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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

A hazard control system for robot manipulators

A robot for space applications will be required to complete a variety of tasks in an uncertain, harsh environment. This fact presents unusual and highly difficult challenges to ensuring the safety of astronauts and keeping the equipment they depend on from becoming damaged. The systematic approach being taken to control hazards that could result from introducing robotics technology in the space environment is described. First, system safety management and engineering principles, techniques, and requirements are discussed as they relate to Shuttle payload design and operation in general. The concepts of hazard, hazard category, and hazard control, as defined by the Shuttle payload safety requirements, is explained. Next, it is shown how these general safety management and engineering principles are being implemented on an actual project. An example is presented of a hazard control system for controlling one of the hazards identified for the Development Test Flight (DTF-1) of NASA's Flight Telerobotic Servicer, a teleoperated space robot. How these schemes can be applied to terrestrial robots is discussed as well. The same software monitoring and control approach will insure the safe operation of a slave manipulator under teleoperated or autonomous control in undersea, nuclear, or manufacturing applications where the manipulator is working in the vicinity of humans or critical hardware.

Carter, Ruth Chiang↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Glenn T. Seaborg Institute: 2025 highlights

The Glenn T. Seaborg Institute (GTSI) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) serves as a dedicated hub for advancing actinide R&D, aimed at strengthening the United States’ capabilities in actinide science. With a focus on medical, industrial, and national security applications, the ORNL GTSI seeks to foster the next generation of scientists and engineers. Collaborating closely with corresponding Seaborg Institutes at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Idaho National Laboratory, the ORNL GTSI leverages its unique strengths. These include unparalleled expertise in isotope production, handling of rare isotopes, and leadership in neutron and computational sciences. Notably, the ORNL GTSI is positioned as the nation’s cornerstone for actinide R&D, capitalizing on the exceptional capabilities of the High Flux Isotope Reactor—the premier reactor for isotope production—and the Hazard Category 2 Radiochemical Engineering Development Center, which supports advanced production, processing, and applications research. Furthermore, the GTSI is committed to serving as a national center of excellence for training across all levels of actinide science education. This report provides an overview of the activities, milestones, and accomplishments of the ORNL GTSI over the past year.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2025

Supporting Fusion at the Idaho National Laboratory

The Fusion Safety Program at Idaho National Laboratory has supported efforts to develop magnetic and inertial confinement fusion energy devices for commercial energy power development since 1979. In addition to our DOE less than hazard category 3 tritium handling facility STAR, we also have unique capabilities such as an adaptation of the severe accident code MELCOR developed specifically for fusion, and integrated modeling capabilities using the MOOSE Finite Element Code. In this presentation, we cover our unique experimental capabilities for investigating tritium sorption, solubility and permeation including in molten salts. We also show the application of MELCOR-TMAP to predict thermal hydraulics and tritium migration in normal and accident conditions. Finally, we demonstrate high-fidelity modeling capabilities found within the open-source MOOSE finite element framework as well as fuel-cycle modeling using TMAP8.

70 - PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗
NASA NTRS1994

The relationship of an integral wind shear hazard to aircraft performance limitations

The development and certification of airborne forward-looking wind shear detection systems has required a hazard definition stated in terms of sensor observable wind field characteristics. This paper outlines the definition of the F-factor wind shear hazard index and an average F-factor quantity, calculated over a specified averaging interval, which may be used to judge an aircraft's potential performance loss due to a given wind shear field. A technique for estimating airplane energy changes during a wind shear encounter is presented and used to determine the wind shear intensity, as a function of the averaging interval, that presents significant hazard to transport category airplanes. The wind shear hazard levels are compared to averaged F-factor values at various averaging intervals for four actual wind shear encounters. Results indicate that averaging intervals of about one kilometer could be used in a simple method to discern hazardous shears.

Lewis, M. S.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Parameters for Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

To assure consistency between DOE and NRC safety basis requirements this ECAR documents the DOE basis requirements for dose consequence assessments in accordance with Standard DOE-STD-3009-2014. The methodology in this ECAR outlines parameters for evaluating airborne radiological releases and provides a consistent basis for assessing current and future DOE NE facilities.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS2015

New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report: Climate Observations and Projections - Chapter 1

During 2013 and 2014, numerous international (IPCC, 2013) and national (Melillo et al., 2014; Gordon, 2014) reports have concluded that human activities are changing the climate, leading to increased vulnerability and risk. Since the industrial revolution, fossil fuel burning, industrial activity, and land use changes have led to a 40% increase in heat-trapping carbon dioxide (CO2), and an approximately 150% increase in methane (CH4), another powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), has been observed. Global temperatures have increased by close to 1 C since 1880 as the upper oceans have warmed and polar ice has retreated. These and other climate changes are projected to accelerate as greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise. In the coming decades, climate change is extremely likely to bring warmer temperatures in the New York metropolitan region (see Box. 1.1 and Fig.1.1 for key definitions and terms). Heat waves are very likely to increase; total annual precipitation will likely increase and brief, intense rainstorms are very likely to increase. Because of incomplete knowledge about exactly how much climate change will occur, choosing among policies for reducing future damages requires prudent risk management (Yohe and Leichenko, 2010; Kunreuther et al., 2013). Given differing risk tolerances among stakeholders, a risk management approach allows for a range of possible climate change outcomes to be examined with associated uncertainties surrounding their likelihoods. The New York City Panel on Climate Change 2 (NPCC2) projections can be used to inform planning across multiple governmental scales (e.g., city, county, state) in the New York metropolitan region. Such coordinated efforts can serve as test cases for successful local, state, and federal coordination for integrated climate adaptation initiatives. This chapter describes the global climate system, and presents observed temperature and precipitation trends and projections for the region. Chapter 2 (NPCC, 2015) focuses on sea level rise and possible changes in coastal storms. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (NPCC, 2015) describe efforts to better understand the region's vulnerability to coastal flooding during coastal storms. The treatment of likelihood related to the NPCC projections is similar to that developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013), with six likelihood categories (Box 1.1 and Fig. 1.1). The assignment of climate hazards to these categories is based on observed data, global climate model simulations, published literature, and expert judgment.

climate change↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Part 107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in sUAS operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the FAA Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Title 14 CFR Part107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. FAA Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the Title 14 CFR Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Title 14 CFR Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRS2013

An Examination of Aviation Accidents Associated with Turbulence, Wind Shear and Thunderstorm

The focal point of the study reported here was the definition and examination of turbulence, wind shear and thunderstorm in relation to aviation accidents. NASA project management desired this information regarding distinct subgroups of atmospheric hazards, in order to better focus their research portfolio. A seven category expansion of Kaplan's turbulence categories was developed, which included wake turbulence, mountain wave turbulence, clear air turbulence, cloud turbulence, convective turbulence, thunderstorm without mention of turbulence, and low altitude wind shear, microburst or turbulence (with no mention of thunderstorms).More than 800 accidents from flights based in the United States during 1987-2008 were selected from a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database. Accidents were selected for inclusion in this study if turbulence, thunderstorm, wind shear or microburst was considered either a cause or a factor in the accident report, and each accident was assigned to only one hazard category. This report summarizes the differences between the categories in terms of factors such as flight operations category, aircraft engine type, the accident's geographic location and time of year, degree of injury to aircraft occupants, aircraft damage, age and certification of the pilot and the phase of flight at the time of the accident.

Evans, Joni K.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.

Majewicz, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Exploring the Complexities of Drug Formulation Selection, Storage, and Shelf-Life for Exploration Spaceflight

Medications have been a part of space travel dating back as far as the Apollo missions. Currently, medical kits aboard the ISS contain medications and supplies to help crew members cope with a variety of possible medical events. NASA reported that 1,867 medical events occurred from 1981 to 1998 on space shuttle flights, STS-1 to STS-89; 498 out of the 508 crewmembers on those flights reported experiencing a medical event other than space motion sickness. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convened a committee of experts, Committee on Creating a Vision for Space Medicine during Travel beyond Earth Orbit, to examine the issues surrounding astronaut health and safety for long duration space missions. The primary theme of the committee’s final report is that there is not enough known about the risks to human health during long-duration missions beyond Earth’s orbit and ways to effectively mitigate those risks in an environment of deep space. In 2014, the IOM convened the Committee on Ethics Principles and Guidelines for Health Standards for Long Duration and Exploration Spaceflights and released a report emphasizing the importance of prevention, mitigation, and treatment of major risks to human health during exploration spaceflight. NASA’s Human Research Program has organized five distinct categories of spaceflight hazards summarized by the acronym “RIDGE” (Space Radiation, Isolation and Confinement, Distance from Earth, Gravity fields, and Hostile/Closed Environments) that astronauts may encounter during exploration spaceflight. From those hazards, NASA further derived 30 of the most critical human health and performance risks, including limits to medical care resulting from pharmaceutical degradation. As we prepare for more distant exploration missions to Mars and beyond, risk management planning for astronaut healthcare should include the assembly of a medication formulary that is comprehensive enough to prevent or treat anticipated medical events, remains safe and chemically stable, and retains sufficient potency to last for the duration of the mission. The present editorial will summarize the current state of knowledge regarding innovative formulary optimization strategies, pharmaceutical stability assessment techniques, and storage and packaging solutions that could enhance drug safety and efficacy for future exploration spaceflight missions.

drug degradation risk assessment↗
NASA NTRS2005

Step 1: Human System Integration Pilot-Technology Interface Requirements for Weather Management

This document involves definition of technology interface requirements for Hazardous Weather Avoidance. Technology concepts in use by the Access 5 Weather Management Work Package were considered. Beginning with the Human System Integration (HIS) high-level functional requirement for Hazardous Weather Avoidance, and Hazardous Weather Avoidance technology elements, HSI requirements for the interface to the pilot were identified. Results of the analysis describe (1) the information required by the pilot to have knowledge of hazardous weather, and (2) the control capability needed by the pilot to obtain hazardous weather information. Fundamentally, these requirements provide the candidate Hazardous Weather Avoidance technology concepts with the necessary human-related elements to make them compatible with human capabilities and limitations. The results of the analysis describe how Hazardous Weather Avoidance operations and functions should interface with the pilot to provide the necessary Weather Management functionality to the UA-pilot system. Requirements and guidelines for Hazardous Weather Avoidance are partitioned into four categories: (1) Planning En Route (2) Encountering Hazardous Weather En Route, (3) Planning to Destination, and (4) Diversion Planning Alternate Airport. Each requirement is stated and is supported with a rationale and associated reference(s).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1985

Safety of Li-SOCl2 cells

The safety of lithium thionyl chloride cells has been a concern of JPL for some time in the development of these cells for NASA's use. Because the safety problems are complex and several issues are interrelated it was decided that it would be best to put together an organized review of the safety issues, which are reviewed here. Hazards are classified in three categories: (1) cell leakage, a problem dealing with construction or materials; (2) venting of toxic gases through seals and welds, considered a mild hazard in which electrolyte and gas is released; and (3) violent rupture or controlled rupture of cells with the possibility of explosion of the materials inside. These hazards and their effects are detailed along with possible ways of dealing with them.

Subbarao, S.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Effects of carbon fibers on consumer products

The potential effects of carbon fibers on consumer products such as dishwashers, microwave ovens, and smoke detectors were investigated. The investigation was divided into two categories to determine the potential faults and hazards that could occur if fibers should enter the electrical circuits of the selected appliances. The categories were a fault analysis and a hazard analysis. Hazards considered were fire, flood, physical harm, explosion, and electrical shock. Electrical shock was found to be a possible occurrence related to carbon fibers. Faults were considered to be any effect on the performance of an appliance which would result in complaint or require service action.

Wise, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Manned testing in a simulated space environment

A view of the facility and operational requirements involved in performing a manned thermal vacuum test is presented. The requirements fall into two major categories. The first category deals with placing the suited crewmen in a hazardous environment and assuring their safety. The second category deals with the constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment. Design areas that deal with man rating a chamber, including fire suppression, emergency repress, emergency power, backups, reliable instrumentation and data systems, communications, television monitoring, biomedical monitoring, material compatibilities, and equipment supporting the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) are discussed. The operational issues that are peculiar to manned testing such as test rules, test procedures, test protocol, emergency drills, availability of hyperbaric facilities, test team training and certification engineering concerns for a safe mechanical and instrumentation buildup, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis are discussed. The constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment are addressed.

Fender, Donna L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mechanically induced thermal runaway severity analysis of Li-ion batteries and continuous energy release monitoring

The large-scale deployment of Li-ion batteries in stationary energy storage and electrical vehicle applications demands a strong focus on safety, particularly on the thermal runaway risk and severity evaluation. A standardized single-side mechanical indentation test protocol was developed to induce an internal short-circuit (ISC) and evaluate cells' thermal runaway severity at different state of charge (SOC). The observed hazard severity (OHS in five categories) and evaluated scores in this work have a comprehensive consideration of each cell's capacity, initial voltage, SOC, temperature and voltage change, allowing a better evaluation of the cells' thermal runaway potential. This method was applied to about 200 Li-ion batteries in order to build an extensive thermal runaway database covering various SOCs, capacities and chemistries. In this study, we monitored the transitions of stored electrochemical energy and applied mechanical energy into both thermal energy and acoustic emissions (AE). The surface temperature and mechanical failures were monitored by infrared imaging and AE to capture critical events within battery cells throughout the mechanical indentation tests. Furthermore, the initial temperature maps can predict two types of follow-up events: thermal runaway or gradual heat release via conduction. Analyzing each cell's severity, AEs, and leveraging the evolving database offer insights into predicting occurrences of thermal runaway. The test method, thermal runaway severity evaluation and prediction, and the corresponding database provide battery designers, manufacturers, and end-users a clear overview of Li-ion batteries' thermal runaway potential under mechanical abuse, advancing the safety design of Li-ion batteries.

Acoustic emission↗
NASA NTRS1988

Robotic applications at Kennedy Space Center

McDonnell Douglas performed a study (1987) to find effective application of robots and their associated technology at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Specifically, this study was directed toward the newly planned Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF). Because the Operations and Checkout (O and C) building has a similar charter to that of the SSPF, the O and C was carefully checked for potential robotic applications. Eleven applications were discovered and a trade study developed to rate these applications. Twenty more applications external to the SSPF were found during additional studies. These robotic tasks fall into three major categories including: teleoperated robots for hazardous tasks, mobile robots for repetitive tasks and feedback compensated robots for refurbishment and inspection tasks. This paper highlights some of the requirements for these tasks and others external to the SSPF. Additionally, the resources available at KSC are discussed.

Wegerif, Dan↗