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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1963

Space Flight Handbooks. Volume 3 - Planetary Flight Handbook: Speed Contours & Auxiliary Graphs for Manned Missions to Mars and Venus - Part 1

This Handbook contains a series of maps, graphs, and tables which will be of use to the preliminary design analyst in scheduling round-trip interplanetary missions to Mars and Venus in the time period 1965-1999. It constitutes the third in a series of space flight manuals prepared for the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA. The present Handbook, denoted as Volume 3 of this series, is divided into three Parts. Part 3-1 presents maps for obtaining departure and arrival speeds for trips to these planets, a listing of useful constants, planetary ephemerides, tables of important occurrences, and a number of auxiliary graphs. Although most of the basic calculations were performed for the period 1965 -1980, much of the information is also applicable to the years 1980- 1999, as is explained in the text.

VENUS↗
NASA NTRS1968

Space Flight Handbooks. Volume 3, Planetary Flight Handbook: Mars Stopover Missions Using Venus Swingbys - Part 6

This volume of the NASA Planetary Flight Handbook contains trajectory data to aid the mission analyst in the planning of stopover missions to Mars that employ the Venus swingby mode. Compared to other mission modes, the Venus swingbys yield substantial reductions in propulsive velocity and Earth entry speed requirements when employed as part of a round trip stopover mission. Conversely, the swingbys are at best, of marginal utility for one-way missions. Consequently, this Handbook has been tailored expressly for use in the planning of round trip missions. The relevant charts, graphs, and tabular data are presented for the totality of such missions, i.e., in terms of total round trip mission duration and stopover time at Mars. Recognizing, however, that within the context of round trip missions the single-leg data can be of importance in certain phases of the mission analyses, all such data has been preserved on a master magnetic tape. Copies of this tape will be made available to interested organizations.

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NASA NTRS1968

Space Flight Handbooks: Planetary Flight Handbook; Mars Stopover Missions Using Venus Swingbys - Volume 3, Part 6

This is the second of three supplements to the Handbook of Mars Stopover Missions Using Venus Swingbys, Part 6 of NASA SP-35, Planetary Flight Handbook. NASA SP-35, Part 6, contains a general discussion, contour charts and related graphical information. Supplement A contains the tabular trajectory data for zero-day stopover time missions, and Supplement C contains the tabular trajectory data for 60-day stopover time missions.

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NASA NTRS1963

Space Flight Handbooks. Volume 3- Planetary Flight Handbook: Supplementary Trajectory Data: Venus to Earth and Mars to Earth - Part 2

Parts 2 and 3 present tabulations of trajectory data for scheduling flights to and from Venus and Mars during the period 1960-2000. Part 2 contains information for outbound flights to these planets; Part 3 contains information for trajectories returning from the planets to Earth. Each Part contains data for single-plane transfers, as well as for broken-plane transfers which employ a midcourse plane-change to eliminate the high speed "ridges." The mathematical analyses employed for all calculations are described in Part 1 of this handbook. To facilitate the construction of round-trip trajectories, the date at the target planet is held fixed while the trip duration is varied in 10-day increments from zero days to the length of that planet's synodic period with Earth. Dates of arrival at the target planet are presented in the extreme right-hand column of Part 2, and dates of departure from the target planet are presented in the extreme left-hand column of Part 3. Thus, by holding Part 2 directly to the left of Part 3, the analyst may easily and rapidly scan all trip possibilities which involve any desired stopover time at the target planet. Within approximately 200 days of each conjunction or opposition, data are presented in 10-day increments at the target planet. Only those trips are listed for which the hyperbolic excess speeds at either or both ends of the trajectory do not exceed 0.6 EMOS (Earth Mean Orbital Speed). For the remaining mission regions, the requirements are so smoothly varying that a 50-day interval in dates at the target planet may be employed; the 10-day interval in trip times is, however, preserved here. In these regions, only those trips are listed for which either or both speeds do not exceed 0.3 EMOS.

INTERPLANETARY FLIGHT↗
NASA NTRS1963

Space Flight Handbooks. Volume 3- Planetary Flight Handbook: Supplementary Trajectory Data: Venus to Earth and Mars to Earth - Part 3

Parts 2 and 3 present tabulations of trajectory data for scheduling flights to and from Venus and Mars during the period 1960-2000. Part 2 contains information for outbound flights to these planets; Part 3 contains information for trajectories returning from the planets to Earth. Each Part contains data for single-plane transfers, as well as for broken-plane transfers which employ a midcourse plane-change to eliminate the high speed "ridges." The mathematical analyses employed for all calculations are described in Part 1 of this handbook. To facilitate the construction of round-trip trajectories, the date at the target planet is held fixed while the trip duration is varied in 10-day increments from zero days to the length of that planet's synodic period with Earth. Dates of arrival at the target planet are presented in the extreme right-hand column of Part 2, and dates of departure from the target planet are presented in the extreme left-hand column of Part 3. Thus, by holding Part 2 directly to the left of Part 3, the analyst may easily and rapidly scan all trip possibilities which involve any desired stopover time at the target planet. Within approximately 200 days of each conjunction or opposition, data are presented in 10-day increments at the target planet. Only those trips are listed for which the hyperbolic excess speeds at either or both ends of the trajectory do not exceed 0.6 EMOS (Earth Mean Orbital Speed). For the remaining mission regions, the requirements are so smoothly varying that a 50-day interval in dates at the target planet may be employed; the 10-day interval in trip times is, however, preserved here. In these regions, only those trips are listed for which either or both speeds do not exceed 0.3 EMOS.

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NASA NTRS1971

Space Flight Handbooks, Volume 3 - Planetary Flight Handbook. Part 8 - Jupiter Swingby Missions to Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. Supplement - Tabular Trajectory Data

The trajectory data are presented chronologically and are organized by holding the arrival date constant while varying the Earth departure date in increments of 10 days. Upon completion of the specified range of Earth departure dates, the arrival date is incremented and the range of departure dates is repeated. The range of departure and arrival dates and the corresponding increments are given in Table 5-1 for each launch opportunity. It should be noted that the interval in arrival date is increased in the long flight time region where the variation of the trajectory parameters is relatively small. The criteria used for the selection of these dates are, in general: (i) the minimum Earth departure hyperbolic excess speed (across the Earth departure window) shall not exceed 0.65 EMOS and (2) the periapsis radius at Jupiter shall not be less than 0.95 planet radii.

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NASA NTRS1969

Space Flight Handbooks: Volume III. Planetary Flight Handbook: Part 7 - Direct Trajectories to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. Supplement B. Tabular Trajectory Data for Direct Trajectories to Uranus and Neptune

The trajectory data are presented chronologically and are organized by holding the arrival date constant while varying the Earth departure date in increments of 10 days. Upon completion of the specified range of Earth departure dates, the arrival date is incremented and the range of departure dates is repeated. For long trip times, where the variation of the trajectory parameters is relatively small, the size of the increment of the arrival date is increased. The range of departure and arrival dates and their corresponding increments are given in Table 5-1 for each launch opportunity. The criterion for the selection of these dates is that they encompass the region in which the Earth departure hyperbolic excess speed is less than or equal to 0.65 EMOS. There are two lines of print for each trajectory (departure-date/arrival date pair). In the first line the two left most columns contain the dates of departure and arrival. The next 18 columns of the first line can be divided into three groups: six columns of data related to departure, six columns pertinent to the heliocentric phase of the mission, and six columns related to arrival at the target planet. The second line of print contains, respectively, the Delta V requirements for departure and arrival, the total Delta V requirement, the heliocentric transfer trajectory type, and four parameters defining conditions at arrival. The value computed for the arrival Delta V is for entry into a circular orbit. The radius selected for this orbit, while necessarily somewhat arbitrary, is representative of the broad range of orbit radii which tend to minimize the arrival Delta V for the range of excess speeds between 0.1 and 0.8 EMOS. The value selected for Uranus and Neptune is 3 planet radii. Significant reductions in the computed Delta V can be realized by assuming entry into an elliptical orbit having a periapsis radius equal to the selected circular-orbit radius. The magnitude of the reduction can be determined from Figures 2-6 and 2-8 i n Section 2.

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NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗