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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Resilience Benefits of Distributed Wind Against Fuel and Weather Hazards in Alaska

In this case study of St. Mary’s Village, Alaska, we present a resilience evaluation exercise. A resilience framework is employed to identify system characteristics, relevant metrics, and resilience hazards and to assess the performance against the hazards with and without a distributed wind system installed. The results show the resilience benefits provided by the distributed wind installation against fuel shortage hazards and cold weather hazards. The resilience benefits can be assigned monetary values, which will be highly dependent on actual circumstances of the hazard, but provide insight into value streams of distributed wind that are not usually considered. For example, the single 900 kW turbine was found to prevent an average of 14,643 kWh of load from being dropped during a two-day diesel fuel shortage event, which saved the community $447,592 from the prevented outages. This case study serves as an example for novel power system resilience analysis and builds understanding of resilience hazards that are common across many power systems.

Culler, Megan J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Central Asia Seismic Hazard Assessment (CASHA): A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Probabilistic seismic hazard assessments (PSHA) underpin the calculation of earthquake loads in most building codes around the world. In Central Asia, the building codes are slowly being updated to incorporate some of the contemporary concepts of seismic hazard representation. There is also a regional desire to coordinate hazard assessments and building code modernization. However, some challenges remain. Expertise in the region related to seismic hazard assessments is still largely compartmentalised, requiring a significant amount of training and capacity building in seismic hazard assessment related topics. In addition, there are vast amounts of seismic data (bulletin and waveforms), both from analogue and digital eras, that the region’s countries stored but until recently did not use or share among themselves or with the broader seismological community around the world. Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many of the countries’ seismic networks suffered a major setback with the lack of attention and budget to update existing equipment and installation of new instruments. In order to address these issues, the United States Department of Energy through Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) initiated a project in 2016 to engage and train local scientists in Central Asia to install new equipment, to enhance the quality of seismic monitoring and reporting, to improve and harmonise the regional earthquake catalogue, and to conduct national probabilistic seismic hazard assessments using the new and improved datasets. To achieve the seismic hazard assessment related goals, a series of workshops were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan from 2016 until 2020. During the time that the COVID-19 pandemic restricted travel, workshops continued online (22 online workshops were hosted in two years). Finally, in May 2022, an in-person workshop in Istanbul, Turkey brought together all project participants along with civil engineers engaged with building code activities in their respective countries, providing a platform to discuss the implementation of the hazard models into updates of building codes in each country, as well as to discuss model parameters, sensitivity analyses and model results in terms of hazard maps, uniform hazard spectra and hazard deaggregations. The workshops were a combination of lectures and hands-on exercises, and included international participation as well as local scientists and engineers. The workshops served several purposes, including training, coordination of data collection, interactions between local earth scientists and engineers, and brainstorming and knowledge exchange among local and international experts. This report outlines the new earthquake catalogue compilation effort and the PSHA project undertaken in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan as part of this initiative. The southern part of this region is tectonically active with moderate to high levels of both shallow crustal seismic activity and occurrence of deeper earthquakes under the Hindu Kush and Pamir mountain ranges. Deeper earthquakes also occur near southwestern Kazakhstan, under the eastern Greater Caucasus and Caspian Sea. Large portions of central and northern Kazakhstan, on the other hand, are in stable continental regions with low levels of seismic activity. This study systematically compiles and improves all available data on local seismicity, active faults, and ground motion attenuation characteristics of the region; and builds a framework to enable a contemporary PSHA to be carried out with the engagement of local scientists. While the project was regional, the seismic hazard assessments are primarily driven by the countries’ own national preferences and understanding of data collection, interpretation, and validation of results.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Preliminary Nuclear Containment Vessel Modeling for Multi-Hazard Probabilistic Risk Assessment under Seismic Hazards and Concrete Degradation

The current practice for natural phenomena hazards (NPH) risk assessment of nuclear facilities is to compute the risk for each hazard independently and then compound the total risk as a combination of single hazard risks. This state of practice does not consider correlations between hazards and the cascading impacts to structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and could thus underestimate the NPH risk or overestimate the nuclear facility safety. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of multi-hazard risk considerations to nuclear power plants (NPPs) that quantify the cascading damage effects to SSCs in the risk models. Moreover, the current fleet of NPPs in the United States is aging; these NPPs are now expected to operate well beyond their initially planned design life. Aging-related deterioration can potentially decrease the capacity of critical structures such as containment vessels to withstand NPH. Such aging considerations may not be adequately accounted for by the current NPH risk assessment guidelines. This paper presents a preliminary modeling and simulation of a representative reinforced concrete containment vessel subjected to seismic mainshock and aftershock considering concrete degradation due to alkali silica reaction. The broader aim is to develop multi-hazard time-dependent fragility functions that could be subsequently used in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. The multi-hazard component comes into play due to the consideration of damage to the containment vessel under seismic loads and concrete degradation. Consideration of concrete degradation also brings into play the time-dependent nature of the containment vessel response. The response of the containment vessel under varying degrees of concrete degradation to seismic loads is investigated. The results presented are simulated using the Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) software for seismic analysis and the Blackbear software for concrete degradation and damage modeling. Both software are open source and developed within the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE).

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2018

Spacecraft Charging: Hazard Causes, Hazard Effects, Hazard Controls

Spacecraft flight environments are characterized both by a wide range of space plasma conditions and by ionizing radiation (IR), solar ultraviolet and X-rays, magnetic fields, micrometeoroids, orbital debris, and other environmental factors, all of which can affect spacecraft performance. Dr. Steven Koontz's lecture will provide a solid foundation in the basic engineering physics of spacecraft charging and charging effects that can be applied to solving practical spacecraft and spacesuit engineering design, verification, and operations problems, with an emphasis on spacecraft operations in low-Earth orbit, Earth's magnetosphere, and cis-Lunar space.

cis-lunar space↗
DOE OSTI2024

Shape restricted additive hazards models: Monotone, unimodal, and U‐shape hazard functions

We consider estimation of the semiparametric additive hazards model with an unspecified baseline hazard function where the effect of a continuous covariate has a specific shape but otherwise unspecified. Such estimation is particularly useful for a unimodal hazard function, where the hazard is monotone increasing and monotone decreasing with an unknown mode. A popular approach of the proportional hazards model is limited in such setting due to the complicated structure of the partial likelihood. Our model defines a quadratic loss function, and its simple structure allows a global Hessian matrix that does not involve parameters. Thus, once the global Hessian matrix is computed, a standard quadratic programming method can be applicable by profiling all possible locations of the mode. However, the quadratic programming method may be inefficient to handle a large global Hessian matrix in the profiling algorithm due to a large dimensionality, where the dimension of the global Hessian matrix and number of hypothetical modes are the same order as the sample size. We propose the quadratic pool adjacent violators algorithm to reduce computational costs. The proposed algorithm is extended to the model with a time‐dependent covariate with monotone or U‐shape hazard function. In simulation studies, our proposed method improves computational speed compared to the quadratic programming method, with bias and mean square error reductions. We analyze data from a recent cardiovascular study.

Mathematical & Computational Biology↗
NASA NTRS2019

International Space Station Spacecraft Charging Hazards: Hazard Identification, Management, and Control Methodologies, with Possible Applications to Human Spaceflight Beyond LEO

In this paper, we present an overview of how the International Space Station (ISS) safety engineering methodology directed to controlling extravehicular activity (EVA) crew electrical shock hazards, caused by ISS spacecraft charging, has evolved over the past 25+ years. Long-term measurements of ISS charging severity and frequency-of-occurrence, combined with detailed probabilistic analysis of EVA electric shock- circuit completion, led to a change in hazard control methodology. The requirement for two-fault tolerant EVA shock hazard control during all EVAs was replaced with a less operationally burdensome and risky EVA shock hazard detection and warning process. The applicability of event probability-based detection-and- warning processes to human spaceflight charging hazard control beyond low-earth orbit (LEO) is also considered.

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS1971

Pyrotechnic hazards classification and evaluation program. Phase 3, segments 1-4: Investigation of sensitivity test methods and procedures for pyrotechnic hazards evaluation and classification, part A

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations relative to the investigations conducted to evaluate tests for classifying pyrotechnic materials and end items as to their hazard potential are presented. Information required to establish an applicable means of determining the potential hazards of pyrotechnics is described. Hazard evaluations are based on the peak overpressure or impulse resulting from the explosion as a function of distance from the source. Other hazard classification tests include dust ignition sensitivity, impact ignition sensitivity, spark ignition sensitivity, and differential thermal analysis.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1971

Pyrotechnic hazards classification and evaluation program. Phase 2, segment 3: Test plan for determining hazards associated with pyrotechnic manufacturing processes

A comprehensive test plan for determining the hazards associated with pyrotechnic manufacturing processes is presented. The rationale for each test is based on a systematic analysis of historical accounts of accidents and a detailed study of the characteristics of each manufacturing process. The most hazardous manufacturing operations have been determined to be pressing, mixing, reaming, and filling. The hazard potential of a given situation is evaluated in terms of the probabilities of initiation, communication, and transition to detonation (ICT). The characteristics which affect the ICT probabilities include the ignition mechanisms which are present either in normal or abnormal operation, the condition and properties of the pyrotechnic material, and the configuration of the processing equipment. Analytic expressions are derived which describe the physical conditions of the system, thus permitting a variety of processes to be evaluated in terms of a small number of experiments.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

HAZARD ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USING A REDUNDANCY-GUIDED APPROACH

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. This paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the triggers of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS1981

Thunderstorm hazards flight research: Storm hazards 1980 overview

A highly instrumented NASA F-106B aircraft, modified for the storm hazards mission and protected against direct lightning strikes, was used in conjunction with various ground based radar and lightning measurement systems to collect data during thunderstorm penetration flights. During 69 thunderstorm penetrations, there were 10 direct lightning strikes to the aircraft. No problems were encountered with any of the aircraft's systems as a result of the strikes and the research instrumentation performed as designed. Electromagnetic characteristics of nine strikes were recorded, and the results of other experiments confirm the theory that X-ray radiation and nitrous oxide gas are being produced by processes associated directly with thunderstorm electric fields and lightning discharges. A better understanding of aircraft lightning attachment mechanisms and strike zones is being accomplished by careful inspection, identification, and documentation of lightning attachment points and swept stroke paths following each strike to the aircraft.

Deal, P. L.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Bibliography on aircraft fire hazards and safety. Volume 1: Hazards. Part 1: Key numbers 1 to 817

Ignition temperatures of n-hexane, n-octane, n-decane, JP-6 jet fuel, and aircraft engine oil MIL-7-7808 (0-60-18) were determined in air using heated Pyrex cylinders and Nichrome wires, rods, or tubes. Ignition temperature varied little with fuel-air ratio, but increased as the size of the heat source was decreased. Expressions are given which define the variation of the hot surface ignition temperatures of these combustibles with the radius and the surface area of the heat source. The expressions are applicable to stagnant or low velocity flow conditions (less than 0.2 in./sec.). In addition, the hot gas ignition temperatures of the combustible vapor-air mixtures were determined with jets of hot air. These ignition temperatures also varied little with fuel-air ratio and increased as the diameter of the heat sources was decreased.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗
DOE OSTI2026

Knowledge-Based Hazardous Waste Determinations for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Modules: A Foundational Study

This report explores using "generator knowledge" to determine whether a solar photovoltaic (PV) module must be managed as hazardous waste prior to recycling or landfilling. Generator knowledge is a legal term and existing regulatory pathway for making a hazardous waste determination that has been used by other industries but is a relatively unknown option to the PV industry. In the United States, a hazardous waste determination often acts as a pre-requisite to recycle or landfill a PV module. The results of the hazardous waste determination dictate whether the PV module must be managed as hazardous waste or nonhazardous solid waste. Managing a PV module as hazardous waste requires compliance with stringent U.S. federal and state hazardous waste law. In addition to increased management costs, which can be ten times higher, legal liability for PV modules regulated as hazardous waste is also heightened with both civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance which includes making an inaccurate or faulty hazardous waste determination. The most common reason a PV module would be regulated as hazardous is if it contains a regulated metal in an amount that equals or exceeds the toxicity characteristic limits. To determine whether a PV module exhibits a hazardous characteristic, the regulated person/entity must "apply knowledge...in light of the materials and processes used." In the absence of adequate knowledge to determine whether the PV module is hazardous, it must be tested using Test Method 1311 Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) or an equivalent EPA-approved method. Although TCLP is the predominant method used to today to make a hazardous waste determination for PV modules, evidence from this study concludes it is not practical to TCLP test every PV module even in a single utility-scale installation, and a scalable solution is needed. This study finds that knowledge-based hazardous waste determinations may allow a regulated person/entity to make a hazardous waste determination for more than one PV module at one time - making this regulatory pathway a potential scalable solution. Through legal analysis and interviews with 44 experts, the authors explore what it means to make an accurate knowledge-based hazardous determination for PV modules considering sources and forms of information as well as potential limitations. The work aims to provide a foundation for building consensus on whether knowledge-based hazardous determinations are a viable, scalable industry approach for solar.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗