Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “HAZARDS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Resilience Benefits of Distributed Wind Against Fuel and Weather Hazards in Alaska

In this case study of St. Mary’s Village, Alaska, we present a resilience evaluation exercise. A resilience framework is employed to identify system characteristics, relevant metrics, and resilience hazards and to assess the performance against the hazards with and without a distributed wind system installed. The results show the resilience benefits provided by the distributed wind installation against fuel shortage hazards and cold weather hazards. The resilience benefits can be assigned monetary values, which will be highly dependent on actual circumstances of the hazard, but provide insight into value streams of distributed wind that are not usually considered. For example, the single 900 kW turbine was found to prevent an average of 14,643 kWh of load from being dropped during a two-day diesel fuel shortage event, which saved the community $447,592 from the prevented outages. This case study serves as an example for novel power system resilience analysis and builds understanding of resilience hazards that are common across many power systems.

Culler, Megan J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Central Asia Seismic Hazard Assessment (CASHA): A Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Probabilistic seismic hazard assessments (PSHA) underpin the calculation of earthquake loads in most building codes around the world. In Central Asia, the building codes are slowly being updated to incorporate some of the contemporary concepts of seismic hazard representation. There is also a regional desire to coordinate hazard assessments and building code modernization. However, some challenges remain. Expertise in the region related to seismic hazard assessments is still largely compartmentalised, requiring a significant amount of training and capacity building in seismic hazard assessment related topics. In addition, there are vast amounts of seismic data (bulletin and waveforms), both from analogue and digital eras, that the region’s countries stored but until recently did not use or share among themselves or with the broader seismological community around the world. Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many of the countries’ seismic networks suffered a major setback with the lack of attention and budget to update existing equipment and installation of new instruments. In order to address these issues, the United States Department of Energy through Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) initiated a project in 2016 to engage and train local scientists in Central Asia to install new equipment, to enhance the quality of seismic monitoring and reporting, to improve and harmonise the regional earthquake catalogue, and to conduct national probabilistic seismic hazard assessments using the new and improved datasets. To achieve the seismic hazard assessment related goals, a series of workshops were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan from 2016 until 2020. During the time that the COVID-19 pandemic restricted travel, workshops continued online (22 online workshops were hosted in two years). Finally, in May 2022, an in-person workshop in Istanbul, Turkey brought together all project participants along with civil engineers engaged with building code activities in their respective countries, providing a platform to discuss the implementation of the hazard models into updates of building codes in each country, as well as to discuss model parameters, sensitivity analyses and model results in terms of hazard maps, uniform hazard spectra and hazard deaggregations. The workshops were a combination of lectures and hands-on exercises, and included international participation as well as local scientists and engineers. The workshops served several purposes, including training, coordination of data collection, interactions between local earth scientists and engineers, and brainstorming and knowledge exchange among local and international experts. This report outlines the new earthquake catalogue compilation effort and the PSHA project undertaken in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan as part of this initiative. The southern part of this region is tectonically active with moderate to high levels of both shallow crustal seismic activity and occurrence of deeper earthquakes under the Hindu Kush and Pamir mountain ranges. Deeper earthquakes also occur near southwestern Kazakhstan, under the eastern Greater Caucasus and Caspian Sea. Large portions of central and northern Kazakhstan, on the other hand, are in stable continental regions with low levels of seismic activity. This study systematically compiles and improves all available data on local seismicity, active faults, and ground motion attenuation characteristics of the region; and builds a framework to enable a contemporary PSHA to be carried out with the engagement of local scientists. While the project was regional, the seismic hazard assessments are primarily driven by the countries’ own national preferences and understanding of data collection, interpretation, and validation of results.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Preliminary Nuclear Containment Vessel Modeling for Multi-Hazard Probabilistic Risk Assessment under Seismic Hazards and Concrete Degradation

The current practice for natural phenomena hazards (NPH) risk assessment of nuclear facilities is to compute the risk for each hazard independently and then compound the total risk as a combination of single hazard risks. This state of practice does not consider correlations between hazards and the cascading impacts to structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and could thus underestimate the NPH risk or overestimate the nuclear facility safety. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of multi-hazard risk considerations to nuclear power plants (NPPs) that quantify the cascading damage effects to SSCs in the risk models. Moreover, the current fleet of NPPs in the United States is aging; these NPPs are now expected to operate well beyond their initially planned design life. Aging-related deterioration can potentially decrease the capacity of critical structures such as containment vessels to withstand NPH. Such aging considerations may not be adequately accounted for by the current NPH risk assessment guidelines. This paper presents a preliminary modeling and simulation of a representative reinforced concrete containment vessel subjected to seismic mainshock and aftershock considering concrete degradation due to alkali silica reaction. The broader aim is to develop multi-hazard time-dependent fragility functions that could be subsequently used in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. The multi-hazard component comes into play due to the consideration of damage to the containment vessel under seismic loads and concrete degradation. Consideration of concrete degradation also brings into play the time-dependent nature of the containment vessel response. The response of the containment vessel under varying degrees of concrete degradation to seismic loads is investigated. The results presented are simulated using the Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) software for seismic analysis and the Blackbear software for concrete degradation and damage modeling. Both software are open source and developed within the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Path of Disposal for Hazardous and Non-hazardous Waste from Cradle to Grave

Hazardous waste is a threat to human health and the environment and must be managed and disposed of properly. A Solid Waste is defined as any material (solid, liquid, containerized gas) which has been discarded, abandoned (no longer needed), or recycled. The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) is a law that creates the framework for the proper management of solid waste. Under RCRA, EPA has developed a program which ensures hazardous waste is managed safely from the moment it is generated to its final disposal (cradle-to-grave)2. To educate about how waste is handled at the Savannah River Research Campus (SRRC) under RCRA, the path it takes from point of generation (cradle) to disposal (grave), and the responsibilities of every person involved in the process. Researcher or other laboratory personnel that generates waste as a result of their work Responsibilities: - Fill out inventory log sheet and corresponding container sheet which includes the constituents of the waste; - Properly label waste container with SAA/WSA ID no., generator's name, what it is, the hazards, and date; - Place waste in designated waste storage area. Laboratory Custodian Responsibilities: - Ensures waste is handled and stored properly; - Ensures inventory is updated; - Ensures all container sheets are completed; - Ensures only authorized personal have access to waste storage areas. Environmental Compliance Authority Responsibilities: - Develops waste procedures; - Provide waste training; - Inspects for improperly handled waste; - Establishes or closes waste storage areas as needed; - Determines if waste can be recycled; - Determines if waste is RCRA hazardous: Is it U or P listed? - Unused commercial chemical products; Is it F listed - Spent solvents; Is it characteristic? - Flammable/Oxidizer, Corrosive, Reactive, Toxic; - Weighs waste to ensure laboratory has not exceeded its monthly or total storage limits; - Maintains waste records; - Determines how waste should be disposed: Trash - Nonhazardous solids; Drain - Nonhazardous Liquids; Labpack; - Prepares waste for shipment with Vendor and Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Packages, Transports, and Treats Hazardous Waste Responsibilities: - Must be EPA permitted and approved by the Department of Energy - Picks up hazardous waste for transport to a treatment, storage or disposal facility depending on waste disposal requirements - Must meet all Department of Transportation regulations for transporting hazardous waste - Dispose of waste according to RCRA regulations. Due to the potential risks to human health and the environment, waste must be handled safely through the chain of possession from cradle to grave. To ensure proper handling, there are many safety checks as required by RCRA and DOT regulations. This includes proper labeling, inventory, and characterization to ensure all hazards are known, inspections by the Custodian, ECA, and the state regulator (SCDHEC), and transportation verifications and manifesting. One of the best ways to reduce the risks that waste presents is to minimize or eliminate the creation of waste. This can be accomplished through source reduction which includes: Inventory control, material substitution, process modification, improved housekeeping, and preventative maintenance and recycling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Shape restricted additive hazards models: Monotone, unimodal, and U‐shape hazard functions

We consider estimation of the semiparametric additive hazards model with an unspecified baseline hazard function where the effect of a continuous covariate has a specific shape but otherwise unspecified. Such estimation is particularly useful for a unimodal hazard function, where the hazard is monotone increasing and monotone decreasing with an unknown mode. A popular approach of the proportional hazards model is limited in such setting due to the complicated structure of the partial likelihood. Our model defines a quadratic loss function, and its simple structure allows a global Hessian matrix that does not involve parameters. Thus, once the global Hessian matrix is computed, a standard quadratic programming method can be applicable by profiling all possible locations of the mode. However, the quadratic programming method may be inefficient to handle a large global Hessian matrix in the profiling algorithm due to a large dimensionality, where the dimension of the global Hessian matrix and number of hypothetical modes are the same order as the sample size. We propose the quadratic pool adjacent violators algorithm to reduce computational costs. The proposed algorithm is extended to the model with a time‐dependent covariate with monotone or U‐shape hazard function. In simulation studies, our proposed method improves computational speed compared to the quadratic programming method, with bias and mean square error reductions. We analyze data from a recent cardiovascular study.

Mathematical & Computational Biology↗
DOE OSTI2019

A computational risk assessment approach to the integration of seismic and flooding hazards with internal hazards

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear power plants historically focuses on internal events at the plant, rather than external hazards. Although the importance of external hazards risk analysis is now well recognized, the methods for assessing the risk associated with low probability external hazards rely heavily on subjective judgment of specialists, often using conservative elements in the analysis, as is the case with the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin approach commonly used for seismic PRA. The U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability program has been investigating the use of first principles analyses to provide a more realistic assessment of the risk of external hazards, in a process called computational risk assessment (CRA). Efforts undertaken are described in the development of CRA methods to integrate the risk associated with seismic and flooding events into traditional PRA. Further, the results of four case studies are presented.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

HAZARD ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USING A REDUNDANCY-GUIDED APPROACH

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. This paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the triggers of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2026

Knowledge-Based Hazardous Waste Determinations for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Modules: A Foundational Study

This report explores using "generator knowledge" to determine whether a solar photovoltaic (PV) module must be managed as hazardous waste prior to recycling or landfilling. Generator knowledge is a legal term and existing regulatory pathway for making a hazardous waste determination that has been used by other industries but is a relatively unknown option to the PV industry. In the United States, a hazardous waste determination often acts as a pre-requisite to recycle or landfill a PV module. The results of the hazardous waste determination dictate whether the PV module must be managed as hazardous waste or nonhazardous solid waste. Managing a PV module as hazardous waste requires compliance with stringent U.S. federal and state hazardous waste law. In addition to increased management costs, which can be ten times higher, legal liability for PV modules regulated as hazardous waste is also heightened with both civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance which includes making an inaccurate or faulty hazardous waste determination. The most common reason a PV module would be regulated as hazardous is if it contains a regulated metal in an amount that equals or exceeds the toxicity characteristic limits. To determine whether a PV module exhibits a hazardous characteristic, the regulated person/entity must "apply knowledge...in light of the materials and processes used." In the absence of adequate knowledge to determine whether the PV module is hazardous, it must be tested using Test Method 1311 Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) or an equivalent EPA-approved method. Although TCLP is the predominant method used to today to make a hazardous waste determination for PV modules, evidence from this study concludes it is not practical to TCLP test every PV module even in a single utility-scale installation, and a scalable solution is needed. This study finds that knowledge-based hazardous waste determinations may allow a regulated person/entity to make a hazardous waste determination for more than one PV module at one time - making this regulatory pathway a potential scalable solution. Through legal analysis and interviews with 44 experts, the authors explore what it means to make an accurate knowledge-based hazardous determination for PV modules considering sources and forms of information as well as potential limitations. The work aims to provide a foundation for building consensus on whether knowledge-based hazardous determinations are a viable, scalable industry approach for solar.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Remote Sensing Improves Multi‐Hazard Flooding and Extreme Heat Detection by Fivefold Over Current Estimates

The co‐occurrence of multiple hazards is of growing concern globally as the frequency and magnitude of extreme climate events increases. Despite studies examining the spatial distribution of such events, there has been little work in examining if all relevant life threatening and damaging hazards are captured in existing hazard databases and by common hazard metrics. For example, local/regional flash flooding events are seldom captured by optical satellite instruments and are subsequently excluded from global hazard databases. Similarly, the heat hazard definitions most frequently used in multi‐hazard studies inherently fail to capture events that are life‐threatening but climatologically within an expected range. Our goal is to determine the potential for increasing multi‐hazard event detection capabilities by inferring additional hazard footprints from widely accessible satellite data. We use daily precipitation and temperature satellite data to develop an open‐source framework that infers additional hazard footprints that are not included in traditional methods. With the state of Texas as our study area, we detected 2.5 times as many flood hazards, equivalent to $320 million in property and crop damages. Furthermore, our expanded heat hazard definition increases the impacted area by 56.6%, equivalent to 91.5 million km 2 over an 18 year period. Increasing hazard detection capabilities and expanding existing definitions of hazards using daily satellite data increases the temporal and spatial resolutions at which multi‐hazard events are detected. Having more complete data sets of all relevant hazard extents improves our ability to track global trends and more accurately determine the magnitude of hazard exposure inequities.

equity↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities (Revision 1)

This project will demonstrate a multi-hazard time-dependent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach for nuclear facilities considering aging-related deterioration of structures. A generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor subjected to seismic mainshock-aftershock sequences considering the aging of the containment structure will be used as a case study to demonstrate the multi-hazard PRA approach. Using advanced modeling and simulation, seismic mainshock-aftershock fragility functions will be simulated for the containment structure considering aging effects. A multi-hazard PRA model for a generic PWR reactor will be built to quantify the multi-hazard core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) with explicit time-dependent modeling of event sequences. To date, the cascading impacts of multi-hazards are not adequately accounted for in the PRA models for nuclear facilities. In addition, for both initial and periodic evaluation of facilities to withstand natural phenomena hazards (NPH), deterioration of the SSCs due to aging and other effects is not adequately considered. By advancing multi-hazard considerations accounting for aging effects, this project will contribute to improved understanding of the safety of aging nuclear facilities. Project outcomes such as the multi-hazard CDF and LERF will also allow facility owners to optimize upgrade and retrofit protocols. This project is divided into two components: (1) advanced modeling and simulations; and (2) multi-hazard PRA. For the first component, Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Multi-hazard Analysis for STOchastic time-DOmaiN phenomena (MASTODON) and BlackBear codes will be used to simulate the seismic response and damage of a containment structure under cascading mainshock-aftershock sequences with aging effects. Uncertainties related to the seismic inputs, material parameters, and environmental factors such as temperature and humidity will be identified and propagated to the fragility functions. These fragility functions, which consider aging effects, will be time dependent. The second component will take the fragility information from the first component to build a multi-hazard time-dependent PRA model starting from a generic PWR model to evaluate the multi-hazard CDF and LERF and characterize the associated consequences. For this component, OpenPRA Web Application and SAPHIRE code will be used. Events such as the Fukushima Daiichi accident have highlighted the importance of considering the cascading impacts of multi-hazards for PRA. Moreover, many of the reactors in the current nuclear fleet in the United States (US) are already operating well beyond their initially planned design life, and applications for further extensions to operating licenses are being considered. Therefore, considering multi-hazard effects and aging deterioration in the NPH risk assessment process will contribute to the safety of both existing and future nuclear facilities. Outcomes of this project will thus directly benefit the standards DOE-STD-1020-16 and DOE-HDBK-1224-18.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Idaho National Laboratory Integrated Multisite SSHAC Level 3: Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) resides on the eastern Snake River Plain (ESRP), part of the Snake River Plain (SRP) with a complex origin and geologic history of volcanism. Much of the Quaternary (last 2.58 million years) volcanism within 400 km of INL is genetically associated with a major thermal anomaly referred to as the Yellowstone hotspot, which is currently located more than 180 km northeast of INL. Near INL, local volcanic sources include silicic domes near its southern border, and numerous dike-fed basaltic vents of the ESRP, some of which are near or within the INL boundaries. Quantitative probabilistic assessments of screened-in volcanic hazardous phenomena for nine different facility complexes at the INL are presented for a Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 (SL3) study. The comprehensive, integrated multisite SSHAC study consists of a single regional Probabilistic Volcanic Hazards Assessment (PVHA) that pertains to all nine INL facility complexes, with site-specific information developed at each respective area of interest (AOI), referred to as the "INL facility AOI" (Figure ES-1). Hazard products are generated for specified INL facility AOIs for use by multiple stakeholders from different agencies in risk-informed decision-making regarding site selection, operations, and design of nuclear facilities at INL, consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory guidance. The study also serves as the basis for future periodic safety assessments required for existing DOE facilities, such as 10-year evaluations of natural-phenomena hazards. Elements of the INL PVHA including initial characterization, screening, quantitative assessments of eruption and hazard potential, and consideration of facility needs are conducted using the three phases of the SSHAC process: evaluation, integration, and documentation. As per regulatory guidance, the SSHAC framework provided the necessary processes and procedures for the PVHA Technical Integration (TI) team, at three workshops, five formal working meetings and many TI team remote meetings, to conduct initial characterization, screen the volcanic hazards, create PVHA model inputs, exercise those models in the PVHA, consider facility-specific volcanic hazard needs, and perform final hazard calculations. The Participatory Peer Review Panel (PPRP) provided independent oversight and performed process and technical reviews of the PVHA throughout its duration. The study included an extensive New Data Collection and Analyses (NDCA) program developed by the PVHA TI team to reduce uncertainties in hazard-significant elements in the PVHA model. NDCA activities generated 20 reports providing important contributory datasets and results to the project database for characterizing the ESRP. For example, a report compiling the dimensions of ESRP shield volcanoes and lava fields was used to construct volcanic footprints (areas of impact), was compared with data from INL subsurface cores, and was used to validate the results of lava-flow inundation modeling on the contemporary terrain. Another example is the acquisition of aeromagnetic data over INL and its surrounding area, with maps of buried magmatic features (e.g., subsurface volcanoes and swarms of feeder dikes) that informed the PVHA conceptual model of volcanism. The SSHAC evaluation process was used to conduct all elements of the PVHA including initial characterization and screening. Existing data and NDCA activities provided the foundation to develop the tectonomagmatic conceptual model of volcanism for the region of geographical interest in the SRP and Yellowstone hotspot volcanic system, and for considering volcanoes in the western US. Considering Quaternary volcanic sources active during this period, the screening approach identified and evaluated magma compositions, types of eruptive and intrusive phenomena, types of hazardous phenomena, and proximity of sources to INL. The PVHA TI team evaluated 18 types of magmatic sources in terms of 20 potentially hazardous phenomena, resulting in 360 screening decisions. The screening process resulted in 140 screened-in hazardous volcanic phenomena for Quaternary volcanic sources 1) proximal to INL facility complexes in the ESRP (64 basaltic and 54 silicic), 2) regional sources associated with the Yellowstone caldera system and Blackfoot Reservoir volcanic field (7), and 3) more distal sources from thirteen Cascade volcanoes and two volcanoes at Long Valley caldera (CA).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

The requirements of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit are fulfilled through execution of LANL's fourth strategic goal: “Enabling mission delivery through next-generation facility, infrastructure, and operational excellence.” With input from our stakeholders, we will continue to fulfill those requirements and to improve our waste operations. In 2015, the Laboratory purpose statement focused waste management efforts by directing delivery of mission success through operational effectiveness and scientific excellence. This Plan advances that purpose through community involvement. In the process of achieving our national security mission, Los Alamos National Laboratory generates some hazardous and mixed waste. Hazardous waste is solid waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to human health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded as commercial products, such as cleaning fluids or pesticides, or as the byproducts of operations. Specific substances are listed in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 261: 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515-1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure, post closure care, and cleanup as necessary, of permitted waste management units. On November 30, 2010, NMED renewed the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the Permit). In June 2020 the Permittees submitted a permit renewal application to the NMED for their review and approval. The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan (CRP) describes the scope of public involvement in the activities of the Permit. The CRP is specifically designed to facilitate the community outreach, engagement, and relations activities concerning the Laboratory’s Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and coordinates with but does not include public involvement for other Laboratory programs, initiatives, or environmental activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

A complete electrical shock hazard classification system and its application

Current electrical safety standards evolved to address the hazards of 60-Hz power that are faced primarily by electricians, linemen, and others performing facility and utility work. As a result, this leaves a substantial gap in the management of electrical hazards in Research and Development (R&D) and specialized high voltage and high power equipment. We find substantial use of direct current (dc) electrical energy, and the use of capacitors, inductors, batteries, and radiofrequency (RF) power. The electrical hazards of these forms of electricity and their systems are different than for 50/60 Hz power. This paper proposes a method of classifying all of the electrical shock hazards found in all types of R&D and utilization equipment. Examples of the variation of these hazards from NFPA 70E include (a) high voltage can be harmless, if the available current is sufficiently low, (b) low voltage can be harmful if the available current/power is high, (c) high voltage capacitor hazards are unique and include severe reflex action, affects on the heart, and tissue damage, and (d) arc flash hazard analysis for dc and capacitor systems are not provided in existing standards. This work has led to a comprehensive electrical hazard classification system that is based on various research conducted over the past 100 years, on analysis of such systems in R&D, and on decades of experience. Lastly, the new comprehensive electrical shock hazard classification system uses a combination of voltage, shock current available, fault current available, power, energy, and waveform to classify all forms of electrical hazards.

42 ENGINEERING↗