstone Production Facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Zirconium Sludge Criticality Calculations in Large Process Tanks

The Savannah River Site’s H-Canyon facility has been tasked with accelerating the disposition of used research reactor fuels. • Future missions will involve dissolution of “Non-Aluminum” clad fuels – not easily dissolved – Nitric acid is not capable of dissolving stainless steel, Zirconium, and Hastelloy, clad fuels by itself • The electrolytic dissolver has been (re) selected as a disposition path for these fuels. 2

Devine, Nathan P.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Literature Review Investigating Historical Plutonium Solubility in SRS Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has designed the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) disposition mission. Similarly, the H-Canyon facility at SRS is reestablishing the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver for dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel (SS) clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel. In both discard types (ABD and FCA), plutonium is present and its complex solubility when composited to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) sludge is being investigated as it may have downstream impacts to the liquid waste (LW) organization. This literature review aims to highlight and compile the existing literature on plutonium solubility in waste streams relevant to ABD and FCA discards, as well as discuss some considerations in analyzing solubility data of plutonium. This review serves to help define the analysis methods for future experiments involving plutonium (and other actinides) and in designing appropriate testing conditions surrounding these studies. This review is broken up into five parts and will discuss: (i) The possible effects of testing hold time and temperature on plutonium solubility, (ii) the influence of neutralization rate and particle size of freshly precipitated discards, (iii) the coprecipitation of plutonium with iron and uranium, (iv) predictive solubility modeling and the influence of supernate anions on solubility, and (v) the speciation of plutonium in solutionas a result of supernate anions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Statistical Analysis of Imaging Laser Scan Data of an Exhaust Tunnel at the SRS

• The SRS H-Canyon Building is a critical facility under the responsibility of DOE-EM. • It includes an Air Exhaust Tunnel (HCAEX) that allows for ventilation of the process airflow. • Inspections are performed remotely because of hazards, e.g. radioactivity, debris, high airflow, and nitric acid vapors.

Wells, William Willie [Savannah River National Lab↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evaluation of Pu Solubility in Glass for Sludge Batch 11

Stainless-steel clad Pu from Japan’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) reactor is currently being dispositioned at the Savannah River Site. The electrolytic dissolver, operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions in H-Canyon, is being utilized to dissolve the material. The resulting solutions are transferred to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities, operated by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), for subsequent vitrification at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). In support of the FCA mission startup, a preliminary evaluation was conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory to assess the impact of the FCA discards on the liquid waste system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗