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NASA NTRS2022

Supporting Hazard Analysis for Wildfire Response Using fmdtools and MIKA

The System Wide Safety (SWS) Safety Demonstrator (SD) Series drives development of an increasingly capable In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) focusing on humanitarian applications, starting with wildfire response (SD-1). The goals of this report are to (1) provide an early hazard analysis and mitigation evaluation of wildfire response to support these efforts and (2) provide a demonstration of capabilities of the Fault Model Design Tools (fmdtools) and Manager for Intelligent Knowledge Access (MIKA) tools. fmdtools provides a modeling, simulation, and resiliency analysis framework in which a wildfire response model, the System Modeling and Analysis of Resiliency in Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations (SMARt-STEReO), is built. MIKA is an intelligent knowledge manager with several capabilities, including assisting in hazard analysis by extracting and analyzing hazards from historical incident reports. The following topics are covered in the report: Understanding Wildfire Hazard Dynamics. We provide a description and simulated examples of how hazards occur in the SMARt-STEReO model of wildfire response and their effect on its outcome. This provides a common mental model and focuses the analysis presented in the remainder of the report. Wildfire Hazard Identification. MIKA identifies wildfire hazards from three relevant datasets: the ICS-209-PLUS, SAFECOM, and SAFENET. Hazards are manually organized into a taxonomy and MIKA analyzes each hazard’s effects, likelihood, severity, and risk. Evaluating Mitigation Strategies. The SMARt-STEReO wildfire response model built in fmdtools evaluates a subset of identified hazards. Specifically, we simulate the effect of communications faults and equipment faults on operator safety, the effect of changing winds and flammability, and a scenario with multiple ignition points and heavy smoke. Tool Limitations and Usage Considerations. We provide a discussion of appropriate tool use cases as well as limitations and considerations for usage. The tool findings are used to synthesize recommendations for wildfire response operations, which can be captured as part of an IASMS. Key recommendations are as follows: Hazards are identified from a broad spectrum of sources including aircraft subsystems, operational sources, and ground crew operations. Highest risk operational environment hazards identified are Evacuations. The highest risk manned aerial operations hazard categorized is Jumper Operations Mishap. Ground crew hazards that are highest risk are Burns, Cargo Operations Overhead, Dehydration, Entrapment, Falling Objects, Heart Attacks, Heat Exhaustion, Inadequate Training or Certification, Vehicle Breakdown, and Vehicle Collision. Modelled containment failures arise from a mismatch between the difficulty of the firefighting scenario and the capacity (e.g., speed, effectiveness, awareness) of the response. In firefighting scenarios where containment is possible (e.g., because the fire does not spread too quickly), these mismatches can occur because of a change in environmental conditions (e.g., wind, flammability, etc) or because of planning, equipment, or communications faults. Improvements to communications increase the capacity of the firefighting response by reducing the time needed to respond to the fire. While surveillance does not increase this capacity by itself, it increases operator safety by increasing state awareness, enabling firefighters to evade approaching fires. Increasing both has a synergistic effect. In general, these performance and resilience increases generalize over fault scenarios as well as unforeseen changes to circumstances (i.e., wind, aridity, etc.). However, these improvements need to be designed so as not to make the system prone to persistent large-scale communications outages, which can reduce performance.

Hazard analysis↗

NASA NTRS2005

Using Qualitative Hazard Analysis to Guide Quantitative Safety Analysis

Quantitative methods can be beneficial in many types of safety investigations. However, there are many difficulties in using quantitative m ethods. Far example, there may be little relevant data available. This paper proposes a framework for using quantitative hazard analysis to prioritize hazard scenarios most suitable for quantitative mziysis. The framework first categorizes hazard scenarios by severity and likelihood. We then propose another metric "modeling difficulty" that desc ribes the complexity in modeling a given hazard scenario quantitatively. The combined metrics of severity, likelihood, and modeling difficu lty help to prioritize hazard scenarios for which quantitative analys is should be applied. We have applied this methodology to proposed concepts of operations for reduced wake separation for airplane operatio ns at closely spaced parallel runways.

Shortle, J. F.↗

NASA NTRS2022

A Scalable Framework for Post Fire Debris Flow Hazard Assessment Using Satellite Precipitation Data

Wildfire is a global phenomenon that has dramatic effects on erosion and flood potential. On steep slopes, burned areas are more likely to experience significant overland flow during heavy rainfall leading to post fire debris flows (PFDFs). Previous work establishes methods for PFDF hazard assessment, often relying on regional-scale parameterizations with in-situ rainfall measurements to categorize hazard as a function of meteorological and surface properties. We present a globally scalable approach to extend the benefit these models provide to new areas. Our new model relies on publicly available satellite-based inputs with a global extent to provide first order hazard assessments of recently burned areas. Our results show it is possible to identify the conditions relevant for PFDF-initiation processes across a variety of physiographic settings. Improvements to satellite borne rainfall intensity data and increased availability of PFDF occurrence data worldwide are expected to enhance model skill and applicability further.

Wildfire↗

NASA NTRS2006

Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using Management Safety Tools

The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.

Lu, Chien-tsug↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space vehicle propulsion systems - Environmental space hazards

An evaluation of hazards which exist in geo-lunar space and have the potential to negatively affect a long-term mission-oriented spacecraft systems is presented based on published data. The hazards are categorized as pervasive (radiation), incident specific (meteoroids and thermal shock), and chemically corrosive (monatomic oxygen). It appears that the number one priority should be the development of new materials; and the secondary concern should be the development of fabrication techniques for the exterior hull, so that incident specific hazards can be minimized in an active fashion. The pervasive hazard can be dealt with by exploring on-board circuit technology with ancillary monitoring systems. Effects of thermal shock on the exterior nozzle, directional gimbals, and internal combustion chamber geometry seem to need more investigation.

Bahr, G. K.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Secondary impact hazard assessment

A series of light gas gun shots (4 to 7 km/sec) were performed with 5 mg nylon and aluminum projectiles to determine the size, mass, velocity, and spatial distribution of spall and ejecta from a number of graphite/epoxy targets. Similar determinations were also performed on a few aluminum targets. Target thickness and material were chosen to be representative of proposed Space Station structure. The data from these shots and other information were used to predict the hazard to Space Station elements from secondary particles resulting from impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris on the Space Station. This hazard was quantified as an additional flux over and above the primary micrometeoroid and orbital debris flux that must be considered in the design process. In order to simplify the calculations, eject and spall mass were assumed to scale directly with the energy of the projectile. Other scaling systems may be closer to reality. The secondary particles considered are only those particles that may impact other structure immediately after the primary impact. The addition to the orbital debris problem from these primary impacts was not addressed. Data from this study should be fed into the orbital debris model to see if Space Station secondaries make a significant contribution to orbital debris. The hazard to a Space Station element from secondary particles above and beyond the micrometeoroid and orbital debris hazard is categorized in terms of two factors: (1) the 'view factor' of the element to other Space Station structure or the geometry of placement of the element, and (2) the sensitivity to damage, stated in terms of energy. Several example cases were chosen, the Space Station module windows, windows of a Shuttle docked to the Space Station, the habitat module walls, and the photovoltaic solar cell arrays. For the examples chosen the secondary flux contributed no more than 10 percent to the total flux (primary and secondary) above a given calculated critical energy. A key assumption in these calculations is that above a certain critical energy, significant damage will be done. This is not true for all structures. Double-walled, bumpered structures are an example for which damage may be reduced as energy goes up. The critical energy assumption is probably conservative, however, in terms of secondary damage. To understand why the secondary impacts seem to, in general, contribute less than 10 percent of the flux above a given critical energy, consider the case of a meteoroid impact of a given energy on a fixed, large surface. This impact results in a variety of secondary particles, all of which have much less energy than the original impact. Conservation of energy prohibits any other situation. Thus if damage is linked to a critical energy of a particle, the primary flux will always deliver particles of much greater energy. Even if all the secondary particles impacted other Space Station structures, none would have a kinetic energy more than a fraction of the primary impact energy.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2007

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) for Space Systems

This presentation discusses radiation hardness assurance (RHA) for space systems, providing both the programmatic aspects of RHA and the RHA procedure. RHA consists of all activities undertaken to ensure that the electronics and materials of a space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the space radiation environment. RHA also pertains to environment definition, part selection, part testing, spacecraft layout, radiation tolerant design, and mission/system/subsystems requirements. RHA procedure consists of establishing mission requirements, defining and evaluating the radiation hazard, selecting and categorizing the appropriate parts, and evaluating circuit response to hazard. The RHA approach is based on risk management and is confined only to parts, it includes spacecraft layout, system/subsystem/circuit design, and system requirements and system operations. RHA should be taken into account in the early phases of a program including the proposal and feasibility analysis phases.

Poivey, Christian↗

NASA NTRS1990

Environmental space hazards - An overview

An overview of space hazards that exist in the geo-lunar environment is given along with specific examples of deleterious effects that can be visited upon a long-term mission-oriented spacecraft system in LEO, GEO, the intervening space, LLO, and the lunar surface. Hazards discussed are categorized as pervasive (radiation), incident specific (meteoroids, monatomic oxygen, thermal gradient and shock, and low earth orbital debris), and chemically corrosive (monatomic oxygen). It is pointed out that, while some of the difficulties encountered are common to all types of propulsion systems, in the interplanetary domain the emphasis shifts from incident specific hazards to the pervasive upsets caused by ionizing and nonionizing radiation.

Bahr, G. K.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space vehicle propulsion systems: Environmental space hazards

The hazards that exist in geolunar space which may degrade, disrupt, or terminate the performance of space-based LOX/LH2 rocket engines are evaluated. Accordingly, a summary of the open literature pertaining to the geolunar space hazards is provided. Approximately 350 citations and about 200 documents and abstracts were reviewed; the documents selected give current and quantitative detail. The methodology was to categorize the various space hazards in relation to their importance in specified regions of geolunar space. Additionally, the effect of the various space hazards in relation to spacecraft and their systems were investigated. It was found that further investigation of the literature would be required to assess the effects of these hazards on propulsion systems per se; in particular, possible degrading effects on exterior nozzle structure, directional gimbals, and internal combustion chamber integrity and geometry.

Disimile, P. J.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Hazard Contribution Modes of Machine Learning Components

Amongst the essential steps to be taken towards developing and deploying safe systems with embedded learning-enabled components (LECs) i.e., software components that use ma- chine learning (ML)—are to analyze and understand the con- tribution of the constituent LECs to safety, and to assure that those contributions have been appropriately managed. This paper addresses both steps by, first, introducing the notion of hazard contribution modes (HCMs) a categorization of the ways in which the ML elements of LECs can contribute to hazardous system states; and, second, describing how argumentation patterns can capture the reasoning that can be used to assure HCM mitigation. Our framework is generic in the sense that the categories of HCMs developed i) can admit different learning schemes, i.e., supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning, and ii) are not dependent on the type of system in which the LECs are embedded, i.e., both cyber and cyber-physical systems. One of the goals of this work is to serve a starting point for systematizing L analysis towards eventually automating it in a tool.

Smith, Colin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gap Analysis of UAS Manuals and Hazards

Emerging aviation includes the use of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in novel operations. The manufacture and operation of these small UAS are not as regulated as today’s commercial operation, and their widespread use introduces new risks and hazards to the general public. Today, there are case-by-case approvals for sUAS operations, particularly for emergency response operations in which the potential benefits to use of sUAS is perceived to outweigh potential risks. We analyze operational approvals, procedures, and concepts of operation to identify and categorize the risks and hazards that applicants and approvers are already considering, and also identify barriers and mitigations that the operators have already put in place. This analysis may help lead to routine checklists that standardize safety analysis and lead to more routine operations.

grounded theory↗

NASA NTRS2004

Atmospheric Monitoring Strategy for Ground Testing of Closed Ecological Life Support Systems

This paper reviews the evolution and current state of atmospheric monitoring on the International Space Station to provide context from which we can imagine a more advanced and integrated system. The unique environmental hazards of human space flight are identified and categorized into groups, taking into consideration the time required for the hazard to become a threat to human health or performance. The key functions of a comprehensive monitoring strategy for a closed ecological life support system are derived from past experience and a survey of currently available technologies for monitoring air quality. Finally, a system architecture is developed incorporating the lessons learned from ISS and other analogous closed life support systems. The paper concludes by presenting recommendations on how to proceed with requirements definition and conceptual design of an air monitoring system for exploration missions.

Feighery, John↗

NASA NTRS2021

Data-driven landslide nowcasting at the global scale

Landslides affect nearly every country in the world each year. To better understand this global hazard, the Landslide Hazard Assessment for Situational Awareness (LHASA) model was developed previously. LHASA version 1 combines satellite precipitation estimates with a global landslide susceptibility map to produce a gridded map of potentially hazardous areas from 60° North-South every 3 h. LHASA version 1 categorizes the world’s land surface into three ratings: high, moderate, and low hazard with a single decision tree that first determines if the last seven days of rainfall were intense, then evaluates landslide susceptibility. LHASA version 2 has been developed with a data-driven approach. The global susceptibility map was replaced with a collection of explanatory variables, and two new dynamically varying quantities were added: snow and soil moisture. Along with antecedent rainfall, these variables modulated the response to current daily rainfall. In addition, the Global Landslide Catalog (GLC) was supplemented with several inventories of rainfall-triggered landslide events. These factors were incorporated into the machine-learning framework XGBoost, which was trained to predict the presence or absence of landslides over the period 2015–2018, with the years 2019–2020 reserved for model evaluation. As a result of these improvements, the new global landslide nowcast was twice as likely to predict the occurrence of historical landslides as LHASA version 1, given the same global false positive rate. Furthermore, the shift to probabilistic outputs allows users to directly manage the trade-off between false negatives and false positives, which should make the nowcast useful for a greater variety of geographic settings and applications. In a retrospective analysis, the trained model ran over a global domain for 5 years, and results for LHASA version 1 and version 2 were compared. Due to the importance of rainfall and faults in LHASA version 2, nowcasts would be issued more frequently in some tropical countries, such as Colombia and Papua New Guinea; at the same time, the new version placed less emphasis on arid regions and areas far from the Pacific Rim. LHASA version 2 provides a nearly real-time view of global landslide hazard for a variety of stakeholders.

XGBoos↗

NASA NTRS2016

Characterization of Evidence for Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding the kinds of evidence available and using the best evidence to answer a question is critical to evidenced-based decision-making, and it requires synthesis of evidence from a variety of sources. Categorization of human system risks in spaceflight, in particular, focuses on how well the integration and interpretation of all available evidence informs the risk statement that describes the relationship between spaceflight hazards and an outcome of interest. A mature understanding and categorization of these risks requires: 1) sufficient characterization of risk, 2) sufficient knowledge to determine an acceptable level of risk (i.e., a standard), 3) development of mitigations to meet the acceptable level of risk, and 4) identification of factors affecting generalizability of the evidence to different design reference missions. In the medical research community, evidence is often ranked by increasing confidence in findings gleaned from observational and experimental research (e.g., "levels of evidence"). However, an approach based solely on aspects of experimental design is problematic in assessing human system risks for spaceflight. For spaceflight, the unique challenges and opportunities include: (1) The independent variables in most evidence are the hazards of spaceflight, such as space radiation or low gravity, which cannot be entirely duplicated in terrestrial (Earth-based) analogs, (2) Evidence is drawn from multiple sources including medical and mission operations, Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), spaceflight research (LSDA), and relevant environmental & terrestrial databases, (3) Risk metrics based primarily on LSAH data are typically derived from available prevalence or incidence data, which may limit rigorous interpretation, (4) The timeframe for obtaining adequate spaceflight sample size (n) is very long, given the small population, (5) Randomized controlled trials are unattainable in spaceflight, (6) Collection of personal and environmental data on the astronaut population may create opportunities for advanced analytics and human-environment modeling that goes beyond that achieved in isolated experimental designs; and (7) Translation of relevant research to operations is a complex, transdisciplinary enterprise in which the approach must apply across the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. The approach to synthesizing evidence must address both source and fidelity of data, and reflect the most general attributes of quality of evidence in science and engineering: reliability and validity. The authors are developing a two-factor approach which includes the various kinds of evidence required to understand risks and for the integrated interpretation of all evidence that is essential to develop standards and countermeasures. A unified framework for aggregating and assessing different kinds of evidence provides a consistent, traceable, evidence-based decision-making process to translate research to operations in an environment where engineers, scientists, physicians, and managers all engage in analyzing the trade space of vehicle design, standards, requirements and solutions for spaceflight.

Steinberg, S. L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.

Hazards Analysis↗

NASA NTRS2006

Material Issues in Space Shuttle Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) store gases used in four subsystems for NASA's Space Shuttle Fleet. While there are 24 COPV on each Orbiter ranging in size from 19-40", stress rupture failure of a pressurized Orbiter COPV on the ground or in flight is a catastrophic hazard and would likely lead to significant damage/loss of vehicle and/or life and is categorized as a Crit 1 failure. These vessels were manufactured during the late 1970's and into the early 1980's using Titanium liners, Kevlar 49 fiber, epoxy matrix resin, and polyurethane coating. The COPVs are pressurized periodically to 3-5ksi and therefore experience significant strain in the composite overwrap. Similar composite vessels were developed in a variety of DOE Programs (primarily at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or LLNL), as well as for NASA Space Shuttle Fleet Leader COPV program. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) formed an Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) team whose primary focus was to investigate whether or not enough composite life remained in the Shuttle COPV in order to provide a strategic rationale for continued COPV use aboard the Space Shuttle Fleet with the existing 25-year-old vessels. Several material science issues were examined and will be discussed in this presentation including morphological changes to Kevlar 49 fiber under stress, manufacturing changes in Kevlar 49 and their effect on morphology and tensile strength, epoxy resin strain, composite creep, degradation of polyurethane coatings, and Titanium yield characteristics.

Sutter, James K.↗

NASA NTRS2023

The Hazard Components of Representative Key Risks. The Physical Climate Perspective

The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II (WGII) to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks from climate change. These are risks expected to become severe due to the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions with the exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs holistically by assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, in these papers, such assessment cannot always be organized according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes. Often the big-picture evolution of risk has to be extrapolated from either qualitative effects of “low”, “medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C), together with consideration of the socio-economic context and possible adaptation choices. In this study we offer a representation – as systematic as possible given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels (GWLs) to the extent possible. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group I supplemented when needed by more recent literature. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with increasing GWLs has been identified. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - that link can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different GWLs remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems, in the absence of compensating changes in these systems’ exposure and vulnerability, and in the absence of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in their often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future potential evolution, an important component – if never the only one – of the future evolution of risk severity.

Representative Key Risks↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth

NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.

mars sample return↗